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“a poisonous element of terrible volume and power” 
(Warde Fowler, 1908, 232) 
 
 
 
 
“throngs of idle and worthless freedmen  
that left their curse upon Rome” 
(Duff, 1928, 209) 
 
 
 
“these new-comers carried with them the  
moral handicap of servile origin” 
(Gordon, 1931, 77) 
 
 
 
“the stigma of slavery cannot be wiped out” 
(Treggiari, 1969a, 272) 
 
 
“the stigma of slavery was a greater handicap  
than that of non-Roman descent” 
(Wiseman, 1971, 16) 
 
 
 
“Once a slave, always a slave” 
(de Vos, 2001, 95) 
 
 
 
“The stain of their slave birth separated  
them from the upper strata” 
(Clarke, 2003, 4) 
 
 
 
“La macule servile est indélébile” 
(Tran, 2006, 125) 
 
 
 
“The unique – and irredeemable – stigma  
the freedman carried” 
(Mouritsen, 2011, 111) 
  1 
Introduction 
When Arnold Duff wrote his 1928 monograph on freedmen1 in the early Empire, he 
described its theme as “a fresh subject” that was neither “petty” nor “unimportant”2. He 
noted that the Roman freedman had been a well-known social category in modern 
scholarship for quite a while, but that the various aspects of his position in, and impact 
on, ancient society had been fragmented across many social, economic, and legal 
histories, which highlighted these respective dimensions of freed identity but in 
isolation. Duff’s call for a more comprehensive attention has not remained unanswered. 
Recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of identity has been one of the most 
pervasive paradigm shifting influences in ancient history research in the recent past. 
Together with an ever increasing attention and appreciation for the “invisible Romans” 
and their “lost voices”, this shift has produced a wide and varied array of theoretical 
frameworks and innovative methodologies that aim to “give voice to the subaltern” in 
the ancient world3. Whereas macro-level analyses from a postcolonial perspective have 
vehemently stressed the dire situation of the ruled, and often adhere to a pessimistic 
assessment of Roman imperialism – Mattingly speaks of the “ugly side”, the “dark side”, 
and the “sinister side” of Empire4 –, other scholars have highlighted the contextual 
opportunities available to individuals and groups to mediate their social status and 
identity (cf. infra). The distribution of persons in monolithic and highly stratified 
echelons of ‘the social ladder’ from which they would subsequently derive their legal 
and social status, has been rightly nuanced, and survives in modern scholarship only as 
 
                                                     
1 For the sake of fluency, the plural “freedmen” is used throughout this work to denote ex-slaves of 
both genders (unless it was felt necessary to accentuate a claim’s application to both men and 
women, in which case “freedpersons” is employed). The adjective “libertine” is used in a neutral 
sense, without implying any connotation of immoral hedonism with which the term is sometimes 
associated in modern English parlance. 
2 Duff (1928), v. 
3 Knapp (2011); Mattingly (2011), 26ff. 
4 Mattingly (2011), xxii, 5, 20, 23. 
 2 
a reductive and outdated secundum comparationis, through which a much more fluid and 
dynamic conception of identity is usually accentuated. This tendency has proved 
particularly rewarding for the study of Roman freedmen, scholarly attention to which 
has gradually increased the past three decades or so. A heightened awareness that this 
group was not the undifferentiated mass it has often been made out to be (both in 
ancient and modern accounts), gave rise to a vast, and steadily expanding academic 
tradition5.  
Much of the groundwork has been laid by a few pioneering scholars, whose works 
have greatly influenced subsequent research programs. In 1969, Susan Treggiari set out 
to complement Duff’s study on freedmen in the Empire, by exhaustively covering the 
preceding late Republican period. Although not presenting fundamental innovations in 
freedmen scholarship, the work was – besides invaluable for the wealth of source 
material and diverging subjects it treated – also vital in nuancing the manifest racial 
and xenophobic undertones of Duff’s work (although not entirely exempt from them 
itself)6. Coincidentally, three independent studies – a French, English, and German one, 
all appearing within a short period of seven years – treated the function and sociology 
of the familia Caesaris and the phenomenon of the “imperial freedman”, which previous 
scholarship had not structurally addressed7. A considerable change of focus was 
introduced by Georges Fabre’s 1981 study on the private freedman-patron relationship 
in the late Republic, which explicitly aimed at treating “les profondes insuffisances” of 
Treggiari’s work8. Although innovative in shifting away from the freedman’s position in 
the public sphere, and erudite in the wide array of different source types that were 
scrutinised, Fabre’s study was problematic in that it set out from the start to illustrate 
the precarious condition of ex-slaves as constantly living in the shadows of their patron. 
As a consequence, analyses and conclusions throughout the work often had a very 
predetermined outcome (as will be noted throughout this study). Nonetheless, Fabre’s 
study must be credited for firmly keeping freedmen on the international academic 
agenda.  
In fact, the 1980s (as well as subsequent decades) were marked by an unprecedented 
output in freedman scholarship, which was spearheaded by studies focussing on 
economic factors and relations. Peter Garnsey’s influential article about the impact of 
freedmen – as industrial and commercial entrepreneurs and property owners – on the 
 
                                                     
5 The following paragraphs only highlight the hallmark studies. For further bibliography, see esp. 
Mouritsen (2011), 1-9; Bell & Ramsby (2012), 1-12. 
6 E.g. Treggiari (1969a), 231-2 speaks of “the infiltration of the Roman population by foreigners”, and 
238 assumes that “[t]he racial mixture would certainly dilute the Roman character”. 
7 Chantraine (1967); Weaver (1972); Boulvert (1974). 
8 Fabre (1981), viii. 
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economy of imperial Italy, paved the way for almost immediate reactions and 
elaborations, of which Aaron Kirschenbaum’s work on the role of freedmen in ancient 
commerce is perhaps the most noteworthy9. The vast tradition on the subject – to 
include less extensive contributions would require much more space than is available 
here – most recently culminated in Koenraad Verboven’s survey of the “freedman 
economy”. It drew justified attention to the structural determinants of the crucial role 
of ex-slaves in the Italian economy by fruitfully incorporating concepts and models 
from social theory (e.g. trust networks, Bourdieu’s capital metaphor, etc.)10. From yet 
another economically inspired perspective, Wolfgang Waldstein has studied in detail 
the legal obligation imposed on freedmen to perform services (operae) for their patrons. 
The approach is very legalistic (primarily due to the virtual absence of literary or 
epigraphic evidence), but nonetheless provides a detailed insight into the 
“Dienstpflicht” of Roman freedmen. As a clear (though certainly no uncontested) 
reaction against the pessimistic impression Fabre provided, Waldstein concluded that 
operae were no remnants or indications of any quasi-serfdom freedmen were oppressed 
by, but that they were formal means of “payment” instead11.  
Interest in the social and cultural identity of freedmen primarily increased in the 
wake of these economic studies, with Paul Veyne’s 1961 article on the usefulness of 
Petronius’ Satyricon as a historical source being an early outlier12. Even though it 
arguably places too much trust in the representative value of this satire, Veyne’s 
insights would remain pivotal in later scholarship13. He questioned the notion that a 
freedman derived his social status primarily from membership of a legal class, and 
conceptualised a multi-tiered system of hierarchies for freeborn and freed individuals. 
Many later scholars added that the multiplicity of fields in which differentiation can 
take place, precludes a conception of Roman society in terms of horizontally layered 
status groups14. If “social mobility” was the umbrella term under which these and 
similar studies were grouped15, recent enquiry has stressed the personal agency of 
freedmen and their individual potential to mediate – through “self-schemas” – such 
fixed identity dimensions (“group schemas”). Professional pride, membership of an 
 
                                                     
9 Garnsey (1981); Kirschenbaum (1987). 
10 Vreboven (2012). 
11 Waldstein (1986). For a justified critique on this view, see most recently Mouritsen (2011), 224-6, 
who argued that operae were a “highly inflexible means of regulating the patron–freedman 
relationship”, and who does not believe that their prominence in legal sources is a reflection of their 
actual importance in society. 
12 Veyne (1961). 
13 More cautious evaluations of the cena Trimalchionis include Łoś (1995), 1013-4; Andreau (2009), 124. 
14 E.g. Shaw (1982), 34-8. 
15 E.g. Weaver (1967); D’Arms (1981); López Barja de Quiroga (1995); Mouritsen (2011), 261-78. 
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association, respectful marriage, and personal connections were increasingly recognised 
as highly contextual loci of identity formation that allowed freedmen to construe a 
sense of self that was not (primarily) rooted in legal status or “class” membership16. 
These alternative dimensions allowed ex-slaves to downplay their own subordination to 
a patron, to accentuate their own power over dependents, to achieve a form of social 
respectability, etc. The result was a conception of identity as always elastic and 
multifaceted, and (therefore) often conflicting.  
The greatest boom in enquiry into the socio-cultural identity of freedmen occurred at 
the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century.  As another clear critique on 
Fabre’s gloomy portrayal of the patron-freedman relationship, Andrew Wallace-Hadrill 
and Jane Gardner identified this relation as a fundamental tool for the socialisation and 
integration of freedmen in society17. Andrzey Łoś probed the evidence for the social 
condition of freedmen in the first century CE by, for example, revisiting the most 
influential models and theories of the stratification of Roman society as a whole, that 
have greatly influenced modern opinion on the place of ex-slaves within it (e.g. Alföldy, 
Jongman, D’Arms, etc.)18. The notion (advocated by art historians like Paul Zanker) that 
freedmen imitated elite art and architecture, but that they added distinctively 
“libertine” touches to it as a consequence of their experiences as slaves (e.g. abundant 
references to family life or professional prowess), has been critically revisited by Lauren 
Petersen, who has convincingly shown that it is premature to ascribe this (or any) form 
of art to preoccupations shared only by ex-slaves19.  
In light of these on-going developments, it is perhaps surprising that the freedman in 
the ancient Greek world only received due treatment in 2005 by Rachel Zelnick-
Abramovitz (after almost a century had passed since Aristide Calderini’s pioneering 
study on “la manomissione e la condizione dei liberti in Grecia”)20. The Roman 
freedwoman had to wait for Matthew Perry’s project in 2014, but would certainly have 
been appreciative of the in-depth and nuanced analysis presented in this inspiring 
monograph, that fully explored the tension between a servile past and the possibilities 
the new life of a Roman matron had to offer21. It is also in the past few years that 
conferences were held (or edited volumes published), that were dedicated entirely to 
manumission and freedpersons. The collection of 42 valuable essays edited by Antonio 
 
                                                     
16 Joshel (1992); Tran (2013) (professional pride); Tran (2006); Liu (2009), esp. 171ff (membership of 
an association); Perry (2014) (respectful marriage); Nielsen (1997); Verboven (2012) (personal 
connections). 
17 Wallace-Hadrill (1989b), 76f; Gardner (1993), 19-20. 
18 Łoś (1995), esp. 1027ff; D’Arms (1981), e.g. 148; Alföldy (1984), 85-132; Jongman (1988), 279-91; … 
19 Petersen (2006), e.g. 95-6 (including references). Contra Zanker (1998), 136-203. 
20 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005); Calderini (1908). 
21 Perry (2014). 
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Gonzales in two volumes, for example, adopts a very wide (and sometimes comparative) 
perspective, but all contributions are in some way related to the general question 
whether (or to what extent) a life of slavery truly ended at the moment of manumission 
(hence the title: “La fin du statut servile?”)22. Among the most successful attempts to 
bring together scholars with various backgrounds to establish a coherent volume on 
diverging aspects of the impact of Roman freedmen on the society they lived in, is Bell & 
Ramsby’s 2012 volume (which contains the above mentioned essay by Verboven)23. 
Finally, freedmen have received detailed treatment in dedicated chapters in studies on 
slavery and manumission, among which Hopkins’ and Bradley’s figure as some of the 
most influential24. 
 
* 
Great strides, in other words, have been made towards fulfilling Duff’s wish for modern 
scholarship to duly value the multifacetedness of freedmen’s identity, instead of merely 
considering it an epiphenomenon of socio-economic inequality. Interestingly, however, 
very recently (and more than 80 years after the appearance of Duff’s monograph), 
Henrik Mouritsen’s unsurpassed synthesis on the freedman in the Roman world pointed 
out that a lot of work still had to be done. He too, wrote about a “surprising gap” in 
scholarly literature, and reiterated Duff’s point that attempts at synthesis have been 
rarely undertaken25. Surely, as Mouritsen duly recognises, Treggiari’s treatment of 
freedmen in the late Republic, or Fabre’s analysis of the patron-freedman relationship 
were great leaps forward. But vital advancements in the scholarship on Roman 
freedmen as they may have been, neither of these studies provided a general synthesis 
on the phenomena of manumission or libertinitas. This is precisely the gap Mouritsen set 
out, and succeeded, to fill. His synchronic approach (the first to cover both Republic and 
Empire) has the great merit of – more than any study so far – comprehensively 
embedding the practice of manumission in the larger texture or Roman ideology and 
society. In doing so, Mouritsen structurally deconstructed the ingrained belief that 
racial, ethnic, or cultural prejudices determined the interaction between freed and 
freeborn26. 
 
                                                     
22 Gonzales (2008). 
23 Bell & Ramsby (2012). 
24 Hopkins (1978); Bradley (1987). 
25 Mouritsen (2011), 1. 
26 For the problematic influence of racism and xenophobia on freedman studies in the past, see 
Mouritsen (2011), esp. 2-3, 80-8. Examples include Duff (1928), 61; Treggiari (1969a), 231-2. Earlier 
(and even more radical) examples are Frank (1916), passim; Sullivan (1939), 504ff. 
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It is certainly no exaggeration to credit Mouritsen’s synthesis for reconfiguring 
scholarly debate on Roman freedman. Nearly all contributions published in its wake 
explicitly engage with it; a manifest testimony to its profound impact on the academic 
scenery. While our own study too is greatly indebted to this work – as we hope will 
become clear throughout – we have, over the past three years, increasingly found fault 
with one of its central tenets. Indeed, the main argument of this dissertation is that 
Mouritsen’s study has replaced one manifestly faulty orthodoxy by another, which is 
not exempt from flaws itself, namely the postulation of the existence of an all-pervasive 
belief that freedmen were morally tainted by a permanent stain as a consequence of 
their servile past. The idea itself is by no means a novelty introduced by Mouritsen, but 
rather a logical culmination of a gradually increasing tendency in modern scholarship 
to find an alternative meta-explanation for the freedman’s disabilities and restrictions 
in Roman society27. This genesis, and especially the evidence usually purported to 
support the existence of a “stain of slavery” (macula servitutis), will be the subject of 
detailed scrutiny in Chapter 2. One of its main aims is to show how modern rhetoric on 
this “stain of slavery” is as much a consequence of too unwarranted a focus on elite 
discourse, as early 20th century scholars’ invocation of race and bloodline was. As a 
recurrent feature in recent scholarship, it is frequently resorted to as an analytic 
shorthand rather than as a phenomenon worth studying in its own right; an explanans 
rather than an explanandum.  
Mouritsen may well claim that the most authoritative studies of the past “have 
slipped into the mindset of Roman slave owners” by at face value appropriating ancient 
elite stereotypes concerning freedmen (e.g. racial prejudices)28, but by elevating the 
macula servitutis as the catchphrase par excellence for the freedman’s social condition, he 
is arguably doing the exact same thing. As mentioned, however, this tendency is all but 
novel, though it seems fair to say that it got a second wind by Mouritsen’s strong focus 
on it, as exemplified by the explicit reference made to it in the title of his second 
chapter (“Macula servitutis: slavery, freedom, and manumission”). A few very brief 
introductory examples of how the a priori assumption of an all-pervasive moral stain on 
the freedman’s persona has influenced and steered various modern analyses and 
conclusions in the past decades and centuries, should suffice – for now – to illustrate the 
impact of this framework, since this point will be taken up in further detail in Chapters 
2 and 4.  
 
                                                     
27 Radical examples of this macula servitutis framework typically combine it with outdated notions of 
geographic and physiognomic determinism. E.g. de Vos (2001), 94: “In effect, those who came from a 
servile origin would have been expected to act like slaves. And since behaviour (as it was linked to 
background, form and function) did not change, then neither would their essential servility”. 
28 Mouritsen (2011), 3. 
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* 
A very early example is Gustav Lahmeyer’s analysis of the order of names (praenomen, 
nomen, and cognomen) in Cicero’s works. Lahmeyer argued that when Cicero changed the 
traditional order of names (cognomen – nomen) to a more exceptional one (nomen – 
cognomen), he often did so because the persons thus referred to were mere freedmen or 
other lower class individuals, who did not deserve the more honourable cognomen – 
nomen construction, reserved for noble Romans29. The tendentiousness of these 
arguments was first unveiled by Harold Axtell, who not only substantially corrected 
Lahmeyer’s quantitative data, but also demolished his theories30. At the core of 
Lahmeyer’s arguments lay the unquestioned assumption that a generally shared 
contempt for, in casu, freedmen had to be reflected in the naming conventions of these 
persons. This point has been reiterated (and expanded to an actual freedman discourse) 
in more recent studies, albeit less radical and at any rate more nuanced31. An in-depth 
analysis of these and similar themes will constitute the main focus of Chapter 7. 
In the legal sphere, Duff has argued that the praetor would be typically inclined to 
take a patron’s side if the latter had a quarrel with his freedman. Freedmen were not 
allowed to sue their patron, unless they had first obtained explicit permission from the 
praetor; a restriction imposed not only on ex-slaves but also on children in relation to 
their parents32. According to Duff, the praetor would often refuse to grant such 
permission, “consulting the dignity of a patron rather than the justice due to a 
freedman”33. Not only does he nowhere qualify this assumption, but – as Jane Gardner 
rightly noted – it would also constitute a manifest violation of the principled equality of 
freed citizens in society at large (cf. Chapters 1 and 7)34. Writing several decades after 
Duff (but still before Gardner), Fabre adopted and expounded this assumption by 
interpreting the pietas freedmen owed to their patrons – and the legal penalties 
associated with a failure to observe it – as highly sui generis, thereby ignoring the 
demonstrable fact that these restrictions were imposed on members of all kinds of 
social categories35. This unwarranted attribution of “unique traits” to the patron-
freedman relationship, is a feature permeating Fabre’s work in general. As noted earlier, 
 
                                                     
29 Lahmeyer (1865), 493f. 
30 Axtell (1915), esp. 393-5. 
31 Mouritsen (2011), e.g. 58-64; Maclean (2012); Perry (2014), e.g. 147. 
32 Dig. 2.4.4.1; Gaius, Inst. 4.46. 
33 Duff (1928), 38. 
34 Gardner (1993), 24. 
35 Fabre (1981), 148-50, 219-26, 318-9. Cf. Gardner (1993), 25: “Fabre is representing as a duty imposed 
specifically upon freedmen what is in fact the recognition of a general obligation of pietas upon 
children, parents, siblings, marriage partners and their kin, and freedmen”. 
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his monograph presents in rather pessimistic terms the condition of Roman freedmen 
in private life, i.e. as permanently subjugated to the yoke of a patron’s dominance. 
Several chapters in the current study will challenge both individual expressions of this 
general assumption, as well as the underlying framework from which they derive. 
One particularly disturbing expression of the assumption of an essential “sameness” 
of slaves and freedmen (in terms of their “stain” or “stigma”) is the recurrent collation – 
both analytical and rhetorical – of these two status groups in modern works36. In his 
chapter on the macula servitutis, for example, Mouritsen regularly downplays 
fundamental differences between slaves and freedmen. Abundant attention is paid to 
the “distinct nature” of slaves, which at least theoretically made them incapable of 
loyalty or virtue, and which inspired a whole range of negative stereotypes. The 
discussion convincingly shows that servitude was indeed a “source of stigma”, that 
“slaves belonged to a distinct category of humanity with inherent characteristics”, and 
that they were marked by an “innate inferiority”37. It is hard to find fault with 
Mouritsen’s description of the Roman perception of slaves, but the same cannot be said 
about its – often unqualified – extrapolation to freedmen. This transference usually 
takes the form of rhetorically connecting a passage featuring a freedman to a preceding 
list of cases of slaves. The implication is that because something is true for slaves, it 
must also be true for freedmen. It is difficult not to see the inherent circularity in the 
argument, since the link between slave and freedman cases is tenable only when one 
accepts the suggestion – a priori taken for granted by Mouritsen – that freedmen were 
“tainted” in the same way slaves were.   
After treating in detail the notion of “natural slavery”, for example, he discusses a 
freedman case as an example of the “remarkably consistent Roman tradition which 
insisted on the slave’s innate inferiority to all free men” (italics added). Horace’s famous 
sneer to a successful freedman, exclaiming that his genus is not in any way changed or 
ameliorated by his fortuna, is taken at face value as an indication of the transposition of 
a servile stigma onto freedmen. Mouritsen thus takes the passage as proof that the 
slave’s inferiority remains “resistant to any change of status” (manumission).  
 
* 
For Mouritsen cum suis, then, the macula servitutis is very much an objective and 
pervasive belief in the Roman world. Within the freedman’s own familia, however, he 
admits that “the stigma of his origins hardly counted at all” since “different rules 
 
                                                     
36 E.g. MacLean (2012), 63, who speaks about the unique parameters of their [slaves and freedmen] 
social position, and who argued that slaves and ex-slaves had a distinct approach to obsequium, 
“creating a specific constellation of values”. Cf. also p. 82-5, 154, … 
37 Mouritsen (2011), 17-21. 
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applied, and relations that would have been shameful with other people’s freedmen 
appear to have been perfectly acceptable with your own”38. Whereas the distinction 
between liberti sui and liberti alieni is rightly accentuated, the claim that it derived from 
(an exception to) a generally perceived taint on an ex-slave is doubtful at best. The 
problem that arises from this assertion, is that freedmen had excellent contacts with 
people other than their patrons or familia members, in interactions where no trace of 
any stereotype or stigma is attested (cf. esp. Chapters 4 and 5). Mouritsen is at pains to 
reconcile this observation (i.e. “a suspension of the ‘servile’ stigma in these contexts”) 
with the presumed existence of a macula servitutis permeating the Roman mind: “what 
seems to have happened was that the freedman’s own dishonoured person became 
subsumed into that of his patron”. Instead of looking to adjust the idea of an ancient 
ideological doctrine, Mouritsen defines the situation as a “paradox”, and takes recourse 
to an almost mystical explanation that has the freedman “transcend his status” in these 
contexts39. The explanation, moreover, blatantly contradicts a previous claim that 
libertinitas was an “innate condition” with “innate deficiencies”40, and closely resembles 
the notion that freedmen could only be virtuous or acceptable to society by mediation 
of their patron (a notion that will be dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5). These chapters 
argue that it is no coincidence that precisely in the correspondences – approached as a 
network embedded social practice – barely any trace of a servile stain is attested. 
Moreover, if a freedman was able to “transcend his status” in some cases, the question 
remains why he could not “do” so in others. Instead of interpreting the many casual and 
positive references to freedmen as exceptions or suspensions of a standard servile 
stigma, a good case can be made precisely for the reverse situation.  
Besides these preliminary observations, attention should be drawn to the problematic 
use of a heavily laden term like “stigma”. As the excerpts cited at the beginning of this 
introduction already indicated, “stigmatisation” is a concept quickly resorted to by 
modern scholars to conveniently capture the freedman’s social condition, and is often 
even generally imposed on (Roman) society as a structural trait. Treggiari, for example, 
thought that a libertine stigma permeated not only elite discourse, but also the minds of 
 
                                                     
38 Mouritsen (2011), p. 42. See also the following pages (esp. p. 47): “Within this particular 
environment [of the familia] the conventional stigma of servitude appears to have played no part 
(…)”. 
39 Mouritsen (2011), p. 49-50. Cf. p. 107-8: the ius anulorum aureorum was “a remarkable invention 
which allowed freedmen to be ‘cleansed’ of their macula servitutis” and “involved the miraculous 
suspension of the freedman’s servile ‘stain”; 214: “their own inferior persons were subsumed into 
that of their patrons”. 
40 Mouritsen (2011), 36, 64. Page 284 speaks of the innate differences between slave and master, 
which the legal concept of libertinitas had to entrench. 
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the Roman plebs ingenua41. Bell and Ramsby recognised a general “desire to overcome 
the stigma of servitude” 42. And Mouritsen suggested in no unclear terms that freedmen 
were “stigmatised and made to suffer for a past for which they bore no personal 
responsibility or blame”43. Surely, a common sense understanding of the term is often 
enough to grasp its intended meaning in these cases, but it remains an anachronistic 
way of looking at freedmen, by no means as structurally attested in ancient sources as 
its modern usage implies (cf. Chapter 2). Moreover, when Wiseman argued that “the 
stigma of slavery was a greater handicap than that of non-Roman descent”, he 
nonetheless concluded that the two stigmatised groups were comparable, but without 
paying attention to the sociological implications of the term, or the nuances in 
stigmatisation between both social categories.  
Generalisations like these grossly violate vital insights of sociological literature on 
stigma and stigmatisation, but are not entirely surprising when we observe that this 
literature itself is greatly divided on the matter of how to define stigma44. This variety is 
in itself no problem, since the many different scientific disciplines, as well as the 
different research methodologies and themes that employ the notion as an analytical 
tool, often require a contextualised definition of the term45. The problem arises, 
however, if this conceptual variety is tacitly accepted as permission to use the notions 
of stigma and stigmatisation as broad labels, without adequately defining its use in the 
study at hand. Moreover, the connotation of the term “stigma” implies an inherent 
trait, and as such greatly accommodates modern discourse on the macula servitutis, since 
it suggests continuity in the mental deficiency of slaves even after they had been 
manumitted46. Already in 1963, however, the pioneering sociologist in the field, Erving 
Goffman, stressed that stigma should not be approached (solely) as an individual 
attribute, but rather as a relation, i.e. something that comes into existence only in a 
social context and in interaction with others who stigmatise47. In 1998, Link and Phelan 
proposed to discard terms like “attribute”, “mark”, or “condition” altogether when 
referring to stigmatised individuals, by replacing them with “label”, thus reconfiguring 
the implied “agency” in the interaction, and fully conceptualising stigmatisation as a 
 
                                                     
41 Treggiari (1969a), 37. 
42 Bell & Ramsby (2012), 1. 
43 Mouritsen (2011), 17. Cf. 79, 111. For a refreshing take on the subject, see Borbonus (2014), e.g. 118: 
“The common assertion that inferior status was a source of disgrace simplistically assumes that 
nonelite Romans collectively adopted elite views”. 
44 E.g. Goffman (1963), 3; Stafford & Scott (1986), 80-1; Crocker, Major & Steele (1998), 505. 
45 Link & Phelan (2001), 365. 
46 For this connotation of “stigma”, see especially Sayce (1998). 
47 Goffman (1963), e.g. 12-3. 
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performative social practice48. This insight is widely accepted in sociology, but it is often 
neglected in other disciplines, which usually employ “stigma” as a convenient 
shorthand for an inherent, rather than affixed, trait.  
For Goffman, a stigma constitutes a “special discrepancy between virtual [attributed] 
and actual social identity”49. Evidently, having been a slave was a part of one’s life that 
could not be changed (though certain legal fictions existed to achieve precisely such 
erasure)50. But describing this past as an inherent stigma, is ignoring the necessary 
relational component of virtual social identity. It implies that it was a biological or 
moral characteristic in any given context, rather than a trait originating from, and 
activated in, social interaction. Again, this interpretation greatly suits the macula 
servitutis framework, because it a priori attributes to the freedman the moral inferiority 
of a slave. It is such conception that subsequently leads to the conviction that not only 
elites but also the freeborn members of the lower classes in general saw freedmen as 
degraded individuals, i.e. because it was an absolute deficiency. Interestingly, very 
similar modern conceptions have been revisited and repudiated in the very recent past. 
The Roman conception of manual labour, for instance, was a recurrent theme in elite 
sneers towards the “sordid poor”, but at the same time a source of great pride among 
these lower classes (cf. Chapter 8). It is now generally accepted that a monolithic 
“Roman” conception of manual labour never existed to begin with51. Put differently, 
there were contextualised forms of appreciation or condemnation of certain identity 
dimensions, but the point is that these were relational, rather than an objective 
evaluation of inherent traits (i.e. Goffmanian attributes).  
Finally, some essential features of stigma and stigmatisation – in the sociological 
sense of the words – are demonstrably absent when considering the social position of 
Roman freedmen. “If a stigma disappears or is shaken off”, Goffman wrote, “what often 
results is not the acquisition of fully normal status, but a transformation of self from 
someone with a particular blemish into someone with a record of having corrected a 
particular blemish”52. Firstly, this new situation is by definition not an instance of 
stigmatisation anymore, but a position in between stigmatised (i.c. slave) and “normal” 
 
                                                     
48 Link & Phelan (2001), 368. 
49 Goffman (1963), 11-2. 
50 The procedure of restitutio natalium granted fictitious ingenuitas to freedmen (though imperial 
initiative and patronal permission was required). Dig. 40.11.5.1: “Libertinus, qui natalibus restitutus 
est, perinde habetur, atque si ingenuus factus medio tempore maculam servitutis non sustinuisset”. 
See also Chapter 2. 
51 Tran (2013) provides the most comprehensive overview of the evolution (p. 187-9), as well as an 
original in-depth analysis of the interaction between aristocratic and lower class mentalities 
(passim). Cf. Verboven (2014). 
52 Goffman (1963), 18-9. 
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(to use Goffman’s own term). In addition, Goffman does nowhere explore exactly how 
“normal” such an individual can become. Perhaps most importantly, though, the use of 
stigma terminology rhetorically – but unwarrantedly – transposes its underlying 
features to freedman socialisation, leading to manifestly skewed analyses and tenacious 
conclusions. Goffman’s concept of “covering”, for instance, states that stigmatised 
individuals typically “make a great effort to keep the stigma from looming large. The 
individual's object is to reduce tension, that is, to make it easier for himself and the 
others to withdraw covert attention from the stigma, and to sustain spontaneous 
involvement in the official content of the interaction”53. However, as is well known, 
freedmen were prone – at least until the end of the first century CE – to explicitly 
exclaim their legal status in their epitaphs54. Several scholars have explained this 
phenomenon – from a macula servitutis point of view – as an attempt by freedpersons to 
downplay their servile past, but this is now considered an outdated view55. The decline 
in the occurrence of status mentions on funerary monuments can, moreover, not be 
explained by the notion of “covering”, since it is a general trend attested also (and 
arguably even more so) for ingenui (cf. Chapter 2). 
It is unfortunate that a study like Mouritsen’s should focus so strongly on the unique 
nature of Roman libertinitas, but at the same time rhetorically reduces it to a monolithic 
instance of stigmatisation. In fact, as will be noted repeatedly, the macula servitutis 
framework derives in no insignificant degree from too rigidly isolating freedmen as a 
social category. This conception of uniqueness is a reflection of the disproportionate 
attention paid to freedmen in elite discourse, where they were often singled out as 
exempla (cf. Chapter 6). While it would be wrong not to consider libertini as a sui generis 
social category, they were by no means as isolated from other sub-elite strata as the 
macula framework suggests. Chapters 2 and 6 address this issue in more detail, by 
further elaborating on the notion that freedmen were targeted by elite discourse and 
framing because they constituted the most visible (and most threatening) component of 
the non-elite classes, against whom a general discourse of distinction was directed. 
 
* 
It is well beyond the scope of this introductory note to give an exhaustive overview of 
the social and legal aspects of “the” freedman’s position in Roman society. Any such 
endeavour would arguably be derivative anyhow, in light of the excellent existing 
 
                                                     
53 Goffman (1963), 124. 
54 See the discussions in Chapters 2 and 8. 
55 Taylor (1961), 122. Cf. Huttunen (1974), 129; MacLean (2012), 126. Perry (2014), 100 gives an 
extensive overview of the debate. 
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surveys mentioned earlier. Relevant aspects of this social and legal position will be 
touched upon throughout this work when relevant for the argument. Nonetheless, two 
very general notes are included here, in order not to impede the flow of argument in the 
respective chapters by unnecessary digressions. These notes relate to the distinction 
between the terms libertus and libertinus, and to the distinction between formally and 
informally freed slaves. 
The Latin language had two words to denote a freedman: libertus and libertinus. Modern 
scholars generally agree on the difference between both terms: libertus refers to a 
freedman within the private relation to his patron, and libertinus to a freedman as a 
member of society at large. Put differently, libertus accentuated the social status of the 
ex-slave, whereas libertinus stressed his legal status. Duff thus summarised56:   
“While a freedman was a libertus in relation to his patron, he and his fellows 
formed a definitely marked-off class called libertini in relation to the ingenui or 
free-born. (…) the Roman freedman is not only the libertus of his patron; he is also 
a libertinus as opposed to an ingenuus”. 
 
However, there has been considerable disagreement on the original meaning of the 
term libertinus. The main source of confusion is a famous passage in Suetonius’ Lives, in 
which the historian corrects the language of the emperor Claudius57: 
“Even then, fearful of criticism [on his decision to allow the son of a freedman into 
the senate], Claudius declared that the censor Appius Caecus, the ancient founder 
of his family, had also chosen the sons of freedmen (libertini filii) into the senate; 
but he [Claudius] did not know that in the days of Appius and for some time 
afterwards the term libertini designated, not those who were themselves 
manumitted, but their freeborn sons”. 
 
Haley, followed by Shimada, accepted Suetonius’ correction. They both drew from the 
linguistic argument that nouns with the suffix -inus were originally patronymics, and 
that the application of libertinus to sons of freedmen was a consequence of ex-slaves 
 
                                                     
56 Duff (1928), 50-2. Cf. Treggiari (1969a), 52-3. 
57 Suet. Claud. 24: “Ac sic quoque reprehensionem verens, et Appium Caecum censorem, generis sui 
proauctorem, libertinorum filios in senatum adlegisse docuit, ignarus temporibus Appi et deinceps 
aliquamdiu libertinos dictos non ipsos, qui manu emitterentur, sed ingenuos ex his procreatos”. 
Throughout this work, Latin and Greek passages, as well as English translations, are taken from the 
most recent Loeb Classical Library editions, unless otherwise noted. 
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often informally being called servi in the early and middle Republic58. Mommsen, 
followed more recently by Fabre, believed that libertinus denoted both the freedman and 
his son in Appius’ time59. Treggiari, on the other hand, thought that Suetonius was 
simply mistaken60. In fact, no other Roman authors concur with Suetonius on the 
matter, except some, of whom it can be plausibly argued that they had precisely 
Suetonius’ passage as their only source for this claim61.  
In his 1904 doctoral dissertation, Crumley conducted a detailed philological and 
grammatical study into the terms libertus and libertinus, and evaluated the influential 
Suetonian passage as follows62: 
 “The formation of the word [libertinus], the unmistakable evidence that it was 
used as early as the time of Plautus to designate manumitted men, and the fact 
that no other Latin author speaks of the word ever having this restricted meaning, 
seem to discredit the statement of Suetonius”. 
 
However, because Appius’ lifetime predated any noteworthy expansion of Latin 
literature, the lack of evidence for Suetonius’ claim may simply be due to this dearth of 
sources from the historical period in question. The matter was complicated even further 
when some scholars proposed that libertinus was not only used to denote freedmen, 
their sons, or both. One hypothesis, for example, states that the content of the term was 
much broader, and that it applied also to individuals who had but recently received 
Roman or Latin citizenship (e.g. peregrini)63. Be that as it may, the habit of referring to 
freedmen’s sons as libertini – if ever it existed – died out when these sons became truly 
equated with sons of freeborn Romans. Haley saw 217 BCE as a plausible moment (i.e. 
when the sons of freedmen became “full-fledged ingenui” by the grant of the ius 
praetextae)64. Fabre suggested 189 BCE (i.e. when the lex Terentia supposedly endowed 
 
                                                     
58 Haley (1986), 117-8; Shimada (1988), 420. 
59 Mommsen (1887), III, 422-3; Fabre (1981), 125 note 1. 
60 Treggiari (1969a), 52-3. 
61 E.g. Isid. Orig. 9.4.47: “Libertus autem vocatus quasi liberatus. Erat enim prius iugo servitutis 
addictus. Libertorum autem filii apud antiquos libertini appellabantur, quasi de libertis nati”. 
Crumley (1904), I, 6: “The influence of the Suetonian passage is traceable through the entire period 
from his day to the present and seems to be at the bottom of the whole discussion. Wherever the 
question is raised, Suetonius is usually quoted or cited as authority”. Cf. Haley (1986), 116 note 5. 
62 Crumley (1904), I, 39. 
63 Cels-Saint-Hilaire (1985), 360: “Le mot libertinus apparaît ainsi comme un vocable ambigu, dans la 
mesure où, ne prenant en compte que la citoyenneté romaine (ou latine, après 171) de l'individu 
ainsi qualifié, il insiste sur le caractère récent de cette citoyenneté, mais laisse dans l'ombre le statut 
d'origine - esclavage ou peregrinate”. 
64 Haley (1986), 119-20. 
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sons of freedmen with full citizenship)65. Whatever the precise date may have been, this 
ancient use of libertinus is not once attested in the period under consideration in this 
dissertation. For all practical means and purposes, then, our use of libertus and libertinus 
reflects – like that of the late Republican and early Imperial Roman authors – the 
difference between the freedman in relation to his patron on the one hand, and to 
society as a whole on the other. As we will see in (especially) Chapters 4 and 6, the 
distinctive connotations both terms carried were of particular importance for the 
representation of freedmen, and greatly underpinned the message an individual writer 
tried to convey. Interestingly, the same elites who frequently freed their favourite 
slaves, also complained about the increasing number of freedmen in society and the 
undue influence they were able to exercise. This almost paradoxical situation gradually 
led to a crystallisation of both libertus and libertinus into a very positive and negative 
marker respectively (cf. Chapters 4 and 6)66.  
As common denominators for all ex-slaves, the terms libertus and libertinus easily 
create the impression that freedmen belonged to a homogenous group of people, whose 
identity derived only or primarily from their belonging to this legal category. As noted 
before, early studies on freedmen appropriated this elite focus on legal status, whereas 
more recent enquiries accentuated individual and contextual ways to mediate it. While 
this is a point taken up on several occasions throughout this dissertation, it should be 
stressed that even within the restricted legal sphere, significant demarcations already 
divided the body of freedmen.  
 
* 
When a master wanted to free one of his slaves, he had the choice to do so formally or 
informally. This choice had far-reaching consequences, since only formal manumission 
bestowed on the slave not only freedom, but also citizenship. This latter grant was what 
separated Roman manumission from any other contemporary form, and famously 
evoked awe among contemporary observers67. Although Roman historians disagreed on 
 
                                                     
65 Fabre (1981), 125 note 1. The lex Terentia, however, is generally believed now not to have applied to 
freedmen’s sons (who already held full citizenship prior to 189 BCE), but perhaps rather to peregrini 
or Spurii filii. Cf. Mouritsen (2007b). 
66 Cf. Patterson (1982), 278 in more general terms: “the decision to grant or to permit slaves to 
purchase freedom was an individual one, largely determined in the advanced slave systems by 
economic and/or political factors, whatever the cultural rationalizations, whereas the decision to 
accept the freedman was a collective one, strongly influenced by traditional values and prejudices”. 
67 Cf. the often quoted letter from Philip V of Macedon (214 BCE): “ὧν καὶ οἱ Ῥωμαῖοί εἰσιν, οἳ καὶ 
τοὺς οἰκέτας ὅταν ἐλευθερώσωσιν, προσδεχόμενοι εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων με[ταδι]δόντες, 
καὶ διὰ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου οὐ μόνον τὴν ἰδίαν πατρίδα ἐπηυξήκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποικίας <σ>χεδὸν 
[εἰς ἑβ]δομήκοντα τόπους ἐκπεπόμφασιν”. 
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the origin of manumission as a citizen-making procedure, the practice is documented 
already in the Twelve Tables, and probably greatly predates them68.  
During the Republic, formal manumission required the fulfilment of two conditions. 
First and foremost, the master had to be a citizen himself (i.e. possess the ius Quiritum). 
Secondly, he had to use one of the three formal manumission procedures (manumissio 
iusta ac legitima). These were manumissio vindicta (in front of a magistrate with imperium), 
manumissio testamento (a gift of freedom through the master’s testament), and 
manumissio censu (formal enrolment in the census record)69. At the end of the Republic 
and certainly in the Principate, however, the latter method fell into disuse. Other ways 
to manumit a slave were via a letter (per epistulam) or via an agreement “as if between 
friends” (inter amicos)70. These were, however, informal procedures (manumissio minus 
iusta), and did as such not confer citizenship on the new freedman. Informally freed 
slaves were not recognised by law in the Republic (si neque censu nec vindicta nec 
testamento liber factus est, non est liber)71. Even though their freedom – or rather, their 
mere forma libertatis – was protected by the praetor (e.g. against an actio Publiciana), their 
situation remained precarious72.  
This changed under Augustus. A lex Iunia of unknown date – but certainly predating 
the lex Aelia Sentia of 4 CE73 – established a legal framework for informally freed slaves, 
who would henceforth be known as Iunian Latins. They were called Latini because their 
status was modelled on that of Roman citizens who migrated to a Latin colony, and 
Iuniani because it was the lex Iunia that granted them their freedom74. The status and 
legal peculiarities of Iunian Latins are notoriously complex, and an exhaustive 
discussion greatly exceeds the scope and intent of this introductory note. The following 
 
                                                     
68 Dionysius of Halicarnassos (4.22) credited king Servius Tullius, but Livy (2.5.9-10) and Polybius 
(Publ. 7.5) thought it had originally been a measure to reward the slave Vindicius for uncovering a 
conspiracy against the vulnerable new Republic in 509 BCE. For the Twelve Tables, see Crawford 
(1996), 646-8. 
69 Gaius Inst. 1.17, 35, 138; Ulp. Reg. 1.6-9; Frag. Dos. 5. Cf. Buckland (1908), 437-448 (manumission 
during the Republic), 449-551 (manumission during the Empire); Treggiari (1969a) 21-5; Fabre 
(1981), 5-7; Mouritsen (2011), 11-2. 
70 Gaius, Inst. 1.44. 
71 Cic. Top. 2.10. Cf. Tac. Ann. 13.27: “quos vindicta patronus non liberaverit, velut vinclo servitutis 
attineri”. 
72 Gaius, Inst. 1.22; 3.56; Reg. 1.10. Cf. Fabre (1981), 55-9; Sirks (1981), 249; Mouritsen (2011), 85-6. 
73 Balestri Fumagalli (1985). Sirks (1981), 250 suggested 17 BCE for the promulgation of the lex (see 
251 note 9 for further references). 
74 Gaius, Inst. 3.56: “Latinos ideo, quia lex eos liberos proinde esse uoluit, atque si essent ciues 
Romani ingenui, qui ex urbe Roma in Latinas colonias deducti Latini coloniarii esse coeperunt; 
Iunianos ideo, quia per legem Iuniam liberi facti sunt, etiamsi non essent ciues Romani”. 
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paragraphs therefore merely provide a general outline, which will be elaborated upon 
when necessary throughout this work75. 
Iunian Latinitas was a considerable improvement over the status of Republican 
informally freed slaves. Most importantly, they were now legally recognised as free men 
(though not as citizens). They received the right of commercium (i.e. to conduct trade 
and make legal contracts), and their children would become free persons rather than 
slaves76. Severe restrictions, however, marked the Iunian Latin when compared to his 
formally freed counterpart. Although legally free, he could neither make a valid will, nor 
inherit any property (unless he was able to obtain Roman citizenship within 100 days)77. 
His property was considered as peculium, and it would therefore return to his patron 
when he died (whereas freed citizens owed him only a portion of it, depending on their 
possessions)78. These patronal rights could also be transmitted to people outside the 
familia (whereas rights over freed citizens could be given only to natural heirs)79.  
The lex Iunia should be seen in close connection with the lex Aelia Sentia of 4 CE. This 
law imposed further restrictions on formal manumission. Besides the requirements of a 
citizen master and a formal procedure, the slave now had to be at least 30 years old, and 
the manumitting master at least 20. The age limit could, however, be circumvented if 
the master had a “good reason” (iusta causa) to free a younger slave (e.g. when he was 
related by blood, when he intended to use a freedman as a business agent (procurator), or 
a freedwoman as a spouse, when he was legally obligated to free the slave, etc.)80. The 
lex Aelia Sentia also provided ways to “upgrade” the status of Iunian Latinitas to 
citizenship optimo iure (Latini vero multis modis ad civitatem Romanam perveniunt)81. The 
most obvious way was to repeat the manumission of an informally freed slave (iteratio), 
but this time fulfilling all three necessary conditions (citizen patron, formal procedure, 
and age requirement)82. Another possibility was the anniculi probatio procedure, which 
granted Roman citizenship to married slaves freed under 30, on condition that they 
 
                                                     
75 For the most detailed studies on Iunian Latins, see Sirks (1981); Weaver (1990); (1997); López Barja 
de Quiroga (1998), with further bibliography in note 3 (p. 134); Camodeca (2006); Koops (2013), 114-9. 
76 Gaius, Inst. 1.66, 79, 81. 
77 Gaius, Inst. 1.23-4; 2.275; Ulp. Inst. 20.14; Ulp. Reg. 17.1; 22.3; 22.8. 
78 Gaius Inst. 1.23; 3.56-7, 63-5; Ulp. Inst. 11.16; Inst. Iust 3.7.4. Cf. Sirks (1981), 255-6; Levick 
(1990),124. 
79 Gaius, Inst. 1.23-4; 3.56, 58; Tit. Ulp. 19.4; 20.14; 22.3. 
80 Examples of iustae causae are spread out over the legal sources, see e.g. Gaius, Inst. 1.19-20, 38-9, 41; 
Ulp. Reg. 1.12-3; Dig. 40.2.9, 11-14, 15pr-1, 16.1; … Cf. Buckland (1908), 538-42; López Barja de Quiroga 
(1998), 155 note 54. 
81 Gaius, Inst. 1.28. 
82 Frag. Dos. 14; Ulp. 3.4; Tac. Ann. 13.27. 
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presented a one-year-old child to a praetor or governor83. Later laws increased the paths 
to formal citizenship even further, by making it the reward for productive behaviour 
(e.g. serving 6 (and later 3) years in the vigiles, investing in real estate in Rome, 
contributing to Rome’s grain supply by providing ships for the annonae, owning a large 
bakery, etc.)84. 
We do not (and cannot) know precisely how many informally freed slaves there were, 
or how their number compared to that of freed citizens, because the members of both 
categories received a tria nomina on manumission (i.e. the praenomen and nomen 
gentilicium of their master, and their slave name as cognomen)85. This practice makes 
informally freed slaves indistinguishable from freed citizens in the epigraphic record86. 
However, Iunian Latinitas must have been very attractive to masters because of the 
inheritance regulation. Moreover, the epigraphic record clearly indicates that slaves 
were freed – even after the lex Aelia Sentia – before their 30th birthday, automatically 
making them Iunians (as surely not all of these cases would have been justified by a iusta 
causa)87. Perhaps even more important, most of the ways to “upgrade” to formal 
citizenship required the presence of a magistrate, which must have posed a problem in 
many cases88. Literary sources sometimes suggest Iunian Latinitas for certain freedmen, 
but they never explicitly refer to this status. Pliny’s letters casually mention informally 
freed slaves on occasion (without explicitly calling them Latini Iuniani), but they appear 
only when they are about to become Roman citizens through iteratio or imperial grant89. 
Most scholars nowadays assume that the number of Iunian Latins must have been 
considerable at the very least (due to economic and practical reasons), despite the 
conspicuous silence in the source record90. 
 
                                                     
83 Gaius, Inst. 1.29-32. Both parents and child received citizenship. Initially, only Iunians under the 
age of 30 could benefit from this procedure, but Vespasian extended access to all Iunians, regardless 
of their age (Ulp. Reg. 3.4). For the exact procedure, see López Barja de Quiroga (1998), 139, 145, 155-
7; Weaver (1990), 277, 280, 301; Camodeca (2006). For a summary of the other conditions, see 
Sherwin-White (1973), 329-30; Sirks (1981), 254; López Barja de Quiroga (1998), 145-6. 
84 Gaius, Inst. 1.32-4. 
85 Receiving not only the nomen gentile of the master, but also his praenomen became standard 
practice no later than the first century BCE. Cf. Salomies (1987) 229ff. For the significance of this 
practice, see Saller (1994), 79-80; Mouritsen (2011), 39. 
86 Weaver (1990), 279, 300-4; López Barja de Quiroga (1998), 144; Mouritsen (2007a). 
87 Alföldy (1986). 
88 Watson (1987) 35, 42; Mouritsen (2011), 189 esp. note 313. Sherwin-White (1973), 330; López Barja 
de Quiroga (1998), 156-9; Weaver (1990), 280-1 warn us that transformation from Iunian Latin to full 
citizen was difficult outside of Rome. 
89 Plin. Ep. 7.16.4; 7.32; 10.5.2; 10.6.1; 10.11.2; 10.104-5. 
90 E.g. Weaver (1997), 55: Iunian Latins constitute “a black hole of large but unknown proportions”; 
López Barja de Quiroga (1998), 149: they were “perhaps even more numerous than freedmen with 
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Importantly, besides further regulating manumission procedures, the lex Aelia Sentia also 
created a third category of freedmen: those who were considered as in dediticiorum 
numero. These were ex-slaves who had been severely beaten, chained, branded, or 
tortured, or who had been forced to fight in the arena; in short, men whose previous 
treatment or behaviour made them “incapable” of obtaining citizenship91. Indeed, 
dediticii suffered from the most degrading and severe restrictions that could be imposed 
on a free man. They could – contrary to Iunian Latins – under no circumstance obtain 
citizenship (or even Iunian Latinitas itself), and they were not allowed to enter a 
perimeter of 100 miles around the city of Rome (on the pain of re-enslavement without 
prospect of manumission)92. Like Iunian Latinitas, the status of dediticii was based on an 
already existing category of people (i.c. that of enemies who had surrendered to 
Rome)93. Interestingly, then, the Augustan laws – of which the lex Iunia and the lex Aelia 
Sentia were among the most important ones for freedmen – transformed libertinitas from 
a dual division (informal – formal) into a formal three-tier system (dediticii – Latini 
Iuniani – citizens optimo iure), which allowed for further promotion, and forced masters 
to be selective and discriminative when deciding about the fate of a slave94. 
The inability to distinguish Iuniani from freed citizens (or even dediticii) in the 
sources, permeates every study on Roman freedmen. It will be duly recognised in ours 
whenever possible or relevant. However, since this work focusses primarily on 
discourse and representation (as both reflecting and consolidating existing dimensions 
of reality), this concern is of lesser importance (given the fact that elite authors or 
freedmen never distinguished between these categories themselves). While Robert 
Knapp’s solution to entirely conflate as a rule both categories throughout his study on 
“invisible Romans” is certainly too rash and defeatist, there is often no other way to 
proceed in practice (especially when treating literary and epigraphic sources)95. 
Finally, freed citizens optimo iure may well have been better off when compared to 
Iunians or dediticii (especially in terms of inheritance law), but they were not entirely 
free from disabilities or restrictions themselves. They – like all freedmen – owed a 
lifelong debt of respect (obsequium) and sometimes contractual services (operae) to their 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Roman citizenship”; Sirks (1981), 274. Pace Hopkins (1978), 116: “almost all ex-slaves freed by Roman 
masters received Roman citizenship”. 
91 Gaius, Inst. 1.13–6; Ulp. 1.11.  
92 Gaius, Inst. 1.13, 15, 26-7; Gaius, Inst. 1.160; Tac. Ann. 13.26. See also Buckland (1908), 402, 544-6; 
Wenger (1941), 356-60; Roth (2011). Mouritsen (2011), 33 note 127 typically sees this expulsion from 
Rome as a measure to prevent “servile contamination”, although a mere pragmatic intention to put 
freed dediticii on a par with real surrendered enemies of Rome (by definition living far away from it) 
may just as well have inspired this initiative. 
93 Mouritsen (2011), 33; Sirks (1981), 259. 
94 Mouritsen (2011), 88ff. 
95 Knapp (2011), 174. 
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patron96. In public life, they were excluded from important priesthoods, from public 
office (de facto during the Republic, but formally after the lex Visellia of 24 CE), and from 
the army97. As such, the freed citizen’s position was a highly ambiguous one, hovering as 
he did between equality in principle and exclusion in practice. However, too strong a 
focus on these disabilities undervalues the significant benefits citizenship did bestow on 
them. Not only did a freedman become sui iuris and could he start his own family as a 
pater familias, but he also enjoyed legal protection, the right to trade and to make 
contracts, the right to formally marry,  to vote, to adopt, to make a will, etc.98 Whereas a 
focus on their disabilities prompts a rather gloomy picture, drawing attention to their 
many rights – unparalleled in other slave societies – leads to the realisation that freed 
citizens were better off than the large majority of people inhabiting the Roman world 
(at least in terms of their legal status). Moreover, Chapter 2 argues that the public 
restrictions of freedmen are better understood as corollaries of the private patronage-
relationship (more specifically, of the pragmatic desire to prevent freedmen from 
obtaining power over their former masters), rather than as expressions of an ingrained 
belief of moral inferiority. 
 
* 
To conclude this introduction, we will briefly underscore the main aims of this study. 
The general argument is that the socialisation of freedmen is better understood  – in a 
Goffmanian sense – as relational rather than attributive. Underlying every individual 
chapter is the attempt to show how the notion of a persisting moral stain on the 
freedman’s person as a consequence of his servile past, is a tentative and arguably 
anachronistic way of interpreting both the restrictions and limitations ex-slaves faced 
in their public and private lives, as well as their interaction with freeborn Romans. This 
macula servitutis framework permeates studies as a template imposed on the source 
material, rather than emanating from them, and derives from a particularly resilient 
remnant of what Petersen has called “Trimalchio vision”, i.e. the “tendency to see 
Roman ex-slaves from the elite perspective”99. Alternatively, this study proposes to 
consider the socialisation of Roman freedmen as a dynamic interaction of a “discourse 
of distinction” on the one hand, and a “public transcript of principled equality” on the 
 
                                                     
96 Dig. 37.15. See also Watson (1967), 227-9; Waldstein (1986), 60-1; Masi Doria (1993), 76-81; Gardner 
(1993), 20-5; Koops (2013), 110 note 32. None of the freedman’s obligations were typical for the 
patron-freedman relationship, as they were part and parcel of an ideology if kinship in broader 
terms, cf. Gardner (1993), 24; Mouritsen (2011), 56-7. 
97 E.g. Cod. Iust. 9.21; 9.31; 10.33.1; Suet. Aug. 25.2. See also Chapter 2. 
98 Gardner (1993), 7-51. 
99 Petersen (2006), 10. 
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other (terms that will be clarified in detail in Chapter 1). The macula servitutis framework 
derives in no small degree from a one-sided focus on the former (typically attested in 
public and published literature and law texts), but ignores the other end of the scale, 
viz. that freedmen were entitled to the social respectability of free men (and citizens). 
The symbiosis of these two tendencies may at first sight seem paradoxical or counter-
intuitive, but an in-depth analysis of elite discourse reveals that each instance is always 
a contextualised combination of both, expressed on a scale with either of them on an 
“archetypical” extreme. 
Although their legal status was fundamentally different from that of the freeborn, ex-
slaves benefited from the widely available opportunities to increase social status 
through investment in identity dimensions other than mere legal status (e.g. familial, 
professional, collegial, civic, … pride), all of which were recognised and respected – 
despite a hostile elite tradition. Reconfigured in these terms, a macula servitutis is but a 
contextualised expression of the general elite discourse of distinction, rather than an 
all-encompassing and pervasive belief among Romans sensu largo. By focussing also on 
the contextualised expressions of the public transcript of principled equality 
(highlighted in this study by a focus on correspondences and epitaphs), we argue in 
favour of a less monolithic and more multifaceted approach to Roman freedmen. 
 
* 
Chapter 1: The assumptions, models, and theories underlying the analysis throughout 
the next chapters are expounded in detail. Social theory provides a meaningful 
framework for evaluating freedman socialisation. 
This  chapter elaborates in detail the theoretical framework that structures each 
chapter. It draws heavily on social theory, and mainly consists of four different pillars: 
1) Bourdieu’s capital metaphor (with a strong focus on the notion of social capital) and 
Tilly’s trust networks; 2) Scott’s transcript theory; 3) Isaac’s action statements; and 4) 
critical discourse analysis. The chapter introduces the most relevant aspects of each 
theory, and operationalises them into a workable model for practical analysis, adapted 
to the historical particularities of an ancient Roman context. It also indicates the 
novelty of this approach, and its potential for elucidating freedman socialisation. 
 
Chapter 2: The notion of a macula servitutis has no firm footing in our sources, and is a 
modern – arguably anachronistic – analytical concept, rather than a reflection of 
ancient reality. 
This chapter is conceived rather broadly as a programmatic statement, providing the 
frame in which the subsequent specialised chapters will be structured. It traces the 
notion of a macula servitutis (and related expressions) back to the ancient context, and 
 22 
argues that on the very rare occasions where the expression or any derivatives occur, 
these explicitly refer to the servile condition. It is an entirely modern leap to conclude 
from this observation that this macula persisted after manumission. A brief comparative 
overview of European slavery confirms our suspicion that the exact opposite was true. 
Another major point of attention throughout the second part of this chapter, is the 
alternative explanation for the freedman’s restrictions and disabilities in both public 
and private life, i.e. not an ideological belief of moral inferiority, but a pragmatic elite 
concern about safeguarding (private) patronal rights and power on the one hand, and a 
persistent desire to prevent freedmen from obtaining an “unnatural” position of formal 
power over their former owners on the other.  
 
Chapter 3: A critical (quantitative and qualitative) analysis of previous scholarship on 
the occurrence and representation of freedmen in the correspondences of Cicero, Pliny, 
and Fronto results in a prosopographical database that constitutes the source base for 
the next two chapters. 
 
This chapter is the first of three that focusses on Roman correspondences. It revisits 
previous scholarship (both quantitative lists and qualitative analyses) on freedmen in 
these documents, and elucidates the methodology used in compiling our own 
exhaustive prosopographical Tables of Cicero’s Pliny’s, and Fronto’s correspondences 
(Appendices 2-4)100. As such, it is a very heuristically inspired chapter, since it presents 
the source basis of the following ones. Nonetheless, a qualitative and comparative 
analysis of the occurrence and representation of freedmen is included, and some 
general observations are distilled, which will be subsequently elaborated upon in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
 
Chapter 4: Libertinitas was a fundamental constituent of the social capital of both patron 
and freedman alike, rather than a stigmatising liability. The discursive function of 
libertination in “network embedded” sources was essential in constructing and 
consolidating trust networks. 
Whereas Chapters 1, 2, and 3 expounded on the theoretical, thematic, and heuristic 
frameworks of this dissertation, Chapter 4 begins the in-depth analytical part of the 
study. Like the subsequent chapters, it seeks to deconstruct in detail existing notions of 
libertinitas and the patronage relation that typically emanate from a macula servitutis 
 
                                                     
100 All Appendices are included on the CD-ROM attached to this dissertation. 
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framework. For this reason, a very comprehensive treatment of the source material was 
deemed necessary, in order to avoid falling back in traditional macula pitfalls. With 
Chapters 3, 5, and 8, this chapter shares a focus on “network embedded” sources, i.e. 
sources that were written while authors were fully aware – in a much more direct and 
pervasive way than is the case for any type of public discourse – of the potential 
repercussions and impact of what they wrote on their social network (either positive or 
negative). Network embedded sources were written in real life, rather than merely about 
it, and are throughout these chapters considered explicitly as a performative social 
practice rather than as a literary product. In Chapter 6, we contrast these sources with 
the public discourse of the elites, which was in this sense more “detached” from 
concerns related to network embeddedness. 
The central argument of this chapter (and the next) is that libertination – i.e. 
referencing a freedman by his legal status “libertus” – was neither a source of shame for 
these freedmen, nor a strategy of social stratification (let alone “stigmatisation”) of the 
writers of these documents. It demonstrates the unambiguous triadic correlation 
between the explicit mention of freed status, the reference to a freedman’s patron, and 
the role of this freedman in his patron’s trust networks. Instead of being the 
stigmatising tool it is often made out to be (especially for epigraphic sources), 
libertination thus served to positively stress the fides (loyalty, reliability) of a freedman 
insofar as it presented him as a quintessential part of his patron’s social, economic, and 
symbolic capital. This was not only beneficial for the freedman himself (he was, in the 
process, endowed with at least the image of this capital, which had very tangible 
consequences), but also for the patron (who arguably benefited the most from this 
configuration).  
 
Chapter 5: Recommendations of freedmen are identical to those of ingenui, despite 
previous claims that they were characterised by a specific vocabulary or a structural 
attention to subservience to a patron. 
This chapter is closely linked to the previous one in both theme and methodology. It 
elaborates the notion of libertination as a vital tool in publicising social capital by 
arguing that recommendations of freedmen were not essentially different from those of 
ingenui. It will briefly touch on the vocabulary and discourse (in a very literal sense of 
the word) employed when recommending freedmen (a focus that will be broadened in 
Chapter 7). The main aim, however, is to show that discursively embedding a freedman 
in the relation with his patron when recommending him, was – much like using 
libertination to do so – a practice also discernible in recommendations of ingenui (and 
even elites). It served to accentuate the vital trust-instilling strategies of “dyadic” and 
“network” learning, as well as the social capital of the commendatus (notions that are 
clarified and defined in detail in Chapter 1).  
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Chapter 6: Sources that did not originate in a network embedded context feature 
freedmen as contextualised expressions of an abstract category within a meta-narrative 
that served elite attempts at distinction, but that was detached from any real empirical 
basis. 
This chapter aims to highlight the performative function of libertination in network 
embedded sources by contrasting it with its function in a sample of “detached” sources. 
It shows how freedmen – both as a class and as individual representations of that class – 
served as a template for much broader concerns, related to the perceived increase in 
“usurpation from below”, to the “decline of freedom” and “moral decay” under the 
emperors, etc. This chapter too, has a prosopographical basis (i.c. an exhaustive 
database of freedmen occurring in the works of Suetonius and Tacitus). A preliminary 
statistical overview already clearly reveals structural differences with the network 
embedded letters of Cicero. Tacitus and Suetonius are usually much more negatively 
inclined, mention libertini much more often (as opposed to the almost exclusive focus on 
liberti in the epistolary databases), and focus heavily on imperial freedmen as reflections 
of the emperor’s policy. A significant part of this chapter, however, is dedicated to 
illustrating how notions of network embeddedness nonetheless survive in these 
“detached” sources, and how this sheds light on freedman socialisation. The main 
argument is that highly derogative references to (mostly imperial) freedmen – the basis 
par excellence for the macula servitutis framework – derive not so much from an ingrained 
belief of the moral inferiority of ex-slaves, but of an a priori designed elite meta-
narrative, in which the (perceived) wickedness of individual freedmen is extrapolated to 
the entire class of libertini, in order to present the danger they represent not only as a 
threat to elite exclusivity, but to the “natural order” of society as a whole. As such, this 
chapter is linked to Chapter 2, in that it pays particular attention to the metaphor of 
slavery as an elite tool of distinction. 
 
Chapter 7: The public transcript of public equality of freedmen as free men (or even 
citizens), as well as the practice of elite distinction – which was directed at the lower 
classes in general, rather than at freedmen in particular – explain why there existed no 
specific set of libertine values, no distinct vocabulary, and no discourse reserved for 
freedmen, despite earlier claims. 
This chapter revisits the ungrounded notion of a freedman vocabulary or discourse, 
already briefly hinted at in Chapter 5. As a consequence of the pervasive macula servitutis 
framework, scholars have generally assumed the existence of a specific set of virtues 
and terms reserved for freedmen. This chapter is conceived as a general critique on this 
assumption, and as such engages in constant dialogue with works like Mouritsen’s 
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recent synthesis on the Roman freedman (2011), or MacLean’s doctoral dissertation at 
Princeton University (2012), which are the most vigorous proponents of this model. The 
epigraphic sources used are mainly non-metric epitaphs, whereas the literary sample 
includes proponents of many different and diverging genres (comedy, historiography, 
poetry, epistolography, speeches, satire, etc.). This very wide scope contrasts with the 
much more specific attention to epistolography (Chapters 3-5), historiography and 
biography (Chapter 6), and metric inscriptions (Chapter 8), but has the compensatory 
advantage of allowing us to make broader claims. Indeed, one of the main critiques of 
Critical Discourse Analysis, which serves as a structuring methodology throughout this 
chapter, is that analyses so far have focused mainly on separate bodies of text, usually 
restricted to a very limited set of genres. By structurally analysing the occurrence, 
semantic scope, and connotations of alleged “freedman virtues” or “freedman 
vocabulary”, this chapter aims to refute the existence of any such notion in antiquity. 
 
Chapter 8: Sources written by and for freedmen themselves, highlight the various 
strategies of mediating identity, accentuating social capital, and construing a 
biographical narrative in which a servile past either did not feature at all, or merely as a 
secundum comparationis against which social promotion was highlighted. 
The chapter illuminates the “freedman’s perspective” as a contrast to the analysis of 
previous literary and legal sources, which usually originated from elite society. Like in 
the previous chapter, Scott’s transcript theory will provide the theoretical framework. 
The source base of this chapter is a database of metric inscriptions. The focus on these 
carmina latina epigraphica is justified because these epitaphs often contain much more 
(varied) information on the deceased (or dedicating) freedmen’s life – contrary to the 
bulk of non-metric epitaphs. The chapter serves as an epilogue, revisiting several of the 
arguments made in the previous chapters, but this time firmly from the freedman’s 
point of view. The use of libertination by these freedmen themselves, the notion of an 
all-pervasive presence of a servile past looming large in their every-day life, and the 
assumption of a specific set of libertine qualities are some of the main topics that are 
scrutinised. Furthermore, ample attention will be drawn to the possibilities (metric) 
commemoration provided a freedman with to mediate his social identity, and to find 
“paths to glory” unrelated to his servile past.  
 
* 
Together, these eight chapters add to our understanding of the freedman’s socialisation 
and place in the Roman world, and as such contribute to the vast scholarly tradition 
briefly outlined at the beginning of this introduction. Although this dissertation 
challenges the notion of a pervasive macula servitutis as the root cause for freedmen’s 
disabilities in the public and private sphere, and is as such in disagreement with some of 
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these earlier studies’ tenets, we hope to make clear along the way that it is at the same 
time greatly indebted to this tradition of freedmen scholarship, to which, it is hoped, it 
constitutes both a valuable contribution and a tribute – sit precor hoc iustum exemplis in 
parvo grandibus uti. 
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Chapter 1 Theoretical framework 
In this chapter, we extensively set out the theoretical framework of this study. To 
bridge the enormous gap – both methodological and practical – between source 
material on the one hand and any meaningful understanding of it on the other, a 
dialectic approach of empiric observations and models from social theory seems 
advised. The notorious scarcity of source material to which historians of other epochs 
sometimes cynically refer, as well as the resulting need to complement it with 
assumptions and hypotheses have been raised as an argument against the use of 
theoretical frameworks in historical research1. We run the risk, so the argument goes, 
that theory might not only fill the gaps created by the scattered source material but 
eventually also replace empirical evidence altogether. More than anything, such 
critiques should serve as a reminder that the application of social theory in historical 
research in general is not without its own methodological caveats. This does not mean, 
however, that it should therefore be avoided or abandoned altogether. Broad frames of 
reference and interpretation, in other words, serve to structure what would otherwise 
tend to become an obscuring and chaotic mass of source material. Borrowing the words 
of Hayden White – obviously taken from their original context – we consider our 
theoretical framework the plot of this dissertation: a structure of relations that gives 
meaning to the elements comprised within the work by identifying them as constitutive 
parts of an integrated whole2. Without such “meta-historical definitions” and 
generalising theories, we would throughout the analysis get lost in what the German 
historian Reinhart Koselleck called the “vortex of its historicization”3. 
 
                                                     
1 Cf. already Isaac (1982), 323: “The notorious obsession of historians with the seemingly intractable 
particularities of nonrecurrent, unique events has stood as a barrier to interchanges with 
aggressively generalising, nomothetic social sciences”. 
2 White (1990), 9. The original text aimed at defining “emplotment” as structuring strategy of the 
historian (“a structure of relationships by which the events contained in the account are endowed 
with a meaning by being identified as parts of an integrated whole”). 
3 Koselleck (2004), 259. 
 28 
In this chapter, then, we will expound our choice for a specific theory or model, 
paying particular attention to its scientific evolution and to its embeddedness in the 
disciplines of sociology and anthropology, without glancing over its limitations and 
pitfalls for historical application. These theories are roughly categorised under three 
headings: 1) trust, trustworthiness, and trust networks; 2) transcript theory; and 3) 
critical discourse analysis. The chapter ends with a final section containing a few brief 
notes on how the theoretical models will be operationalised throughout the subsequent 
analyses.  
1.1 Trust, trustworthiness, and social capital 
In order to be able to theoretically apply the concepts of trust and trust networks to 
historical analysis, one has to respect their embeddedness in social relations. As such, 
the traits and foundations of social relations themselves have to be accounted for before 
proceeding. The notion of social capital is thereby unavoidable. Because of the wide 
array of fields and disciplines that use the (or better yet: some) notion of social capital, 
we will set out by reviewing its genesis in the works of the French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu. In the following paragraphs, therefore, we will touch upon these concepts in 
the reverse order, building up in terms of relevance for our current purpose, but firmly 
rooting every step in its scientific and historical framework. It is not our intention here 
to reproduce Bourdieu’s sociology and its accomplishments as a whole. Instead, we will 
focus on some of its most influential constituting aspects that will prove to be of 
particular interest throughout this work.   
1.1.1 Pierre Bourdieu 
1.1.1.1 Bridging objective structure and subjective construction 
One of the most profound contributions of Bourdieu’s work was the closing of a chasm 
that had for decades prevented sociology from advancing as a discipline. Indeed, the 
field had been divided into two main schools that disagreed on whether the individual 
rather than social structures should be sociology’s main focus in explaining social 
reality. As one of the great founding fathers of the structuralist approach, Claude Lévi-
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Strauss believed that sociology should reveal the structural patterns that determine all 
human behaviour4. Probably the best known example of this approach is structuralist 
Marxism with its conviction that class structures limit, control, and essentially define 
individuals as well as their actions. This approach – in its most radical form – reduces 
the historical agent to a mere carrier of objective structures, unable to fundamentally 
influence or alter his own behaviour. On the other side of the spectrum, there were the 
proponents of a constructivist sociology (with the phenomenology-inspired approaches 
as its ultimate extreme), who maintained that the agent’s subjective experience of 
structures, and his ability to negotiate them should prevail in scientific analysis. The 
result, however, was an underappreciation (and sometimes even complete disregard) 
for the valuable insights of structuralism. Both schools were strengthened in their 
conviction by what their advocates believed to be the unmistakable validity of their 
method. Indeed, structuralists argued that recurrent patterns could not affluently be 
explained by the essentially empiric subjectivist approach. The other side – grouped 
under the heading of “post-structuralism” since the 1960’s, and spearheaded by scholars 
like Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault – stressed that structures are never able to 
predict or explain individual behaviour, thus concluding that the prime mover of social 
action must be the lived experience of agents5. 
Bourdieu methodologically uncovered the fallacies and shortcomings of both 
structuralism and constructivism (known in more philosophical terms as objectivism 
and subjectivism respectively) and made it his life’s work to distil their viable elements 
and to reconcile them in an entirely new approach to sociology. He considered 
structures and representations as being related dialectically. Objective structures first 
have to be constructed – which is possible only when the subjective representations of 
agents are momentarily disregarded – thus creating the limiting framework in which 
social action plays out. Objectivism, therefore, remains a valuable and necessary part of 
any scientific sociological endeavour. In a second stage, however, the representations 
need to be considered again since their ability to transform or reproduce said structures 
is as vital and constitutive of social reality as the structures themselves. This dialectical 
process repeats itself continuously – Bourdieu speaks of an alternation between opus 
operatum (or “structures structurées”) and modus operandi (or “structures 
structurantes”), and calls the process the “dialectic of the internalisation of externality 
and the externalization of internality”6. It is quite telling in this regard that Bourdieu 
 
                                                     
4 E.g. Lévi-Strauss (1958). 
5 E.g. Derrida (1967), which is a collection of Derrida’s early essays (of which “La structure, le signe et 
le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines” is the most relevant for the discussion at hand, p. 409-
29). 
6 Bourdieu (1977), 3, 72ff. Bourdieu (1989), 15, 18. 
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himself ended up indecisive as to the position of this new sociology within the field of 
tension between the structuralist and constructivist schools, but that he would 
definitely coin it either structuralist constructivism or constructivist structuralism7. 
Both descriptions, in any case, capture Bourdieu’s brilliance insofar as they bridge two 
opposing and conflicting visions on sociology. 
1.1.1.2 Habitus, field, and the reproduction of social power 
The most instrumental development throughout Bourdieu’s endeavour was the 
introduction of the notion habitus. An agent’s habitus can in a very simplistic manner be 
conceptualised as the mental or cognitive matrix that results from the aggregate 
accumulation and internalisation of that agent’s dispositions, preferences, and personal 
history. To a limited extent, this matrix in turn delineates a certain amount of potential 
“paths to take” and as such guides the individual’s behaviour and decision-making but 
never absolutely predetermines it. This latter trait of habitus should be stressed, since it 
constitutes an important deviation from the idea, particularly popular in rational choice 
theory and widely applied in economic sciences (cf. infra), that an agent is entirely 
rational and calculative in his decision-making. Bourdieu replaces a purely rational 
mode of thinking by a reasonable one: a practical sense which he often calls strategy, and 
which he describes, using a sports metaphor, as a sense of the game8. The habitus is thus 
both the internalisation of the external social structures that order reality and “the 
glasses” through which these structures are in turn conceived and reproduced9. People 
do what they “have to” do (i.e. what they necessarily have to do because of the 
restraining, limiting nature of habitus) but they also do what they “have” to do (i.e. the 
different options within the direction imposed by the habitus)10. This may seem, at first 
sight, an inescapable and, indeed, structuralist cycle: structures are reproduced through 
agents. However, for Bourdieu, these “glasses” do not force individuals into making 
predetermined choices. The habitus merely limits the potential courses of action. It 
steers the individual’s action and thinking but it leaves considerable opportunities to be 
“filled in” by the agent. Bourdieu thus accounts for both deterministic influences and 
individual freedom, and as such bridges another great divide within sociology, i.e. that 
between mechanistic, deterministic conceptions of action (traditionally associated on 
 
                                                     
7 Bourdieu (1989), 14. Bourdieu did stress his different conception of the “structuralist” part. 
Contrary to Lévi-Strauss’, Bourdieusian structures exist also in the “social world itself and not only 
within symbolic systems”.  
8 Bourdieu (1987), 77. 
9 Or in Bourdieu’s own words: “Habitus is both a system of schemes of production of practices and a 
system of perception and appreciation of practices”, Bourdieu (1989), 19. 
10 Berger (1986), 1448 makes a similar wordplay. 
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the structuralist side of the sociological spectrum) and a more subjectivist stance which 
fails to predict behaviour and action in any significant way since it considers both as 
pertaining to the realm of individuals’ “free will”. In short, for Bourdieu, people act 
practical and reasonable – and thus in a sense along the lines of expectation – but never 
wholly rational or predictable.  
The second concept Bourdieu needed to truly reconcile structuralism with 
constructivism was his notion of the field. Fields are differentiated and semi-autonomous 
spheres that constitute all social life (e.g. the political field, the religious field, the 
academic field, etc.). They are autonomous in the sense that they operate according to 
their own “rules” but are never truly isolated from one another. These “rules” are a 
complex matrix of interwoven presuppositions that guide action and to a certain degree 
steer thought within any given field. All agents in the field unconsciously adhere to these 
rules (because they are taken for granted and considered as natural) and as such 
confirm and reproduce them. When an actor – or a group of actors – in the field tries to 
change the very structures that define his relative position, a conflict arises with the 
defenders of the status quo (usually the socially dominant). At that moment, both 
groups will activate and engage their respective reservoir of power and resources 
(which Bourdieu calls capital) in order to reach or maintain the upper hand. Due to the 
nature of hegemonic discourse, such attempts are usually rendered in a pejorative way 
(“usurpation”, “insurrection”, “rebellion”) although they rarely truly surface11. 
Bourdieu himself called the rules of a field doxa (or in another sports metaphor: the rules 
of the game). Much like the habitus itself, doxa is a result of processes of internalisation 
and socialisation, making social reality appear self-evident. Bourdieu explicitly 
accentuated the term doxa since it was of paramount importance to distinguish it from 
“an orthodox or heterodox belief [that both imply] awareness and recognition of the 
possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs”12.  
The conceptualisation of social reality as a collection of fields is Bourdieu’s answer to 
the structuralist line of thinking which generally uses monolithic systems – oftentimes 
crystallised in the great “-isms” such as capitalism, Marxism or, ironically, structuralism 
itself – to render the social world comprehensible. A common trait of such structuralist 
-isms is their a priori determined nature. For structuralist Marxists, for example, an 
agent is wholly defined by the class relations of the society in which he thinks and acts. 
For Bourdieu, reality is more complex since it is shaped by multiple layers or fields. 
Fields are not monolithic or unalterable but, quite on the contrary, subject to constant 
sways as a result of historical dynamics. These dynamics are primarily a consequence of 
 
                                                     
11 See the discussion of Scott’s concepts of public and hidden transcripts below. 
12 Bourdieu (1977), 164. 
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shifting balances and changing distributions of the capital present in every field. This 
leads us to Bourdieu’s capital metaphor which will be touched upon (with specific 
attention to the social form of capital) below. It is important to note that fields are 
separate entities although linked to each other by the capacity of capital to be 
transferred between them. Moreover, the political field is considered to be the most 
important one since the relations of power within it, structured hierarchically, organise 
all other fields. The field of political power, in short, cuts through all other fields. 
The concepts of habitus and field bridge a structuralist approach that would mainly 
consider the latter, and a constructivist view that would focus on the actor’s potential 
for agency and negotiation of the matrix that constitutes his habitus. Moreover, the 
interplay of habitus and field has particularly weighty implications for our 
understanding of social dominance. When an agent’s habitus is shaped within a field and 
few external influences occur throughout his lifetime (i.e. influences that would 
dramatically change the positioning of the field or the positioning of the agents within 
it), Bourdieu argues that the agent’s thinking and acting will be instant and intuitive. 
When habitus and field thus align, the agent experiences what Bourdieu called cohesion 
without concept13. An agent is so embedded in (and moulded by) the field that his actions 
within it require no thought: his position and his disposition overlap14. Bourdieu 
himself, in one of his many colourful analogies, compared this condition to that of a fish 
in the water. It is only until the fish is somehow removed from the water that it will 
realise what constituted its “feeling like a fish in the water”, i.e. that it becomes aware 
and critical of the arbitrariness of its internalised habitus. The same happens to a 
historical agent when the field in which he operates transforms in a relatively short 
term: his habitus is overhauled by these sudden changes in the field, a situation which 
Bourdieu captured with the term hysteresis15. In a sense, this is a corollary of what the 
German historian Reinhart Koselleck has called the interplay between all the past 
experiences and memories of an individual or group (Erfahrungsraum) on the one hand, 
and all the hopes and expectations they hold for the future (Erwartungshorizont) on the 
other16. As long as the Erfahrungsraum and Erwartungshorizont coincide, that is, as long as 
 
                                                     
13 Wacquant (1992), 21. 
14 Bourdieu oftentimes loans the language of Goffman to refer to this “sense of one’s place”, 
Bourdieu (1989), 17; Bourdieu (2000), 184. 
15 Bourdieu (1977), 78. 
16 Koselleck (2004), 255-275. See also already Gramsci (1971), 200: “no society sets itself tasks for 
whose accomplishment the necessary and sufficient conditions do not either already exist or are not 
at least beginning to emerge and develop (…) the problem itself arises only when the material 
conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation”. New 
Institutional Economics would later adapt this notion in its concept of “path dependence”, cf. notes 
89 and 92 below. 
  33 
an individual or group expects the future to be not all that different from the past or the 
present, the status quo is maintained and shared ideologies and models keep their 
relevance. This could be part of an explanation for the fact that early proponents of 
Christianity – despite some manifest philanthropic ideals – did not fundamentally 
question the existence of the most dehumanising of institutions: slavery. When, 
however, a relatively abrupt upheaval occurs which questions the very validity of the 
current system or ideology – say, the beheading of a French king in the wake of 
persisting protests – the future suddenly becomes a blank sheet and the traditional 
confidence that past experiences will be reproduced to give form to the future starts to 
waver. It is more or less this effect that Bourdieu envisages when he talks about rising 
discrepancies between habitus and field. The habitus is outpaced by (and therefore 
rendered inadequate to match) the evolution of the objective structures of which it was 
itself an internalisation. Friction arises due to the habitus’ durability and relative 
inertness in the face of such changing circumstances. Existential categories no longer 
seem to apply (or are no longer compatible with social structures) and their 
fundamental arbitrariness is laid bare. The fish is no longer in the water and only now, 
for the first time, notices that the water was there all along but that alternative 
conceptions of reality are feasible as well. 
A necessary consequence of the positioning of agents within a field according to their 
habitus, is the fact that any inequality implied by this position is considered natural. 
Because the habitus is largely shaped by a priori present social structures (which by 
definition contain hierarchy and inequality), the latter are uncritically accepted and 
may even go unnoticed by the agent. By internalising said structures, subordinate 
individuals and groups not only tacitly accept but also reproduce these structures, 
leading to a perverse situation in which the dominated become an instrument of their 
own subordination. Although these concepts are theorised on a rather general level, 
recent scholarship has used them as a framework for more empirically inspired 
approaches17. Subordinated individuals do not merely “settle” in this position from a 
feeling of inherent powerlessness and usually they do not even do so consciously. 
Indeed, the strength of any dominant group is directly related to its ability to conceal 
the workings and results of the inequality it (re)produces18. Rather than a conscious 
genuflexion to the power of social superiors, the consent of subordinates to their own 
inferiority results from the fit between field and habitus which is barely noticeable at all 
as long as one remains “in the water”. Bourdieu calls this share of subordinates in their 
 
                                                     
17 E.g. Langman (1998) examines how individual identities may be shaped primarily by (often 
invisible) ideologies which in the process also legitimise them. By doing so, they impose and 
reproduce inherent qualities which as a consequence become invisible to these individuals as well.  
18 Cf. infra for Scott’s notion of the public transcript. 
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own subordination symbolic violence19. Symbolic violence obscures the arbitrary nature of 
power relations and inequality and makes the habitus look like intrinsically natural. It is 
practiced and sustained through control over cultural tools such as language and 
symbols (cf. infra). 
1.1.1.3 Gramsci’s legacy 
It should be clear that the notion of symbolic violence bears some resemblance to the 
Gramscian concept of hegemony as domination by consent. Throughout his activity as a 
political thinker, the Italian communist theorist Antonio Gramsci stressed the fact that 
ideologies are not merely deceptions or illusions to which subordinates are subject (as 
his fellow countryman Benedetto Croce would have it) but rather “real historical facts 
[anything but arbitrary,] which must be combatted and their nature as instruments of 
domination revealed (…) in order to destroy one hegemony and create another”20. 
Contrary to Bourdieu, Gramsci primarily (though not exclusively) had the hegemony of 
and by “the state” in mind; a consequence, of course, of his writing under the fascist 
regime in Italy’s 1930s. He did, however, make a distinction between two institutional 
levels: the civic society (i.e. the private sphere) on the one hand and the political society 
(i.e. the state) on the other. With the necessary amount of good will, one could here 
identify the roots of Bourdieu’s concept of fields or at least of the practice (in 
rudimentary form) of distinguishing between spheres of social reality within a theory of 
social dominance. Of course, Max Weber had also separated (economic) class from 
(prestige-related) status and (political) power21, but Bourdieu did not agree with the 
strictness by which these spheres were disjointed. Fields (as he would call them in his 
own model) were related to each other because of the capacity of capital to be 
transferred between them (cf. infra).  
Through the civic level, Gramsci argued, the dominant can exercise their hegemony 
whereas the political level is used to “dominate more directly”. The former instils a 
“spontaneous consent (…) ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent 
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in 
the world of production”22. If not for the reduction of hegemony to a very restricted 
Marxist sense (by the last word of the sentence), Gramsci’s conception of consent would 
have been very similar to Bourdieu’s idea of symbolic violence. One of the fundamental 
 
                                                     
19 Bourdieu (2001), 1-2 defines symbolic violence as “a gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible 
even to its victims, exerted for the most part through the purely symbolic channels of 
communication and cognition (more precisely, misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling”. 
20 Gramsci (1971), 196. 
21 Weber (2002), 531-40 [originally published in 1922]. 
22 Gramsci (1971), 306. 
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differences between the two theories of reproduction of social power, however, is that 
Bourdieu’s symbolic violence implies that subordinates (due to the overlap between 
habitus and field) do not explicitly recognise domination. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, 
on the contrary, states that the suppressed groups do recognise domination but that 
they choose to consent to it. In this sense, Gramscian consent (as a “voluntary” reaction 
to the dominant’s hegemony) and Bourdieusian symbolic violence (as the result of the 
failure to recognise domination) are rather each other’s opposites. A subordinate’s 
unconscious complicity in his own subordination makes any wish to intentionally alter 
current practices of domination a priori impossible. Such wish would by definition have 
to originate from a sociologist who understands the underlying processes and 
mechanisms of the reproduction of power. Much less platonic would be a Gramscian 
struggle for hegemony, since it merely requires enough popular dissatisfaction with the 
establishment, a breaking down of the potential reasons for subordinates to consent to 
the status quo.  
It should be clear that there are certain similarities between Bourdieu and Gramsci. 
They both questioned and abandoned deeply rooted Marxist principles by focussing 
primarily on the so called cultural superstructures (or “fields”) rather than on any 
determining economic base in their respective theories of reproduction of power23. 
Although Gramsci’s insights were highly original at the time and have influenced 
political thought ever since (both within and outside Marxist circles), Bourdieu’s theory 
of cultural reproduction – which distances itself more than Gramsci’s from the Marxist 
tradition – is generally considered to reflect social reality better. It is for this reason that 
we will now turn to Bourdieu’s capital metaphor, to the concept of social capital within it, 
and to its relevance for a coherent and relevant theory of trust and trust networks in 
particular. 
1.1.1.4 The capital metaphor 
Capital as a metaphor for resources that are not (necessarily) of an economic nature is 
not an innovation of Bourdieu. The American economist Gary Becker, for example, 
already wrote his controversial eponymous study of human capital in 1964, paying 
particular attention to its economic and cultural implications24. Bourdieu, however, was 
 
                                                     
23 For an illuminating comparison between the theories of domination of Gramsci and Bourdieu, see 
Burawoy (2008). 
24 Becker (1964). Three years earlier, Schultz (1961) had already drawn attention to this notion of 
human capital. 
 36 
the first to integrate the capital metaphor in an all-encompassing theory of social 
reproduction25.  
The most important forms of capital are economic capital (mainly material resources), 
cultural capital (know-how, skills, connections), social capital (group membership, bonds, 
networks), and symbolic capital (prestige, recognition)26. Whereas economic capital is 
usually the easiest to grasp, the other three can be best understood as “all the inherited 
and acquired skills and facilities that function as assets (and liabilities) (…) and that, like 
economic capital, their possessors may deploy [i.e. in fields]”27. Capital of one sort can be 
transformed into capital of another sort by a process Bourdieu called transubstantiation. 
The commensurate currency in all such transformations is, however, economic capital 
in its most literal and material sense28. The value of another kind of capital (especially 
symbolic capital) is immediately related to its ability to disguise its essentially economic 
nature29. The learnedness of a young man is usually more prestigious when it is (claimed 
to be) due to his innate talent and greatness or to his industriously studying for months 
or years on end than when it is attributed solely to his father’s ability to send him to the 
most expensive educational institutes and to provide him with the best professional 
guidance. Respectability, in this case, is essentially derived from financial investment 
but it is important that it is not made too obvious. A sense of meritocratic achievement 
thus contributes to the already prominent status of inherited capital. This works both 
ways. Once the son will have eventually attained, say, a high public office (i.e. has 
transformed his father’s economic, social and symbolic capital into (more) symbolic 
capital of his own), he can use this position to more easily transform some of it (back) 
into (more) economic capital. Symbolic capital is therefore the most valuable form of 
capital since it exists essentially in the acceptance by others that all the other capital 
belonging to this agent is both valuable and justified (i.e. not arbitrarily attributed to 
him).  
 
                                                     
25 Critiques have been raised against the use of the notion “capital”. These generally centre around 
the observation that the economic connotation of the term obscures its true meaning. E.g. Solow 
(2000), 6-7; Arrow (2000), 4. Fukuyama (1995), 26-7 separates social capital from the other forms of 
capital because it cannot be rationally invested in. Especially in this case, then, does the economic 
connotation of capital obscure the true meaning of the metaphor. 
26 Bourdieu recognised yet other forms of capital such as academic capital, Bourdieu (1984), 18-23. 
Other forms of capital have been proposed by scholars drawing on Bourdieu, e.g. linguistic, 
scientific, or artistic capital. DiMaggio (1979), 1468 rightly warns, however, against the dangers of 
this “proliferation of forms of capital” since its “metaphorical currency undergoes inflation and its 
value declines accordingly”.  
27 Berger (1986), 1446.  
28 Bourdieu (2005) [1986]; Bourdieu (1979), 128-144. 
29 This aspect of Bourdieu’s theory has been heavily criticised for being a reductionist vision 
whereby economic capital is given undue privilege, Tzanakis (2013), 3. 
  37 
Although economic capital is considered the “common currency” in the 
transubstantiation process, it should be stressed that Bourdieu would never have agreed 
with a reduction of his model to a mere “economism” without paying attention to the 
social importance and performative functions of the other forms of capital. Ignoring the 
central role of economic capital, on the other hand, leads to a similar disregard of some 
of the essential structural components of the metaphor30. Like the interplay of habitus 
and field, therefore, Bourdieu’s capital metaphor is in its own right strongly concerned 
with bridging the structural dichotomies within sociology.  
The position of an actor in any given field is determined by the quantity (“volume”) 
and the quality (“relative weight”) of his capital31. All social conflict (i.e. agents 
mobilising their resources and power to renegotiate or confirm their relative positions 
in a field) can be reduced to these agents trying to obtain more or more precious forms 
of capital (i.e. capital that in any particular field is valued more than another form of 
capital). In this way, Bourdieu’s conception of social struggle is markedly different from 
that of many Marxist thinkers who traditionally prioritise (or even single out) economic 
capital as prime mover. Indeed, whereas structural Marxists would explain the 
precarious situation of “proletarians” primarily to their position in the production 
process, Bourdieu stresses that such a focus on the economic field alone is not sufficient 
to capture the inherent complexity of society. Instead, he reminds us that social reality 
is configured through and within many different fields in each of which social struggles 
can and do occur according to their own “rules”. 
As a consequence, “class” in Bourdieu’s model is defined not in the usual way. Marx (and 
Gramsci too) saw economic capital as the most important (or sole) prime mover of social 
positioning. Class as an absolute category was a corollary of the postulated capitalist 
division of the means of production and therefore existed even prior to any class 
struggle. Bourdieu’s attention to other forms of capital made him aware that “class” is 
not only an economic position, but also a socio-cultural one, defined by the different 
forms capital can take and its specific configuration within any given field. Instead of 
being a given, “class” thus becomes a concept of which the meaning has to be 
continuously (re)established since every manifestation of it is per definition different 
due to the unique relations, proportions, and distribution of the respective forms of 
capital that constitute it. Perhaps even more importantly, class for Bourdieu is not only 
this actual position (let alone an objective one in Marxist thought) but also agents’ 
perception of this position32. 
 
                                                     
30 Bourdieu (2005) [1986], 104-5. 
31 Bourdieu (1989), 17; Bourdieu (2005) [1986]. 
32 Bourdieu (1989), 17-18. 
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1.1.2 Social capital and trust 
Trust and trust networks are typically related to, and embedded in, social capital. It is on 
this specific form of capital that we will concentrate now. The pivotal role of trust will 
inevitably surface already in these paragraphs, but will be elaborated upon in more 
detail in 1.2.2. The literature on “social capital” and “trust” is vast and its degree of 
specialisation often overwhelming. It is, at any rate, too extensive to completely 
circumscribe in the limited amount of paragraphs reserved for it below. We will 
nonetheless highlight and contextualise its relevant aspects and dimensions for our 
study. Our aim is therefore not to review all the literature on both notions in general – 
an impossible task indeed – but to provide an outline of the terms, concepts, and 
assumptions that will reoccur throughout this study in particular, without omitting 
their theoretical foundation altogether.  
1.1.2.1 Social capital: definition and proliferation 
In its most rudimentary form, social capital can be described as the value that ensues 
from the investment of resources in durable relations and networks. The notion of 
social capital has its roots in the work of French sociologist Emile Durkheim, which 
drew attention to the bonds of mechanic and organic solidarity between people in any 
given society33. Durkheim’s approach, to be clear, was structuralist and objectivist to the 
bone. Social life, he was convinced, “doit s'expliquer, non par la conception que s'en 
font ceux qui y participent, mais par des causes profondes qui échappent à la 
conscience”34. But his general observation that social bonds are the bare foundation of 
any society remains valuable up until today. Indeed, the very essence of the notion of 
social capital as it is understood nowadays can be described with the adage 
“relationships matter”35. People who interact with other people form groups, bonds, 
and networks which provide them not only with psychological advantages (e.g. a sense 
of belonging) but also practical and instrumental ones. The resulting shared mental 
models not only facilitate the fostering of norms and the improvement of intergroup 
communication, but “being a member” of this or that group can also serve as an asset in 
negotiations outside the group itself (e.g. in interaction with other groups or networks). 
Neoclassical economics have traditionally undervalued these social aspects of human 
behaviour, resulting in an “undersocialised conception of man” that explains social and 
 
                                                     
33 Durkheim (2013), passim [originally published in 1893]. 
34 Durkheim (1970), 250. He shared with Marx the belief that such structures were conditioned by 
the division of labour and the unequal distribution of the means of production. Cf. Seligman (1997), 
4. 
35 Field (2008), 1. 
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economic institutions primarily in terms of their functions and that as a consequence 
neglects their embeddedness in more tangible, personal relations36. It was therefore 
primarily in reaction to such conceptions that sociologists began to balance the scales 
by stressing the importance of groups, networks, trust, and social capital. These, as is 
generally accepted now, constitute an important basis of social action and have as a 
consequence become an immensely attractive theoretical framework in many different 
disciplines.  
Bourdieu defined social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources 
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to 
membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the 
collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various 
senses of the word”37. As we have seen, Bourdieu’s conception of social capital is firmly 
embedded in a much more comprehensive model and its essence cannot be grasped 
without taking into account other Bourdieusian concepts and processes such as the 
habitus-field relationship and the capital metaphor. In this model, social capital is – like 
the other forms of capital – a vital factor in attributing and reproducing positions in a 
field and has, as such, direct bearing on the reproduction of social power and inequality. 
Other theorists have disconnected the concept with Bourdieu’s general model and have 
studied the nature, value, and performativity of social capital in more empirically-based 
contexts. In a first movement, this happened most prominently in the works of the 
American sociologist James Coleman38. Once its enormous explanatory and analytical 
power was recognised, however, it became one of the most rapidly proliferated 
scientific concepts in the fields of economics and political sciences as well39.  
1.1.2.1.1 Macro- or micro-level? 
Like Bourdieu, Coleman considered social capital as relational40 but broke with the 
Bourdieusian conception by 1) studying it primarily on the macro-level, 2) embedding it 
in a theory of rational action, and 3) attributing to it a primarily positive, bonding 
function, whereas Bourdieu’s model allowed for a more nuanced evaluation in which 
social capital was also responsible for the reproduction of social inequality41. The 
 
                                                     
36 Granovetter (1985), 483ff. A critique on the opposite, oversocialised notion of action was 
formulated by Wrong (1961). 
37 Bourdieu (2005) [1986], 101. 
38 Coleman (1988); Coleman (1990). 
39 E.g. Dasgupta & Serageldin (2000); Putnam (1993a); Lyon (2000), 676. 
40 Coleman (1988), 100-1. 
41 Coleman (1988), 97-8. 
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American political scientist Putnam likewise analyses social capital on the macro-level 
but goes even further by considering it a variable that can be used to compare entities 
(groups but also whole regions) on this macro-level. Even more than Coleman, Putnam 
engaged social capital as a tool in studying the cohesion of civil structures and – in 
extenso – of a society as a whole, as well as its ability to serve as an indicator of 
“performance” in fields such as economy and politics42. Putnam thus agreed with 
Coleman on the primarily positive and progressive function of social capital43. We will 
not go into further detail as to the manifest differences between these particular 
scholars. The specific issues that Coleman, Putnam, and yet other scholars raised, as well 
as the many additions to social capital theory they provided, will be touched upon 
below insofar as they prove relevant for our framework44. 
The enormous popularity of social capital as an analytical tool has resulted in every 
study creating its own working definition. Despite their nuancing particular aspects and 
accentuating different features, all these studies share a particular interest in laying 
bare the ability of social capital to smoothen cooperation within and between groups45. 
One of the most fundamental splits within the sociology of social capital relates to the 
debate, briefly referred to above, whether it should be used as a theoretical framework 
on the micro-level or on the marcro-level of investigation. Studies which prefer the 
latter perspective typically analyse the relation between social capital on the one hand 
and governmental efficiency, economic performance and growth, or even the workings 
of national courts on the other46. As indicated above, the work of Putnam is one of the 
most representative examples of this approach. He considered social capital a collective 
 
                                                     
42 Putnam (1993b), 105-7 speaks of a “decline in social capital [that] helps explain the economic and 
political troubles of our own democracy”, of the need to invest in a “nation's portfolio of social 
capital”, and argues that “to revitalize our democracy we shall need to begin by rebuilding social 
capital in our communities, by renewing our civic connections”. 
43 Note that trust is also generally considered positive, Lyon (2000), 665; Gambetta (1988), 214. For a 
historically supported critique on this one-sided belief, see Ogilvie (2005) which points to the darker 
side of particularised and differential trust, and Granovetter (1985), 401 which considers the 
potential of trust to cause agents to cheat. See also Tzanakis (2013), 8, which points out that social 
capital “cannot be assumed to be equally distributed in a network nor equally accessible by all 
actors. (…) Therefore Putnam’s [but also Coleman’s] a priori assumption that trust [and social 
capital] has pro-social consequences is unfounded and proves in practice simplistic.”  
44 We refer the reader interested in a convenient overview of the conceptualisation of social capital 
in the works of some of its most well-known proponents (Bourdieu, Coleman, Putnam, Loury, …), to 
Portes (1998), esp. 3-6; Siisiäinen (2000); Tzanakis (2013), 3-8 (including several structural critiques 
on each of these authors). 
45 Quibria (2003) provides an overview of “the confusing medley” of interpretations related to social 
capital, esp. p. 21-6. Portes (1998), 2 criticises the fact that social capital has “evolved into something 
of a cure-all for the maladies affecting society” and warns against the further proliferation of the 
term which would necessarily lead to even more loss of meaning. 
46 E.g. Putnam (1993a); Fukuyama (1995); La Porta et al. (1997). 
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feature of social organisations that had immediate bearing on the level of development 
of civic institutions47. Studies like this use the notions of social capital and trust as an 
analytic framework to illuminate social processes and human behaviour sensu largo on 
a group, corporational, communal or even national (i.e. aggregate) level. A common 
trait of all these studies is that they systematically ignore and undervalue individual 
heterogeneity. This has, of course, not gone unnoticed. Due criticism was formulated by 
scholars who claimed that any collectivist approach to social capital must on the most 
basic level be a “function of individual-level actions and attributes” and that attention is 
therefore due to social capital as an analytic concept on that very level48. For our 
purpose, attention to individuals’ embeddedness in their social networks of trust will be 
a means to bridge this dichotomy in the sense that we acknowledge that inherent 
aspects of the patron-freedman relationship loom large in every reference that is made 
to a freedman, be it in a negative or positive context. Whereas the close reading of 
individual passages in Cicero’s letters draws us rather to the individualistic side of the 
above mentioned spectrum, we make sure to situate each of these concrete cases in the 
larger frameworks of patronage and trust relations of which they are a manifestation. 
1.1.2.1.2 Particularised versus generalised trust 
Another important divide in the literature on social capital in the wake of Bourdieu is 
the distinction between so called “particularised trust” and “generalised trust”49. This 
distinction may in some cases overlap with the micro-macro level divide, but does not 
do so as a rule. Particularised trust exists between individuals or groups by virtue of 
these particular entities knowing each other “personally” (e.g. as a consequence of 
previous contacts, by having received information concerning the other’s 
trustworthiness, or by the other being a member of a “trustworthy” group). People in a 
particularised trust context trust each other because they possess tangible indications 
that the other “is to be trusted” based on knowledge of his characteristics50. Generalised 
 
                                                     
47 Putnam (1993c), passim (esp. 35-6). 
48 Glaeser et al (1999); Portes (1998); Tzanakis (2013), esp. 8: “aggregating trust at the regional or 
national level eclipses information about all the vital variability of trust at the individual level. (…) 
context makes all the difference (…). [The macro perspective] ignores actors’ subjective 
understandings, fundamental in shaping the emergent meanings assigned to such relationships”. 
49 Lyon (2000), 677 refers to this distinction in a slightly different context when asking the question 
“whether there are pervasive norms of generalised morality that shape whole markets or societies, 
or whether each relationship has to be considered in its own changing context”.   
50 For a theoretical outline of generalised and particularised trust, see for example Al-Khalifa (2009). 
The study (and many others like it) is mainly concerned with issues that are not at all related to the 
subject of this dissertation (usually macro-perspective economic structures). The parts in which the 
theoretical approaches are elucidated, however, provide valuable information on both generalised 
and particularised trust (i.c. p. 56-64). For the many different aspects and implications of the 
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trust, on the other hand, is “blind” in the sense that it occurs in situations where the 
trustor does not personally know the trustee. The trust exists by virtue of institutions 
that either motivate and encourage trust and trustworthiness or that allow for a course 
of action in the case trust is damaged (e.g. formal institutions like contracts and laws 
but also informal ones such as stigmatisation by an in-group or the prospect of being 
excluded from further transactions). These institutions are continuously reproduced on 
both the individual and societal level through processes of socialisation51. Information, 
knowledge, and experience become less important in a context of generalised trust 
since morality and norms render them redundant. Generalised trust – “the belief that 
most people can be trusted” – is a modern phenomenon52 and is typically considered 
beneficial and desirable as a means to improve coherence within a society on both the 
social, economic, and political level53. It is, moreover, tacitly assumed in most literature 
on this dichotomy that an average increase in particularised trust will lead to an 
increase in generalised trust. Misztal, for example, claims that “each positive contact 
with our local doctor (…) may gradually increase our confidence in the medical 
system”54. This link between particularised and generalised trust has, however, not been 
qualified. Empirical studies have shown, for example, that individuals place more trust 
in their own doctor than in the more abstract health system. The idea that an increase 
in particularised trust results in a corresponding increase in generalised trust is 
therefore heavily contested55. Groundless assumptions like this are due primarily to the 
fact that generalised trust is very difficult, if not impossible, to study (let alone quantify) 
in a consistent and structured way. A similar critique has been raised against the macro-
level conception of social capital by Coleman cum suis (cf. supra)56. 
1.1.2.1.3 Bonding and bridging social capital 
A final theoretical distinction in the literature on social capital is that between bonding 
and bridging social capital57.  Patulny and Svendsen have argued compellingly that the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
dichotomy particularised vs generalised trust, see Uslaner (2002), passim; Hooghe & Stolle (2003), 
passim; Ogilvie (2005), passim (e.g. p. 5). 
51 Platteau (1994), 536 (writing primarily from an economic perspective). 
52 Uslaner (2002), 9 (incl. further references), 21. 
53 E.g. Hooghe & Stolle (2003), 2 (“Generalised trust and generalised reciprocity (…) can be 
considered as integral and probably irreplaceable parts of any democratic political culture”). 
54 Misztal (1996), 14-5. 
55 Tonkiss & Passey (1999). See also Ogilvie (2005), which questions the proportionate increase in 
generalised trust as a consequence of an increase in particularised trust (e.g. p. 39). 
56 Hooghe & Stolle (2003), 233-6; Lyon (2000), 665. 
57 The division has been part and parcel of the literature on social capital for a while now, but the 
specific terms “bonding” and “bridging” were coined by Gittell & Vidal (1998), 8. 
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distinction – going as far back as Durkheim’s opposition between mechanical and 
organic solidarity – is often not yet given its due attention and that many problems in 
the scholarship on social capital (relating to both conceptualisation and quantification) 
have their origin in precisely this neglect58. Bonding social capital is social capital that 
exists within strongly knit-together groups such as families whereas bridging social 
capital consists of much weaker ties that allow for connecting, transcending, indeed, 
“bridging” particular groups. The former is “inward looking” and typically the domain 
of “exclusive”, “homogenous” groups whereas the latter is “outward looking”, “open”, 
and “encompassing”59. As the specific choice of words already betrays, both kinds of 
social capital have been attributed a qualitative evaluation which more often than not 
boiled down to a simple negative versus positive opposition. Bridging social capital is 
generally praised for its “potential for accessing information and opening up new 
contacts outside a person’s own circle”60. Bonding social capital, on the contrary, may 
lead to “primordialism”, “essentialism”, and “parochialism”61. It is no coincidence, then, 
that in sociological literature, bonding social capital has been traditionally linked to 
contexts of particularised trust and bridging social capital to contexts of generalised 
trust62. Particularised and generalised trust have been subjected to a similar binary and 
exclusive qualitative categorisation. Following the warnings of social geographer Colin 
Williams, Patulny and Svedsen address this issue in a couple of paragraphs under the 
meaningful title “Is bonding always “bad?”63. Their answer is in the negative and they 
succeed in painting a very nuanced image of the division, paying particular attention to 
the positive effects of bridging as well as bonding social capital. Coleman has been one 
of the most influential scholars that attributed a positive role to the practice of clearly 
demarcating group boundaries and establishing strong in-group bonds. He even 
considered such “closure”, as he called it, essential for the generation, increase, and 
effectiveness of social capital64. Indeed, closure makes sure that members (as well as 
non-members) are clearly defined which in turn guarantees that compliance to norms 
can be enforced and violation adequately punished. This opinion has not escaped 
criticism, as scholars argued that closure is only desirable or necessary in particular 
 
                                                     
58 Patulny & Svendsen (2007), passim (e.g. p. 33). This article contains the most essential references 
to literature on the subject. 
59 Putnam (2000), 22. 
60 Tonkiss (2004), 21. 
61 Tzanakis (2013), 5. Patulny & Svendsen (2007), 33 discusses the contrast between the openness of 
bridging social capital and the exclusivity of bonding social capital in terms of the common 
evaluation sociologists attribute to them respectively. 
62 Patulny & Svendsen (2007), 35. 
63 Patulny & Svendsen (2007), 36-7. 
64 Coleman (1988), 105-108. 
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contexts but that in many other instances, closure actually impedes rather than 
facilitates the growth of social capital65. Granovetter has argued, for example, that 
connections that bridge two networks (“weak ties”) are more valuable in achieving 
specific goals than connections that only strengthen the cohesion of one particular 
network (“strong ties”). The ability to transcend his own network enables the individual 
to draw upon information and resources that would not have been accessible if he only 
invested in “strong ties” or “closure”66. This is a valuable observation to keep in mind 
throughout the discussion of freedmen’s social capital, and will be invoked explicitly in 
the section on the letters of recommendation. 
1.1.2.2 Trust: definition(s) and debates 
As mentioned before, Durkheim already noted that the act of creating and maintaining 
solidarity and the grouping of people who mutually trust each other, constitutes the very 
basis of any historical society. Accounting for and respecting the different socio-
historical context, this meta-historical character of trust and trust networks allows for a 
projection of modern theory of trust on antiquity. Indeed, both trust (fides) and 
institutionalised forms of reciprocity that anchored and encapsulated this trust (e.g. 
patronage relations) were omnipresent in the Roman world and in the minds of the 
people that inhabited it.  
The extraordinary difficulty in precisely grasping a concept as multi-faceted as trust 
is already perceivable in the many different (kinds of) definitions that have been 
proposed for it. The Oxford English Dictionary instinctively defines it as the “confidence 
in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a person or thing, or the truth of a 
statement”. Macro-level sociologists tend to define it in broader terms such as “the 
expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and co-operative 
behaviour, based on commonly shared norms”67. Functionalist approaches to trust 
would prefer Luhmann’s conception of it as a means of neutralising or at least 
downplaying the potential dangers of social interaction68. In all of these cases, however, 
trust has been credited for being “essential for stable relationships, vital for the 
maintenance of cooperation, fundamental for any exchange and necessary for even the 
 
                                                     
65 For this strand of critique on Coleman’s work, see Tzanakis (2013), 5, including references. For a 
historical study that takes into account the value (and limitations) of closure as a concept, see 
Ogilvie (2005), passim (e.g. p. 3). 
66 Granovetter (1973), esp. 1360-9. By focussing not only on the traditional “strong ties”, Granovetter 
tries to bridge the gap between micro- and macro-level sociology.  
67 Fukuyama (1995), 26. 
68 Luhmann (1979), passim. 
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most routine of everyday interactions”69. More nuanced definitions stress the potential 
downside of trusting: “trust involves a social relationship in which one person makes 
themself vulnerable to another who can do them harm if the trust is misplaced. (…) 
Trust implies a judgment of risk in conditions of uncertainty”70. 
Much like the case of social capital, the realisation of the central role of trust in 
society and social relations has led to a vast amount of literature that at times helped 
more in obscuring the concept than in clarifying it. In addition, vital theoretical 
observations are often overlooked or ignored. The difference between trust as a 
personal inner feeling (and by definition unobservable to the sociologist or historian) on 
the one hand and trust as a more detectable tendency to trust in general is a good 
example. Ogilvie, calling these different forms “trust as sentiment” and “trust as 
propensity” respectively, draws attention to the fact that many scholars of social capital 
fail to make this distinction, leading to severe conceptual confusion71. Since there exist 
no clearly defined behavioural indicators of trust or distrust, trust as a sentiment 
continues to elude social scientists even though their language and rhetorical strategies 
often refer to trust precisely as an individual inner feeling72. 
Misztal provides one of the most comprehensive overviews of the academic history of 
and the sociological literature on the concept of trust. This overview primarily 
concentrates on trust in contemporary society, considers it mainly from a macro-level 
perspective, and is sometimes rather functionalist insofar as trust is defined and 
characterised primarily by its utility within society. In the third chapter in particular, 
Misztal lists the three main functions of trust. Trust is integrative (it promotes and 
proliferates social order), it reduces the increasing complexity of modern society (it 
compensates for the inability to take into account all possible factors in choice-making), 
and it is a lubricant for cooperation73. These functions roughly coincide with the 
tripartite conceptualisation of trust as the domain of the social system as a whole, of 
social relations, and of individuals (cf. macro versus micro level divide). It should be 
clear that we will primarily focus on this latter, micro-level function of trust, given its 
obvious relevance and applicability on the ancient source material. However, critiques 
have been uttered against approaches that consider the individual level in isolation of 
 
                                                     
69 Misztal (1996), 12, including many more references to scholars pointing out the crucial role of 
trust in society. For an overview of the progress that has been made in trust-related research since 
the 1980s, see Koniordos (2005), 29. 
70 Smelser & Baltes (2001), 15922. 
71 Ogilvie (2005), 4. 
72 Putnam (1997), 52. 
73 Misztal (1996), Chapter 3. The three functions are elucidated by a discussion of the works of their 
greatest proponents in sociology (i.e. Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann, and Coleman/Arrow 
respectively. 
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the other ones74. As mentioned before, we will make sure to respect these (and similar) 
critiques throughout our analysis by firmly rooting individual case studies in their 
institutional context (e.g. the institution of patronage or the central ideological role of 
fides in the elite’s networks).  
One of the most vigorously quoted one-liners capturing the essence of “what trust 
is”, is Putnam’s description of it as lubricant of social life75. Trust serves to supplement 
(or compensate for the lack of) other institutions that facilitate and smoothen social 
interaction such as coercion, contracts, or legal sanctions76. When these latter 
mechanisms are prioritised, they are said to support relations of confidence rather than 
trust: “relations of confidence work to depersonalise exchanges, to reduce uncertainty 
and manage risk, whereas trust relations live with uncertainty, take on risk”77. We have 
to keep in mind at all times that in managing their freedmen, Cicero and his 
correspondents could very rarely take recourse to measures of coercion. For one, their 
(potential) status as citizens prevented any encroachment on freedmen’s liberty and 
respectability. Cicero’s ultimate powerlessness when his freedman Hilarus was 
damaging his reputation in the East is well known78. Nor could they invoke a wide array 
of legal sanctions. Cicero could bitterly write to Atticus that he wanted to reduce his 
freedman Chrysippus to slavery after his scandalous behaviour (he stole from his patron 
and neglected his son), but in reality he lacked the means to do so79. The relation 
between freedmen and their patrons, then, is to be situated within the realm of trust 
rather than confidence, although this gradually changed with the introduction of legal 
measures against “bad” freedmen (e.g. the accusatio ingrati liberti, cf. infra). 
The precise nature of the relation between trust and social capital is also heavily 
debated. Some scholars perceive it as a dialectic one in which trust is both a constitutive 
factor and a result of social capital80. Others see trust as but one component of social 
capital and as such place it on an equal footing with, for example, norms and networks 
“that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action”81. Others 
still regard the creation of trust by social networks as a conditio sine qua non for the 
emergence of social capital82. The debate boils down to the question whether “social 
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75 Arrow (1974), 23. Cf. Putnam (2000), 21. 
76 Granovetter (1985), passim (e.g. 490). 
77 Tonkiss (2004), 18-9, including references. Note how the Oxford English Dictionary conflated both 
terms, cf. supra. 
78 Cic. Att. 1.12.2. See also his mentions throughout the next chapters. 
79 Cic. Att. 7.2.8. Idem. 
80 Fukuyama (1995), esp. 26-7. 
81 Putnam (1993a), 167. 
82 Ogilvie (2005), 2. 
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capital is the infrastructure or the content of social relations, the ‘medium,’ as it were, 
or the ‘message.’”83. In any case, the two are very closely related, both conceptually and 
analytically, and a distinction between what causes and what constitutes social capital 
or trust may not even be a relevant or even valid one84. Throughout this study, we 
consider trust as a vital, though not the only, constituent of social capital. We realise 
that neither of the two theoretical concepts can be quantitatively linked or measured, as 
many of the macro-level approaches to social capital and trust in modern societies tend 
to do by making use of statistics and surveys that are simply unavailable for ancient 
historians. We will therefore be particularly concerned with how trust contributed to 
social capital and how someone’s capital could, on the other hand, inspire trust (or at 
least prevent it from being damaged), without claiming any direct (mono-)causal link 
between the two. It is, in other words, not our primary intention to study trust and 
social capital as phenomena in their own right, but to apply modern theory on the 
subjects to the observable relations and interactions between freedmen on the one hand 
and their patrons, elites, and society sensu largo on the other, in order to improve our 
understanding of these social exchanges.  
1.1.2.2.1 Trust and rationality 
It should not come as a surprise that the scholarship on trust has generated at least as 
much controversy and debate as the work done on social capital. One of the most 
important divides within the scientific literature in this respect, is the question whether 
trust is a consequence of rational action and rational choice or not. The act of trusting 
is, in a sense, always calculative because it necessarily involves an evaluation of the 
probability that the trustee will respect the trust relation85. For the proponents of a 
rational choice framework, people in any given context trust each other because they 
believe that trusting will yield more benefits than not trusting86. Actors trust as a 
consequence of a deliberate consideration, know what is in their best interest at all 
times, and possess all possible or necessary information to make the right decision. 
Trust becomes very instrumental – a tool even – in obtaining certain goals. Of course, 
rationality is not always a synonym for self-interest. Indeed, altruism can be rational as 
 
                                                     
83 Woolcock (1998), 156. 
84 Lyon (2000), 664. 
85 Gambetta (1988), 217-8. 
86 Buskens (2002), 6ff. Cf. Smelser & Baltes (2001), 15924: “The act of trust, of making oneself 
vulnerable, requires a thoughtful assessment of risk, informed by a rational expectation or a 
rational belief that the trusted will be trustworthy. Such an expectation or belief is generally 
grounded in knowledge of the other’s past behavior or present motives and constraints”. For a 
comprehensive introduction to rational choice theory, see Scott (2000); Green (2002). 
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well. The rationality here refers to the way in which a particular goal is achieved (i.e. by 
rationally considering all the means and ways in which that goal can be reached in the 
most efficient way)87. Trust, in rational choice theory, is gradually hindered when actors 
do not have full access to the information they need to make “correct” decisions. 
Opponents of rational choice theory, on the other hand, claim that it is precisely in such 
contexts that actors are prone to trusting one another (i.e. to compensate for the 
uncertainty of inadequate information)88. They raise the valid argument that habits – a 
“propensity to engage in a previously adopted pattern of behavior” – may serve to at 
least partially replace rational deliberation89. Moreover, relations that are created as 
part of a calculative strategy may eventually turn into intuitive and habituated ones90. 
These last observations are echoed in Simon’s model of “bounded rationality”. Simon 
convincingly shows that an individual – rational to the bone and aware of all the 
surrounding aspects of reality – simply cannot exist91. A much more realistic approach 
to human behaviour sets aside the primacy of rationality and focuses on ad hoc 
decision-making. The behavioural vision on rationality thus assumes that people will 
make decisions concerning certain aspects of their lives without taking into account all 
the others and without being aware of all the possible alternatives, let alone outcomes. 
This “satisficing” is central to the model of bounded rationality and is the clear opposite 
of a rigid, rationality-based model of decision-making92. Simon goes on to show that 
emotions help us to focus our attention to the most urgent matters at hand and that “a 
 
                                                     
87 A similar distinction was already present in Weber’s work and its differentiation of goal-
instrumental action (Zweckrationalität) by which the actor weighs and deliberates on the means and 
alternatives available to efficiently attain a specific goal, and value-rational action (Wertrationalität) 
where the value or intention of the action takes precedence over its goal. An act that is in se 
emotional and irrational, but which in the long run turns out to serve the self-interest as good or 
better than any rationally inspired act, could, taken to its extreme, be termed “rational” as well. See 
Barbalet (2001), 41. On the contrary, an act can seem rational (and be explained as such) without it 
actually being so. See Denzau & North (1994), 10. 
88 Held (1968), 157 (“trust is most required exactly when we least know whether a person will or will 
not do an action); Cook (2003), 10 (“what seems to strike us is the act of “trusting” despite the lack of 
adequate expectations of fulfillment to justify the relevant risk”). Cf. Seligman (1997), 21ff; Patulny 
& Svendsen (2007), 34, including references. 
89 Hodgson (1998), 178; Hodgson (1988), passim (esp. 167). Cf. Frier and Kehoe (2007), 137 for “path 
dependence” (cf. note 92 below). 
90 Lyon (2000), 673, which also mentions the difficulties in identifying habits in empirical research 
(676). 
91 Simon (1983), 12-7. He thereby criticises the so-called “Olympian model” of rationality (more 
commonly known as the theory of Subjective Expected Utility). 
92 For this behavioural model, see Simon (1983), 17-23. Satisficing refers to the act of chosing a 
satisfactory course of action as opposed to an optimal one (the latter usually being implied in more 
mathematical and economic models of action). Togeteher with the notion of “path dependence”, it 
is an essential assumption in New Institutional Economics, cf. Frier and Kehoe (2007), e.g. p. 121-2 
for “satisficing” and note 89 above. 
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behavioral theory of rationality, with its concern for the focus of attention as a major 
determinant of choice, does not dissociate emotion from human thought (…)”93.  
One of the most famous sociologists who has worked on the theme of rationality long 
before Simon, was Max Weber. His idea of modernisation as a process of rationalisation 
(the Entzauberung der Welt) is traditionally considered the single most important 
foundation for subsequent studies on rationality94. The conviction that rationality and 
emotion are each other’s opposites and therefore irreconcilable has been the most 
common interpretation of his work for decades. However, recent contributions to the 
history of mentalities and emotions have questioned this view. They have argued that 
emotion and rationality are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that no human being 
can “turn off” emotion to act as an absolute rational individual. Even the true meaning 
of Weber’s thesis has recently become the subject of scholarly scrutiny95. Studies with 
remarkable titles such as The Rationality of Emotion are indicative of this course research 
on rationality has taken in the past two decades96.  
A fundamental and recurrent critique on the primacy of rationality – often raised by 
the proponents of New Institutional Economics – states that rational choice theory does 
not account for ideas, ideologies, and institutions. Choices are at least in part the result 
(and a reflection) of “shared mental models” as well97. One particularly troublesome 
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95 E.g. Velitchkova (2008) which re-evaluates the role of emotion in Weber’s theory of rationality: 
“Weber develops an implicit dynamic model of the world in which rationality goes hand in hand 
with what he often interchangeably refers to as the ‘irrational’, the ‘sentiment’, ‘passions’, and 
others” and “analyses of the emotive are spread throughout Weber’s writing. The emotive is often 
the background, against which rationality works”. 
96 De Sousa (1990). 
97 Denzau & North (1994), 4: “[to understand agency, we need to understand] the relationships of the 
mental models that individuals construct to make sense out of the world around them, the 
ideologies that evolve from such constructions, and the institutions that develop in a society to 
order interpersonal relationships”. The concept of “shared mental models” is, in turn, not without 
its pitfalls. It is not not difficult, for example, to think of a shared mental model that is at least 
partially inspired by rational considerations. Mental models, in these cases, are not the reason for 
the way in which a particular individual acts but instead are a consequence of the fact that rational 
considerations need an overarching ideology that legitimises them. An ideology does never exists a 
priori and is never “just there”. It is formed, supported, and reproduced by the interests and 
problems of the dominant class in any society. In this regard, it may be better not to see the relation 
between values, ideologies, and “mental models” on the one hand and concrete acts on the other as 
either top-down or bottom-up processes. Instead, it seems better to interpret their interaction as a 
dialectic one. Ideology exists because individuals need a frame of reference through which they can 
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corollary of this observation for historians, however, is that actors (individuals or 
collectives) in the past had mental models greatly different from the ones that shape the 
historian’s social world. Explaining behaviour of these actors based solely on their 
shared mental models thus becomes a sheer impossible task. Other critiques have 
focussed not so much on rationality an sich but on the exclusivity its most vigorous 
proponents – usually economists – claim for it98. One result worth mentioning is the 
distinction raised between theoretical and practical rationality. The latter is not based 
on an a priori present ratio but instead has its roots in rational models that result from 
past experience with similar situations or contexts99. Still others argue that emotion is a 
conditio sine qua non for trust to be rational. Only through emotional processes can the 
fundamental uncertainty about the future be coped with and can room be created to act 
rationally in: “reason and rationality require emotional guidance”100. These 
observations, and others like it, point to one of the most fundamental flaws in any 
theory that aims to provide one coherent model of human and social behaviour. 
Rationality, emotion, and mental models are similar to one another in the sense that 
their explanatory power is always relative. All three models of interpretation have 
produced convincing arguments but depending on the specific context of the case at 
hand, one will be more salient than the others. Throughout our analysis, we will judge 
each individual case in its own right (one of the rare advantages of having to rely on a 
relatively limited amount of source material) and consider it as hovering on a scale with 
rationality and affectivity on both extremes, keeping in mind, of course, the theoretical 
observations briefly touched upon in these sections. 
1.1.2.2.2 Learning and control 
Considering the stakes often implied in extending one’s trust, the trustor needs certain 
guarantees that his trust will not be damaged. In a relationship that is characterised by 
repeated interactions between trustor and trustee, the former will constantly 
(re)evaluate his relation with the latter by assessing the feedback of the trust relation. 
Repeated interaction – or the “temporal embeddedness” of the transactions – becomes 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
structure and, indeed, live reality. But reversely, this ideology will – once ingrained in society – 
influence and steer both thought and action of these individuals. 
98 Ostrom & Walker (2003), passim (e.g. p. 25: “what has come to be called rational-choice theory in 
the social sciences is instead one model in a family of models useful when conducting formal 
analysis of human decisions (…)” and “[t]here are many different conceptions of rational behavior of 
the individual”. Cf. Emerson (1976), 351, 340-1. 
99 E.g. Barbalet (2001), 46-7 which discusses the relation between such practical rationality, trust, 
and emotion. See also the concept of “habits” above. 
100 Barbalet (2001), 39, 49. See also note 93 above. 
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in itself a mechanism of control101. Through this temporal embeddedness, the trustor 
acquires the means that give him the confidence to sustain the relation. These means 
are typically categorised under the broad headings of “learning” and “control”102. 
Learning pertains to the ability of the trustor to adjust his own expectations concerning 
a particular trustee after evaluating how the latter has dealt with the trust invested in 
him. It is therefore essentially a change within the trustor. Control, on the other hand, 
refers to the ability of the trustor to alter and manipulate the trustee’s behaviour. It 
therefore implies a change primarily within the trustee. It is important to note that 
control does not only or even primarily refer to post factum sanctions against the 
trustee, but also to the latter’s awareness that these sanctions could be exercised against 
him should he chose to damage the received trust. The more sanctions the trustor can 
invoke, the less likely the trustee is to betray his trust and, as a consequence, the more 
the trustor will trust him103. Both learning and control can be enhanced by the 
experience of the trustor himself (i.e. without relying on a third party) or they can be 
increased by others who either provide the trustor with information on the trustee or 
are able to execute the sanctions on behalf of the trustor. In the sociological literature, 
the terms “dyad” and “network” are used to refer to these two kinds of embeddedness 
(i.e. internal and external to the actual trust relation)104. In a dyadic context, learning 
will make sure that trust increases after positive experiences with the trustee. In a 
network context, other factors can supplement these experiences. If the trustor has a 
wide network of contacts, for example, he can receive information from third parties as 
well (e.g. because the trustee is also a trustee of one of these network members). Of 
course, in both cases, trust will decrease if the information on the trustee is 
predominantly negative. Control in a dyadic context ensures that trust will increase 
when the trustee recognises that it is in his own advantage to foster it. Potential 
sanctions such as a loss of reputation are usually instrumental. If a trustee feels he 
would benefit from prolonged interaction with the trustor, trust will also increase as 
both parties realise that abuse is less likely to occur. Any short-term benefits the trustee 
could obtain by betraying the trustor are outweighed by the prospect of either enduring 
advantageous bonds or enduring sanctions and loss of reputation105. Once again, if the 
 
                                                     
101 Zucker (1986), 60 refers to the same mechanism with the concept of “process-based” 
(re)production of trust, and Lyon (2000), 671 speaks of “working relationships”. 
102 Buskens (2002), passim (introduced on p. 10). 
103 Buskens, Raub & van der Veer (2009), passim (esp. 123-4). 
104 Buskens & Raub (2013), passim (e. g. 123, 131); Buskens, Raub & van der Veer (2009), 123. Buskens 
(2002), 10-14 discusses dyad embeddedness, 15-22 treats network embeddedness. 
105 These sanctions may take different form depending on the situational context. Lyon (2000), 665, 
for example, talks about “the threat of stopping a contract and losing future benefits; the threat of 
damage that can be done to an agent’s reputation through bad reports; and social pressure”. 
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trust relation is embedded in a larger social network, sanctions may not only be 
tightened by third party members of this network, but a potential loss of reputation is 
felt to be much more pervasive. A betrayal of trust, in that case, will not only sever all 
ties with the individual trustor, but also establish a reputation of untrustworthiness 
across a much larger social group. It should be stressed that both learning and control 
are vital in bringing about (or terminating) trust, but that for all practical means and 
purposes their effects are rarely clearly distinguishable from one another106. If trust is 
deeply embedded (be it temporarily or in a network), future decisions might be taken 
more instinctively. Embedded trust, in other words, may result in transcending 
“sentimental” forms of trust and may lead to a higher “propensity” to trust (cf. supra). 
It is important to stress, however, that this is – like the relation between particularised 
and generalised trust – not a straightforward or necessary evolution. 
Closely connected with the concept of control is the degree to which the trustor has 
access to so called “exit networks” and “voice networks”107. Both could be considered as 
examples of “controlling” sanctions that minimise the possibility of a scenario in which 
trust is damaged. An exit network denotes the alternatives a trustor has at his disposal 
should he decide not to continue trusting a particular trustee. If a trustor has ample 
alternatives, this may increase his willingness to trust as he is aware of the trustee’s 
realisation that the trust can be terminated without noticeable cost for the trustor. The 
publicising of one’s social network thus becomes an important goal for anyone aiming 
at strengthening the bonds of trust within it. A voice network serves a similar 
preventive purpose. It refers to the trustor’s ability to proliferate any and every 
grievance or criticism he might have concerning a trustee. If his voice network is dense, 
trust is more likely to increase since the consequences of betraying it have increased 
exponentially (and both trustor and trustee, again, realise this).  
Hardin identifies three models of trust. One-way trust, mutual trust, and trust 
embedded in thick relationships108. In a one-way trust relationship, only one agent takes 
on all the risks of trusting the other. The trustee is not required to trust the trustor back 
and can, technically, use or abuse the trust invested in him as he sees fit. A mutual trust 
relationship, on the contrary, is characterised by the investment of trust by both 
partners who thus each become both trustor and trustee. It usually occurs in a context 
of long-term and repeated interactions. Both one-way trust and mutual trust occur in 
“dyadically embedded” relations. Finally, trust embedded in thick relationships takes 
into account not only the relationship between two agents but also their respective 
 
                                                     
106 Buskens, Raub & van der Veer (2009), 123. 
107 Hirschman (1970), esp. 1-43 introduces and theoretically supports these concepts; Buskens (2002), 
15. 
108 Hardin (2004), 14-23. 
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network of relations with third parties. It is “network embedded”. Indeed: “[a]ctual 
motivations for trusting or being trustworthy are better understood when reputations 
in repeated relationships and third-party relationships are taken into account”109. Thick 
relations are generally possible only in a limited and closed community and can as such 
be linked to bonding social capital, Coleman’s concept of closure, as well as to 
particularised trust. The crucial corollary of thick relations is the realisation by every 
actor that a betrayal of invested trust has very wide consequences. The network 
embeddedness of thick relations makes sure that not only the learning side (i.e. 
obtaining information not only by one’s own means but also through the network in 
which the trust relation is embedded) but also the control side (i.e. the knowledge that 
sanctions have network wide repercussions on status, reputation, and future 
interaction) of the trust facilitating mechanisms is considerably enhanced. 
At first glance, a patron-freedman relationship may seem an instance of one-way 
trust. When a slave is freed, it is only the master who trusts in the slave’s compliance to 
the norms and values Roman society had set out for freedmen. It is only he, therefore, 
that runs the risk of trust betrayal. The slave can, technically, act on this endowment of 
trust as he wishes and needs not in turn trust his ex-master. The danger in risking this 
“leap of faith” was sincerely felt by Roman slave owners. One of the many potential 
reasons for the promulgation of the Augustan manumission laws, was undoubtedly a 
desire to increase critical deliberation among masters when they decided to free slaves. 
The lex Aelia Sentia (4 CE) imposed age restrictions on the manumission and the lex Fufia 
Caninia (2 BCE) limited the amount of freedmen that could be freed by testament. The 
recurrent debate on the process of revocatio in servitutem reveals that patrons desired a 
tool to adequately punish ungrateful or disobedient freedmen110. Freedmen did not only 
maintain one-way trust relations with their own patrons. When Cicero stresses the 
quality of fides when recommending freedmen to his friends or acquaintances, he does 
so because he realises that by acting on his recommendation, these men would take 
upon themselves the unilateral risk of trusting111. The extreme rage resulting from the 
 
                                                     
109 Ostrom & Walker (2003), 8. 
110 For Cicero’s attempt to de facto obtain a revocatio in servitutem (Att. 7.2.8), see Treggiari (1969a), 
258; Mouritsen (2011), 55. There existed no legal procedure to reduce freedmen back to slavery 
during the Republic. The accusatio liberti ingrati allowed by the lex Aelia Sentia established the first 
legal framework. Punishments for ungrateful freedmen ranged from verbal warnings and a 
confiscation of part of their property over castigation or temporary exile to forced labour in the 
mines or sale to a third party. Dig. 1.12.1.10; 1.16.9.3; 37.14.1; 37.14.7.1; Tac. Ann. 13.26; Suet. Claud. 
25.1. Cf. Gardner (1993), 45-8. A return to slavery under the previous master is nowhere provided 
for, although the freedmen could be placed under the patria potestas of his patron again under 
Commodus (Dig. 25.3.6.1). 
111 E.g. Fam. 13.16; 13.60; 13.69. The stress on a recommended person’s trustworthiness was of course 
not limited to the letters introducing freedmen (cf. Chapter 5). 
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blatant ingratia of a freedman should be seen in this context as well. By betraying his 
patron or showing socially unacceptable behaviour, the freedman not only undermines 
the essential cohesion-inducing ideology of reciprocity but also puts to shame his 
patron by revealing that the latter had been easy-going or even naïve in his decision to 
manumit (cf. infra). 
Nonetheless, the categorisation of a patron-freedman relationship as a one-way trust 
relationship is too simplistic. We should at all times remember that any theoretical 
model or division is in the end only just that: an archetypical representation that 
facilitates analysis of social reality but never completely coincides with it. The 
interactions between patrons and freedmen were by definition temporally embedded, 
i.e. taking place over an extended period of time. The patron thus had many 
opportunities to “learn” within this dyadic context, a trait that – as we have seen – may 
increase both trust and trustworthiness. Moreover, the relationship can be defined as 
embedded in a network of thick relations as well. The use of freedmen as agents within a 
patron’s social, economic, or even political network ensured that information on the 
trustworthiness of these freedmen was not only generated by the patron himself, but 
also provided by the many connections within the network. When a freedman was sent 
out to perform services for his patron’s friends, for example, he would on returning to 
his patron typically carry a letter in which these friends praised the good work the 
freedman had done112. Patrons, therefore, could also increase their “learning” through 
this network context. Not only learning but various means of control were at the 
patron’s disposal. Especially a reputation of ingratia would severely hamper any 
freedman’s chances to, for example, obtain the social and symbolic capital he so 
strongly desired to catapult his freeborn sons on the social ladder113. For the freedman, 
it was – at least in the long term – not beneficial to be branded as ingratus or infidus114. 
Both the dyadic relationship and its network embeddedness thus provided essential 
means of both preventive and remedying “control”. 
An important distinction has to be made between the two constitutive factors of 
trustworthiness: the willingness to correctly act upon received trust on the one hand 
and the ability to do so on the other. Indeed: “[t]he trustworthy will not betray the trust 
as a consequence of either bad faith or ineptitude”115. The resilient moral obligations of 
 
                                                     
112 Wilcox (2012), 92. Cic. Att. 7.4.1 is one example that will be elaborated on in more detail in 
Chapter 7. 
113 Gordon (1931); Weaver (1991); Mouritsen (2011), 261ff. 
114 Verboven (2002), 46. 
115 Smelser & Baltes (2001), 15922-3. Cf. also Cook (2003), 3-4. Levi (2000), 142 refers to this distinction 
as well when pointing out the three factors that generate distrust (the other is indifferent or hostile; 
the other’s interests differ or conflict; the other is incapable of adequately responding to invested 
trust).  
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pietas, gratia, and obsequium – the appropriation and internalisation of which was, at 
least in theory, a conditio sine qua non for slaves to be manumitted – as well as the 
freedman’s own self-interest must have made many a patron rest assured, sometimes 
prematurely, that his ex-slave would be loyal and trustworthy116. The competence 
acquired during his time as a slave as well as the habit of letting a slave keep his 
peculium after manumission undoubtedly contributed to the freedman’s aptitude to 
transpose this trustworthiness to the practices of daily life117. For these and other 
reasons, Mouritsen has claimed that [t]o the Romans nobody was considered 
trustworthier than a freedman”118. Nonetheless, we see freedmen failing on both 
accounts throughout Cicero’s correspondence. Chrysippus is clearly attacked by Cicero 
for not having acted faithfully but Dionysius, also a victim of some serious rants by 
Cicero, seems to have disappointed him because he had his own business to take care of 
first (cf. infra)119. 
1.1.2.2.3 Motivations for trusting 
Despite ideological frameworks, means of “learning” and “control”, and the network 
embeddedness of a trust relation, a patron could never predict the behaviour of his 
freedmen with absolute certainty. This leads us to the potential motives that moved 
actors to risk this leap of faith in the face of such fundamental uncertainty. In 
sociological literature, four types of motivations are conceptually distinguished120. 
Dispositional motivation originates from an individual’s personal propensity to trust 
which may have been shaped (or left undeveloped) by his education, social networks, 
 
                                                     
116 The conception of the time spent as a slave as a period of education (and internalisation of Roman 
norms) is meaningful. Cicero implies, rhetorically, that captured enemies could internalise these 
values in a mere six years (Phil. 8.32) and that any slave who obtained his freedom had deserved it 
by proving his worthiness (Cat. 4.16). (Ps.-) Quintilianus thought that “freedmen were made out of 
honest (frugi) slaves” (Decl. Min. 388.22). The lex Aelia Sentia made sure that slaves spent at least 
thirty years  “learning” and the lex Fufia Caninia encouraged them to apply themselves in the process 
by limiting the number of slaves that could be set free per master. Cf. Mouritsen (2011), 30-3. 
117 Dig. 32.97 (a freedman retains his peculium on manumission); Cod. Iust. 7.23.1 (slaves who were 
freed by living masters usually retained their peculium). This practice favoured the patron as well as 
the freedman since it gave the freedman ample opportunity to increase his capital whereas the 
patron would benefit from it too, given his claims on his freedman’s property. Indeed, Cod. Iust. 
7.23.1 specified that the peculium of a slave manumitted ex testamento would d’office go to the heirs. 
The dead patron could no longer benefit from his slave retaining his peculium. See Mouritsen (2011), 
176f, including references. 
118 Mouritsen (2011), 98. 
119 See also Treggiari (1969b), 201: “Dionysius was in the awkward position of having to maintain 
cordial relations with Cicero and Atticus simultaneously while his private affairs also demanded his 
attention. He was guilty merely of not putting Cicero’s interests before his own in time of civil war”. 
120 For the convenient overview to which this paragraph is greatly indebted, see Smelser & Baltes 
(2001), 15923-4, including references. 
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and norms. When a master trusts a slave enough to free him or a freedman to take care 
of delicate business, he might be inspired partially by dispositional motives. The 
patron’s and freedman’s character, their closeness to eachother, as well as their past 
experiences provide the framework of the master’s decision-making121.  
Moral motivations stem from a belief that trust is beneficial for societal cohesion and 
that “to trust” is therefore essentially a duty for anyone concerned with the well-being 
of that society. It also refers to the propensity to consider those people more 
trustworthy who either share certain norms or at least adhere to values that inspire and 
respect trust. Applied to the patron-freedman relation, this would mean that patrons 
trusted their freedmen (or freed their slaves) because it constitutes a moral virtue 
contributing to society. This may be true in the many philosophical reflections – mostly 
stoically inspired – but isolated from other motivations, the moral one does not seem to 
adequately explain the practice of investing trust. Pliny may well write that the creation 
of citizens through formal manumission enhances the reputation of a city, but we 
should not take this conviction as the reason why his great-grandfather-in-law decided 
to free the slaves in question122. Moreover, a strict notion of moral motivations of trust 
implies that it does not matter which slaves are freed or which freedmen are sent to 
deliver delicate messages. The action of trusting is thus isolated from any other concern 
and undertaken only by the grace of a moral ideal. It goes without saying that moral 
motivation should therefore be considered a trust-amplifying (or -reducing) factor only 
in combination with other motivations. In the end, it seems that the valuable aspects of 
the notion of moral motivations of trust are better grouped under the heading of a 
model of social motivation.  
Socially inspired motivation to trust refers to an individual’s willingness to trust and 
to be considered trustworthy because it is part of his identity. In a reductionist sense, 
this motivation comes down to people intentionally trying to profile themselves 
positively (both inwards and outwards). This can be taken to mean that a master frees 
his slaves or trusts his freedmen because it generates an image of him that can 
successively be used in relations with other people. It enhances his reputation and could 
in turn lead to an increase in status. It should be stressed that the envisioned benefits 
are usually immaterial, in contrast to the fourth, instrumental motivation.  
 
                                                     
121 E.g. Strack (1914), 8 who states that in many cases the “Vorbedingung für die Freilassung” was 
“persönliche Bekanntschaft”. One of the most decisive reasons to free Tiro, we know, was his 
literary cultivation, his intelligence, and his manifold usefulness to Cicero (Fam. 2.1.2; 16.1.3; 16.3.2). 
Eros was freed in an impulsive mood of generosity (Plut. Apopth. Cic. 21), although it is unlikely that 
he would have received this gift without other motivations playing as well. 
122 Plin. Ep. 7.32. In this case, it was not the freeing of slaves but the iteratio – a second, formal 
manumission – of informally freed slaves. 
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This last type of motivation pragmatically makes someone trust another (or present 
oneself as trustworthy) in order to obtain certain results and reach certain goals. It 
generally takes into account both the costs and the potential risks when deliberating 
the investment of trust123. Masters knew that the “human capital” of a slave was not lost 
after manumission. Besides operae, freedmen owed a lifelong debt of obsequium and at 
the end of their life, the patron could usually claim at least part of their inheritance. The 
freeing of slaves, moreover, created valuable social capital in the form of trustworthy 
agents that could be deployed in all sorts of business (cf. infra). Cicero was acting 
instrumentally when he, while exiled, ordered his wife to free all their slaves even 
though he only considered one of them (Orpheus) truly loyal, trustworthy, and 
deserving124. Only this drastic measure ensured that Cicero would retain some sort of 
control over his dependents (i.e. as a patron over liberti) rather than losing them 
altogether (i.e. as confiscated slaves). The reference to Orpheus again implies that under 
normal circumstances, a dispositional motivation would have played as well as an 
instrumental one. In reality, then, every motive for trusting a slave or a freedman would 
have been a combination of motives, each of which in different degrees deviated from 
or conformed to any of the four archetypes listed above. All of these considerations may 
have resulted in a patron feeling “confident” to trust this (and not another) freedman, 
despite the uncertainties and risks inherent in the act of investing trust. 
1.1.2.2.4 Tilly’s trust networks 
One particularly interesting analytic model is that of “trust networks” as defined by the 
American sociologist, political scientist, and historian Charles Tilly. Tilly defines a trust 
network by summing up the four features that characterise it:  
“How will we recognise a trust network (…)? First, we will notice a number of 
people who are connected, directly or indirectly, by similar ties; they form a 
network. Second, we will see that the sheer existence of such a tie gives one 
member significant claims on the attention or aid of another; the network consists 
of strong ties. Third, we will discover that members of the network are 
collectively carrying on major long-term enterprises such as procreation, long-
distance trade, workers’ mutual aid or practice of an underground religion. 
 
                                                     
123 Cf. once more Weber’s Zweckrationalität. Social and especially moral motivations of trust are, on 
the contrary, manifestations of Wertrationalität. Dispositional motivation (and especially the example 
of Eros’ manumission) is closely linked to Affektuelles Handeln. See notes 85 and 121 above. 
124 Fam. 14.4.4. This decision had, it is true, less to do with trusting these individuals than with 
making sure that their worth would not completely be lost. As slaves they would be confiscated and 
transferred to another owner, but as freedmen they would still owe their patron services and 
respect. 
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Finally, we will learn that the configuration of ties within the network sets the 
collective enterprise at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, and failures of 
individual members”125. 
It becomes clear in a heartbeat that at least conceptually, a trust network thus defined 
can be observed in antiquity as well as in the modern world Tilly had in mind when 
writing this definition126. Indeed, it is well known that freedmen maintained strong 
mutual bonds with their patrons – whether they liked it or not. They became subsumed 
within the network of their patron’s familia as an extension of his identity or at least his 
pseudo-son127. The enduring relationship made sure that they did indeed have 
“significant claims on attention or aid of another”. The obligation of support (be it 
juridical or financial) was not only considered mutual, but also well ingrained within a 
legal framework128. Secondly, examples of “long-term enterprises” between a freedman 
and his patron (or his contacts) are legion. Murena’s freedman Tyrannio was 
responsible for Cicero’s library over the course of almost 15 years, Philotimus was kept 
in charge over some of Cicero’s financial affairs even after he was suspected of 
embezzling funds, and Tiro, of course, remained the loyal secretary of his patron until 
the latter’s death129. These enterprises, Tilly specifies, could take on different forms. His 
example of long distance trade focussed in particular on transatlantic and Asian trade 
networks which, in Roman times, were inexistant and limited respectively. Nonetheless, 
freedmen did act as intermediaries of their patrons in long distance (trade) transactions. 
The freed Anthestii in the Roman colony of Dion in Macedonia, for example, were part 
of a network of negotiatores set up to look after the overseas business of their Italian 
patron(s)130 and Cn. Otacilius Naso had at least three of his freedmen look after his 
affairs in Sicily131. Another manifestation of long-term enterprises according to Tilly is 
procreation. Although procreation was never openly considered a function of the 
patronage relation, the many instances in which patrons married their female ex-slaves 
do reveal that it may have been an important factor in strengthening their mutual 
bonds and in extending the family. Vernae, the children born to female slaves in the 
house of their master (and not seldom his own biological children), are another 
 
                                                     
125 Tilly (2005), 4 (bold markings added). 
126 Tilly’s work centred around immensly complex questions relating to the rise of the nation state, 
social movements, and democracy as a whole. E.g. Tilly (2004); Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly (1998). 
127 Mouritsen (2011), 42; Kirschenbaum (1987), 127-8; Publ. Syrus P1: “Probus libertus sine natura est 
filius”. 
128 Dig. 22.5.4 (freedmen and patrons could not be compelled to testify against each other in court); 
38.2.33 (a patron needs to support his freedman in financial need). 
129 See the respective entries in the prosopographical database (Appendix 2). 
130 Demaille (2008), 193-8.  
131 Cic. Fam. 13.33. 
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example132. Tilly’s conception of a trust network, in short, clearly shows that it can be 
projected onto the Roman world and that, as an analytical concept, it has great potential 
for studying the freedman’s position in society. This potential will be further developed 
and elaborated upon in Chapter 4, which considers the position of the many freedmen 
in Cicero’s (and his correspondents’) networks of trust. First, we will turn to the second 
pillar of our theoretical framework: the transcript theory of James Scott and in 
particular its relevance for our purpose in the next chapters. 
1.2 Transcript theory 
In his influential study Domination and the Arts of Resistance, political scientist and 
anthropologist James Scott investigates through critical analysis how the powerful and 
their subordinates in any given society interact and negotiate their respective positions. 
This interest is of course not new. Gramsci, as mentioned earlier, already observed that 
dominant groups are involved in a constant struggle to stay dominant. Scott’s highly 
original contribution, however, is the introduction of the concepts “public transcript” 
and “hidden transcript” to describe the fundamental duality of this interaction. The 
former is practiced publically “on stage” by both the dominant and the powerless, but is 
always criticised by the hidden transcript which takes place “behind the scenes”. Scott 
first noticed this phenomenon when studying class relations in a Malay village where “it 
seemed that the poor sang one tune when they were in the presence of the rich and 
another tune when they were among the poor” and where “the rich too spoke one way 
to the poor and another among themselves”133. The results of this sociological study 
appeared in his 1985 work called Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance. 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance takes a step back and analyses the processes that 
underlie the interaction between hidden and public transcript from a broader 
perspective. It is in this work that Scott provides a comprehensive exposition of the 
“transcript”-theory. As Scott himself remarked, his general model of the public and 
hidden transcripts can realise its greatest potential only by “embedding [it] firmly in 
settings that are historically grounded and culturally specific”134. Roberta Stewart’s 
analysis of slavery in the works of Plautus or Carlos Galvao-Sobrinho’s chapter on 
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household burial practices, are particularly interesting examples of how Scott’s theory 
can be thus operationalised for the study of the Roman world135. 
Both the powerful and the powerless thus have a hidden discourse they can express 
when they are not under observation by the other group. At the same time, both make 
sure to uphold the public transcript throughout mutual interactions. The hidden 
transcript of subordinates “represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the 
dominant” whereas that of the powerful contains “the practices and claims of their rule 
that cannot be openly avowed”136. Scott is primarily interested in systematically 
exploring 1) the relation between the hidden transcripts of both groups, and 2) the 
relation between each hidden transcript and the common public transcript. Such 
analysis, Scott argues, uncovers the way dominance, hegemony, and power relations are 
maintained, legitimised, and reproduced as well as how subordinates can act 
“politically” in the face of overwhelming domination. 
1.2.1 The hidden transcript 
The nature of hidden transcripts makes them very difficult to notice for contemporary 
members of “the other group” as well as for historians or sociologists. Often, however, 
hidden transcripts occur in public discourse, albeit in a disguised, oblique form, 
surfacing only in folktales, rumours, taverntalk, or other manifestations that hide 
“behind anonymity or behind innocuous understandings”137. This is what Scott calls the 
infrapolitics of subordinate groups: “a partly sanitized, ambiguous, and coded version of the 
hidden transcript [that] is always present in the public discourse of subordinate 
groups”138. Hidden transcripts are uttered manifestly only on very rare occasions in the 
face of power, that is, “on the stage” which is normally reserved for the negotiation of 
the hegemonic public transcript. Hopkins already made a similar observation for the 
ancient world in particular: “[m]ost slave resistance involved neither open rebellion nor 
murder. It probably took the form of guile, deceit, lying and indolence”139. This is due to 
the fact that subordinates too, have stakes in upholding and even reinforcing the public 
 
                                                     
135 Stewart (2012), passim (e.g. 54, 67, 143); Galvao-Sobrinho (2012), 147. The latter, for example, 
raises the question whether “the shift away from household burial [in the late first century BCE 
could have been] an expression of resistance to the forms of control and domination imposed [on 
slaves and freedmen] in the early Principate”, and theoretically supports this suggestion by explicit 
references to Scott. 
136 Scott (1990), xii. 
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138 Scott (1990), 19. 
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transcript. It is for this reason that Roman epigraphic texts or the works of freed 
authors like Epictetus, Publilius Syrus, or Terence are of very limited value in 
reconstructing a true “freedman’s perspective”140. If these documents had really 
contained fundamental critiques on their authors’ social position, for example, they 
would have never been uttered in the domain of the public transcript. Instead, they 
adhere precisely to this public transcript and thereby reinforce it, presenting and 
legitimising it as being approved from below as well as from above. In epigraphy, this 
process is exemplified by the standardisation by which freedmen glorify their patron for 
being benevolent, generous, and kind, and by which patrons in turn praise their 
freedmen’s loyalty, gratefulness and piety. Both parties openly adhere to the public 
transcript in which the relation between patron and freedman is conceptualised as that 
of a benign father and an obedient son141. 
Consequently, penetrating the hidden transcript is a very delicate task since it always 
hides in the shadows of the public transcript and since the occasions in which it is 
subtly expressed in public discourse are rarely recorded142. The nature of the source 
material makes this difficulty all the more pertinent for ancient historians and does 
only rarely allow us to get a glimpse of “what freedmen really thought”. One would have 
to look for those spheres (and sources) in which freedmen could either innocuously or 
anonymously air their critiques on their subordination (assuming they had any). One 
way to proceed could be to study defixiones. Curse tablets were, by their very nature, not 
meant to be read by other persons, and the gods to which they were addressed were 
considered unlikely to reveal the secret feelings that were being entrusted to the lead 
sheets. In the late first century CE, the population of the Umbrian city of Tuder was 
horrified after the discovery of a curse directed against some members of its city 
council. A sceleratissimus servus publicus was accused, but no details are provided about 
how his guilt was established. We know of the case because a freed Augustalis priest 
named L. Cancrius Primigenius had begged for and eventually obtained divine help in 
remedying the dangerous situation. As a token of gratitude for the felicitous outcome of 
the affair, he erected an inscription in the temple of Jupiter143. The actual content of 
such defixiones would have been particularly helpful in revealing the opinions and 
 
                                                     
140 This was already noted by Finley (1980), 117, 177. See Kleijwegt (2006b), 92 for an updated 
discussion. Cf. Chapter 6. 
141 Joshel (1992), 14 similarly refers to this phenomenon when she reminds us that epigraphical texts 
are not true representations of actual thoughts: “And when epitaph and dedication are the texts to 
which we look for the other's subjectivity, the absence of a language that says "I think" or "I feel" 
increases the difficulty”. 
142 One ancient definition of slavery centred precisely on the impossibility to “say what one thinks”. 
Eur. Phoen. 392: “δούλου τόδ’ εἶπας, μὴ λέγειν ἅ τις φρονεῖ”.  
143 CIL 11, 4639. For this case, see Gager (1992), no. 135 (p. 245-6); Luck (2006), no. 16 (p. 128).  
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complaints of slaves (but also freedmen) that could not be uttered in the public sphere. 
Unfortunately, curse tablets by slaves or freedmen are often very brief and the ones that 
have been preserved are of very limited value for the reconstruction of their author’s 
hidden resentments144. Graffiti present another possible gateway to subordinates’ 
hidden transcripts since they can be written anonymously. As is clear from an example 
from Pompeii, graffiti could be used to utter critiques that could not – without 
potentially grave consequences – be expressed in the face of power, i.e. in the public 
transcript. At some point during Nero’s reign, someone scratched the words cucuta ab 
rationibus Neronis Augusti on a wall. Usually, a rationibus is preceded by a name to identify 
someone as the bookkeeper of – in this case – the emperor Nero. In this instance, 
however, it refers to cucuta (the juice of the hemlock plant and therefore a pars pro toto 
for “poison”). The phrase thus translates as “poison [is] Nero’s bookkeeper” and as such 
refers to the rumours that Nero had rich people killed to confiscate their property and 
to allow for his own excessive expenditure145. Once again, however, barely any graffiti 
are left that inform us about the hidden resentments and social critiques of freedmen in 
particular. As we will see in due time, the exceptional nature of epistolary sources – 
written in the context of daily life – can provide us with alternative examples. 
The powerful usually know that the powerless have spheres (both physically and 
discursively) in which they utter criticism against their subordination146. Indeed, the 
extreme measure of putting to death the entire household “that had been present under 
the same roof” after a master had been murdered by one of its members, implies the 
dominant’s suspicion that premeditation and advance knowledge of the crime was 
widely proliferated among all household members through the elusive channels of the 
hidden transcript147. The Senate’s opposition against a uniform garbing of slaves was 
 
                                                     
144 Some of the lead tablets produced by freedmen and slaves include curses against rivals in chariot 
races or against masters unwilling to set free a slave. E.g. Gager (1992), no. 13 (p. 67-8); no. 79 (p. 171-
2). Appeals to the gods not to be sold by their masters reoccur as well. E.g. Gager (1992), no. 78 (p. 
169-71). Freedmen could also be cursed themselves, but the underlying reasons are rarely given, e.g. 
Gager (1992), no. 93 (p. 192-3); 103 (p. 201). For further editions of these and other defixiones, see 
still Audollent (1904); Kropp (2008). Funerary inscriptions could be exceptionally presented as 
defixiones both in content and in form. See, for example, the second inscription on the aedicula of P. 
Vesonius Phileros near the Porta Nocera in Pompeii, which is literally nailed to the monument. Any 
passer-by familiar with defixiones would have recognised the iconography. Cf. Elefante (1985); 
Williams (2012), 263-4. Inscriptions like this are, however, very much “public” transcript. 
145 For this case as an example of a “critique sociale”, see Desclos (2000), 517; Beard (2008), 50-1. 
146 Pliny’s villa at Laurentum – and many others like it – had separate work and living quarters for 
slaves and freedmen. For a good overview of the archaeological evidence on slave quarters in 
Roman villa’s, see Joshel & Petersen (2014), 165-9. 
147 After Pedanius Secundus was murdered, all his slaves were executed. A motion to punish the 
resident freedmen as well was in extremis denied by Nero, Tac. Ann. 14.45. For the legal perspective, 
see Robinson (1981), 234; Wolf (1988), 11-2; Bauman (1989), 98-9; (1996),  81-3. 
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based on the fear that slaves would recognise their overwhelming number148. This fear 
implies at least some notion of a widely shared hidden transcript of resentment among 
the slave population as a whole. Although they could never fully grasp the content or 
extent of it, the slave holding elite was aware of its existence among the powerless 
strata of society.  
1.2.2 The public transcript 
As mentioned earlier, it is not only the subordinates that put up an act in their 
interactions with the group on the other side of the spectrum of power: “the powerful 
have their own compelling reasons for adopting a mask in the presence of 
subordinates”149. They have to adhere to their own ideology of domination through 
which their superiority is rooted in and legitimised by their image as benevolent 
guardians of social order and harmony. The rhetoric of opportunity that presented 
worthy slaves as able to transcend their position and even become Roman citizens by 
their own virtues – the somnium Romanum in a sense – was a fundamental part of this 
ideology. It not only legitimised the institution, but it also made sure that subordinates 
(i.c. slaves) would have more to benefit by “following the rules” than by trying to 
change them at great risk. The promotion of worthy slaves and the creation of citizens 
were fundamental parts of the public transcript. However, this transcript would lose its 
consolidating power if freed citizens were subsequently treated merely as “promoted 
slaves” instead of “real citizens”. As we will argue in (especially) Chapter 7, this formed 
the basis of a public transcript of equality with regard to freedmen. 
In short, the powerful sacrifice absolute power, but they legitimise and consolidate 
their dominant position in doing so. It is precisely this aspect of the public transcript 
that subordinates can use as the field within which to negotiate their own position and 
that therefore constitutes the main reason for their stakes in upholding it. Indeed: “any 
dominant ideology (…) must, by definition, provide subordinate groups with political 
weapons that can be of use in the public transcript”150. Or in Pliny’s words: “No one who 
bears the insignia of supreme authority is despised unless his own meanness and 
ignobility show that he must be the first to despise himself. (…) It is a poor thing if 
authority can only test its powers by insults to others, and if homage is to be won by 
terror”151. If the dominant ideology, expressed in the public transcript, presents the 
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master or patron as a generous and forgiving father to his slaves and freedmen, then 
subordinates that had overstepped their bounds could manoeuvre within this logic to 
obtain a pardon. By the same logic, masters who treated their slaves and freedmen with 
extreme violence were not tolerated because of the deviation from the public transcript 
it implied152. Publius Vedius Pollio, for example, was known for his cruel habit of feeding 
unfortunate slaves to his collection of carnivorous lampreys. When Pollio invited 
Augustus to his house for dinner, the emperor was confronted with this practice: a slave 
had broken a crystal cup by accident and was punished in Pollio’s favourite way. 
Appalled by the inappropriately cruel punishment, Augustus not only prevented its 
execution, but also publicly condemned Pollio for such intolerable behaviour153. 
Similarly, a patron was supposed to aid his freedmen in need. Although he was not 
technically obligated to furnish support (alimenta), the law provided that if he ignored a 
request for help, he would forfeit the privileges that were granted him by the 
manumission, including the rights over the freedman’s estate154.  
Likewise, a shared image of slaves as ignorant and dumb could mollify the 
sanctioning of an act of disobedience by ascribing it to these very traits155. By accepting 
the dominant’s point of view as the basis of negotiation and by using the very logic by 
which it is legitimised, subordinates can use the public transcript to their own 
advantage. Scott calls this “critiques within the hegemony”156. When emotionally 
imploring Pliny to intercede on his behalf, an unnamed freedman who had disobeyed 
and thereby insulted his patron, counted on the dominant ideology that considered the 
patron as a forgiving father157. In his letter to said patron, Pliny relied on the very same 
ideology of patronal benevolence when trying to convince him of the desirability of a 
reconciliation. “He realises he was wrong” (deliquisse se sentit), Pliny writes, indicating 
that the freedman was willing to restore the public transcript158. Similarly, Cicero 
 
                                                     
152 Slaves were increasingly protected by law as well. Whereas censorial supervision would have 
been the main check on exaggerated abuse of slaves, senatus consulta and laws provided that slaves 
could not be castrated (Dig. 48.8.6), arbitrarily made to fight against wilde animals (Dig. 48.8.11.1-2), 
abandoned when seriously ill (Suet. Claud. 25), etc. For these and other measures, see Buckland 
(1970), 36-7; 70-1 and Watson (1987), 115-33. 
153 Dio 54.23.2-4; Plin. NH. 9.39; Sen. Cl. 1.18.2; Ira 3.40.2-3. 
154 Dig. 25.3.6pr: “Alimenta liberto petente non praestando patronus amissione libertatis causa 
impositorum et hereditatis liberti punietur: non autem necesse habebit praestare, etiamsi potest”. 
155 Scott (1990), 99-101. For the danger of considering servile stereotypes as references to a “core of 
untransformed truth”, see Joshel (1992), 6-7 which warns against their masking function that 
“eclipses the power relations that uphold [them]”. 
156 E.g. Scott (1990), 105-7. 
157 Dig. 21.1.17.5 states that a slave who runs away from his master and seeks refuge with his mother 
is not considered a fugitivus when he did so to obtain his mother’s intervention (deprecatio) in asking 
forgiveness for a misdeed. 
158 Plin. Ep. 9.21; 24. 
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showed himself prepared to forgive Atticus’ freedman Dionysius’ transgressions. His 
only condition was that he should apologise for them, i.e. that he should restore and 
reaffirm the public transcript in which Dionysius was the loyal freedman and Cicero the 
benign (pseudo-) patron159. In a letter to his mother-in-law, Pliny jokingly complained 
about his slaves. He explains that these slaves only served their master for appearances’ 
sake (e.g. when guests were visiting) but that they had become so used to him in private 
settings that their industry was lacking. Because of Pliny’s wish to (appear to) be a 
humane and kind master to his household members, his slaves had started to realise 
that they could afford to act indifferently and become utterly lazy, as Pliny – no doubt 
exaggerating – observed160.  
1.2.3 Hegemony, consent, and resistance 
The concept of a public transcript to which both the powerful and the suppressed 
adhere is very reminiscent of the Gramscian notion of hegemony as domination by 
consent. Scott, however, fundamentally disagrees with Gramsci’s conception of consent. 
The belief that subordinates somehow consent to their subordination is based on a 
flawed methodology which focuses only on the public transcript to which the 
subordinates openly adhere but which does not account for the many oblique acts and 
discourses of resistance161. Scott clarifies this by pointing to the difference between two 
versions of false consciousness (i.e. a mistaken belief about society and the social order 
and the inability to recognise its arbitrariness). The “thick version” argues that a 
dominant ideology is accepted by subordinates because they have truly internalised the 
values that justify their inferior position. The “thin version” does not suppose 
internalisation of values but only states that subordinates do not resist because of their 
belief in the unavoidability of the status quo. In Scott’s words: “the thick theory claims 
[what Gramsci would call] consent; the thin theory settles for resignation”162. Scott, 
however, rejects the Gramscian notion of false consciousness (and thus of hegemony as 
domination by consent) in its entirety. He notes that it is incompatible with empirical 
evidence to claim that internalisation of norms and values (or Bourdieusian 
 
                                                     
159 Cic. Att. 10.16.1. Dionysius was given the praenomen Marcus in honour of Atticus’ friendship with 
Cicero, which led Cicero to take his transgressions in a more personal way than usual, cf. infra. 
160 Plin. Ep. 1.4. 
161 Scott (1990), 4: “Any analysis based exclusively on the public transcript is likely to conclude that 
subordinate groups endorse the terms of their subordination and are willing, even enthusiastic, 
partners in that subordination”. 
162 Scott (1990), 72. 
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“naturalisation”) temper the potential of social conflict163. Indeed, if values and the 
social order are either internalised or considered inevitable, it becomes impossible to 
explain resistance against them. On the contrary, Scott argues, the explanandum in this 
regard is precisely “[why it is] that subordinate groups (…) have so often believed and 
acted as if their situations were not inevitable”164.  
If the many instances of resistance (mostly through hidden transcripts but 
sometimes also out in the open) undermine any notion of structural hegemony (and 
internalisation or naturalisation of the dominant ideology), how does one account for 
the apparent submission and acquiescence of subordinates in any given society? Scott’s 
answer, it should be clear by now, is based on the existence of the public transcript165. 
Voluntarily and pragmatically adhered to by subordinates, a public transcript may give 
the impression of an overall consent to domination, but it is only one side of the medal. 
There appears to be no resistance, but this is a consequence rather of this resistance not 
(or rarely) playing out in the public transcript than of such resistance being non-
existant. The very nature of the division between public and hidden transcripts, 
therefore, is responsible for the illusion of hegemony and consent to it by subordinates. 
Only by structurally recognising the subordinate’s intent to make it look like there is 
widespread consent (i.e. by making sure that the hidden transcript remains hidden) 
does one realise the reality of resistance and the flaws in theories of hegemony and 
consent.  
1.2.4 Transcript theory as methodology 
The relation of the “transcript”-theory with other sociological models is a very 
complicated one.  Like Bourdieu and Foucault, Scott pays considerable attention to the 
normalisation and naturalisation of power. Unlike the Gramscian notions of hegemony 
and consent or their counterparts in the works of Foucault (normalisation) and 
Bourdieu (symbolic violence), however, he does not believe that the naturalisation of an 
essentially arbitrary “order of things” truly occurs in any society. Whereas Bourdieu’s 
habitus is essentially “uncritical” (like the fish who is unaware of the water), 
subordinates for Scott are well aware of the arbitrariness of the public transcript (and 
indeed critique it  through the hidden one). Foucault, in contrast to (neo-)Marxists, 
generally ignored the themes of class struggle and subordination (or at least remained 
neutral in the debate about whether resistance should be encouraged by social theory). 
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Scott’s work could be rightly seen as a project that provides the analytic tools to study 
precisely these phenomena. Contrary to Foucault, moreover, Scott’s work primarily 
focusses on personal forms of domination instead of the “impersonal, ‘scientific’, 
disciplinary forms of the modern state that preoccupied Foucault”166. Foucault’s 
conception of power not as definitely owned but as relatively exercised, and its logical 
consequence that not only social elites can have power, finds its reflection in Scott’s 
notion of the infrapolitics of subordinates (i.e. the twilight zone between hidden and 
public transcript in which subordinates can act “politically”). By considering the 
importance of symbolic and personal domination in the exercise of power, Scott shares 
Foucault’s opposition to Marxist theory that sees economic and materialistic processes 
as the primary or sole cause of inequality. In fact, Scott eventually admits that both 
views have their merit and that dominance (as well as resistance) is both symbolic and 
material but that the former usually has a more pronounced effect167. With practitioners 
of Critical Discourse Analysis (cf. infra), Scott shares the conviction that discourse is not 
only a reflection of attitudes or behaviours, but that it also creates and reproduces 
them168. As a corollary of his critique on hegemony as domination by consent, however, 
he disagrees with many of them (usually inspired by Marxist thought) that the analysis 
of discourse should have as its primary objective the revealing of processes that enable 
and expedite “normalisation”. For Scott, hidden transcripts are not mere speech acts, 
but also “a whole range of practices” such as poaching, embezzlement, etc.169 
In our own adaptation of Scott’s theory, we will primarily focus on the notion of the 
public transcript. We will argue in favour of a public discourse of equality. The personal 
patronage relation imposed stringent conditions on freedmen’s lives. A lifelong debt of 
gratia, contractually assigned operae, but above all the discrimination in inheritance law, 
voting rights, and eligibility for public office (all of which, as we will show, stem from 
the individual relation with a patron instead of the so-called macula servitutis) weighed 
heavily on an ex-slave. However, in the public domain – we argue – a public transcript 
of equality made sure that their respectability as citizens remained unimpaired. This 
point is elaborated on in Chapter 7.  
After having discussed social capital, trust (networks), and transcript theory, we now 
turn to the methodology by which these theoretical frameworks will be operationalised 
throughout the study. What social capital, trust, and transcripts have in common is that 
they are realised by historical agents by and through “communication” (in the broadest, 
sometimes symbolic, sense of the word, thus including ceremonies, rites of passage, 
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Foulcauldian discourses, etc.), and that it is through such “language” that we can study 
them. This may seem like a rather self-evident observation, but it is important to 
consider all its ramifications. That crucial connotations, linguistic structures, or figures 
of style may elude a superficial reader of Latin and that reality is represented by an 
author who is at the same time – consciously and unconsciously –  distorting that reality 
by imposing on it his own perception of it, are widely recognised truths170. A structural 
attention to the word-use, the subtextual meanings, and linguistic patterns in general is 
less common in historical studies. Classen has noticed how Tacitus’ use of modestia (and 
similar terms) reveals his attitudes toward the Principate171. Pliny is mindful of an 
orator’s use of language even in his daily life and Cicero often explicitly weighs his 
words when writing a letter, carefully making sure that the language he employs is 
fitting for both the purpose of the letter and the status of its intended audience172. 
Ancient authors were well aware of the impact of their language on (different) readers 
and so should we. It is for this reason that we will first appropriate some of the crucial 
insight of the discipline that has for decades studied the subtleties and performative 
functions of language. 
1.3 Critical Discourse Analysis 
The so called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis postulates that linguistic categories and 
structures influence, shape, or even determine thought to a degree not yet wholly 
agreed upon by scholars173. One of its best known advocates today is cognitive 
psychologist Lera Boroditsky. Her work has unambiguously laid bare the impact of 
language on how people perceive fundamental dimensions of reality such as time, space, 
and causality. When someone is asked to order chronologically a small amount of 
 
                                                     
170 Isaac uses the term “translation” to refer both to the act of translating a text frome one language 
to another, but also to the process by which historians and anthropologists (he speaks of 
ethnographic historians) have to submerge themselves in the framework of the authors whose text 
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171 Classen (1988). 
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verba et antiqua”; Cic. Fam. 7.5.3: “non illo vetere verbo meo [scribo](…) sed more Romano quomodo 
homines non inepti loquuntur”; Fam. 13.33: “Nihil iam opus est exspectare te quibus eum verbis tibi 
commendem quo sic utar ut scripsi”. 
173 See Hoijer (1954) for the earliest formulation of and reflections on the hypothesis. 
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images reflecting temporal progression (e.g. a man aging), Europeans will end up with a 
series of images going from left to right. Unsurprisingly, Hebrew speaking individuals 
will order from right to left (reflecting the way they write). An individual speaking Kuuk 
Thaayorre (the Aboriginal language spoken in Pormpuraaw, Australia), however, will lay 
out the images from east to west, regardless of which direction he or she is facing174. An 
unconscious “awareness” of one’s position clearly influences the perception of time. 
The same holds true for language. The Kuuk Thaayorre language does not contain terms 
like “next to” or “left” and “right”, but instead uses cardinal directions175. Indeed, “In 
Pormpuraaw, one must always stay oriented, just to be able to speak properly”176. Space, 
time, and language systems are interrelated even though specific agents are usually 
unaware of this. This is a dialectic process in the sense that cognitive processes shape 
language but that the reverse is also true. Changing the way someone talks, similarly 
changes the way in which he or she thinks177.  
1.3.1 Foucault and discourse 
An operationalisation of these insights for the study of Roman antiquity is, however, 
hardly feasible since the methods by which they are obtained and demonstrated (i.e. 
primarily through interviews and experiments) are not available to historians. 
Nevertheless, the importance of language in human relations is beyond any doubt. It is 
because of this observation that sociologists, linguists, and philosophers have tried for 
decennia to develop operational frameworks by which language and its influence on 
both individual actors and societal values and norms could be analysed. Within this 
extensive tradition, the importance of the insights of French philosopher Michel 
Foucault take pride of place. His works have had a resonating influence across 
disciplinary borders from the 1970’s onwards178. This is not the place or time to 
elaborate on the complexity of Foucault’s many theories and insights but in this 
context, his focus on the performativity and productivity of language and discourse 
deserves particular attention. For Foucault cum suis, power and discourse are 
dialectically related: social institutions (and reality as such) are both products and 
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account of her scientific results. For the scientific report, see Boroditsky & Gaby (2010). 
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producers of discourse179. In his works, discourse is conceptualised as the collection of 
all communicated representations – linguistic or material – of socio-economic, cultural, 
and political reality. The dominant discourse in any society is the set of representations 
that structure and legitimise current power relations and is continuously reproduced by 
its affirmation through the agency of all members of that society. Every relevant 
societal issue, for Foucault, has a discourse through which it is represented. The amount 
of potential discourses for Foucault – and he strongly differs on this point from a 
Lacanian notion of discourse180 – is theoretically infinite as reality can be thought of as a 
collection of countless domains, spheres, and issues of interest. With the concept of 
“orders of discourse”, Foucault captured the way in which discourses can occur in (and 
differ from each other depending on their connection to) different institutional settings 
that try to constrain and control them. “Family” has a discourse, “government” has a 
discourse, “democracy” has a discourse, “human rights” have a discourse, etc.181 
Reality, therefore, does not exist prior to its perception, structuring, and (thereby 
reproductive) expression of individual or collective agency, nor does there exist a 
thinking process prior to its substantiation through (and therefore limiting 
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lecture delivered at the Collège de France in 1970, see Foucault (1972a). The insights on discourse 
were further elaborated in other theoretical works, as well as operationalised in many of Foucault’s 
historical studies. E.g. Foucault (1972b) and Foucault (1977) respectively. The empirical studies 
continuously stress the fact that discourse became more and more specialised over time, allowing 
“specialists” such as doctors to impose their discourse (i.c. that of medicalisation), which could be 
transposed onto societal domains. Foucault’s observation that the language of medicine is 
increasingly used outside its original context to endow certain ideas, beliefs, or even products with 
its authority is an example of such “specialisation”. For recent adaptations of Foucault’s theories in 
linguistics, see Mayr (2008a). For discourse having “the performative power to bring into being the 
very realities it claims to describe”, see Fairclough (2003), 203-4. Some scholars implicitly or 
explicitly suggest that the importance of language as the prime determinant of power and ideology 
is a product or trait of modern society. See for example Fairclough (2013), 2-3. This very modernistic 
view stems in part from the author’s clear social and emancipatory agenda (p. 4) as well as from the 
fact that at the time modern society was the main focus of social linguists (cf. Foucault himself).  
However, language – as the linguistic turn has made clear – has always had this function and 
inherent power in other historical periods as well. 
180 Lacan distinguished only four types of discourse (under which all the others could be grouped). 
The master’s discourse (i.e. the discourse between or about the powerless and the powerful), the 
university discourse (i.e. the discourse – often serving the master’s discourse – that endows 
someone with power as a result of his knowledge), the hysteric discourse (i.e. the discourse that 
questions the dominant view expressed in the master’s discourse), and the analyst discourse (i.e. the 
discourse that reveals to the agent his existential longing by laying bare the existence of the other 
discourses). For Lacan, these discourses are the product of terms rotating over fixed positions, 
rendering the whole theory very formalistic and mechanical. It should not concern us any further 
here.  
181 Foucault (1984). 
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determination by) discourse182. Because the reality agents live in – arbitrary in essence 
but perceived as natural – is shaped by this process, and because the same process 
makes it impossible to either imagine or realise other “realities”, the study of discourse 
becomes paramount to any attempt at grasping hegemonic social structures and the 
relations that emanate from them. Discourse, in other words, is the straitjacket imposed 
on the objective world and prevents any clear view on it. The “world” does not a priori 
have any meaning, but is given meaning through discourse which is therefore 
productive and as a consequence serves as the most powerful tool of the dominant who 
possess the symbolic capital to impose their own183. Power, in this perspective, is never 
owned or attributed but rather exercised and practised.  
At the same time, discourse defines and dictates what cannot be said. These “rules of 
exclusion” are internalised by every agent and can be divided into three kinds of 
“prohibition”. Prohibition of the object limits the things that can be spoken of, 
prohibition of the ritual limits the way in which can be spoken in any given context, and 
prohibition of the subject defines who can speak and who cannot184. These prohibitions 
explain the different registers of language agents use in any given situation. It goes 
without saying that this interpretation is closely related to the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony, Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence, and Scott’s model of the public 
transcript (but is by no means identical to it, cf. infra). However, the enormous 
contribution of Foucault was his developing of a method that would allow sociologists 
and historians (among others) to empirically study the workings, influence, and effects 
of discourse in a historical context: discourse analysis.  
 
                                                     
182 Foucault captured these essential traits of discourse by stating that it has no inside (in thought) 
and no outside (in things). This is, of course, not to say that for Foucault everything consisted of 
discourse. He paid important attention to the non-discursive as well. For a discussion, see Kendall & 
Wickham (1999), 35-41. 
183 See Mayr (2008b), 5 (including the many references). This should not merely be considered a 
conflict between elites and non-elites. Indeed, Foucault’s early work on the historical evolution of 
the way people perceived insanity, for example, focused on how “the other” was increasingly 
separated (both mentally and spatially) from the “normal people” and eventually became “defined” 
as a corollary to the process he called normalisation, Foucault (1973). 
184 Foucault (1984), esp. 109f. This theoretical division finds expression in many works on discourse 
analysis, where it is used to categorise the discursive constraints imposed on the powerless. 
Fairclough (2013), 39, for example, uses the triad of contents (restraint on “what is said or done”), 
relations (restraints on “the social relations people enther into in discourse”), and subjects 
(restraints on the “’subject positions’ people can occupy”). 
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1.3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis as methodology 
Foucault’s notion of discourse analysis has been widely taken up in the social sciences 
where the strands of investigation that are indebted to it are often grouped under the 
heading of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)185. Simplistically defined, CDA is “a theory 
and method analysing the way that individuals and institutions use language”186. It 
should be stressed, however, that certain branches of CDA highlight only one aspect of 
what Foucault considered to be the essence of discourse. Foucault never thought of 
discourse as merely a linguistic phenomenon, whereas CDA is concerned precisely with 
the analysis of vocabulary, structure, connotation, etc. of a certain written or spoken 
text187. For Foucault, the social aspect of discourse analysis is at least as important as the 
linguistic one. It refers to a much broader conception of discourse as a collection of 
communicative acts that are steered and determined by (and in turn reproduce) the 
dominant ideological conviction about a societal issue188. Discourse captures and 
reflects objects and structures in the world, but at the same time it also constructs and 
shapes them. The linguistic and the social aspects of CDA meet when the structure of a 
text, the intentional use of specific words, or repeated catch phrases are deconstructed 
in order to unravel that text’s normative character and lay bare the ideologies, values, 
and power relations of which it is an expression. It is this meaning of CDA that we will 
use throughout the analysis as our methodological instrument. 
It would be far beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the history, different 
points of focus, and nearly endless applications of CDA. Indeed, socio-linguistics, 
pragmatics, cognitive psychology, conversation analysis, etc. are strands of enquiry that 
have both made valuable contributions to the development of CDA and benefit from its 
increasing theorisation and level of complexity189. The “critical” in CDA stands for the 
way in which the analysis aims at uncovering connections between the straightforward 
language of a text on the one hand and the assumptions, ideologies, and power relations 
that are hidden (and often obscured by it) on the other. It shows how conventions are 
 
                                                     
185 For a very comprehensive introduction in Critical Discourse Analysis, see Fairclough (1995), 
which consistently considers discourse a form of social practice.  
186 Richardson (2007), 1. 
187 Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), a popular theory of language withing CDA, for example,  
focusses mainly on the linguistic aspect of discourse. See Mayr (2008b), 17ff. 
188 Conley & O’Barr (1998), 6-7 have this dyadic nature of discourse in mind when referring to it as 
either macrodiscourse (i.e. discourse in the social, more Foucauldian sense) or microdiscourse (i.e. 
discourse in the mere linguistic sense). Cf. also Lee (2012), 2. The distinction is echoed also in 
Habermas’ theory that separates communicative use of language (making oneself understandable) 
from strategic use of language (language which uses others to attain certain goals). For a discussion 
of these uses of language, see especially Cooke (1994), passim (esp. 8-27). 
189 See Fairclough (2013), 5-10 for a short overview. 
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never a priori natural and vocabulary or terminology rarely neutral. It takes into 
account who says “what”, “when” and “why”, but especially “how”. CDA, in other 
words, wants to reveal how communication in any given context may seem neutral and 
innocent to the agents concerned, but at the same time discloses that it is always 
systematically structured, socially determined, and a reflection of power relations. 
Communication is always a choice – albeit a predominantly unconscious one – and any 
choice of words and speech is, just like the omission of others, always meaningful. Or in 
Bourdieu’s words: “[i]t is because subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what they are 
doing that what they do has more meaning than they know”190. 
CDA necessarily involves three stages. Firstly, one has to analyse the text itself (i.e. 
which words are used, how are the sentences structured, when are passive rather than 
active verb forms used, etc.). Fairclough calls this first step Description. Secondly, the 
way in which and the reason why the text was produced as well as the understanding 
and interpretation of it by the receiver should be scrutinised. This is the process of 
Interpretation within the discourse analysis. Finally, due attention has to be paid to the 
embeddedness of production, product (text), and interpretation within social structures 
(i.e. the internalised mental framework of agents, which Bourdieu would call their 
habitus). This process of Explanation is concerned with both the social determination as 
well as with the social effects of discourse191. An essential corollary – well-known by 
historians – to keep in mind throughout any attempt at discourse analysis, is that a text 
cannot be read or studied in isolation from its productive, interpretative and broader 
socio-historical context. Not only should we fully recognise the implications of, for 
example, the vital chasm between intended readership and actual readership (an 
observation of particular relevance when reading ancient letters), but we must also 
acknowledge the common assumptions, mental models, and cognitive structures that 
the author and any potential reader (may or may not have) had in common.  
One of the strategies CDA uses to go about this task, is to consider language as a form 
of action, a social and cultural practice. This is primarily the object of the linguistic sub-
discipline of pragmatics, i.e. the strand of scholarship that studies the use of language192. 
The performative function of discourse was of course already recognised by Foucault, 
Bourdieu, and even Gramsci, but recent works have further developed and 
operationalised this insight. One particularly inspiring example is Rhys Isaac’s 1983 
 
                                                     
190 Bourdieu (1977), 79. 
191 For a much more detailed view on this methodology, see Fairclough (2013), 18-22. Note how we 
restrict discourse analysis here to the analysis of mere texts, whereas in its broadest sense, it should 
also include other communicative acts (or multimodal approaches to communication). For our 
purpose, of course, texts form the crux of the source material. 
192 Fairclough (2013), 7-8. 
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Pulitzer Price in History winning account of The Transformation of Virginia, 1740-1790. 
Although Isaac does not primarily set out to use CDA throughout his analysis, the most 
fundamental tenet of his methodology exists in considering all actions that are reported 
in literary sources as statements by historical actors. Historical sources need to be 
looked at in the first place as windows on those actions, providing clues to the historian 
as to how historical agents created, perceived, and transformed their reality. Actions – 
much like the discourse that is both their basis and their product – are always value-
laden statements. Uncovering the meaning they conveyed for both the historical actor 
and the historian is the fundamental objective of Isaac’s methodological approach. This 
can only be done by immersing oneself in the “language” of the historical society under 
consideration193. Learning that “language” is therefore the first task of the historian. 
This leads to an “inescapable circularity”, a hermeneutic circle as it were, in which 
knowledge of the “language” is 1) necessary to fully comprehend the socially rooted 
action statements of historical agents, but 2) achievable only through the study of these 
action statements194. The process by which the historian internalises this “language” 
(and which Isaac calls “translation”) therefore consists in the alternation between 
attention to the social structures or ideologies and an endeavour to fine-tune his 
understanding of them by testing it against individual cases that are contextual 
expressions of it. During this process, it becomes clear that there might exist 
“competing and conflicting definitions of what the actual situation was”195 as actors – to 
use Scott’s terminology – may not only negotiate their terms of existence within the 
public transcript when appearing “on stage” but can also, “behind the curtains”, contest 
the public transcript in its entirety through the hidden transcript196.  
In his Discourse on method, Isaac suggests a manner in which to study action 
statements197. Without going in too much detail here, every action is considered as an 
(often unequal) exchange, an “accounting process”, or a “social trading” between an 
agent and a significant other, resulting in the endowment and reproduction of social 
power which, when internalised by both partners, becomes social authority. 
Internalisation can only occur when the power is somehow considered “normal” or 
“legitimate” and leaves at least some part of the “stage” open to contestation or 
 
                                                     
193 Isaac, like Foucault, sees language not only as a linguistic phenomenon but also uses it in a more 
general sense as “all the codes by which those who share in the culture convey meanings and 
significance to each other”. Isaac (1982), 325.  
194 Isaac (1982), 325. 
195 Isaac (1982), 328. 
196 In this regard, it is no coincidence that both Isaac and Scott use the metaphor of theatre 
throughout their work.  
197 Isaac (1982), 323-57.  
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negotiation by subordinates198. In other words, the authority should be supported by 
ideals of justice. Each agent acts from his own definition of the situation which is in no 
small degree determined by the social structures in which the action statement unfolds 
but which is also subject to change depending on the room for such change within the 
public transcript (cf. supra).  Isaac’s conception of historical sources (i.c. texts) as a 
collection of performative action statements as well as his methodology based on a very 
close reading of the “language” by which these statements are presented, makes his 
work a highly original and particularly successful adaptation of the insights of CDA. 
Throughout our own analysis, we will assess the value of these insights for the study of 
freedmen, taking into account the necessary modifications and recontextualisations 
that have to be made when applying them to the ancient world. 
1.4 From opus operatum to modus operandi: operationalising 
social theory 
Although all of the insights discussed above will be employed to underpin the analysis 
in each subsequent chapter, every single one will have its own specific focus in 
particular. The next chapter takes the form of a programmatic statement that serves as 
a framework for the rest of the chapters. It discusses and eventually rejects the notion 
of a macula servitutis being responsible for the freedmen’s disabilities in both the private 
and the public sphere. As will be argued, it is a rather uncritical appropriation of the 
Roman elite’s discourse on freedmen; a remnant of the “Trimalchio vision” Lauren 
Petersen tried so ardently to expel from scholarship on Roman freedmen199. Chapters 4 
and 5, analysing the freedmen in the Roman epistolary genre, will primarily draw on the 
theoretical models of social capital and trust as set out above, although its detailed case 
studies are heavily indebted to insights from CDA as well. Chapter 7 will take up the 
issue of “the freedman discourse” and introduce in detail the notion of “the public 
transcript of equality”. Theoretically, the chapter draws on Scott’s transcript theory, 
but methodologically CDA is again indispensable. Chapter 8 combines CDA, transcript 
theory, and insights from social identity theory. It broadens the scope of analysis by 
 
                                                     
198 Cf. again Gramsci’s notion of hegemony as domination by consent and Scott’s theory of the public 
transcript (supra). 
199 Petersen (2006). 
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including the carmina latina epigraphica which lend themselves better than any other 
epigraphical texts to comparison with the literary sources on freedmen.  
In the final paragraphs of the current chapter, some clues are provided as to how the 
different theoretical models will be operationalised in what follows. It should 
immediately be emphasised that our prosopographies of freedmen introduced in 
Chapter 3 (and included in Appendices 2-4) are not meant to quantify or to serve as a 
proxy for the social capital of Cicero, Pliny, Fronto, and their correspondents. This 
would lead to a very distorted image indeed – even if we were somehow able to 
compensate for the non-representative selection and portrayal of freedmen of these 
sources (cf. Chapter 3). For one, it would ignore more subtle and informal ways in which 
trust is produced and reinforced, and which are per definition obscured in our 
sources200. Nonetheless, the nodal function of freedmen in the social networks of the 
elite will be the subject of close scrutiny. It is equally important to note that 
manumission or “trusting freedmen” was not just the consequence of a deliberate 
strategy to create social capital. This caveat is contained in the notion of “multiplex 
relations” which denotes the fact that an institution intended to serve a particular 
purpose can over time also grow to accommodate other ones201.  
The distinction between bridging and bonding social capital will prove a valuable tool 
for analysing ancient trust networks. If we conceptualise any social network as a set of 
expanding concentric circles centred on the core of a familia, freedmen functioned as 
agents facilitating the contact between such cores and their “periphery”. Points of 
contact in this periphery were in turn the center of a different social network. Insofar as 
freedmen smoothened communication and trust between these networks, they could be 
said to have embodied their employer’s bridging social capital (e.g. Caesar’s freedman 
Diochares who is used to connect Caesar, Atticus, Quintus, and Marcus Cicero; or Statius 
who is continuously approached by people trying to profit from his representing 
Quintus’ “capital”)202.  
Alternatively, they were also deployed to strengthen cohesion within a particular 
familia, an example of their bonding potential (e.g. Cicero using Aegypta to maintain 
 
                                                     
200 Cf. Lyon (2000), 676-7: “formal associations may only be a small factor in the production of trust 
or social capital and the links between networks, norms and the mechanism of creating institutions 
based on trust is not made clear. There is a risk that some definitions of social capital may ignore the 
‘softer’, less formalised networks that cannot be easily quantified”. 
201 Coleman (1988), 108-9. Earlier studies did not always recognise the multiplex nature of 
manumission. Wilson (1935), 66 one-sidedly claimed, for example, that “[m]any slaves were 
manumitted, not as a reward for past services, but in order to enable them to hold more responsible 
posts in the service of their late masters”. 
202 Cic. Att. 11.6.6; Quint. Fratr. 1.2. 
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contact with Tiro)203. It goes without saying that the role of freedmen in either bridging 
different networks or knitting individual networks closer together is also a very delicate 
one. Failure to succeed (or deliberate sabotage) has repercussions that extend far 
beyond individual relationships (cf. Chapter 4). Expanding one’s trust network by 
manumitting a slave, by accepting a recommendation, … is therefore not without risk. 
Indeed: “[t]hrough the introduction of new members into a family, a clan, or a club, the 
whole definition of the group, i.e., its fines, its boundaries, and its identity, is put at 
stake, exposed to redefinition, alteration, adulteration”204. It is very important, in other 
words, to allow only the most worthy elements to enter the group. Cicero’s worries 
about the manumission of Statius, and Quintus’ congratulations to Cicero after 
manumitting Tiro are examples of how keenly this preoccupation was felt. As a study of 
the extant letters of Cicero shows, “trusting” the wrong person could be very 
detrimental to one’s reputation (“symbolic capital”). As will be argued, this effect was 
increased in the case of trust damaged by freedmen since the latter’s nodal position in 
many trust networks would cause the betrayal to reverberate throughout all these 
netwerks. 
The main reason why trust and trust networks are chosen here as primary frames of 
reference to study freedmen, is the well-known notion in social theory that it is “the 
influence not of the individual capital holder within the network, but [that] of the 
trusted intermediaries that facilitate a network, [that create] specific networks of 
connections between individuals and institutions” and that these networks “settle down 
over time to become social structures”205. It is certainly true that the use of freedmen 
for this purpose is nowhere considered exceptional or unconventional in Roman 
literature and epistolography – quite on the contrary – and that we may justly speak of a 
certain degree of institutionalisation. This is all the more clear during the Principate, 
 
                                                     
203 Cic. Fam. 16.15.1-2. 
204 Bourdieu (2005) [1986], 102. 
205 Patulny & Svendsen (2007), 42. Bourdieu (2005) [1986], 101 also referred to the need of 
“indissolubly material and symbolic exchanges” to maintain relations. Studies in antiquity generally 
take this observation into account but rarely ever support it theoretically. Hall (2009), for example, 
brilliantly analyses the relation between Cicero and his correspondents in terms of their politeness. 
Although he does so primarily through detailed case studies of (repeated) interactions, he does not 
frame them in or with Bourdieusian notions of social, cultural, or symbolic capital. Besides a 
mention of “capital” to denote ad hoc political alliances (102), the only reference to the capital 
metaphor occurs in a footnote (218, note 107) and has no bearing on the actual discussion. Hall, in 
other words, realises that maintaining networks implies an “endless effort at institution (…) which is 
necessary in order to produce and reproduce lasting, useful relationship that can secure material or 
symbolic profits” (Bourdieu (2005) [1986], 101-2), and focusses on the role of politeness in this 
process. But his approach as a whole would, we feel, benefit in no small degree from embedding 
these practices of politeness in Bourdieu’s model which would see them as only one of many 
“investment strategies aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships”. 
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when freedmen become the emperor’s primary agents through whom the empire is 
managed (cf. Chapter 6). The institutionalisation seems complete when the titles these 
men received (ab rationibus, ab epistulis, etc.) became exclusively reserved for the familia 
Caesaris, and when these freedmen were no longer regarded as ex-slaves of this or that 
individual emperor, but as “imperial freedmen” instead: freedmen who served in the 
imperial administration, sometimes under several successive emperors206. For our 
purpose, the development within theories of trust and trust networks of frameworks by 
which the intermediaries rather than the capital holders can be studied, legitimises its 
central role in our work. 
We will furthermore argue that the tension between a freedman as an agent in a 
patronage relation (libertus) on the one hand, and the same freedman as a member of 
society as a whole (libertinus) on the other can be meaningfully explored by applying the 
theoretical distinction between particularised trust in persons and generalised trust in 
institutions. Trusting freedmen was always a combination of both: a freedman was 
trusted because he had individually shown great promise which in turn led the master to 
trust that he would adhere to the institutionalised norms of manumission and patronage 
(gratia, fides, …). Recommendations of freedmen therefore always typically invoked the 
general norms of patronage as well as the confirmation that these were internalised by 
the freedman (Chapter 5). This confirmation was needed because there never existed a 
blind belief in the machineries of patronage207. As mentioned earlier, it is assumed in 
many sociological models that a sustained or increasing level of a particular trust in 
persons will result in general trust in such institutions208. This stands in sharp contrast 
with the observation that liberti are very much trusted on the personal level (e.g. as 
couriers, agents, etc.) but that this rarely seemed to have resulted in a more generalised 
positive perception towards the class of libertini209. This is of course in part due to the 
propensity of agents to place trust in concrete, known persons rather than in abstract 
groups or classes210. The elite reacted particularly bitter and hostile towards freedmen 
 
                                                     
206 Weaver (1972), 45, 61; Winterling (1999), 23ff; Mouritsen (2011), 94 note 116. For imperial 
freedmen in general, see the other two hallmark studies of Chantraine (1967) and Boulvert (1974). 
Nero famously prosecuted Torquatus Silanus (and later his nephew) for allegedly having given the 
“titles of the business of empire” (i.e. ab epistulis, ab libellis, etc.) to his own private freedmen (Tac. 
Ann. 15.35; 16.8). 
207 Damon (1997) gives an original account of the pathology of Roman patronage (as experienced by 
the elite) through a focus on the figure of the parasite as a negative reflection of the cliens (e.g. p. 2, 
8). 
208 E.g. Ogilvie (2005), 4-5. 
209 See the ratio of positive and negative evaluations of individual freedmen versus groups of 
freedmen (SP and GP) in Chapter 3.   
210 We noticed how people placed more trust, for example, in their own doctor than in the medical 
system as such. 
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violating the trust of their patron or acting in a way that differed from the their 
expectations. In the case of mild transgressions, this tension could be resolved by both 
parties taking recourse to the ideology that propagated loyal, amiable, and forgiving 
relations (cf. supra). Often, however, the consequences were too grave to opt for 
reconciliation, and acts of deviance became to be considered acts of defiance. Not only 
did a patron see his investments in human and economic capital (sustenance, education, 
manumission, …) go to waste, and his social capital crippled, but his symbolic capital too 
– including the recognition by a subordinate of the status quo as legitimate – was 
tarnished by an act of insubordination. This is why such acts of betrayal were 
particularly hard felt, and their condemnation typically consisted of rhetorically 
reducing the freedman to slave status. The constant realisation that individual 
freedmen could turn out to be no more than “unjustly freed slaves” did not prevent 
trust on the personal level, but it did thwart any form of generalisation. It seems 
reasonable to hypothesise that had no freedman ever tried to usurp positions of power 
or damaged his patron in any way, generalised trust in the class of libertini could have 
been a possibility211. Free will, the persistence of social structures, and the realisation of 
the latent (or overt) discrimination that emanates from them, formed a cocktail that – 
much like today – prevented the realisation of this ideal situation. It is a short – but 
analytically incorrect – step from this observation to the idea that a macula servitutis was 
responsible for a freedman’s treatment and disabilities in the social, legal, and political 
field. This idea of a macula servitutis inherent in any freedman’s identity is incompatible 
with the notion of the public transcript of equality. The tension and apparently 
paradoxical relation between the public transcript of equality and the equally salient 
elite strategies of social distinction will be elaborated upon in the next chapter. 
An important variable that inclined freedmen to either accept or contest their role in 
a social network of trust, was their self-perception. Not only will this observation in due 
time lead us to draw from social identity theory in order to elucidate the notion of 
“freedmen as social capital”, but it also suggests that elites had their own interests in 
mind when they adhered to, and confirmed, the public transcript of equality of 
freedmen. Experimental studies have shown that dependents will be more prone to act 
selflessly when they have a predominantly positive perception of themselves212. 
Presenting and accepting freedmen as equals in principle, we will suggest, strongly 
increased their trustworthiness and ensured the acceptance of their role as bonding and 
bridging agents within their patron’s networks. By representing and increasing his 
patron’s social capital, a freedman, in other words, also generated social and symbolic 
 
                                                     
211 This is, of course, an historian’s translation of Scott’s critique on the notions of consent, 
hegemony, naturalisation, and internalisation (cf. supra). 
212 See Tzanakis (2013), 14. 
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capital for his own. Moreover, as Bourdieu already noted, one’s own social capital 
increases when the economic, cultural, or symbolic capital of one’s connections 
increase213. Patrons therefore needed freedmen not only to stay in touch and have 
reliable couriers, but the trust they created and evoked was a resource in itself. Openly 
recognising the trustworthiness of freedmen in letters of recommendation, for example, 
was thus not only beneficial for the freedman himself, but also for both the writer and 
the receiver of the letter (provided that the trust was not betrayed afterwards). These 
processes also at least partially explain, as we will see, the difference in the discourse on 
freedmen between Cicero and his correspondents on the one hand, and, for example, 
Tacitus or Suetonius, who did not write about freedmen in a networking-context, on the 
other (cf. Chapter 6). 
Scott’s notion of infrapolitics as the field in which subordinates can act politically by 
creating spheres in the public transcript where aspects of their hidden transcript can be 
subtly, harmlessly, or anonymously expressed, will prove useful when analysing the 
behaviour of certain freedmen as “action statements” (cf. Isaac). As will become clear, 
freedmen found themselves in a constant process of negotiation with their patron and 
with society at large. Some settled more easily in the patterns of expectation set out for 
them, but many kept testing and redefining them. They could never openly express 
their reasons to do so or the precise contents of this potential resentment. This would 
not only violate the rules of the public transcript, but opposing or transgressing existing 
norms would also prove harmful in the short-term (and potentially long-term if any 
hope for advancement through posterity was held). As such, we can only interpret their 
story through the glasses of the elite that documented it. In this respect, considering 
what freedmen did as “action statements” will compensate for the lack of personal 
testimonies. Although the Roman letter-writers or their “publishers” did not include 
letters written by freedmen, we can sometimes catch a glimpse of what these letters 
must have looked like (cf. Chapters 6 and 7). Not only is the subject matter sometimes 
referred to in a letter to a third correspondent, but on rare occasions the writers would 
even quote from freedman letters. The reason why they did so in specific circumstances 
is not only revealing in its own right, but the actual contents of these passages can offer 
a unique insight into the freedmen’s thoughts and preoccupations.  
The seemingly paradoxical tension between a freedman’s equality as a citizen (as a freed 
man) on the one hand, and the elite’s efforts to safeguard the distinction between 
themselves and these ex-slaves (freedmen) on the other, is a common theme throughout 
the scholarship on freedmen. The methods by which either position has been qualified 
are manifold, ranging from quantitative analysis of samples from the Corpus 
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Inscriptionum Latinarum, over scrupulous examination of case studies, to synthesised 
accounts of “the” freedman’s social, economic, political, and cultural role in society. 
Rarely has structural attention been paid to CDA as a methodology that has for decades 
proved to be instrumental in revealing latent power relations. Bourdieu already 
remarked that the “truth of any interaction is never entirely to be found within the 
interaction as it avails itself for observation”214. We cannot take descriptions or 
accounts of events at face value since they are partially shaped by broader hidden 
structures. We argue that CDA can help us in laying bare these structures. Moreover, 
Bourdieu stressed that the primacy of symbolic capital originates from the ability it 
gives its possessors to exercise symbolic power. This happens predominantly through 
the imposition and naturalisation of a specific discourse. The struggle for capital is 
therefore not only a struggle for discourse, but also a struggle through discourse. 
Negotiation of, and competition for, position in the field is always discursively framed. 
CDA therefore emerges as the analytical tool par excellence to study these very processes.   
Throughout the analysis, we will therefore pay particular attention to how grammatical 
and syntactical forms, as well as specific choices on the semantic level not only justify 
the meaning they themselves create, but also express hidden assumptions, symbolic 
power and hegemony. What is said in a text is often as important as what is omitted. 
This distinction between explicit mention and implicit meaning is crucial to 
acknowledge. What is merely implied often gives an indication of what is taken for 
granted, what is considered common sense or “natural”, in short: for ideology215. When 
analysing what is explicitly stated, the grammatical and syntactical patterns may reveal 
either deliberate rhetorical strategies or unconsciously expressed opinions. Repeated 
functionalisation (the reduction of a subject to a type) or identification (the reduction of 
a subject’s identity to one dimension of it), reveal the author’s wish to classify (and 
force) these subjects in his own conception of reality. When nominalisation occurs 
(verbs represented as nouns), it may be an indication of the author downplaying agency 
and creating distance from the subject. The same goes for the choice for passive rather 
than active verb constructions. Binomials, a chain of two (or more) syntactically similar 
words, are used to – often empathically – stress a point. When the same binomial 
reappears often in a similar context, it may betray formalisation and standardisation, 
rather than real feelings. Whereas figures of style are usually consciously created by the 
author, grammatical and syntactical patterns like the ones just mentioned often 
originate from unconscious habit and may therefore be revealing for the author’s 
 
                                                     
214 Bourdieu (1989), 16. 
215 Fairclough (1995), 5-6. 
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opinions and assumptions. They are therefore considered of primary importance by 
CDA216. 
As noted before, CDA will underpin the analysis of the Roman letters. In Chapter 7, 
the scope will be expanded by transcending the epistolary genre, and by including many 
other genres in the lexical analysis. The different literary genres – approached as 
reflections of Foucauldian “orders of discourse” – will be analysed via corpus linguistics, 
an “empirical approach to natural language which is generally used to show the 
frequency of items and patterns in texts associated with particular contexts of use”. The 
meaning or appropriation of a specific term or expression may vary considerably 
according to the literary genre in which it occurs. Indeed, a common critique on CDA is 
that it is particularly prone to “over-interpretation”. A limited focus on one genre or 
corpus may paint only part of the picture. Or in other words, corpus linguistics “can be 
used to uncover recurrent language patterns over a range of similar texts, which a 
conventional CDA analysis concentrating on a single or limited range of texts may 
overprivilege”217. By thus not only including various literary genres, but also by 
expanding our view to include epigraphical sources (Chapter 8), we intend to meet this 
justified criticism. 
 
                                                     
216 These rhetorical strategies and unconscious formulations (and many more) are introduced and 
applied to concrete sources throughout the different contributions in Mayr (2008a).  
217 Bastow (2008), 139. 
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Chapter 2 Neque enim aboletur turpitudo, quae 
postea intermissa est? The macula 
servitutis of Roman freedmen 
In 1736, the German jurist Joachim Potgieser wrote a monumental commentary on the 
Germanic laws of slavery. In a chapter called De libertis, he could not resist venturing 
comparison with the writings of Roman lawgivers on the subject. After mentioning 
Servius Tullus’ role in the enfranchisement of freedmen, the summary continues as 
follows1: 
“Quantumvis autem deinde AUGUSTUS, & TIBERIUS, de civium Romanorum 
existimatione solliciti, libertorum iura variis modis coercerent, adeo, ut pauci 
civitatem Romanam obtinerent; reliqui vero Latini & dedititii fierent, ne tam 
ingenti libertorum colluvie orbis domina amplius contaminaretur, sed ab omni, 
quoad eius fieri poterat, macula peregrini & servilis sanguinis incorruptus 
maneret populus (…)” 
 
This image of freedmen “contaminating” the body of Roman citizens and diminishing its 
prestige has long been the dominant interpretation of the many laws on freedmen 
passed under the first emperors. Although this view has been convincingly challenged 
by recent contributions2, a persisting stain of slavery is generally held responsible for 
freedmen’s status as “minderberechtigte Mitglieder” of the citizen body or as “second-
 
                                                     
1 Potgieser (1736), 771 (IV.14.3). 
2 When freedmen first emerged as a subject sui generis in academic research, scholarly discourse 
largely reproduced ancient elite stereotypes (e.g. Suet. Aug. 40.3; Dio 56.33.3–4). See again Mouritsen 
(2011), 2ff for a discussion of this long and influential tradition. More recent works have rightly 
stressed the danger of using elite sources in reconstructing and evaluating the freedman condition, 
e.g. Petersen (2006), passim; Mouritsen (2011), 80ff, 108 (cf. note 132 below); Bell & Ramsby (2012). 
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class citizens”3. The aim of this chapter is to study whether and to which extent this 
idea of a macula servitutis adequately represents ancient reality. Lavan rightly noted that 
the Roman ideology of slavery was characterised by a high degree of inconsistency and 
contradiction and that “any generalisation about Roman attitudes to slaves can only be 
an oversimplification of a complex discourse”4. While freedmen’s past as slaves would 
always be remembered in Rome’s class-conscious society, to attribute (and thereby 
reduce) their restrictions and social limitations to a stigma derived from their servile 
past is too narrow a view.  
We will first elaborate on a subject already briefly touched upon in the Introduction, 
i.e. the question how the undisputed assumption of a servile stain on the freedman’s 
person has permeated classical studies, and has influenced the way scholars interpreted 
their sources. Secondly, the expression itself (macula servitutis) will be situated in its 
historical and legal context. A comparison will be made with similar “stains” on a 
person’s honour, to allow us to evaluate how pervasive, impactful and definite these 
were for the persons under consideration, and to gauge how this can broaden our 
understanding of a freedman’s situation. Finally, the shortcomings of the macula 
servitutis view as an explanatory model will be outlined, and some alternative 
interpretations will be suggested for the source material that has traditionally been 
regarded as definite proof for it. 
2.1 Pervasiveness in modern scholarship 
Statements about “une macule servile”, or the “unique – and irredeemable – stigma the 
freedman carried”, are omnipresent in freedman studies up to the point that the phrase 
became eponymous for an entire chapter in Mouritsen’s recent monograph on the 
Roman freedman5. As noted earlier, this decision was but the logical culmination of a 
tradition that had for a long time stressed the pervasiveness of the ex-slave’s past in his 
social life. Some examples demonstrate the influence this perspective has had, and how 
it has steered both the analysis and conclusions of many studies. 
 
                                                     
3 Klees (2002), 91; Taylor (1960), 133. 
4 Lavan (2013), 79. See also Fitzgerald (2000), 8; MacLean (2012), 212; Hopkins (1978), 216 (writing 
about the intertwinement of politics and religion).  
5 Chapter 2 in Mouritsen (2011) is called “Macula servitutis: slavery, freedom, and manumission”. 
Quotes are from Boulvert & Morabito (1982), 111 and Mouritsen (2011), 111 respectively. Cf. Duff 
(1958), 52. 
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For instance, at some point in its history, the highest magistracy in the Roman colony 
of Dion (Macedonia) was, quite exceptionally, in the hands of the freedman P. 
Anthestius Amphio6. In one inscription – immortalising their benefactions to the city – 
Amphio and his wife omitted their legal status7. Demaille argued that they had done so 
“par souci d’honorabilité” because it was “une tâche indigne”: Amphio felt that his 
servile past tainted him in such a way that the juxtaposition of libertination and official 
titles would seem inappropriate8. Accepting this motive or concern, however, renders 
problematic the fact that he (and his wife) did include full libertination in other, quasi 
identical, inscriptions9. Conversely, L. Iulius Hyla and T. Granius Felix were aediles of the 
same colony but did not publicise their legal status in their dedications to Liber Pater10. 
Although Dion is the only colony in Macedon known to have allowed freedmen to obtain 
public office in the late Republic and early empire, the phenomenon was not 
exceptional in other Caesarian colonies throughout the Roman provinces11. In 45 BCE, 
for example, L. Pomponius Malchio was duumvir quinquennalis in Curubis (Tunisia), and 
 
                                                     
6 Dion was re-founded as a Roman colony by Caesar or Augustus, and this context may explain how a 
freedman could obtain the highest municipal office: especially the former ruler is known to have 
allowed freedmen to pursue political ambitions in his colonies (cf. the lex coloniae Ursonensis of 44 
BCE in CIL 2, 5439, cap. 105, and note 11 below). However, the specific case of Amphio has 
alternatively been dated to the Severan period; well after the lex Visellia of 24 CE (Cod. Iust. 9.21), and 
even after the lex municipii Malacitani of ca. 82 CE (CIL 2, 1964, cap. 54), which both formally excluded 
freedmen from local office (universally and for Spanish towns of Latin status respectively). The 
earlier date for Amphio’s inscriptions is based on palaeographic and onomastic analysis of the texts, 
a Severan one on in situ archaeological evidence and other contextual arguments. For the debate 
and the arguments, including references, see the extensive overview in Demaille (2008), 17-20. 
López Barja de Quiroga (2010), 330 has noted that taking the Visellian law as support for the earlier 
date amounts to circular reasoning, which too prematurely dismisses the possibility that this case 
may have been an exceptional one. Cf. Rizakis (2001), 42. Mouritsen (2011), 74 note 36 called the case 
of Amphio a “glaring anomaly”. 
7 AE 1950, 20: “P(ublius) Antestius Amphio / aed(ilis) augur IIvir quinq(uennalis) / et Antestia 
Iucund(a) / aedem Libero / et colonis de sua / p(ecunia) f(aciendum) c(uraverunt)”. 
8 Demaille (2008), 3. He connects this omission to the function of the inscription (i.e. listing the acts 
of evergetism undertaken by the freed couple). However, other inscriptions referencing 
benefactions included libertination (see the next note). 
9 AE 1998, 1209: “Serapi et Isi et colonis / portic(us) duas ianum alam / P(ublius) Anthestius P(ubli) 
l(ibertus) Amphio aug(ur) aed(ilis) / IIvir quinq(uennalis) et Anthesia P(ubli) l(iberta) / Iucunda d(e) 
s(ua) p(ecunia) f(aciunda) c(uraverunt)”; AE 2008, 1228: “Dianae et colonis / Antestia P(ubli) l(iberta) 
Iucunda aram d(e) s(ua) p(ecunia) f(aciendum) c(uravit)”. 
10 AE 1954, 23; 2006, 1262. For these and other freedmen holding public office in the colony of Dion, 
see Rizakis (2003), 119-21. 
11 Rizakis (2003), 120-21; Salmon (1969), 135; Treggiari (1969a), 63-4. Rizakis (2001) treats the 
municipal elites (many of whom were freedmen) of the colonies in Achaea, with specific attention to 
Corinth (p. 41-6), Dyme (p. 46-7), and Patras (p. 48), although the role of freedmen in the latter – as 
an Augustan military colony – was much less outspoken than in the other two. Cf. Spawforth (1996) 
for the composition of Corinth’s early elite. Demaille (2008) discusses the freed P. Anthestii in Dion. 
A more general treatment of the role of freedmen in municipal life is provided by Le Glay (1990). 
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celebrated his contributions to the city in an inscription that explicitly mentioned his 
freed status12. However, 25 years later, another duumvir of the same city – Cn. Domitius 
Malchio – chose not to include libertination when listing his acts of evergetism13. Other 
Republican freedmen in positions of power had, like Amphio, multiple inscriptions 
erected, sometimes with but sometimes without explicit reference to their status14. 
Inscriptions of freedmen who did not hold any office but who nonetheless eternalised 
their influence in, and benefactions to, a city, similarly suggest that the decision to 
include libertination was highly contextual. C. Iulius Zoilus – the famous freedman of 
Octavian – thus mentioned his contribution to the construction of the theatre of 
Aphrodisias (Asia) in an inscription that formally spelled out his freed status (θεοῦ 
Ἰουλίου υἱοῦ Καίσαρος ἀπελεύθερος)15. However, earlier inscriptions set up in the same 
city (listing, for example, his contribution to Aphrodite’s temple), presented Zoilus 
without any reference to his legal status16. If shame or a feeling of inappropriateness 
was the primary motive for omitting libertination in the earlier inscriptions, then surely 
Zoilus would not have included it in the highly visible one in the theatre some eight 
years later. 
The debate about the proportion of freeborn to freed persons in epigraphic sources 
in general has often produced similar arguments. Some scholars explained the 
enormous mass of incerti (people of unknown status) as a result of “the freedman’s 
unwillingness to declare his inferior status (…)”, and therefore suggested that these 
incerti were mostly embarrassed freedmen17. Libertination (except in the cases of 
imperial freedmen) did indeed decline at the end of the first, and the beginning of the 
second century CE, but so did filiation18. Moreover, whenever individuals chose to 
 
                                                     
12 CIL 8, 977: “C(aio) Caesare Imp(eratore) co(n)s(ule) II[II] / L(ucius) Pomponius L(uci) l(ibertus) 
Malc[hio(?)] / duovir V / [m]urum oppidi totum ex saxo / quadrato aedific(andum) coer(avit)”. 
13 CIL 8, 978: “M(arco) Appuleio / P(ublio) Silio co(n)s(ulibus) / Cn(aeo) Domitio / Malchion[e] / 
duovir(o) quin(quennali) / L(ucius) Sertorius Al[ex]an(der) / L(ucius) Vitruvius Alexan(der) / 
aed(iles) / pluteum perpetu(um) / scholas II i[tem(?)] / [h]orologium / [via]m muni[endam(?)] / …” 
14 See, for example, the famous case of M. Caelius Phileros (CIL 8, 26274; 10, 6104) whose career as 
aedilis and praefectus iure dicundo in Carthage and as duumvir in the nearby Clupea is discussed in 
detail by Gascou (1984). Cf. Le Glay (1990), 623-5. 
15 Reynolds (1982), nr. 36 (ca. 30 BCE). 
16 Reynolds (1982), nr. 37 (38 BCE). For a discussion of Zoilus’ extant dedications, see besides 
Reynolds (1982), 156-164 also Weaver (2004), 199-200; Osgood (2006), 274-6. 
17 Taylor (1961), 122. Cf. Huttunen (1974), 129; MacLean (2012), 126.  
18 Taylor (1961), 119f; Weaver (1963), passim; Mrozek (1976b), 40-3 (for Rome). For the situation in 
the rest of Italy, see e.g. Lazzaro (1985), 465 (for Ateste); (1989), passim (in particular for Padua). For 
a similar development in the East, see e.g. Leveau (1984), esp. 154 (for Mauretania Caesariensis). Łoś 
(1995), 1034-6 argue that the decline of epigraphic libertination in this period was not (only) related 
to the epigraphic habit, but (also) reflects the decline of the importance of freedmen in general. This 
suggestion likewise neglects the equally important observation that filiation decreased at the same 
time. 
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nonetheless include explicit status indicators at this time, this was more often done by 
freedmen than by freeborn dedicators, and often in combination with expressions of 
pride related to their newly attained freedom and citizenship, their family life and their 
professional activities19. A statistical approach in this instance undervalues the 
contextual motivations of individual actors in epigraphically representing themselves. 
Kleijwegt thus nuanced the existence of “post-servility stress”, arguing that the 
situation was “much more complex than the simplified equation hostility (on the part of 
the freeborn) leading to shame (on the part of the freed slave)” suggests, and that pride 
in having escaped slavery may have been at least as important as shame about that very 
past20. In the same vein, Joshel observed that “[t]he omission of formal status indication 
in contexts that would have been associated with slavery does not point to a desire to 
hide one's background: the statement made by libertination is missing, but servile 
origin is concealed neither by burial location nor by the information given on the 
epitaph”21. Verboven likewise noted that the continuing relation with a patron – and 
the presentation of the freedman as essential part of his trust network and social capital 
– was an identity dimension worth stressing rather than hiding22. Yet others added that 
libertination was a useful tool in situating oneself in the social networks not only of a 
patron, but also of other social relations (professional colleagues, colliberti, etc.)23 
Finally, Perry has most recently shown for freedwomen in particular that libertination 
could serve both to express an individual identity (e.g. when nomen and cognomen are 
included besides libertination) and a relational one (e.g. when the nomen is omitted but 
is anyhow implied by a reference to a patron with full nomenclature)24. 
The matrix of individual decision-making most likely contained elements of both 
interpretations. The point is that the “shame” explanation is based entirely on the 
assumption that an all-pervasive macula servitutis in the lives of freedmen was not only 
stressed in elite writing, but was a crucial dimension of the freedman’s self-appraisal 
and identity as well. The fact that on their epitaphs, some ex-slaves chose to refer to 
 
                                                     
19 Huttunen (1974), 139-41; 187-8; Joshel (1992), 167f; 183-6. Weaver (1990), 294 stresses the optional 
character of mentioning libertination. Carroll (2006), 146 (incl. references) accentuates the other 
identity dimensions that were celebrated besides legal status. Perry (2014), 100 (incl. especially 
notes 9-12) gives an extensive overview of the debate. 
20 Kleijwegt (2006b), 94-5, 110-1. He connects the decline of libertination to the changing of one’s 
name to have it sound less “servile”, but contests that this was done solely to diminish “life-long 
concerns with the symbols of their suffering”.  
21 Joshel (1992), 185. 
22 Verboven (2012), 98. Contrast Andreau (1993), 196-7 who thought that freedmen “probably tended 
not to insist too much on the strength of this personal tie” and that “[t]o be free of such ties was 
probably a freedman’s dream come true”. 
23 E.g. Nielsen (1997), 204. This is of course also the central theme of Joshel (1992). 
24 Perry (2014), 98ff (esp. 101-2). 
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each other as conservus and contubernalis instead of collibertus and coniunx cannot be 
explained by (and blatantly contradicts) a widely shared shame among ex-slaves. 
Apparently, it was more important for these individuals to stress the continuity and 
durability of their relationship (which had its roots in slavery) than to hide any “stigma” 
that may have been attached to it25. Likewise, instead of obscuring their children’s 
servile ancestry, freedmen often gave them (a variant of) their own name, often a Greek 
or “servile” Latin one26. This practice seems incomprehensible if we assume that the 
macula servitutis weighed heavily on these individuals. Finally, the assumption of a 
servile stain has also led scholars to suggest that Romans conditioned their freedmen 
and “inculcated a distinct set of values”27. Often coupled to this line of reasoning is the 
claim that there existed a status-specific (elite) discourse on freedmen. Because this is a 
point we will take up in further detail in Chapter 7, we will limit ourselves to merely 
mentioning it here.  
In short, besides a modern conceptual framework, the macula servitutis is also attributed 
a pivotal role in the socialisation of ex-slaves. But how legitimate is this assumption of a 
pervasive and omnipresent stain on the freedman’s person? How discernible is it in our 
sources? Was it a widely held belief among Romans or rather a useful analytic concept 
for modern scholars to grasp (and group) the many particularities of freed status? To 
fully understand its meaning, we should not only look at the literal attestations of the 
expression and similar concepts such as the labes, naevus, dedecus or ignominia of slavery. 
It is equally important to analyse 1) the semantic scope of these words outside the realm 
of slavery and manumission, and 2) to address the issue of a taint on someone’s honour 
in more general terms, including the social and moral implications, its pervasiveness 
after restoration or social promotion, and the discourse related to it. 
 
                                                     
25 MacLean (2012), 133-4. Even if she is mistaken in restoring “CONSER” to “CONSERVI” (instead of 
“CONSERVATORI”) in CIL 6, 582, the argument still stands strong. 
26 Duff (1958), 57-8; Tran (2006), 115; Mouritsen (2005), 41 note 17; (2011), 286-9. 
27 Mouritsen (2011), 58. Further onwards, he writes of a “specific set of virtues”, a “fairly well 
established format for the praise of freedmen”, “common stereotypes used to praise freedmen” (p. 
61), “pivotal virtues” (p. 62), a “limited range of virtues open to freedmen” (p. 63), “specific libertine 
qualities” (p. 64), and of elevating trust (fides), parsimony (frugalitas), and hard work (industria) as 
particular libertine qualities (p. 148).  
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2.2 Stains, marks, and blemishes 
2.2.1 Literature, epigraphy, and law texts 
Throughout Roman literature, maculae of all sorts appear, ranging from “stains” or 
“spots” in a very literal sense to the blemish on one’s reputation after misconduct. 
Examples of the former can be found in various descriptions of animals, fruits, 
symptoms of diseases, and bodily flaws28. Such plastic descriptions could in turn be used 
to express a figurative or metaphorical stain. When Ovidius is told the meaning of one of 
his dreams, a white heifer representing the poet’s girlfriend had a black blemish (macula 
nigra) on her breast, which the dream-interpreter took to indicate that her heart was 
not free of adultery’s stain (adulterii labes)29. This leads us to the moralising use of 
maculae: the stains on someone’s person or character. When Cicero airs his disgust about 
the behaviour of jurymen to Atticus, he says they consisted – among others – of maculosi 
senatores30. In his public speeches too, Cicero could mention the stain on Cluentius’ 
family as a result of his mother’s lust; the macula, invidia, and infamia cast on the state by 
wicked governors; the pollution and stains of treachery and corruption; and the stain 
and disgrace (macula atque labes) of his age in general31. On more dramatic occasions, 
such descriptions could amount to climactic bursts of rhetoric, as was the case in 57 
BCE, when Cicero vehemently accused Clodius of sacrilege for polluting the Megalesian 
games with numerous crimes, and staining them with infamy (omni flagitio pollueres, 
dedecore maculares, scelere obligares)32. In its figurative sense then, macula is often used as 
a generic insult and, conversely, the lack of any macula as a praiseworthy quality33.  
Some masters named their slaves “Macula”, a name they would then usually keep 
after manumission as part of their tria nomina. Thus a midwife from Mactar (Africa 
Proconsularis), most likely freed, was called Aurelia Macula34. However, the name did not 
refer to any (past) condition, and was as such not associated with slavery. Indeed, 
 
                                                     
28 Examples are legion: Col. RR 6.37.7; 12.47.2 and 49.4; Plin. NH 8.23(62); 27(69); Liv. 41.21; Lucr., 
1.590; Verg. Aen. 5.566; Plaut., Capt. 595; Ovid., Met. 5.455; Cels. 2.8.32; 3.25; Cic. ND 1.79; Suet. Aug. 
80.1; 94.4; Nero 51.1; etc. 
29 Ovid. Am. 3.5.43. Likewise, after he had set his mind on the praetorship, Cn. Scipio presented 
himself on the Campus Martius dressed in the white toga of the candidate but soiled by the stains of 
depravity (turpitudinis maculae), Val. Max. 3.5.1. 
30 Cic. Att. 1.16.3. Cf. Cluent. 130 (macula iudiciorum). 
31 Cic. Cluent. 12; Prov. 13; Ver. 2.3.144; Rhet. ad Her. 4.47; Font. 36; 41; S. Rosc. 113; Cael. 16; Balb. 15; 
Sest. 108. 
32 Cic. Har. 27. Polluere is on other occasions used as synonym of maculare as well, e.g. Mil. 85. 
33 E.g. Cic. Planc. 15. 
34 AE 1980, 936. 
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ingenui could carry it as well. Examples include Caius Cassius Macula from Patavium, and 
Quintus Pompeius Macula, duumvir of Pompei in 25 CE35. Most likely, the name Macula 
(or a derivative) instead referred to a physical trait or imperfection, as did many 
cognomina. In a letter to Quintus Lepta, Cicero mentions another Macula36. This man is 
probably to be identified with Pompeius Macula in a passage of Macrobius’ Saturnalia. 
There, Avienus tells the anecdote of Sulla’s daughter Cornelia Fausta who had two lovers 
simultaneously: a certain Fulvius (the son of a fuller) and our Pompeius Macula. When 
noticing this scandal, her brother Faustus made a joke based on the literal meaning of 
macula, and on the rhetorical elite aversion to manual labour: he asked himself whether 
his sister should have a stain (macula) because she had a fuller (miror sororem meam 
habere maculam, cum fullonem habeat). He thereby wittily addressed both the 
undesirability of his sister having two lovers, and the humiliation of one of them being a 
mere fuller. Since one of the tasks of a fuller was the removal of stains out of dirty 
garments, macula can have both a literal and a figurative meaning in this case, which 
was no doubt what Faustus was alluding to37. Although it could thus occasionally be 
used to mock someone, the name Macula in no way referred to a (past) servile 
condition. 
There is no explicit evidence for a stain (macula, labes, naevus, …) of slavery on 
freedmen in literary sources. In fact, the metaphorical or figurative use of these words is 
rarely – if ever – related to slavery or manumission. On the rare occasions where it is, 
the terms explicitly refer to the servile condition alone. For example, Publius Crassus 
provoked his captor in killing him, thus escaping the disgrace of servitude (dedecus 
servitutis effugit). Likewise, Procopius, Maximus and Eugenius – usurpers of the purple 
under Valens and Theodosius – are said to have undergone the shame of slavery 
(ignominia servitutis) before their execution38. 
Besides a proper name, macula was a relatively popular word to refer to one’s reputation 
on epitaphs, occurring most frequently in the formula sine macula vixit. In Christian 
texts, it was closely associated with the concept of sin. Thus Saint Nazarius had led a vita 
immaculabilis39, and in an epigram Saint Ambrose described a baptistery as a place where 
repenting men were freed from sin’s stain (maculosum crimen)40. Despite the 
 
                                                     
35 CIL 5, 2918;  CIL 10, 896. 
36 Cic. Fam. 6.19.1. 
37 Macr. Sat. 2.2. For fullers, see Ovid. Fast. 3.821; Plaut. Capt. 841. 
38 Front. Strat. 4.5.16; Jer. Ep. 60.15. 
39 CIL 5, 6250. 
40 CLE 908. For this epigram and its context, see Wills (2012), 12-3. 
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omnipresence of the metaphor of slavery in early Christian ideology, none of these texts 
refer to the (cleansing of) a stain of slavery in particular41.  
In non-Christian sources, sine macula often referred to the nature of an ideal marital 
union. In the epitaph for his beloved wife Urtilia Benedicta, Q. Dasumius Euelpides 
mentioned that he had lived with her for eleven years sine macula42. Similarly, it seemed 
important for Artorius Felicissimus to stress that he had had no quarrel with his late 
wife Aemilia Barbara (macula non habui) during the 56 years they had lived together43. In 
many of these epitaphs, the status of both dedicator and dedicatee is uncertain. When it 
can be established, however, we see that slaves, freedmen and freeborn persons alike 
commemorated their marital bond in this manner, confirming that the expression did 
not so much refer to their identity dimension of social or legal status, as to the quality of 
their marriage44. This is clear also from the fact that macula in the same formula is often 
replaced by other terms. Flavius Amantius, for example, uses sine querella, Decimus Iulius 
Doles sine ullo stomacho, and like many other people, Cornelia Paulina preferred sine ulla 
animi mei laesione45. Variations could occur in the same epitaph. Thus Divixtus (civis 
Sequani) described himself as sine ulla macula, but stressed that he had lived sine ulla 
discordia with his wife46. 
When sine macula is used outside a marital relationship to describe an end-of-life 
achievement, it could be tempting to read it as an apologetic statement, denying any 
remaining stains from a servile past. For example, both the imperial freedman Aurelius 
Petronianus and Lucius Statius Onesimus – probably a freed trader – are presented as 
sine macula after having died at the age of 46 and 48 respectively47. However, slaves too 
could be praised in these terms. Thus, a certain slave girl Data is described by her 
conservus Verna as sine ulla macula, just like Urbicus, vilicus publicus of Volaterrae was48. If 
this macula referred to any stain as a consequence of the servile condition, stating that 
these slaves had no such blemish would seem rather odd. Moreover, freeborn people are 
at least as often praised for the lack of any stain on their person. Thus Aurelia Aia (Titi 
filia) is described by her husband as having lived sine ulla macula49.  
 
                                                     
41 For a good starting point to the immense bibliography on this subject, see Combes (1998); Byron 
(2003); Harrill (2006); Nasrallah (2014).  
42 AE 1992, 221. 
43 CIL 3, 8425. Other examples include CIL 3, 2213; CIL 5, 143; AE 1991, 298. 
44 E.g. CIL 5, 5322 (possibly two freedpersons sharing the same nomen); CIL 6, 22657 (idem); CIL 10, 
8418 (an imperial slave and his – probably freed – wife); CIL 13, 1884 (a freeborn veteran and his 
wife). 
45 AE 1992, 725; CIL 10, 3409; CIL 13, 1851; CIL 13, 1838; CIL 13, 1880; … 
46 CIL 13, 1991. 
47 AE 1957, 127; CIL 6, 9663. 
48 CIL 9, 3365; CIL 11, 1751. 
49 CIL 7, 793; CIL 13, 2505. 
 92 
There is no reason to assume that dedicators of epitaphs had any apologetic 
intentions (related to a servile past) when including the phrase sine macula in their 
commemoration. It described the end-of-life achievement of people of all statuses, and 
when attributed to freedmen, there is no indication of any status specific connotation. 
Of course, the expression macula servitutis would not have become the key-phrase par 
excellence to refer to the freed condition in modern studies if it did not have any footing 
in the source material at all. The references in support usually derive from law texts. 
Before discussing these, and to finish our list of source types in which stains of any kind 
occur, we will briefly look at the juridical sources in general. 
In the Justinian Code and similar law texts, maculae occur only in the figurative sense. 
Although still carrying a pejorative connotation, these mentions are stripped from any 
derogatory or rhetorical meaning. Instead, they are part of a legal discourse in which 
“stains” were usually further specified to indicate a particular status or punishment. 
Getting whipped as punishment for a crime, for example, did not automatically entail 
loss of reputation (existimationis infamia), unless one was already branded with infamy 
(ignominiae maculam) by a previous transgression. Those who exercised usury were also 
branded with infamy (infamiae macula), and judges who had been polluted by corruption 
and other crimes (furtis et sceleribus maculasse convicti) were deprived of their honours, 
and degraded to the lowest rank of plebeians. Relatives could institute proceedings 
against the will of a brother or sister if it proved to be inofficiosus. This was the case, for 
instance, when it benefited heirs that were branded with infamy or dishonour (infamiae 
vel turpitudinis macula). And finally, Marcus Aurelius made sure that descendants of viri 
eminentissimi etiam perfectissimi could not be punished or tortured in the same way as 
plebeians, unless they had incurred the stigma of violated honour (violati pudoris macula) 
through someone of a nearer degree, who would thereby halt the transmission of the 
privilege50. These examples confirm that stains of infamia, ignominia, pudor and flagitium 
were not only literary topoi but actual legal concepts. Although they could be used to 
accentuate a diminished social and legal status, the formal status of freedmen or their de 
facto position in society at large is hardly ever described in these terms. Moreover, in 
the rare instances where this seems to have been the case at first sight, the reference is 
to slave status, not freed, as the next section will further accentuate. 
 
                                                     
50 For these examples, see Cod. Iust. 2.11.14; 2.11.20; 3.28.27; 9.41.11pr; 12.1.12. 
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2.2.2 The macula servitutis in law texts 
The expression is usually taken from three legal texts in which it literally occurs51. In 
the Digest, it is mentioned during the treatment of restitutio natalium. It is established 
that a freedman who is “restored to his birth right” is considered to have become 
freeborn “and, in the meantime (medio tempore), had not endured the stain of slavery 
(macula servitutis)”52. Secondly, from the Justinian Code we learn that a slave who has 
willingly usurped the office of aedile should be appropriately punished because he had 
“defiled the dignity of the decurionate with the servili macula”53. In these two cases, the 
stigma referred to is pertaining to the servile condition and not the libertine. This is 
very clear in the last passage where the defiling is a result of the slave’s usurpation of 
the office. In the first passage, it is not clear whether the medio tempore (during which 
the subject had suffered the macula servitutis) refers to his time as a slave or to the 
period between his manumission and the restitutio.  
A comparative approach can be illuminating here, even though conceptions (and 
discursive representations) of the servile and freed condition in temporarily and 
geographically remote societies can by no means provide clear-cut or transposable 
conclusions, and should therefore be considered solely as presenting a window of 
possibilities. The phrase macula servitutis appears in a range of different sources 
throughout European history54. But when it did, the writers consistently referred to the 
stained condition of slaves, not freedmen. In 1257, Bologna may have been the first city 
ever to collectively free its serf population. The act was recorded, together with the 
names of the beneficiaries, in the famous Liber Paradisus55. When presenting the motives 
for this radical decision, the lawgivers resorted to a biblical discourse on the original 
perfectissima et perpetua libertas of mankind. For this reason, they argued that the city 
should henceforth be free from people shackled by servitude, by restoring them to their 
original freedom56. In a sense, then, the collective manumission was perceived as a 
 
                                                     
51 Most studies mentioning or discussing the macula servitutis quote Mouritsen (2011), 12 and the 
three law texts it refers to, e.g. den Hollander (2014), 87; Goodrich (2012), 79; Nasrallah (2014), 58. 
52 Dig. 40.11.5.1: “Libertinus, qui natalibus restitutus est, perinde habetur, atque si ingenuus factus 
medio tempore maculam servitutis non sustinuisset”. 
53 Cod. Iust. 10.33.2: “Praeses provinciae, si eum qui aedilitate fungitur servum tuum esse cognoverit, 
si quidem non ignarum condicionis suae ad aedilitatem adspirasse perspexerit, ob violatam servili 
macula curiae dignitatem congruenti poena adficiet (…)”. 
54 We here only discuss this phrase as representative of other similar expressions that appear in 
identical contexts, e.g. naevus servitutis (Prudentius Trecensis, De Praedestinatione, PL 115, 1047D; 
Paulus Diaconus, Historia Langobardorum 1.12), all of which refer to the condition of slavery alone. 
55 Currently kept at the Archivio di Stato di Bologna. 
56 “(…) servitutis maculam radicitus extirpavit et servitutis vinculo compeditos provocavit ad 
pristinam libertatem”. 
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restitutio natalium. Interestingly, the city of Bologna would, as a result of the act, cease to 
be tainted by the macula servitutis, which therefore clearly pertained solely to the servile 
condition. When almost two centuries later Iacobus Gali, a merchant and citizen of 
Barcelona, freed his serva et captiva Astacia, he gave her and her descendants “pure and 
perfect freedom”. Since Astacia was originally freeborn, the manumission again takes 
the form of a restitutio natalium, restoring her iura ingenuitatis. Iacobus addresses her 
directly when he stresses that she will henceforth live as if she were freeborn and had 
never carried the stain of slavery (si ingenua esses et nunquam servitutis maculam 
habuisses)57. Again, this case is particularly reminiscent of our passage in Dig. 40.11.5.1. 
Since Astacia is made ingenua, she “skips” the stage of libertinitas. The macula servitutis 
mentioned here, therefore again refers to the stain she suffered as a slave. Finally, when 
slaves were freed in eighteenth century Brazil, their manumission papers – be it the 
testament of their master or a document specifically drawn up for the occasion – 
typically included a formula expressing that the slave would henceforth be free “as if he 
were born in that condition”58. 
Not only in cases similar to the Roman restitutio natalium, but also after “normal” 
manumissions was a slave considered cleansed of his macula servitutis in both ancient 
and modern accounts. In 375 CE, Saint Jerome wrote a letter mentioning that his 
companion Hylas, a famulus, had cleansed the stain of slavery through the purity of his 
virtues59. In modern times, Voltaire demanded in the first article of his projet 
d’affranchissement that “tous nos sujets soient libres, et de franche condition, sans tache 
de servitude personelle et réelle”. At the beginning of the manifest, he had cited Jean 
Ferault, a jurist of king Louis XII, who in his treatise on the privileges of the French 
kings, had stressed the right and duty of kings to free slaves, to remove their stain of 
slavery (servitutis maculam delere), and to restore them to their original freedom60. In the 
work of Potgieser, cited at the beginning of this chapter, the blemish of slavery occurs 
quite regularly, and usually in the form of the expression macula servitutis. He mentions, 
for instance, that not all German coloni lived under one and the same law. Indeed, many 
of them, after being cleared of the servitutis macula, are truly free61. When men of servile 
status entered a Batavian community, lived in it as citizens, and if during the course of a 
year no questions arose as to their status, it was held that the macula servilis conditionis 
 
                                                     
57 Firenze, AS, Notarile antecosimiano, 18791, fasc. III, nr. 46, line 28. 
58 Mattoso (1979), 203. 
59 Jer. Ep. 3 ad Ruffinum Monachum. 
60 “Regium munus est et monarcha dignum servos manumittere, servitutis maculam delere, libertos 
natalibus restituere (…)” (p. 403-6 in the edition of L. Moland). 
61 Potgieser (1736), 231 (I.4.53): “Haud tamen sum ignarus, non omnes colonos, qui nomine der Hoff-
Leute vel Hovener insigniuntur, una eademque lege vivere, multi quippe, abstersa servitutis macula, 
a conditione liberorum hominum prope absunt; alii vero non propemodum, sed plane liberi”. 
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was utterly washed away62. In all of these cases, the macula servitutis referred to the 
blemish on the person of the slave only, without it persisting after manumission. If he 
was freed, the defilement would dissolve immediately instead of remaining as a 
distinctive identity trait63.  
We cannot, of course, rely on an exceptional act of jurisprudence in thirteenth 
century Bologna, on the words of a fifteenth century Spanish merchant, or on the 
account of an eighteenth century author writing about Germanic slave law to draw 
conclusions about Roman practice and ideology. But when considered as a whole, the 
comparative evidence is much in line with the statement of Saint Jerome that his freed 
friend had shook of the macula servitutis after manumission. 
Returning to Dig. 40.11.5.1, it should be clear that a strong case can be made to interpret 
medio tempore as referring to the period of servile subjugation. Thus, at least one, and 
probably two of the canonical mentions of the macula servitutis in the juridical sources 
do not relate to freedmen.  
In one case only, then, does it occur in relation to an actual freedman64:  
Cum precum tuarum conceptio, licet eum contra quem supplicas ex ancilla natum 
esse expresserit, tamen nomini cognomen, quo liberi dumtaxat nuncupantur, 
addiderit et non servum esse, sed servili macula adspersum comprehenderit, 
contra eum qui servus non est supplicasse te intellegitur.  
 
Because the terms of your request – even though it expressed that he against 
whom you filed it is the child of your female slave – added a cognomen (by which 
only free persons are referred to), and by that act made clear that he is not a slave 
but [merely] tainted by the stain of slavery, [because of this, then,] you are 
considered to have addressed your request against someone who is not a slave.  
 
It seems unlikely that the slave in question was a formally freed Roman citizen. The only 
factor that led the lawgiver (and forced the master) to consider him free, was the 
possession of a cognomen. Indeed, his status at the end of the passage is not described as 
civis or libert(in)us, but merely as someone qui servus non est. Therefore, and since a 
formal manumission would hardly have required or evoked a statement like this, it 
 
                                                     
62 Potgieser (1736), 768 (IV.13.8): “Apud Batavos peraeque si homines servilis status recepti, si 
civitatem ingressi, in eadem permanserint, & ut cives habiti, nec quaestio status illis mota intra 
annum & diem, deleta censebatur prorsus macula servilis conditionis”. 
63 Cf. also Potgieser (1736), 238 (I.4.57): “(…) existimantes illos non servos, sed homines proprios, imo, 
abstersa servili macula, plane liberos esse dicendos”. 
64 Cod. Iust. 7.16.9. 
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looks like this passage is referring to an informally freed slave65. Bearing in mind both 
the various possibilities of “upgrading” this status to formal freedom, and the Romans’ 
pragmatic willingness to erase stigma of all shape and form (see below), it could be 
plausibly argued that this macula servitutis would cease to exist once (if ever) the 
freedman was formally made a Roman citizen.  
Of these three often quoted legal passages, then, probably two attribute the macula 
servitutis solely to slaves, and the only one that links it to an actual freedman does so in 
the context of an informal, very recent, and seemingly unintended manumission. In any 
case, these three legal passages are hardly decisive proof of a general habit of the 
Roman jurists to explicitly and literally stress the freedman’s servile stain. 
However, there are other legal mentions of the macula servitutis that are rarely ever 
considered by scholars. Even though they are generally of a later date, they do provide a 
valuable insight into the use and meaning of the expression. When specifying the status 
of children born of a union between a free and an unfree parent, for example, Justinian 
repeated the standard rule of thumb: if the mother was free but the father was not, the 
child would be free. However, if the situation was reversed, the child would follow the 
servile condition of the mother (maternae condicionis maculam)66. The stain again pertains 
to the slave status, and does not characterise the condition of a freedman.  
Traditionally, children who were abandoned by their parents retained their original 
status in the eyes of the law and could, in theory, reclaim it through the process of 
vindicatio in libertatem (if freeborn), or could be reclaimed by their original master (if 
slave)67. This changed rather suddenly in 331 CE, when the recollection of abandoned 
 
                                                     
65 Other legal texts reference very similar cases, where slaves would be considered freed as a 
consequence of a legal act, without manumission having occurred. Like in Cod. Iust. 7.16.9, these 
cases do not specify the subsequent status of the freed slave, but informal freedom was the most 
logical consequence (considering the lack of a formal manumission procedure). See, for example, 
Inst. Iust. 1.11.12, where the lawgiver invokes a precedent (ascribed to Cato) to rule that slaves 
adopted by their master are freed by that very act (servi si a domino adoptati sint, ex hoc ipso posse 
liberari). When a master declared his slave to be his son in an official document, the act would 
automatically make the slave a free man, although it would not endow him with the rights of a real 
son (eum servum quem dominus actis intervenientibus filium suum nominaverit liberum esse constituimus, 
licet hoc ad ius filii accipiendum ei non sufficit). 
66 Cod. Iust. 11.48.24pr: “Si qui adscripticiae condicionis constituti mulieres liberas quacumque 
mente aut quacumque machinatione sive scientibus dominis sive ignorantibus sibi uxores 
coniunxerunt vel postea coniunxerint, in sua libertate permanere tam eas quam prolem quae ex eis 
cognoscitur procreata sancimus: illo procul dubio observando, ut, si ex libero marito et adscripticia 
uxore partus fuerit editus, is maternae condicionis maculam, non paternam sequatur libertatem”. 
Sive scientibus dominis sive ignorantibus is a clear reference to the Claudian decree of 52 CE, which 
Justinian repealed (cf. infra).  
67 Dig. 22.6.1.2; 40.4.29; Cod. Iust. 8.51.1; Cod. Theod. 5.10.1. Cf. Plin. Ep. 10.65-6. In reality, many 
exposed children would not have been aware of their original status nor of the opportunities the 
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children by the original parents or master was prohibited and said children were 
reduced to whatever status their “new parents” saw fit (including slave status)68. If this 
change was drastic, then the rulings of Justinian two centuries later were nothing short 
of revolutionary. This emperor confirmed the prohibition on reclaiming abandoned 
slaves or children, but added that these children would not be considered either 
freedmen, slaves, tenants or vassals (vel loco libertorum vel loco servorum aut colonorum aut 
adscripticiorum), but rather free and freeborn (liberi et ingenui), regardless of their status 
at the moment of abandonment69. They would be able to freely acquire and transmit to 
their posterity or external heirs any property they wanted “without being branded with 
the stigma of servitude, vassalage, or the restrictions attached to the conditions of 
tenancy” (nulla macula vel servitutis vel adscripticiae aut colonariae condicionis imbuti). It is 
not clear whether the macula servitutis here refers to the condition of slaves or 
freedmen, but from the continuation of the passage, it seems not impossible that the 
latter was meant. Indeed, it is specified that those who have subjugated the foundlings 
do not gain any rights over their property quasi patronatus iura. Earlier in this passage, 
however, freedmen (libertina progenie) had been contrasted with both freeborn children 
(ab ingenuis genitoribus) and slaves, who were described as servili condicione maculatus. In 
one and the same legal text, then, the macula servitutis is attributed to both slaves and 
freedmen. The difference between the two is that the expression is used not for libertini 
but for liberti, that is, freedmen in direct relation with their patron, specifically referring 
to the patron’s rights on their estate. Indeed, the class of freedmen in general (libertina 
progenie) is contrasted with people maculati servili condicione, whereas individual 
freedmen in relation to their patron are understood to suffer restrictions as a 
consequence of this personal bond.  
Thus in the only two legal passages in which a freedman – and not, as was much more 
common, a slave – is attributed a macula servitutis70, it is mentioned within the context of 
the individual patronage relation. In addition to the lack of explicit mentions of a servile 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
law provided to reclaim it, cf. D. Chr. Or. 15.22-23; Ramin & Veyne (1981), 474ff. For child 
abandonment in the Roman world, see especially Harris (1994) and Harper (2011). 
68 Cod. Theod. 5.9.1. For this ruling as a phase in the on-going process of abandoning the principle of 
inalienability of free status in favour of the rights of nutritores, see Harper (2011), 406-7. It was still 
intact almost a century later, Cod. Theod. 5.9.2 (412 CE) but may have been partially revoked again 
shortly after, Const. Sirm. 5 (419 CE). Not later than 374 CE, child exposure had been made 
punishable by law, Cod. Iust. 8.51(52).2. 
69 Cod. Iust. 8.51.3. Twelve years later (541 CE), another constitution (Nov. Iust. 153) confirmed this 
ruling, referring to the early imperial precedent of permanently freeing sick slaves who were 
abandoned by their masters on the island of Aesculapius (Suet. Claud. 25). See Harris (1994), 19-22 
and Tate (2008), 129-39 for this evolution in regulating child abandonment. 
70 Cod. Iust. 7.16.9 and 8.51.3. 
 98 
stain on freedmen in literary and epigraphic sources, this observation renders even 
more pertinent the question whether a macula servitutis was in fact the primary reason 
for the public disabilities of freedmen. Especially when we consider the fact that in 
Roman thought, stains on someone’s character or honour were rarely a priori 
persistent, as the next section will illustrate. 
2.3 Social promotion and persistence of maculae 
It cannot be denied that past status or behaviour often resonated after social promotion. 
Indeed, in a commentary on the lex Iulia and the lex Papia Poppaea, Ulpian states that a 
woman who had practiced prostitution in the past was disgraced in the eyes of the law 
(even when she had ceased to do so) “for disgrace (turpitudo) is not erased by later 
discontinuing the behaviour”71. Similarly, as is very well known, freed slaves in Greece 
(few in numbers as they may have been), or informally freed ones in Rome were not 
granted full citizen rights but continued to constitute a “marginal” part of the 
population (metics and Iunian Latins respectively)72. As noted earlier, for yet another 
kind of Roman freedmen, the specific category of dediticii was formalised as part of the 
Augustan reforms. This was the lowest status an ex-slave could obtain. It was reserved 
for those slaves who had been beaten, branded, chained or who had been forced to fight 
in the arena; in short, for all slaves whose previous treatment was incompatible with 
citizenship73. They often carried the scars of slavery in a very literal sense (e.g. the 
freedman in Martial who had covered up his branding scars to avoid being recognised as 
a former slave)74. Contrary to other freedmen or, indeed, prostitutes, the stigma of 
dediticii was absolute. In the case of prostitutes, even though Ulpian (and other 
lawmakers) stated that the loss of a woman’s honour was definitive, others explicitly 
argued that there were ways to regain it – especially through formal marriage after 
 
                                                     
71 Dig. 23.2.43.4: “Non solum autem ea quae facit, verum ea quoque quae fecit, etsi facere desiit, lege 
notatur: neque enim aboletur turpitudo, quae postea intermissa est”. 
72 For Greek manumission, see Calderini (1908); Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005). Whereas Greek freedmen 
may have been “marginal” also in terms of their number, this was most likely not the case for Iunian 
Latins, cf. Weaver (1997), 55; Sirks (1981), 274; Koops (2013), 116ff. 
73 Gaius Inst. 1.13; 15; 26-27; Suet. Aug. 40. This status would become increasingly rare and was 
abolished under Justinian (Cod. Iust. 7.5.1). 
74 Mart. 2.29. 
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manumission75: a feature which freedpersons, not coincidentally, frequently stressed in 
their epitaphs (cf. Chapter 8). These lawmakers believed that “the compulsory nature of 
slavery could be a mitigating factor that reduced the stigma of sexual duties”76. 
Similarly, female slaves could become respectable Roman matrons after manumission, 
indicating that their dishonourable past was outranked by their newly attained status77. 
Since matres familias were explicitly defined as women who had not lived dishonourably 
(non inhoneste vixit)78, the inclusion of freedwomen in this category is indeed significant. 
Finally, as has been mentioned, Augustus famously provided ways for Iunian Latins to 
gain full Roman citizenship after having fulfilled specific conditions such as producing 
offspring or performing acts of civic service79. 
From a broader point of view too, a stain rarely seemed to have been absolute or 
persisting. In their correspondences, Cicero, Pliny, and Fronto never speak of a macula 
servitutis, but they do occasionally mention a stain on someone’s honour or reputation. 
In a letter to Brutus, Cicero mentions “the great blot on the honour of the Roman 
people” (magna populi Romani macula) as a consequence of Caesar’s tyrannical rule, which 
had reduced the Roman citizens to slave-like status80. In his description of Silius Italicus’ 
 
                                                     
75 Cod. Iust. 5.4.23pr-1 is an explicit grant of pardon by the emperor Justinian to women who chose 
to better their way of life after previous misconduct. It would be unfair, so the logic goes, to deny 
free women what could be granted to freedmen (referring to the procedure of restitutio natalium). 
Tainted women, too, could now be purified from all blemishes (omni macula penitus direpta). Infamia 
could also more generally be lifted (e.g. also in the cases of gladiators or actors), Dig. 3.1.1.9. Cf. 
Greenidge (1894), 177-85; Gardner (1993), 153-4. 
76 This is a vital observation throughout Perry (2014), esp. 150-51. Thus, at least in principle, women 
who had once worn the toga as an indication of their sordid profession and base status as prostitutes 
(McGinn (1998),  156f) could always hope to one day wear the stola of a free Roman matron and, by 
doing so, shake off quite literally the stain of their past. For freedwomen wearing the vestis longa, see 
Perry (2014), 132. For marriage as a redeeming factor (even in literature), see pp. 149-50. 
Trimalchio’s wife Fortunata is probably the most famous example of a woman who had risen from 
prostitution to exceptional luxury (Petr. Sat. 37). See, however, Gloyn (2012) for an argument 
against Fortunata being a prostitute. 
77 For the freedwoman Hispala Faecina in Livy’s account of the Bacchanalia, it seemed important to 
stress that she had not accompanied her domina to these rites after she was set free. As a slave girl, 
she had “nothing to lose” from association with the cult – she did, in fact, not have much of a choice 
in the matter – but as a free woman, she wanted to stay away from this officina corruptelarum omnis 
generis (Liv. 39.10.5-8; 12.6-7). 
78 Dig. 50.16.46.1. 
79 See already our remarks in the introduction. For the anniculi probatio, see Weaver (1990), passim 
(esp. p. 277, 280, 301). For a summary of the other conditions, see Sirks (1981), 254; López Barja de 
Quiroga (1998), 145-6. 
80 Cic. Brut. 1.15.4. Cicero often interchangeably used “monarchical rule” and “slavery” and 
presented Caesar as ruling over an enslaved Roman people (e.g. Off. 3.84: “Nam quanto plures ei regi 
putas, qui exercitu populi Romani populum ipsum Romanum oppressisset civitatemque non modo 
liberam, sed etiam gentibus imperantem servire sibi coegisset?”). For Cicero comparing “the 
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career, Pliny mentions the fact that he had damaged his reputation (laeserat famam) 
under Nero by acting as an informer81. Not only were informers considered to sustain 
and aid wicked emperors in the suppression of their subjects, but they also – as a 
consequence – were often considered slavish themselves82. Fronto, when trying to 
obtain the reinstatement of Volumnius Serenus as decurion of Concordia, wonders 
whether it is justified to inflict a significant stain (insignem maculam) on a very old man 
(i.e. by denying him this reinstatement)83. Since Volumnius had been temporarily 
banished, his opponents argued that he had re-entered the body of decurions 
unlawfully. It is significant that in all of these cases, the focus shifts from the stigma 
itself to the fact that it was either already cleansed or that it could be cleansed in the 
future. Indeed, in the quoted passages, Cicero speaks of a macula deleta after Caesar had 
been killed. Pliny stresses the fact that Silius Italicus had removed (abluerat) the stigma 
of his former activities by his honourable retirement. And Fronto wonders whether and 
when the stain on Volumnius’ reputation was to be effaced (quando, oro te, abolendam?)84. 
Here, as in the case of freedwomen, Iunian Latins, and prostitutes, there were clear-cut 
ways (legally and “socially”) of diminishing or completely shaking off the stain of past 
actions and condition, even when these stains were at least rhetorically related to 
slavery. 
Nonetheless, it was often a rhetorical strategy to stress that particularly severe 
“stains” could not be cleansed. Thus Cicero described the confiscation of Cyprus by 
Rome as a stain which no one could ever efface (macula quam nemo iam posset eluere), and 
accentuated the depravity of patricide by stating that it left a stain that could not be 
washed out (macula elui non potest)85. Similarly, he warned Verres that he was greatly 
mistaken in thinking that he could remove the stains of his thefts and depravities in the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
situation in which the res publica had recently found itself under the rule of Caesar to the condition 
of an enslaved person”, see Stacey (2007), 25f. 
81 Plin. Ep. 3.7.3. 
82 E.g. Tac. Dialog. 13, or the stain on informers (macula delatoris) in the legal sources, e.g. Cod. Iust. 
9.35.3; 10.11.3. Delatores were a vital tool for emperors to quell any form of resistance, but were often 
victims of purges by ‘good’ or suspicious emperors (cf. Suet. Tit. 8; Dom. 9; Plin. Pan. 34-35), cf. 
Chapter 6. 
83 Fronto, Ad Amicos 2.7.8. 
84 Other indications of people who had their reputation tainted through improper behaviour, and 
who were subsequently described with (a derivative of) macula include Cic. Att. 1.16.3 (Cicero 
describes a mock trial lead by of a group of maculosi senatores); Plin. 4.11.4 (Valerius Licinianus 
disgraced (macularit) his profession by violating a Vestal Virgin); 6.31.4 (Gallitta brought disgrace 
(maculaverat) on her own and her husband’s position by committing adultery); Fronto, Ad 
Antoninum Pium 3.4.9 (Niger Censorius seared his memory with a stain (maculam) by using 
intemperate language in his will).  
85 Cic. Sest. 63; S. Rosc. 66. The image is made more vivid since the macula here is the stain left, quite 
literally, by the blood of parents. The soiling of something or someone by blood became a topos in 
literature, e.g. Apul. Met. 3.18; 9.38; Liv. 22.1; Stat. Ach. 1.854; Silv. 1.5.38. 
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blood of Rome’s innocent allies (maculas furtorum et flagitiorum tuorum sociorum 
innocentium sanguine eluere)86.  
The same discourse on stigma and its cleansing can be found in the writings of the 
Roman historians. Fonteius Capito, for example, was defiled and stained by his greed 
and lust (avaritia et libidine foedum ac maculosum), Fabius Valens (foedum ac maculosum) by 
his petty strife with Caecina which resulted in a Roman defeat, Lucius Vitellius by his 
role as informer (omni dedecore maculosum), etc.87 Again, there were always ways to 
cleanse or mollify such stigmata, which rarely seem to have been absolute or 
permanently disabling. Caecina, in the example just mentioned, did not hesitate to 
disregard Valens’ “despicable” character when rallying against their common enemy 
Otho. When encouraging his Pannonian troops, Antonius Primus reminded them that by 
bravery they could blot out the stain of their earlier disgrace (abolere labem prioris 
ignominiae), and decades earlier Augustus had waged war on the Germans to erase the 
shame (abolendae infamiae) of the Varus disaster of 9 CE88. Likewise, during a heated 
debate between Eprius Marcellus and Helvidius Priscus, the former was allegedly 
burdened with the memory of his crimes as informer (memoria flagitiorum urgeretur)89. 
And finally, Titus Vinius is said to have gone through many changes of character (variis 
moribus) throughout his life. His initial military service under Calvisius Sabinus was 
infamis because of his part in adulterous affairs. He was later reinstated, and went on to 
become an exemplary praetor and legionary commander, as if his past crimes had never 
occurred. When invited to the emperor Claudius’ table, however, he could not resist 
stealing a golden cup. This disgrace again stained his character, which was now even 
referred to as that of a slave (servili probro). This did not prevent Tacitus from describing 
Vinius’ subsequent administration of Gallia Narbonensis as strict and integer again 
(proconsulatu severe integreque rexit)90. Once more, servility is metaphorically indicated as 
the cause of bad behaviour and a smirched reputation. Nevertheless, this “stain” did not 
in itself preclude or diminish subsequent praiseworthy attitudes. 
 
                                                     
86 Cic. Ver. 2.5.121. 
87 Tac. Hist. 1.7 (Fonteius Capito); 2.30 (Fabius Valens, cf. 2.56); 3.38 (Lucius Vitellius, cf. 2.53: ; 4.41: 
the informer Paccius Africanus is expelled from the Senate).  
88 Tac. Hist. 3.24; Tac. Ann. 1.3. Cf. also Ann. 1.43 (Germanicus deploring the flagitia of his army and 
begging the soldiers to eluere hanc maculam). The stain of surrender could also befall an entire city, 
even after bravely resisting the enemy, e.g. 4.60 (egragiam laudem turpi macularent). 
89 Tac. Hist. 4.7. Cf. 2.53 for Marcellus as hateful (invisus) and exposed to odium (expositus ad invidiam) 
and 4.43 for another attack by Priscus against Marcellus. See Pigoń (1992) for a detailed discussion of 
this inter Helvidium et Eprium acre iurgium and its wider scope. 
90 Tac. Hist. 1.48. Cf. also 2.86 (restoration of senatorial rank after earlier condemnation); 4.44 (two 
senators are denied return from exile whereas lesser offenders were allowed to come back); Ann. 
6.37 (a former exile gets rewarded with Roman citizenship for being a haud inglorious auxiliator to 
Tiberius and subsequently receives further honours from the Parthian king). 
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Regardless, it would be naive to think that a freedman’s past was simply forgotten in 
any class-conscious society. Indeed, Horace’s sneer at a wealthy freedman (fortuna non 
mutat genus)91 found remarkable – and sometimes almost literal – resonance throughout 
the history of European slavery. In the 9th century, for example, one could still reproach 
a freedman by exclaiming that he was indeed free but that he could never obtain the 
social standing of a nobleman92. Horace’s account is harsher since it rhetorically implies 
a natural difference between freed and freeborn, whereas its 9th century parallel merely 
states that freed status is an impediment to becoming nobilis. As briefly hinted at earlier, 
however, the entire discussion benefits greatly from reconfiguring it in light of any 
elite’s wish to distance itself from the lower classes in general, rather than prima facie 
considering these attempts at distinction as the consequence of any libertine stigma in 
particular. In Rome especially, the highly ambivalent and controversial nature of “the” 
freedman made him the target par excellence of this discourse of distinction93. 
Considered in tandem with the strong preoccupation of safeguarding private patronal 
rights, and of preventing freedmen from obtaining a position of power over their 
former masters, this observation not only highlights the inherent problems of the 
macula framework, but also goes a long way in providing alternatives in explaining the 
disabilities of freedmen94. 
2.4 Inconsistencies and alternatives 
The exclusion of freedmen from the legions and their restrictions in both inheritance 
law and voting rights are examples of measures meant to safeguard patronal interests, 
rather than of concerns related to any inherent inferiority of freedmen. Soldiers were 
expected to be deeply invested in their country to guarantee their motivation and zeal. 
The exclusion of slaves and even Iunian Latins from the legions would have been easy 
 
                                                     
91 Hor. Epod. 4.6. 
92 Theganus, de Gestis Ludovici Pii, cap. 44 “Fecit te liberum, non nobilem, quod impossibile est post 
libertatem”. Contrast, however with CLE 990: “M. Aurelius Cottae Maximi Zosimus, accensus patroni. 
Libertinus eram fateor / sed facta legetur / patrono Cotta nobilis umbra mea”, cf. Chapter 8. 
93 Or to paraphrase Wiedemann (1987), 11 (writing about Greek slavery): slavery and manumission 
were tools and concepts used to address broader social issues. For example, good emperors were 
rulers who respected and protected the social hierarchy. The control over and indulgence towards 
their freedmen was often taken as a yardstick of their policy and worth (Plin. Pan. 88.1-3; cf. Tac. 
Hist. 3.55 for a similar discourse on the granting of Latin rights to foreigners). 
94 Mouritsen (2011), e.g. 122 and Perry (2014), e.g. 137 sometimes hint at this but never abandon the 
macula ideology as explanatory framework for the freedman’s disabilities. 
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enough on the grounds of them not possessing citizenship, but even freed citizens seem 
to not have fit this expectation. On the one hand, no law (or even brief reference) 
survives that attests to the formal exclusion of freedmen from the legions, but on the 
other, no evidence exists of ex-slaves actually serving as legionnaires95. As a 
consequence, most assumptions on the matter essentially derive from ex silentio 
arguments, and conflate absence of proof with proof of absence. Atkinson argued – very 
speculatively – that freedmen could and did serve in the legions, and that the lex Iunia 
was intended precisely to guarantee “a flow of recruits for the armed forces”96. Much 
more reasonable is Sherwin-White’s suggestion that freedmen are not found in the 
legions simply because they were too old at the time of their manumission (and not 
because there was a formal ban), but Mouritsen rightly reminded us that this too is an 
unsupported theory97. Mouritsen’s own alternative stresses the potential lack of loyalty 
and skill in freedmen as reasons for their exclusion, but typically describes these 
concerns as “conventional prejudices against the ‘slave nature’”98. Again, a persisting 
macula servitutis is invoked to explain a limitation that could otherwise be accounted for. 
Moreover, freedmen may have been unwilling themselves to serve in the military. 
Slaves who were freed had often enjoyed a good education or training, and could 
generally make a better (and safer) living continuing the trade they had learned as 
slaves. While this too is a valid consideration, the lack of attestations of freedmen in the 
legions is puzzling indeed, if only individual choices or motivations played a role. 
Fundamental, we would argue, was the fact that patronal authority and the freedman’s 
duty of obsequium (not to mention the occasional operae) would have been greatly 
impeded by a military career99. The reluctance of patrons to let their freedmen off to the 
legions100, but also an ingrained unease with freedmen potentially rising to positions of 
power over their patrons, are arguments very much in line with the centrality of the 
patronage relation in Roman ideology on slavery and manumission. 
Indeed, other measures seem to have had the patronal interest rather than any 
“contamination” or “degradation” of a particular body or group in mind. When in 169 
 
                                                     
95 Only in times of crises were freedmen allowed in the army, but even then in separate units (Suet. 
Aug. 25). Cf. also Vell. Pat. 2.111.1; Dio 55.31.1-2; Macr. Sat. 1.11.32. When slaves were exceptionally 
allowed in the army, they were freed on recruitment (Suet. Aug. 25; Tib. 4; Cod. Theod. 7.13.16). 
96 Atkinson (1966), 366. 
97 Sherwin-White (1973), 324-5; Mouritsen (2011), 71 note 22. The military age was between 17 and 46 
years, cf. Forsythe (2007), 31. 
98 Mouritsen (2011), 72. 
99 Cf. Dig. 38.1.43. 
100 When Augustus tried to quell the Panonian revolt, he had to compel patrons to provide freedmen 
as recruits, which suggests that they would normally have been reluctant to do so (Vell. 2.111; Suet. 
Aug. 25; Dio 55.31.1). 
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BCE the censor Ti. Sempronius Gracchus proposed a motion that would deprive 
freedmen of the vote, his colleague C. Claudius Pulcher opposed it because it constituted 
a fundamental infringement on the freedman’s freedom and citizenship (id esse ciuitatem 
libertatemque eripere), and would as such greatly tarnish the public transcript of 
equality101. The compromise was to enrol all freedmen into one single urban tribe (the 
Esquiline), severely diminishing their weight in the comitia tributa. The affair was but 
one episode in the on-going struggle between populares and optimates, who continuously 
sought to expand or restrict the distribution of freedmen over the thirty-five tribes. The 
Roman system of block-voting allowed for an artificial reduction of “democratic” 
representation by grouping a large societal group in but a few tribes102. Although this 
practice met with strong opposition from the populares who appealed to the 
fundamental freedom of all citizens, the very same notion of libertas was invoked by the 
optimates to justify the manifest discrimination of ex-slaves. In the elite’s mind, 
complete equality was essentially unjust (iniqua) because it ignored the moral 
superiority of the highest echelons of society and fundamentally tarnished the gradus 
dignitatis103. Any attempt to equate the lower orders with the higher ones would thus 
infringe on the very libertas the populares claimed to pursue by pleading for equal voting 
rights for all citizens. It is therefore not surprising that originally, not only freedmen 
but a much larger group of unspecified humiles were restricted to the four urban 
tribes104.  
When Clodius tried to open up the rural tribes for freedmen, the attempt provided 
Cicero with effective ammunition to convince a jury of his depravity. Cicero’s main 
concern, however, was not the safeguarding of the rural tribes against any form of 
contamination in a moral sense. His main fear – and thus undoubtedly also the unease 
he wanted to evoke or manipulate in his audience – was that freedmen would, as a 
consequence of the Clodian law, obtain an unparalleled preponderance in elections, and, 
accordingly, an indirect influence over their patrons. If enacted, Clodius’ laws, Cicero 
vigorously argued, “would have made us subject to our own slaves” (incidebantur iam 
domi leges, quae nos servis nostris addicerent)105. Cicero, in this instance, clearly used servi 
 
                                                     
101 Liv. 45.15. 
102 For (the evolution of) the distribution of freedmen in the tribes, see especially Taylor (1960), 
passim (esp. p. 132-49); Treggiari (1969a), 37-52; Fabre (1981), 135-8 (a “véritable discrimination”); 
Millar (1995); Arena (2006); Mouritsen (2011), 76-9 (“openly discriminatory”).  
103 Cic. Rep. 1.43; 53, mirrored in Plin. Ep. 9.5.3. Arena (2006) is dedicated entirely to this ideological 
adaptation of the notion of libertas by both populares and optimates. 
104 Liv. 9.46. Cf. Treggiari (1969a), 42, 52. 
105 Cic. Mil. 87. Cf. Treggiari (1969a), 50; Arena (2006), 79-80.  
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instead of liberti for rhetorical effect – like he often did throughout his speeches106. Later 
commentators indeed assumed that this phrase referred to Clodius’ motion on tribal 
distribution107. In a contribution meaningfully titled “Fear of freedmen”, López Barja de 
Quiroga similarly argued that the sheer number of known instances where the 
freedman vote dominated the political agenda throughout the Republican period 
betrays the fact that the elites considered it a very real threat108. Likewise, Arena has 
drawn attention to the “numerous instances of agreement or silent acceptance of 
populares measures on the part of the senate” but stressed that the enrolment of 
freedmen in all tribes would mean too much of a threat to optimates supremacy to give 
way to it, and was therefore repeatedly and consistently fought109.  
If a distribution among all thirty-five tribes would grant freedmen only indirect 
influence over their patrons110, access to political office constituted a prospect to be 
dreaded even more profoundly. Even prior to the lex Visellia, which formally barred 
freedmen from obtaining public office in the municipalities, ex-slaves seem to have 
been de facto excluded from these dignities111. This did not mean that freedmen were 
entirely excluded from the honores system. The freedman L. Iunius Puteolanus, for 
example, is said to have held all the honours (omnes honores) which freedmen could take 
up112. Similarly, the imperial freedman Titus Flavius Crescens received from the 
decurions and people of Gabii many honores, which he faithfully took up113. These (and 
similar) inscriptions indicate that freedmen could receive certain honours, as long as 
these did not entail any formal power. The lex Visellia therefore aimed at safeguarding 
 
                                                     
106 E.g. Cic. Mil. 89, which refers to the same Clodian law (lege nova, quae est inventa apud eum cum 
reliquis legibus Clodianis, servos nostros libertos suos effecisset). Treggiari (1969a), 265 argued that the 
servi were in fact liberti and the liberti clients. Other scholars interpreted Clodius’ proposal not as a 
distribution law, but as an attempt to legally enshrine the freedom of informally freed slaves (an 
early “lex Iunia” as it were). Even if correct – the suggestion cannot be definitely proved – servi 
would still have to refer to (informal) freedmen, and a reading of liberti as clients remains necessary 
since no (informally freed) slave would become an actual freedman of Clodius. Cf. Łoposzko (1980), 
84ff; Benner (1987), 131-3; Tatum (1999), 238-9. For a justified criticism, see Mouritsen (2011), 78. 
107 Ascon. 52C: “Significasse iam puto nos fuisse inter leges P. Clodi quas ferre proposuerat eam 
quoque qua libertini, qui non plus quam in IIII tribubus suffragium ferebant, possent in rusticis 
quoque tribubus, quae propriae ingenuorum sunt, ferre”. 
108 López Barja de Quiroga (2007). 
109 Arena (2006), 80-1 (with examples in note 46). 
110 The analytic distinction patron-freedman often obscures the fact that many patrons were 
themselves of servile descent. Not every patron therefore necessarily sympathised with the 
“optimate” definition of libertas and the consequent distribution of freedmen in the four urban 
tribes only. From an elite’s perspective, however, the empowerment of freedmen would obviously 
be conceived as a threat to “normal” status categories. 
111 Cod. Iust. 9.21.1. 
112 CIL 2, 1944. The mention of the municipium Suelitanum provides 53 CE as terminus post quem for the 
erection of this altar; well after the lex Visellia. 
113 CIL 14, 2807. His name situates Crescens in Flavian times. 
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the “natural order” rather than stressing and consolidating any innate inferiority of 
freedmen114. The exceptional leniency in allowing freedmen to hold municipal office in 
Caesar’s colonies seems to confirm this picture. There was no danger of freedmen 
gaining direct auctoritas over their patron in these contexts, and it may have often been 
by the initiative of these very patrons themselves that their freedmen were elevated to 
such exceptional heights, e.g. to secure important commercial or strategic positions in 
the region115. The creation ex nihilo of many of these colonies moreover ensured that 
there was no opposition of an entrenched elite corps. If freedmen were considered 
inherently incapable or undeserving of holding municipal magistracies, these 
exceptions – let alone the case of Anthestius Amphio mentioned above – surely would 
not have been tolerated.  
The same lex Visellia formally allowed the emperor to grant the right of wearing the 
golden ring to a freedman (ius anulorum aureorum). This beneficium quite literally 
“annulled” all formal restrictions in the public sphere, entitled the freedman to the 
appearance – though not the actual status – of free birth (imago non status ingenuitatis; ut 
ingenuus habetur), and thus allowed him to exercise all functions of a freeborn person 
(omnia ingenuitatis munia habet; officia publica ingenuorum peragunt)116. Significantly, 
however, this “cleansing” would not erase the connection and obligations to his patron, 
who maintained his (inheritance) rights over the freedman, and to whom the latter 
continued to owe reverentia and support117. Like a Iunian Latin who lived free but died a 
slave, a freedman who received the golden ring lived as an ingenuus but still died as a 
freedman (hic enim vivit quasi ingenuus, moritur quasi libertus)118. Saller observed that these 
grants were “matters of patronal favoritism” and were as a consequence often granted 
to imperial favourites. He concluded that we cannot gauge the extent to which these 
 
                                                     
114 It has been justly argued that the consequences of this restriction differed in no fundamental way 
from those of the formal requirements and informal mechanisms that prevented the lower classes 
in general from obtaining high office. Cf. Mouritsen (2011), 73; Perry (2014), 134. 
115 Treggiari (1969a), 62-4; Mouritsen (2011), 74-5. See, however, Millis (2014), who shows (at least for 
Corinth) that these colonial situations were not cases of exceptional social mobility of freedmen but 
rather the result of economic and politico-strategic considerations of elites (and therefore precisely 
an impediment to social mobility). The argument is an echo of Frederiksen’s (1959), 111 who focused 
on the commercial use of freedmen to secure and consolidate the power-hold of certain families. See 
also Kleijwegt (2006a), 49 who draws attention to the specific “political constellation which favoured 
members of an outsider group to counter or reduce the influence of another group”. 
116 Cod. Iust. 6.8.2; 9.21pr; Dig. 2.4.10.3; 40.10.5,6; Dio 48.45.8-9. For the ius anulorum, see Duff (1958), 
85f; Sherwin-White (1973), 331; Demougin (1984), 218-9. 
117 Dig. 2.4.10.3; 38.2.3pr; 40.10.5,6. On the other hand, the freedman would not forfeit the benefits 
related to the patronage relation, e.g. Dig. 40.10.1pr. 
118 Dig. 38.2.3pr; Gaius Inst. 3.56. 
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grants were actually desired or actively pursued by freedmen119. However, a freedman 
like L. Marius Doryphorus would give the achievement pride of place in his funerary 
inscription, where it meaningfully preceded the account of his impressive apparitorial 
career as scriba, praeco, viator, and lictor120.  
From a macula servitutis point of view, the ius anulorum was a “remarkable invention” 
because it entailed a “miraculous suspension” of the freedman’s “stigma”. For this 
reason, its formalisation under Augustus has been described as “surprising” since it was 
precisely this emperor who was a vigorous defender and enforcer of traditional status 
boundaries121. However, Augustus’ responsibility is only “surprising” when we interpret 
the ius anulorum essentially as “purging” persons who were inherently inferior due to a 
servile past. Rather than considering it merely as a legal, public cleansing of an 
ideological stain, the potential subversive effects of the ius anulorum derived in no small 
degree from its influence on private relations. As a social practice, the impact existed 
primarily in the elevation of a freedman to a legal “status” that could potentially endow 
him with formal authority over his patron. This is implied by the provision that the 
grant of the anulus aureus required the explicit permission of the patron, and could be 
revoked if obtained without the latter’s knowledge122. Since the “promotion” of his 
freedman would by no means diminish a patron’s rights or financial claims over him (cf. 
supra), the explicit requirement of patronal approval must have served other interests. 
On an ideological level, this prerequisite was a formal recognition of the patron’s 
authority over, and judgement of, his freedman. On a more pragmatic level, however, it 
was important for a patron to explicitly agree with granting one of his freedmen the 
golden ring, since the change in legal status would allow the latter to obtain a position 
of formal power over his ex-master. Both ideologically and pragmatically, then, the 
change in legal status had to be approved by the party that was (besides the freedman 
himself) affected most directly by the transition123. 
 
                                                     
119 Saller (1982), 53. Contra Duff (1958), 86 who speaks of “large numbers of humbler freedmen” who, 
like imperial freedmen, gained the privilege. 
120 CIL 6, 1847: “[L(ucius)] Marius L(uci) lib(ertus) Doryphorus anulos aureos / consecutus a divo 
Commodo scrib(ae) aedilic(io) et / tribunic(io) scrib(ae) libr(ario) aedil(ium) curul(ium) praeco 
co(n)s(ulis) / praec(o) quaestorius sacerdotal(is) viator(is) augurum / lictor curiat(or) Laurens 
Lavinas fecit sibi et / Ae(liae) Asclepiodote coniugi item libertis / libertabusque suis posterisque 
eorum”. 
121 Mouritsen (2011), 107-8. 
122 Dig. 40.10.3: “Divus Commodus et ius anulorum datum ademit illis, qui invitis aut ignorantibus 
patronis acceperant”. 
123 Mouritsen (2011), 47 note 68 claims that the ius anulorum “only altered the relationship between 
the freedman and the outside world”. Although this is true in a strictly legal sense (cf. note 116 
above), the possibility of an ex-slave obtaining formal positions of power had repercussions for the 
dynamic of the patronage relation as well (as suggested by the explicit requirement of patronal 
approval for a grant of the ius anulorum). 
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The habit of protecting patronal rights was ingrained in Roman law, but it sometimes at 
least theoretically conflicted with the need to respect the principled equality of freed 
citizens. One of the main arguments of Matthew Perry’s recent monograph, is that 
Roman freedpersons’ citizen rights were respected and protected, even when this 
meant curbing patronal power to some degree. For instance, a patron could not force his 
freedwoman to marry him. However, he could de facto make a slave girl promise to 
marry him after she would have been freed (especially since yielding to this “proposal” 
was plausibly the only way for her to obtain freedom in the first place). The distinction 
between a soon-to-be-freedwoman and an actual freedwoman may seem like juridical 
hair-splitting at first sight, but the vital difference was that a freedwoman’s citizen 
status granted her a set of unalienable rights, which could not be infringed upon, since 
this would undermine the fundamental principle equality she was entitled to as a 
citizen124. Similarly, potential loopholes in the prohibition of revocatio in servitutem were 
carefully closed to safeguard the integrity of a freed Roman citizen. For instance, the 
law made sure that a slave who was (formally) freed by testament on condition that he 
would remain with the deceased’s heir for a few years, could not be made a slave again 
when he violated these terms after his manumission125. As always, we have no way of 
knowing to what degree these and similar laws were implemented on every occasion. 
Legally, for example, a freedman was free to conduct business where and how he 
wanted126 – even if his patron did not agree –, but the threat of informal sanctions (e.g. 
the revocation of financial aid or the exclusion from the patron’s workshops) would 
have de facto forced the freedman to take into account his patron’s wishes127. Be that as 
it may, the general reasoning behind freedman measures in Roman law clearly betrays a 
concern of respecting the principled equality of free Roman citizens. This equality 
perhaps did not always translate into social practice, but on these occasions, the reason 
why it did not, was not an ingrained belief of moral inferiority, but – again – a 
preoccupation with patronal rights. 
The same logic lay behind the special treatment of freedmen in inheritance law. As 
citizens, libertini should by definition have the same property rights as freeborn citizens. 
As liberti, however, they were increasingly disadvantaged. Somewhere during the fifth 
century BCE, the Law of the Twelve Tables ensured that after he died, the property of a 
freedmen who left a will or who had sui heredes would transfer according to the rules 
that applied to inheritances of freeborn citizens128. In two later stages, patronal rights 
 
                                                     
124 Perry (2014), passim (esp. p. 89-93). 
125 Dig. 40.4.52. 
126 E.g. Dig. 37.14.2, 18; 37.15.11. Cf. Waldstein (1986), 316; Aubert (1994), 36-7. 
127 Mouritsen (2011), 212-3. 
128 Gaius Inst. 3.40. 
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increased, even though initially the situation of freedmen was still identical to that of 
emancipated sons129. The reasons for granting special privileges to patrons were less 
inspired by a freedman’s servile inferiority than by pragmatic concerns to curb the 
increasing influence and wealth of freedmen who, at the time of these legislative 
measures, sometimes surpassed their patrons in both respects. Perhaps even more 
important, these measures (the lex Papia Poppaea in particular) need to be framed in the 
Augustan reforms in which the discrimina ordinum in general was rigorously observed 
and patrons’ rights carefully protected130. 
The lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus (18 BCE) was meant to safeguard precisely this 
gradus dignitatis in society at large131. This Augustan law, prohibiting senators and three 
generations of descendants in the male line, from marrying either a freedwoman 
(libertina) or a woman who herself (or whose mother or father) had practiced the ars 
ludicra, is occasionally explained as a stigmatising tool, its goal being to prevent these 
persons’ innate inferiority from “rubbing off” and “contaminating” the elite132. There 
are, however, indications that the raison d’être for this ban was a concern with sustaining 
the exclusivity of the senatorial body in general, rather than a fear of servile 
contamination in particular133. Indeed, the same law explicitly guaranteed that other 
 
                                                     
129 Gaius Inst. 3.41-42; Dig. 37.12.1. For a comprehensive overview of this evolution, see Gardner 
(1993), 21-3. 
130 Perry (2014), 137 drew on Gardner to make a similar argument: the disabilities of libertae are not 
designed to mark their macula or inferiority, but rather to protect patrons’ rights. Contra MacMullen 
(1974), 104 who saw these disabilities as a punishment for the tainted freedperson. For the discrimina 
ordinum as corner stone of the Augustan reforms, see Mouritsen (2011), 89-91. For its central role in 
elite ideology, see Tac. Ann. 2.33. 
131 Dig. 23.2.44pr; Tit. Ulp. 13.1; Dio 54.16.2. See Borbonus (2014), 251-2 note 8. 
132 E.g. Nasrallah (2014), 57; Mouritsen (2011), 21. This is probably too literal an interpretation of 
certain ancient writers (cf. note 2 above). See however Mouritsen (2011), 80ff (rightly nuancing 
these and similar passages and arguing that the Augustean measures should be seen as “a statement 
of principle” rather than a “radical attempt to alter current practice”), 108 (imperial measures 
against freedmen are explained as self-profiling by the emperor (who openly needed to respect 
social hierarchy by containing his freedmen) instead of as a general condemnation of a 
“stigmatised” class). Mette-Dittman (1991) and McGinn (2002) discuss the Augustan marriage law in 
particular. Perry (2014), 134-5 (including notes) reasonably argued that any resulting disabilities of 
freedpersons (exclusion of “the most elite standing” but also legal disabilities, as social status 
became increasingly important in Roman law) were a corollary of the primary purpose of the laws 
to secure the exclusivity of the senatorial order. He sees in them a tightening of social status groups 
and as such a foreshadowing of the later divide between honestiores and humiliores (p. 135): “If 
freedwomen were inferior to senators and their wives, then they shared this inferiority with the 
overwhelming bulk of Roman citizens; in terms of practical application, the law did not entail 
freedwomen being treated all that differently than the majority of free female citizens”. 
133 Weber (1988), 259 compared the law in this respect with the German “Rassengesetzen” of the 
1930s and 1940s (“eine gewisse Nähe”). Pace Mouritsen (2011), 21 who saw the ban as a measure to 
prevent “’contamination’ of the citizen body in general” (though nonetheless adding that “the 
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ingenui incurred no stigma when marrying freedwomen. The accentuation of the 
division between senators on the one hand, and the rest of society (including other elite 
members like knights and decuriones) on the other, is already clear in the passages of 
(the commentaries on) the lex Iulia that separated senators from ingenui ceteri134, but it is 
even more explicitly stressed in the lex Papia Poppaea (9 CE), which confirmed that all 
freeborn men praetor senatores eorumque liberos could marry freedwomen135. The Tituli ex 
corpore Ulpiani provide the clearest distinction between the two groups, since their 
respective restrictions are treated in separate subdivisions136. If any macula precluded 
the marriage between freed and freeborn, the ban would have been made more general. 
Instead, its limitation to the senatorial class is a clear indication of its being directed at 
this exclusive order rather than to that of freedpersons. Indeed, senators were equally 
barred from marrying, for example, actresses (i.e. practitioners of the ars ludicra), 
prostitutes (those who made corpore quastum), or women who were damnatae publico 
iudicio137.  
In his seventh Controversia, Seneca has a speaker give evidence for marriages between 
senators and freedwomen in the past. The only example he comes up with is the 
marriage of Cato the Elder. However, Cato married a low ranking freeborn woman, not a 
freed one. For the speaker, these ranks were interchangeable, the only relevant trait 
being their common distinction from the senatorial order138. Moreover, in the same 
passage, any difference between a freedman and a colonus is explicitly and meaningfully 
downplayed by comparing it to the much greater difference between the speaker and 
the great Cato himself (plus interest inter me et Catonem quam inter libertum et colonum). 
Later marriage regulations, not dealing with freedpersons specifically, seem to have had 
the exact same concerns in mind139. These laws were inspired by a strong preoccupation 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
highest order in particular” was envisaged). Cf. Fabre (1981), 186 who stresses “la protection de la 
pureté du recrutement du Sénat (et de l'ordre sénatorial)”. 
134 E.g. Dig. 23.2.44.8: “Eas, quas ingenui ceteri prohibentur ducere uxores, senatores non ducent”. 
135 Dig. 23.2.23.  
136 Tit. Ulp. 13.1 considers the regulations for senators, and 13.2 those of the ceteri ingenui. Although 
the text is valuable precisely for explicitly making this distinction, the actual content of the 
respective restrictions should be treated with care since editorial flaws and postclassical additions 
have likely occurred, cf. Gardner (1993), 123-5; McGinn (2002), 50-4. 
137 Dig. 23.2.43.10; 2.44pr; Tit. Ulp. 13.1-2 (see, however, the reservation in the previous note). 
138 Sen. Contr. 7.6.17, cf. Plut. Cat. 20.1. See also Cic. Phil. 3.17 in which Antonius is despised for 
having children by a woman of servile descent. However, it is not any remaining servile stain but 
rather her want of noble birth in general (ignobilitas) that provides Cicero with his rhetorical 
ammunition. Indeed, Antonius’ father is attacked on the exact same grounds for marrying the 
(freeborn) daughter of a traitor. 
139 E.g. Mathisen (2006), 1028-32 (discussing a fourth century marriage law prohibiting provinciales 
from marrying barbari) and Harrill (2006), 387 (Tertullian invoking the exemplum of slavery to forbid 
mixed marriages between Christians and non-Christians). 
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with safeguarding the “natural” discrimina ordinum and gradus dignitatis, rather than an 
attempt to stigmatise freedmen or to prevent servile “contamination”. Instead of 
“lashes of the law” trying to alter or adjust existing malpractices, these provisions were 
confirmations of an already existing and established social practice among Rome’s 
senatorial elites. Their immediate result was therefore not a de facto discrimination of 
freedpersons, actresses, or prostitutes, but rather a confirmation of ideological beliefs of 
distinction in a social context where “endogamous” marriage had been the unwritten 
rule all along140. 
This is clear also from closely related issues. Q. Antistius Vetus, for instance, is said to 
have divorced his wife because she had been seen talking to a libertina vulgaris in public 
(in publico)141. This passage has been quoted in support of a general belief among the 
Roman writers that nobles could quite literally be infected with servility by coming in 
contact with it142. However, the passage must be seen in its context. Vetus’ motives had 
been the same (nec aliter sensit) as those of C. Sulpicius Gallus, who divorced his wife 
because she had appeared in public without her veil143. Both “crimes” – like so many 
others – were only considered grave because they had occurred in public144. Conversing 
with a freedwoman would not have been a problem in the secluded sphere of the 
woman’s own domus. This contradicts the idea of servile contamination as the reason for 
Vetus’ severe reaction. In this context, the description of the freedwoman as vulgaris is 
meaningful as well. It is probably at least as much her baseness of character or her 
belonging to the lower plebs in general, as her social status as ex-slave that made the 
encounter particularly shameful. In both cases, the divorces were caused by the women 
not living up to their status and not respecting the distance that should be kept with the 
lower classes.  
The a priori acceptance of the macula-ideology as determinant of the freedman’s 
condition poses other problems as well. As is well known, Roman law did not postulate 
 
                                                     
140 Raepsaet-Charlier (1994); McGinn (2002), 57-8; Mouritsen (2011), 84-5, 91-2; Perry (2014), 135. For 
an alternative view, see Gardner (1993), 39. 
141 Val. Max. 6.3.11. 
142 See most recently Mouritsen (2011), 21. 
143 Val. Max. 6.3.10. 
144 See also Tac. Ann. 1.77 (knights cannot be seen with actors in public); 13.45 (an aristocratic woman 
is praised for rarely appearing in public, and for always wearing a veil on the rare occasions when 
she did); Cic. Com. Pet. 2 (Antonius Hybrida openly keeps a slave girl as his mistress); Suet. Galb. 22 
(Galba publicly kisses his freedman); Otho 2.4 (Vitellius’ father “not secretly nor seldom, but openly 
and every day” worships his freedwoman); Dio 60.2.4 (Claudius was despicable because he – more 
conspicuously than anyone else – was ruled by slaves and women). Epigraphic praise of freedwomen 
qua matrons often focussed on their reluctance to associate with the common crowd (e.g. CLE 959; 
1988). See also Joshel (1992), 28. 
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that slaves were inferior by nature145. However, the condition and experience of slavery in 
itself could change a person’s character in a way that made him or her inferior to free 
people146. The conviction that moral inferiority is a result of being a slave (rather than 
the other way around) is difficult to reconcile with the procedure of vindicatio in 
libertatem by which wrongfully enslaved persons could reclaim their freedom. 
Interestingly, they would legally “become” ingenui again and would as such not suffer 
from any formal macula servitutis, despite having endured servile treatment147. However, 
a necessary consequence of the conception of slavery as “not natural” is that the praxis 
and experience of slavery should, at least theoretically, leave as much of a stain on these 
people as on “real” slaves – both categories having been “born equal” and subsequently 
subjected to the same “servile experience”148. Indeed, freeborn prostitutes or actors 
were automatically branded with infamia because of their occupation and behaviour (cf. 
infra). On the contrary, law texts clearly stated that the practice of (unjust) slavery did 
not make a freeborn person “servile”149. The fact of unjustly having been a slave did not 
result in any disabilities in public or private life in these cases. The same could be said of 
the practice of postliminium whereby freeborn Romans who were enslaved by foreigners, 
could reclaim their freeborn status without any permanent limitation or “stain”150. 
These observations nuance the belief that any moral deficiency as a consequence of 
servile treatment was the primary reason for the freedman’s social and public 
 
                                                     
145 The law explicitly stated that according to the ius naturale, all men are born free (Dig. 1.1.4) and 
therefore essentially equal (Dig. 50.17.32). Slavery was an institution of the ius gentium. See Buckland 
(1908), Chapter 1 (e.g. already p. 1-2), 347; Garnsey (1996), 11-5. Cf. also Fitzgerald (2000), 89. For a 
recent discussion with many references to both ancient literary, philosophical, and legal sources as 
well as to modern opinions, see Mouritsen (2011), 14-7. 
146 Mouritsen (2011), 22; cf. Klees (2002). Similarly, a woman caught in the act of adultery was 
branded with infamia even before (or without) any conviction took place because the degradation 
resulted from the (f)act itself rather than from any formal condemnation (… quia factum lex, non 
sententiam notaverit, Dig. 23.2.43.12). 
147 Harper (2011), 395 (with notes); Watson (1967), 218-22; Treggiari (1969a), 19. Lavan (2013), 80f. As 
mentioned above, there were exceptional ways for slaves to become ingenui without incurring any 
formal macula servitutis. 
148 In defence of the macula ideology, Mouritsen tries to show that “some ‘taint’ did indeed remain in 
the eyes of society because of the reality of servitude, however unjustified”, Mouritsen (2011), 17 
note 39. The single case of Vespasian’s wife is, however, hardly sufficient evidence. 
149 E.g. Cod. Iust. 7.14.10. Cod. Iust. 7.16.6 states that an ingenuus cannot distance himself from his 
ingenuitas even by voluntarily declaring that he is a slave. Freeborn children who were sold into 
slavery did not lawfully forfeit their original status, cf. Buckland (1908), 420-1; Harris (1994). Debtors 
who were condemned to serve their creditors as slaves in order to pay off their debt, however, may 
have been freed like other slaves and ended up as freedmen (Quint. Inst. 5.10.60 and 7.3.26–7). Cf. 
Lavan (2013), 77. 
150 For postliminium, see Dig. 49.15.19; Cod. Theod. 5.7.1. Buckland (1908), 304ff. Cf. also the procedure 
of restitutio natalium (Dig. 40.11.5). 
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disabilities. It was the formal legal status of ingenuitas or libertinitas that determined the 
evaluation of the consequences of a “servile subordination”, not the other way around. 
Reasoning backwards, the fact that in some – albeit exceptional – cases a freeborn 
individual could become a freedperson without ever having been a slave confirms this 
conclusion. In 52 CE, the senatus consultum Claudianum ruled that a freeborn woman who 
had a sexual relationship with a slave without the consent of the slave’s master, would 
become a slave herself. If, however, the master had agreed to the union, she was to be a 
liberta only151. Modern authorities disagree on the precise purpose of this SC, but many 
think that it was not intended as a punishment for the woman in question152. Be that as 
it may, this measure shows that being a freedperson but not having been a slave was not 
an insurmountable (legal) contradiction, and that the restrictions and disabilities of 
these women therefore did not result from any servile past (but rather served to close 
the status-gap between the slave and the woman in question, in order to make their 
union somewhat more acceptable)153. 
The ability of enslaved freeborn people to reclaim their original status without 
incurring formal disabilities, or the possibility of being branded with any without 
formally having been a slave, thus reveal an inconsistency in the idea that a moral 
macula servitutis was the primary identity dimension of freedmen. In the first scenario, 
this assumption becomes even more problematic when we consider that the formal 
modes of manumission (at least vindicta and maybe censu as well) were in fact legal 
fictions that presented the process of manumission as restitutiones in libertatem154. In an 
attempt to ideologically explain and justify the transformation of slave into free person, 
it was pretended that the slave was at some point unjustly enslaved and, by the formal 
manumission, restored to his original status, thus symbolically placing him on the same 
footing as ingenui restored to their birth right by the procedures of vindicatio in libertatem 
or postliminium mentioned above. Especially the public restrictions freedmen would 
nonetheless suffer from, indicate that it was their formal legal position in society rather 
than an ideological belief of moral inferiority that constituted the basis of 
 
                                                     
151 Tac. Ann. 12.53. For this senatus consultum and its purpose, see (among others) Sirks (2005) and 
Harper (2010). Cod. Iust. 7.16.3 declares that the same “crime” committed by a free man is not 
punished in this way. 
152 See particularly Herrmann-Otto (1994), 28-33 and Sirks (1994). 
153 Mouritsen (2011), 22 note 70 argued that the woman’s demotion paradoxically helped restore her 
honour, because it was less shameful for a freedwoman than for an ingenua to associate with a slave 
in this way. 
154 Treggiari (1969a), 21-2; Buckland (1908), 441-2. People held in slavery, who were not aware that 
they were legally free, constituted a distinct category in Roman law: a liber homo bona fide serviens (p. 
331-52). See Mouritsen (2011), 11-2 for further references. 
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differentiation. It seems rather insufficient to dismiss these flaws in the macula-
framework as mere “exemptions” or “inconsistencies”155.  
Finally, a comparison between the “stigma” of freedmen and the social and legal 
condemnation of infames (“degraded persons”) is illuminating. Freedmen shared their 
exclusion from political office with other social groups like women and infames. 
Whereas this legal disability was “ascribed” to freedmen and women, it was “acquired” 
by infames: the former were inflicted with it by their very condition (legal and biological 
respectively), the latter incurred it throughout their lives as a result of immoral or 
criminal behaviour156. Although the legal status of freeborn infames and that of 
freedmen was fundamentally different157, their restrictions in public life often 
overlapped. It is well known that there did not exist one all-encompassing notion of 
infamia under which all those branded with it could be equally categorised. Indeed, 
there were several gradations in the restrictions imposed, and limitations depended 
both on the context of the crime and on the status of the offender158. Roman citizenship 
in general was no “package deal”159. Parts of it could be granted or revoked, and the 
notion of infamia (“downgrading” ingenui) – much like the ius anulorum (“upgrading” 
libertini) – was instrumental in maintaining a trapped system of (citizen) rights.  
Even though the restrictions of freedmen and women were similarly ascribed, the 
two groups still differed from each other since women could not, by their very nature, 
and under any circumstance, lay claim to auctoritas, whereas freedmen could technically 
do so in contexts where there was no threat of rising to positions of power over their 
patrons (e.g. in Caesar’s colonies160), or when they did so illegally by usurping power161. 
Tacitus explicitly writes that informers had to find alternative ways to incriminate 
women, precisely because women could not, a priori, be charged with usurpation of 
power. Indeed, ambitious women could be silenced by a reference to their impotentia 
 
                                                     
155 Mouritsen (2011), 25 note 84. 
156 The standard works on infamia remain Greenidge (1894) and Kaser (1956). For the most relevant 
contributions for the current discussion, see Gardner (1993), 110-54 (with a list of the most 
important legal sources on infamia on p. 126-8) and Edwards (1997). 
157 For example, although Tacitus (Ann. 6.7) harshly condemned the behaviour of Cotta Messalinus 
who was egens ob luxum and per flagitia infamis, even the historian had to admit that he nonetheless 
remained a noble (nobilis quidem). 
158 Gardner (1993) provides a discussion of the range of potential consequences. Besides public 
restrictions like exclusion from public office, citizen privileges that could be revoked included: 
providing or receiving legal representation (p. 111-8), acting as (and later also making use of) a 
witness (p. 118-23), and marrying freeborn persons (p. 123-6). 
159 Mathisen (2006), 1019-20. 
160 The only times freedmen were allowed in the army (cf. supra), they served in the navy or were 
put on garrison duty (i.e. contexts that typically removed them from their home region and their 
patron). 
161 Cf. Reinhold (1971). Ostentatious usurpation of power by women was impossible. 
  115 
muliebris162. On the contrary, the exclusion of freedmen (or freeborn proletarii for that 
matter) was not natural or, to nuance Horace’s sneer, not based on their supposedly 
different genus. Much closer to the truth is Asinius Gallus’ claim that senators and 
knights enjoyed the benefits provided for them by law, not because they differed in kind 
from other men, but rather in their place, rank, and dignity (distinctos senatus et equitum 
census, non quia diversi natura, sed ut locis ordinibus dignationibus antistent…)163.  
The lex Visellia provided that freedmen who pretended to be freeborn, and who 
usurped the office of decurion would become infamis (cum infamia adficitur)164. Note how 
recourse was taken to infamia, rather than to a description involving the macula servitutis 
(as was explicitly done when a slave usurped office in this way)165. Interestingly, 
freeborn people who had been subjected to the servile punishment par excellence – 
flogging – could still legally be admitted to the ordo decurionum since they were not 
considered infamis, even though the jurists implied this admission would be inhonestus, 
and advised that priority be given to viri honesti166. In terms of dishonour, these people 
were the freeborn equivalent of freed dediticii: morally inferior after having suffered an 
ostensibly servile treatment. Nonetheless, they were allowed to take up magistracies 
which even freed citizens optimo iure could not. This points to a significant discrepancy 
between legal ruling and social practice. A flogged freeborn person, Callistratus implied, 
was certainly degraded by the experience, but in terms of legal consequences, he did not 
“acquire” the restriction that was a priori “ascribed” to freedmen. Whereas elite 
literature invoked a servile past or treatment to justify and consolidate the generalised 
disability of freedmen, the jurists clearly did not (primarily) have this consideration in 
mind when judging similarly “impaired” freeborn persons. Again, the different legal 
condition strongly determined the extent of the consequences of similar degrading 
experiences. This is, of course, not to say that legal rank was the only criterion by which 
social status was determined. Nicolas Tran, for example, has convincingly argued that 
Roman collegia provided a locus for freedmen to achieve social respectability or even 
prestige, and that being a collegiatus constituted a valuable complement (rather than an 
absolute alternative) to legal status and subordination to a patron167. Legal rank, 
 
                                                     
162 Tac. Ann. 6.10: “quia occupandae rei publicae argui non poterant (…)”; Ann. 12.57: “nec ille 
[Narcissus] reticet, impotentiam muliebrem nimiasque spes eius [Agrippinae] arguens”. Freedmen, 
on the contrary, were often ascribed potentia, no matter how transgressive this was perceived (Tac. 
Hist. 4.11; Ann. 4.59; 11.28; 12.54; Suet. Cal. 56.1).  
163 Tac. Ann. 2.33. 
164 Cod. Iust. 9.21.1. 
165 Cf. supra (Cod. Iust. 10.33.2). 
166 Dig. 50.2.12. For the notorious “servility” of flogging, see Quint. Inst. Or. 1.3.13-4. 
167 Tran (2006), passim (esp. p. 112, 124-37, 462-70, 490-3, 506-18). Other identity dimensions able to 
mediate social status have been studied in detail, e.g. professional pride (Joshel (1992); Tran (2013)), 
respectful marriage (Perry (2014)), and personal connections (Nielsen (1997), 204).  
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however, was the most salient identity dimension invoked to justify formal restrictions. 
Rather than a moral taint or a servile scar (which freedman would logically share with 
unjustly enslaved freeborn persons or even with rightfully flogged ingenui in general), it 
was a desire to uphold the gradus dignitatis and status boundaries, together with a 
persistent attention to safeguarding patronal interests that was responsible for the 
formal disabilities of freedmen.  
The legal disqualifications and the social disgrace attached to infamia have often been 
considered a consequence of a moral condemnation of behaviour or crimes by society at 
large168. Like the macula servitutis ideology, however, a strong moralising condemnation in 
literary texts should not be conflated with the lawgivers’ reasons for imposing certain 
restrictions. Much like “ascribed” restrictions of women and freedmen, “acquired” 
infamia was not necessarily a consequence of moral depravity. Gardner, for example, has 
argued that the infamy of praecones (auctioneers), dissignatores (overseers in a broad 
sense), and libitinarii (undertakers) – and specifically their exclusion from the ordo 
decurionum and thus local office – was not due to any moral wantonness, despite 
recurrent literary condemnation169. Indeed, the lex Iulia municipalis states that this 
restriction applied only to actual practitioners of these occupations (dum eorum quid 
faciet), but ceased to exist once these persons gave up their profession170. Gardner 
plausibly suggested that their exclusion from municipal office was intended to prevent 
conflicts of interest, as all three professional groups would often accept, and work 
under, contracts from the decurional council. She concluded that no particular stigma 
or prejudice was attached to these people: not while actually being praecones, 
dissignatores, and libitinarii, nor after abandoning these professions. This again points to 
a vital and often undervalued distinction between presumed individual depravity as the 
alleged reason for infamia and its resulting restrictions on the one hand, and the juridical 
consequence of being branded with infamia on the other171.  
Similarly, Edwards has scrutinised the discourse and prejudices concerning three 
“unspeakable professions” that shared an association with providing public pleasure, 
and that were consequently branded with infamia: those of actors, gladiators, and 
 
                                                     
168 E.g. Greenidge (1894), 8. For a justified nuance, see especially Gardner (1993), 110ff; Edwards 
(1997), 69-70. 
169 Gardner (1993), 130-4. 
170 Tabula Heracleensis (CIL 1, 593 lines 94-6). 
171 The distinction is most explicitly made in Gardner (1993), 142-3. These pages contrast the later 
legal compilations that considered condemned criminals, beast-fighters, and prostitutes as 
inherently infamous with the original praetorian edict that judged these people as infamous. Dig. 
3.1.1.5 echoes this distinction when it states that the praetor notavit (external judgment) those 
persons who were notabiles turpitudine (inherent feature), and even Cicero distinguished between 
externalising inherent immorality by committing a crime and the legal condemnation of it (Cic. Leg. 
1.90.50-1).  
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prostitutes. Even though mostly implicitly, this contribution too respects the distinction 
between a general moralising discourse by which elites consistently defined these 
“others” (and thus “themselves”) on the one hand, and the actual individual reasons for 
branding them with infamia on the other172.  
The difference between the “reason” for a restriction – both embedded in and 
emanating from social practice – and the “judgement” of the afflicted individuals – 
often framed in a moralising discourse of distinction – should thus be given its due 
attention. Neither infamia (in the legal sense of the word, as opposed to its appropriation 
in literary texts) nor freed status should be a priori conceived as a consequence of 
inherent immorality. A similar judgement of freedmen and infames in elite literature, 
firmly situated in a discourse of moral corruption, obscures the potentially different 
“reasons” for the imposed restrictions. A monolithic elite discourse of distinction (and 
thus self-identification) could very well explain and legitimate the exclusion of, for 
example, praecones and actors, but in doing so, it ironed out and thereby obfuscated 
potentially diverging motivations. As has been suggested throughout, the macula 
servitutis framework similarly reduces underlying social practices to generalising and 
self-serving (elite) representations. Like praecones (who were pragmatically excluded to 
prevent conflicts of interest within a municipality’s ordo decurionum) or actors (who 
besides their close connection to sexual transgressions – on which elite discourse often 
focused – were considered as useless, unproductive, and therefore undesirable elements 
in society173), freedmen too were a category sui generis in terms of the underlying 
reasons for their disabilities, despite elite discourse that grouped all of them together as 
“the other” from whose behaviour any virtuous citizen should stay clear. As has been 
argued, a potential “conflict of interest” between patron and freedman is at least as 
important, if not more so, as a generalised “moral depravity” in assessing the “reasons” 
for ex-slaves’ public disabilities, especially in light of the lack of “stains of servitude” in 
our sources.  
 
                                                     
172 Edwards (1997), passim, e.g. p. 83: “Yet this association [with transgressive sexual behaviour] does 
not explain (…) their relegation to the category of infames”. For the infamia of actors in particular, 
see Ducos (1990). 
173 Gardner (1993), 152. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Neither in literature nor in epigraphic sources do we find evidence for a Roman habit of 
capturing the libertine condition by an all-encompassing catch phrase such as macula 
(or labes, naevus, dedecus, ignominia, …) servitutis. It could be argued, therefore, that using 
this expression (and the load it covers) as a conceptual framework in freedman studies 
is anachronistic. Only the jurists mention it on occasion, but in so doing usually had the 
servile condition in mind. This is in line with the analysis of source material from later 
periods which – without stressing the point too hard – invariably attributes the macula 
servitutis to slaves, who would be cleansed of it after manumission. Moreover, the 
Romans were clearly very pragmatic in allowing the cleansing of all kinds of stigmata. 
At the very least then, macula servitutis seems a misnomer when used as a common 
denominator for the social condition of freedmen. But there is more to it.  
Surely, we cannot deny the disparaging stereotypes of freedmen which permeate the 
elite’s discourse. And of course, the description of freedmen as slaves was an easy, 
almost gratuitous, way of ridiculing and attacking them. But throughout Roman 
literature, various persons of any status group were compared to slaves, attesting to the 
convenient function of slavery as a general metaphor of depravity174. Cicero thus 
presented Verres and his supporters, but also men who took orders from women as 
slavish. For Tacitus the entire body of senators is often nothing more than a group of 
slaves, and soldiers could see senators as their domini, thereby representing themselves 
as slaves as well. Finally, according to Tacitus, informally freed slaves were still bound 
by the vinclo servitutis even though we know that their freedom was protected first by 
the praetor and later by the Augustan Lex Iunia175. Moreover, when freedmen are 
described as such, there was usually a very concrete “reason” to do so, indicating that 
these persons were not a priori considered quasi servi but only because they proved to be 
incapable of living like free men should, at least in the eyes of the elites (cf. Chapter 6). 
For Mouritsen, Tacitus’ mention of the servilium ingenium and servilis animus of freedmen 
are indications of the general servile stain of freedmen176. It should be clear, however, 
that these particular freedmen had “provoked” these derogatory comments by their 
“misconduct” (manipulating the emperor or betraying their patron), and not by a priori 
 
                                                     
174 Cf. Fitzgerald (2000), 11: “slaves were good to think with”. 
175 Cic. Ver. 2.4.126; Par. Stoic. 36; Tac. Ann. 1.26,31; 2.2,7; 3.65; 13.27; Hist. 4.8; Plin. Ep. 8.6.4. Other 
groups that were occasionally called slaves include governors (Tac. Ann. 6.32); emperors (Tac. Ann. 
6.20); entire states (Tac. Ann. 2.4). Cf. Garnsey (1996), 220-35. Citizens could be described as put in 
chains of slavery (vinculo servitutis), after their freedom was curbed by sumptuary laws (Val. Max. 
2.9.5).  
176 Mouritsen (2011), 18 notes 47 and 48 (on Tac. Ann. 2.12.3; 15.54.4; Hist. 2.92; 5.9.3).  
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being slaves in essence. Servility was a recurrent topos in elite discourse. The reproaching 
of freedmen as slaves should also be seen in this light177. 
Most of the arguments in support of an all-encompassing stain of slavery on 
freedmen come from elite literary sources. The norms and values in these texts, 
however, are notoriously more strict than mainstream ideology, precisely because the 
elite wanted to distinguish itself from it. Petersen has shown that the idea of a 
“freedman art” – typically supported by analyses of elite sources – should be 
revisited178. Similarly, the age-old conviction that there was a general contempt in Rome 
towards manual labour stems from an overstressing of this elite’s discourse of 
distinction and is now rightly being contested179. This chapter’s aim was to show that 
the framework of the macula servitutis can be subjected to a similar revision. Like artistic 
or professional stereotypes, a servile past was merely instrumental in a broader process 
of protecting the discrimina ordinum. 
When we do not take the regular attacks on freedmen and their past in elite 
literature as representative of daily belief and practice – as, indeed, we should not – and 
when we contextualise both the literal mentions of a macula servitutis and the concept of 
a stain on one’s honour in general, a less conflicting explanation for the social and legal 
disadvantages of freedmen becomes much more preferable. Instead of an inherent stain 
on the ex-slave’s person, looming large in every aspect of his life, it was the reflex of the 
elite to distinguish themselves from lower class citizens in general which inspired the 
derogatory discourse on – especially rich and powerful – freedmen who would not by 
any other objective standard differ from these traditional elites. What made the 
treatment of freedmen different from that of other groups similarly presented as “the 
other” (the sui generis nature of the social category of the Roman ex-slave can by no 
means be denied), was their embeddedness in the patronage relationship, which 
provides a very comprehensive framework to evaluate freedmen’s disabilities. 
 
                                                     
177 E.g. Smadja (1976), 88. Attempts to explain occasions were freedmen were called slaves as neutral 
descriptions (e.g. Treggiari (1969a), 172; Andreau (1993), 184) are rightly refuted by Mouritsen 
(2011), 100 note 155. 
178 Petersen (2006). 
179 The locus classicus for this elite contempt is, of course, Cic. Off. 1.150-1. An enormous boost to the 
revisiting of this generally held belief was the publication of Lis and Soly (2012). See Verboven (2014) 
for a discussion of its immediate relevance for antiquity. Cf. Mouritsen (2011), 209-11. Tran (2013) 
provides the most comprehensive overview of the evolution (p. 187-9), as well as an original in-
depth analysis of the interaction between aristocratic and lower class mentalities (passim). The 
notion of statut de travail (esp. p. 5-10; originally introduced by Andreau in several contributions, e.g. 
(1985), 378; (1987), 25ff) highlights the important potential of professional activity to positively 
shape and mediate social identity. 
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In short, this chapter has very broadly set out some key lines of enquiry, providing a 
general framework in which to situate the following chapters. Certainly, rigid legal 
distinctions or highly rhetorical literary ideals should be distinguished from the social 
context in which agency and daily interaction was embedded. It is for this reason that 
the next chapters will focus in detail on the occurrence and representation of freedmen 
in their everyday dealings with the classes that produced these legal and literary 
stereotypes. The next three chapters will centre around the Roman correspondences, 
whereas Chapter 8 engages in particular with the available epigraphic material (and 
especially with metric epitaphs as an extensive case-study). 
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Chapter 3 Freedmen in Roman correspondences 
3.1 The correspondence of Cicero (106-43 BCE) 
3.1.1 Introduction to Cicero’s letters  
As a homo novus, Cicero did not have at his disposal an entrenched (inherited) social 
network in Rome, nor did his symbolic capital match that of the members of the Roman 
nobility, who could boast about a family line that went back for centuries. To secure his 
own place among Rome’s highest elites, Cicero had to rely on his own efforts and 
resourcefulness. His remarkable talent as an orator famously paved the way for his 
forensic and political successes, but maintaining an extensive network of (political) 
friends and clients was essential in consolidating these successes. In light of the great 
distances that could separate public officials from one another (e.g. when holding 
provincial office), letter-writing was the most efficient way of doing so1. 
Cicero’s correspondence (or rather, what remains of it) consists of 4 corpora of 
collections, containing letters on all kinds of subjects – from private freelings of anxiety 
or joy, over trivial family matters, to financial accounting and delicate political events. 
The first corpus is called Epistulae ad Familiares – an early modern name – and consists of 
435 letters arranged in 16 books, most of which were ordered either thematically or per 
addressee. Book 3, for example, contains the correspondence with Appius Pulcher, and 
book 13 the letters of recommendation. Originally, these books existed on their own, 
and were only later compiled into one set of 16 books. The second collection, the 
Epistulae ad Atticum, similarly contains 16 books (with 426 letters in total). Two much 
smaller collections contain the letters exchanged between Cicero and his brother 
Quintus (ad Quintum Fratrem, 27 letters in 3 books), and between Cicero and Brutus (ad M. 
 
                                                     
1 Hall (2009), for example, focusses on the smoothening function of politeness in Cicero’s letters to 
facilitate delicate exchanges when these could not be taken care of in person. Cf. already Schneider 
(1998). 
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Brutum, 25 letters in 2 books)2. Overwhelmingly large as this collection may seem at first 
sight, it probably contains no more than 1% of the letters Cicero wrote during his 
political career3. The ad Familiares collection differs from the others in that it contains 
the correspondences of a wide variety of clients, friends, and family members of 
Cicero’s, whereas the other three corpora include letters written to or by but one 
person4. Additional collections of letters (e.g. to and from Caesar, Pompey, Hirtius, 
Marcus junior, and Octavian) existed in antiquity, but did not survive the vicissitudes of 
time. At least 38 books have thus not been preserved5. Yet other letters simply never 
made the editor’s cut6.  
The correspondence as a whole includes letters dated from 68 to 43 BCE. Some letters 
explicitly included a date, but many others can be securely dated via internal evidence. 
Much more difficult to assess is the date of their publication. We know that prior to the 
publication of the 16 books ad Atticum, Cornelius Nepos already witnessed 11 of them in 
circulation. For Nepos, these letters contained so much historical information that they 
could easily replace any historian’s account of the period (quae qui legat, non multum 
desideret historiam contextam eorum temporum)7. The debate on the publication dates of 
(specific parts of) Cicero’s correspondence is, however, notoriously extensive, although 
scholars now tend to agree that the correspondence as a whole was in circulation before 
the end of the first century CE8. 
Contrary to most of the ad Atticum letters, the ad Familiares were not arranged in a 
strictly chronological order. Mary Beard has quite rightly warned us that the 
chronological ordering by modern editors greatly diminishes the literary value of the 
letters, since deliberate connections are irretrievably lost when ignoring the original 
editor’s choices9. Indeed, there have been clear editorial choices in selecting and 
ordering the letters. The question as to who was this editor has been as eagerly debated 
 
                                                     
2 For a justified criticism on these numbers, see White (2012), 172, who points out, for example, that 
two letters may have merged into one throughout the manuscript tradition, and that letters cited in 
other letters are not always distinguished.  
3 Achard (1991), 139; Hall (2009), 16. 
4 Deniaux (1993), 96-108 exhaustively lists the 97 persons who were either senders or receivers of at 
least one letter. Most of these were recipients of a letter. For an overview of the other letter-writers 
in the correspondence, see White (2010), 173-4. For some general details of the correspondence 
(numbers, correspondents, dates, etc.), see McConnell (2014), esp. 9-13; White (2010), Appendix 1 (p. 
171-5). 
5 Büchner (1939) , 1199-1206. 
6 Nicholson (1998), 76-87; White (2010), 31-61. 
7 Nep. Att. 16. 
8 The exact dating remains a subject of controversy, e.g. Shackleton Bailey (1965), I, 59-76; Setaioli 
(1976); Beard (2002), 116-9; White (2010), 31-61, with 174-5 including further references. For 
Cornelius Nepos’ potential role in the publication, see Stem (2012), 77-9. 
9 Beard (2002), passim. 
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as the correspondence’s publication date, although the two most likely candidates are 
Atticus (for the ad Atticum), and Tiro (for the ad Familiares and the smaller corpora)10.  
In 46 BCE, Cicero had been at least contemplating the publication of some of his letters 
(video quid agas; tuas quoque epistulas vis referri in volumina, to Tiro)11. By “publication”, no 
modern process of widely disseminating these documents should be understood, as – at 
least in a first stage – “publication” would merely mean “circulation” among close 
friends12. Two years later, these plans took more concrete form, as Cicero was about to 
examine and correct some 70 letters for this purpose (eas ego oportet perspiciam, corrigam; 
tum denique edentur)13. But given the fact that Cicero would be executed in the next year, 
and that he had few opportunities to occupy himself with this work during his last 
months, it is uncertain how much of the eventual collection he had been able to revisit 
himself14.  
Certainly, before sending a rather delicate letter, Cicero would sometimes ask a close 
friend of his to inspect it15, and if not Cicero himself, then surely the editor(s) of the 
eventual correspondence may have – to some extent – polished up individual letters 
after Cicero’s death16. Some letters, moreover, were intended for a wider audience from 
the start. The first preserved letter Cicero wrote to his brother Quintus, for example, is a 
full-fledged piece of advice that resembles a rhetorical essay more than a letter17. Some 
were expected to be read by at least a small circle of close friends, and others were 
explicitly intended for even wider dissemination18. At all times, however, letter-writers 
were aware of the potential danger of their correspondence being intercepted by an 
unintended audience, and they often adapted both style and content to this threat (cf. 
Chapter 4).  
But even if they cannot be labelled “spontaneous”, the letters are in any case 
“authentic”. Indeed, in clear contrast to Pliny’s correspondence, no traces of skewing of 
 
                                                     
10 For Tiro and Atticus as editors, see Tyrrell & Purser (1904), 67-8; McDermott (1972), 281-2; Zetzel 
(1973); Phillips (1986); Shackleton Bailey (2001), I, 2; (2002), 4; White (2010), 33-4. Beard (2002), 131 
provides a sceptical note, by reminding us that no real evidence can be advanced, especially for 
Tiro’s role. 
11 Cic. Fam. 16.17.1. 
12 Cf. Nicholson (1998), 104; Murphy (1998); McConnell (2014), 12 note 27 for further references. For 
the circulation of literary works in general, see Starr (1987). 
13 Cic. Att. 16.5.5. 
14 Cf. White (2010), 32-3: “The scarcity of opportunity for literary work during this time is the most 
compelling reason to doubt that he could have expanded and carried through the plan for an edition 
of the letters before he died”. 
15 Cic. Att. 13.25.3. Cf. Trapp (2003), 14: “However much the letter may be thought of as an unofficial 
kind of writing, Cicero was never truly off duty, as stylist or as self-presenter”. 
16 Hutchinson (1998), 1-24. 
17 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 1.1. 
18 E.g. Fam. 1.9; 9.8; 13.1. Cf. Hall (2009), 24-7.  
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facts, manipulating versions of events, or of manifest stylistic enhancement can be 
found in the corpora19. Moreover, – and this is where Cicero’s and Pliny’s 
correspondences do find common ground – the collection was published as a corpus of 
letters, i.e. intended to be readily believed to be a reflection of actual epistolary norms 
and decorum. We should, finally, remember that all references to revision by Cicero 
himself, or to vetting of letters by a third party are very circumstantial, and pertain to 
no more than a few dozens of letters. The great Ciceronian scholar David Roy 
Shackleton Bailey was thus convinced that Cicero’s correspondence as a whole consists 
“almost entirely of private letters written without any idea of future publication and 
published, as it seems, almost exactly as they stood”20. This impression has been 
accepted by modern scholars, who now generally believe that “the letters were not in 
any sense written for publication”21. 
It has been noted, however, that any study of the correspondence should not only 
evaluate the content of individual letters, but also their intertextual relation to others, 
as well as their embeddedness in the corpus as a whole22. Perhaps much more so than 
any retouching of individual letters prior to publication, the editorial positioning of 
these letters – creating a meta-narrative that endows them with meaning beyond that 
conveyed merely by its content – is the most significant impediment to consider these 
documents as unproblematic representations of reality23. We will come back to his point 
repeatedly. 
3.1.2 Who is who? Freedmen in Cicero’s correspondence: a status 
quaestionis. 
3.1.2.1 Identifying freedmen 
A considerable portion of the analysis in the next chapters draws on the numerous 
passages in Cicero’s correspondence that mention or refer to freedmen. A clear 
demarcation of the source material – a database of these passages – is therefore vital at 
the outset. This is, however, an endeavour much more complex than one would expect 
at first glance since it involves the thorny issue of “who is who”.  
 
                                                     
19 For a particularly vivid metaphor of the difference between Cicero’s and Pliny’s correspondences 
in this regard, see White (2010), vii-viii. 
20 Shackleton Bailey (2001), I, 1. 
21 Powell (2003), 1562. Balsdon (2003), 1560 is slightly more nuanced: “only a minority (…) was 
written with any thought of publication”. 
22 Cf. most recently Beard (2002); McConnell (2014), esp. 10-3. 
23 Beard (2002); Henderson (2007); Gunderson (2007). 
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One of the main difficulties in identifying freedmen throughout the correspondence 
(and many other literary sources) is the choice or intuitive habit of writers not to 
include specific status indicators. Our deliberately stringent criteria for status 
determination (cf. infra) result in a list that undoubtedly underestimates the actual 
number of freedmen. Libertination – whether by the Latin libertus or a Greek equivalent 
like ἀπελεύθερος24 –  is by far the most straightforward way to attain certainty as to an 
individual’s freed status. This is the case for many freedmen who are only mentioned 
once throughout the correspondence: Cilix, Dardanus, Menander, Antigonus, 
Apollonius, Gabinius Antiochus, etc.25 The reference to a patron (e.g. in the cases of 
Evander, Hammonius, Zoilus26) or to a manumission (e.g. of Antipho, Eutychides, 
Chrysippus27) sometimes clarifies the identity of an individual whose status would 
otherwise remain uncertain. 
Others are not explicitly indicated as freedmen in the letters, but can be identified as 
such through external evidence. In a letter to Trebatius from April 53 BCE, Cicero 
casually writes that he will spend the night at M. Aemilius Philemon’s house in the 
Pomptine region and that his host has provided him with news from Rome. It is only 
through a passage in Asconius’ commentary on Cicero’s Pro Milone that we know this 
individual to be a quite renowned freedman (homo notus, libertus M. Lepidi)28. The same 
goes for the Demetrius who passes information from Cicero to Atticus as mentioned in a 
letter from June 55 BCE. Of course we are here dealing with the famous and wealthy 
freedman of Pompey, Demetrius of Gadara, who is well known for persuading his patron 
to rebuild his hometown in the Levant29. It may well have been his renown that made 
Cicero omit a superfluous status mention in the first place. Likewise, in November 44 
BCE Cicero mentions that he wanted to make sure the world would know that Mark 
Antony had children by C. Fadius’ daughter. It is again only by reading the Philippics that 
we understand that this Fadius was a freedman, and that Antony’s union with his 
daughter was inappropriate for this very reason30. Finally, Licinius Tyrannio is nowhere 
identified as a freedman in the correspondence, but via Plutarch’s Life of Lucullus, we 
know that he was a famous grammarian of Amisus, first captured by the Romans and 
later controversially freed31. Besides these four, every individual in our database is at 
 
                                                     
24 E.g. Cic. Att. 6.4.3 (Philotimus); 6.5.2 (Timotheus). 
25 Fam. 3.1.2; 10.25.3; 13.70; 13.33; 13.16; Att. 4.18.4;  
26 Fam. 13.2 (C. Avianius Evander); 13.27.2 (C. Avianius Hammonius); 13.46 (L. Nostius Zoilus). 
27 Att. 4.15.6 (Antipho); Att. 4.15.1; 4.16.9 (T. Caecilius Eutychides); 7.2.8 (Chrysippus and an unnamed 
homo operarius) 
28 Fam. 7.18.3 (=Asc. 37C). 
29 Att. 4.11.1 (= Joseph. AJ 14.75; BJ 1.155; Plut. Pomp. 2.4; 40.1-5). Cf. Syme (1939), 76. 
30 Att. 16.11.1 (= Phil. 2.3, he is here called Quintus – not Gaius – Fadius). 
31 Att. 2.6.1, 4.4a.1, 4.8.2, 12.2.2, 12.6.2, Quint. Fratr. 2.4.2, 3.4.5, 3.5.6 (= Plut. Luc. 19.7). 
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least once attributed a clear status indicator32, a consequence, of course, of our selection 
method rather than a reflection of the epistolary practice of Cicero and his peers. 
Indeed, there is a bias in our list towards attestations with explicit status markers since 
many individuals are incerti (and thus not included in our list) precisely because they are 
not explicitly called liberti, because they are not mentioned in conjunction with their 
patron, or because their manumission is not (implicitly) referred to. 
A more inclusive attitude towards incerti and the application of more lenient criteria 
would permit us to expand our list of “freedmen”, but only at the cost of increasing 
uncertainty as to whether the results of the subsequent analysis are truly derived from 
detailed study of real freedmen. The case of Quintus Roscius Gallus, although not 
occurring in Cicero’s letters, is illustrative. The suggestion that Gallus was a freedman 
has been a persistent misconception. We know he was a gifted actor; so talented in fact 
that someone who excelled in any profession could be described as “a Roscius”33. He is 
best known from the eponymous speech, delivered by Cicero in his defence (Pro Q. Roscio 
Comoedo) and enjoyed Sulla’s favour, from whom he also received the first golden ring 
(annulus aureus) attested in literary sources34. Since the grant of a golden ring to 
freedmen – and their correspondent elevation to the rank of knight – is well known 
from the Principate, and because Pliny mentions Roscius when discussing actors who 
bought their own freedom, several scholars have attributed slave status to this 
Roscius35. Moreover, at this time, cognomina were still mainly reserved for ex-slaves and 
the patrician elites, and it is very tempting to interpret “Gallus” as the name given to a 
Gallic slave brought to Rome36.  
 
                                                     
32 The only exception is Caecilius Trypho (Att. 3.8.3). The reason for his inclusion in the list is a 
combination of freed status indicators (his Greek name and the more than likely derivation of his 
nomen from Atticus’ uncle Q. Caecilius) and the communis opinio in regard to this persons’ freed status 
(e.g. Shackleton Bailey in the latest Loeb translations of Cicero’s letters). Even if both assumptions 
are mistaken, the impact would be negligible since the only reference to Trypho is the contextless 
statement Tryphonem Caecilium non vidi by Cicero.   
33 Cic. De Orat. I.130: “Itaque hoc iam diu est consecutus, ut, in quo quisque artificio excelleret, is in 
suo genere Roscius diceretur”. For the lasting “Nachleben” of Roscius, well beyond Antiquity and 
extending into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Garton (1972), passim (esp. Chapter 9: 
“The Rosciad Idea”, p. 203-29). 
34 Macr. Sat. 3.14.13: “Is est Roscius qui etiam L. Syllae carissimus fuit et anulo aureo ab eodem 
dictatore donatus est”. This elevated Roscius to the rank of the equites. 
35 For the ius anulorum aureorum (including examples and notes), see Mouritsen (2011), 107-8. For the 
passage in Pliny the Elder, see NH 7.128: “(…) quippe cum iam apud maiores Roscius histrio HS D 
annua meritasse prodatur”. Henry (1919) referred to this passage to argue that Roscius’ status as ex-
slave is possible (p. 345-6). The Encyclopaedia Britannica (Online Academic Edition, 2014) still 
describes Roscius as a freedman. 
36 Von der Mühll (RE 16) saw in Roscius’ cognomen Gallus an indication of servile descent, although 
Der Neue Pauly (“R. Gallus, Q.”) clearly corrects this view by stating that the actor was freeborn. 
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However, none of these arguments are conclusive. Indeed, Pliny merely mentions 
Roscius as an example of an actor who became rich because of his talent and fame, but 
he does not imply that the man was an ex-slave himself, despite the general theme of 
the passage. Similarly, “Gallus” could just as well have been the name of one of Roscius’ 
forefathers (one of which may have been a freed captive)37. Recent studies have 
convincingly argued, moreover, that Roscius was freeborn. Nicolet, for example, 
reminds us that the golden ring was granted to equestrians in order to cleanse them 
from the infamia their acting on stage had caused38. None of these arguments can thus 
serve as evidence in favour of a freed status for Roscius, and it is nowadays accepted by 
most scholars that he was indeed freeborn39.  
Restraint in attributing freed status to incerti is also warranted by examples from 
Cicero’s correspondence itself. If we would take Greek cognomina as potential indicators 
of freed status, C. Avianius Philoxenus – whom Cicero recommends to Acilius – could 
wrongly be categorised as an ex-slave, especially when we take into account that two 
freedmen in the correspondence carried the very same nomen and praenomen40. In this 
case, we are lucky to possess extra information, indicating that Philoxenus was a 
freeborn Greek, made Roman citizen by Caesar in the colony of Novum Comum, and 
who had received his name through his connection with Avianius Flaccus41. In other 
instances where such clarifying information is not provided, lenient criteria of inclusion 
may result in a distorted database of “freedmen”. Shackleton Bailey, for example, 
identifies another Philoxenus of Att. 7.2.5; 13.8; Quint. Fratr. 3.1.1 – mentioned only as a 
courier – as a “slave or  freedman” without any other evidence supporting such claim.  
In the following paragraphs, we would like to draw attention to some observations 
with regard to our (method of) identification and selection, and make explicit both our 
own assumptions and the relation of our list of freedmen to previous ones. Indeed, the 
presentation of yet another list of ex-slaves mentioned in Cicero’s letters requires some 
justification in view of the many attempts by previous scholars. Our intention is to lay 
bare the shortcomings and inaccuracies of these existing lists, to isolate the different 
factors that led to these imprecisions, and to integrate this knowledge in our own 
 
                                                     
37 In support of this suggestion, Cic. Div. 1.79 can be cited, which mentions Roscius’ birth in 
Solonium (Latium) – not Gaul – where his father was present to consult soothsayers after the little 
Roscius had been marked by a divine omen.  
38 Nicolet (1974), Vol. 2, 1003-4 (n° 300, note 3, including examples). Nicolet thus thinks that Roscius 
was not only freeborn, but of equestrian rank as well. 
39 See also Mouritsen (2011), 107 note 197, who agrees with Nicolet on Roscius’ free birth (but erred 
on Roscius’ praenomen which is given as Sextus instead of Quintus). 
40 These are C. Avianius Evander (Fam. 7.23.1-3; 13.2) and C. Avianius Hammonius (Fam. 13.21.2; 
13.27.2), both freedmen of M. Aemilius Avianianus. 
41 Fam. 13.35. 
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method of selection in order to establish a definite, exhaustive overview of all the 
freedmen in Cicero’s correspondence. It should be clear that it is not our intention here 
to provide a complete account of every attempt made to establish such a list. Such an 
effort – if feasible at all – would be unproductive almost by definition. Instead, we 
choose to focus on a selection of attempts which are of immediate use for our own 
objective. As a consequence, the emphasis is not so much on the actual content of these 
lists as on the light they shed on both the methods their authors applied, and the pitfalls 
these authors became victims of in the process42. 
3.1.2.2 Existing lists of freedmen in Cicero’s correspondence 
3.1.2.2.1 Marion Park (1918) 
Scholars who have committed to creating such lists often made an analytical distinction 
between Cicero’s own slaves and freedmen on the one hand, and those of his 
correspondents (sometimes “lent out” and in Cicero’s employment) on the other. An 
early example of such endeavour is Marion Park’s list of the members of Cicero’s familia 
urbana in her The Plebs in Cicero’s Day43. Among them, she found ten freedmen: seven of 
Cicero or Terentia (Aegypta, Chrysippus, Hilarus, the scriba Laurea, his own Philotimus, 
Terentia’s Philotimus, and Tiro) and three of another patron but for a long time closely 
connected to Cicero’s household (Dionysius, Tyrannio, and Apollonius). Besides these, 
she included two freedmen who are not mentioned in the correspondence (Eros and 
another Tyrannio), completing the list of twelve freedmen in total.  
The list continues with the freedmen of Cicero’s correspondents. As we will see 
shortly, the status of many of these individuals cannot be ascertained and in many cases 
the categorisation as freedmen rests on implicit assumptions, some of which are 
dubious at best. To give but one example here: the librarius Decius is deemed “probably a 
freedman” of P. Sestius only because he is described as frugi, which Park unwarrantedly 
takes to be a “typical freedman’s adjective”44. In addition, the list is not a useful 
instrument for anyone who wants an accessible overview of all freedmen in Cicero’s 
correspondence. As mentioned, it focuses first on Cicero’s own freedmen and then 
expands its scope to include also “the liberti of Cicero’s acquaintances”45. But this latter 
list focusses primarily on freedmen in the service of politicians and businessmen. 
 
                                                     
42 Carcopino’s list (1947, I, 128), for example, is in these respects very similar to that of Drumann & 
Groebe and will therefore not be discussed. 
43 Park (1918), 58ff.  
44 Park (1918), 66 note 5. See especially Chapter 7 for the dangers involved in this strand of 
reasoning. 
45 Park (1918) 65ff. 
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Vettius Chrysippus, a freedman of the architect Vettius Cyrus, for example, appears 
only later in the chapter: in a list of architects employed by Cicero46. Moreover, we can 
only guess what the “(?)” means by which certain individuals are marked. Philadelphus, 
for example, appears in the list of “liberti mentioned in Cicero’s writings who acted as 
business agents away from Rome”47. Whether the “(?)” expresses uncertainty as to his 
belonging to Atticus, to his status as freedman, or to yet another identity dimension is 
not made clear. The result is that freedmen are scattered over many pages in the study 
rather than being grouped in one list, and that many individuals who are claimed to be 
freed are only to be considered as such when we accept Park’s (often implicit) 
assumptions, which in more than a few occasions are manifestly fallacious.  
3.1.2.2.2 Wilhelm Drumann & Paul Groebe (1929) 
The next attempt to give an exhaustive list of Cicero’s freed personnel came from the 
German school. Drumann & Groebe wrote some ten years after Park and, in their 
monumental Geschichte Roms48, found ten freedmen (Aegypta, Alexio, Chrysippus, 
Clodius Philhetaurus, Dionysius49, Hilarus, M. Tullius Laurea, Metrodorus, Pelops, and 
Tiro50). These individuals occur in a list which Drumann & Groebe claim to contain 
Cicero’s slaves and freedmen. Although the above mentioned individuals are explicitly 
called freedmen, others are simply listed without any further discussion as to their 
status (e.g. Anteros, Aristocritus, Demea, Hermia, Menander, Pescennius, Philargyrus, 
…). Once again, we can only guess whether Drumann & Groebe considered them actual 
freedmen rather than slaves, but in most of these cases there exists no conclusive 
evidence either way. Even the “certain” slaves and freedmen are not always actually to 
be identified as such. Pelops was most likely a freeborn provincial51 and M. Tullius was 
certainly neither slave nor freedman (cf. infra). Overall, the rather vague modus operandi 
(including both slaves and freedman, sometimes without clearly distinguishing between 
them) and the manifest inaccuracies, add to the already problematic nature of the list. A 
comparison with Park’s list, for example, shows marked differences. Drumann & Groebe 
included some individuals who did not figure in Park’s list (e.g. Alexio) and vice versa 
(the two Philotimi). Park, however, does identify Alexio as a freedman52 but excludes 
 
                                                     
46 Park (1918), 75. 
47 Park (1918), 68. 
48 Drumann and Groebe (1929), 353-356. 
49 Again: not a freedman of Cicero himself but of Atticus. 
50 Strictly speaking, Tiro is not included, but is discussed in the paragraphs following the list. 
51 Treggiari (1969a), 252. 
52 He is “undoubtedly libertus, though not so designated” (Park (1918), 68). The reason for this 
identification is his leaving a will in 44 BCE (p. 76). 
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him from her list since we cannot know whether he was Cicero’s freedman or someone 
else’s. Less clear is Drumann & Groebe’s decision not to include any Philotimus in their 
list of Cicero’s freedmen. Although Cicero’s Philotimus is referred to on occasion53, he 
seems to have been considered the same individual as Terentia’s freedman54. Whereas 
the decision to exclude Terentia’s freedman could be accepted as respecting strict 
selection criteria (he technically did not belong to Cicero since the latter’s marriage 
with Terentia was sine manu), not including Cicero’s Philotimus is simply erroneous. 
Besides their failure to make a distinction between two individuals who happen to bear 
the same name, it also seems inherently illogical to include Clodius Philhetaerus in the 
list, since he was not a freedman of Cicero’s. Treggiari is certainly too harsh when she 
describes this decision as resulting from “inexplicable inattention to the nomen”55 but 
she is of course right in questioning Philhetaerus’ inclusion in a list of Cicero’s 
personnel. Like Atticus’ freedman Dionysius, he seems to be included because he spent a 
considerable amount of time in Cicero’s service. Even when we accept this criterion, we 
cannot but conclude that it is not applied very rigorously elsewhere. Indeed, why then 
not include Murena’s famous freedman Tyrannio, who for a long time was not only 
responsible for Cicero’s library (at least between 59 and 46 BCE), but who also educated 
Cicero’s son Marcus and his nephew Quintus56? 
3.1.2.2.3 Susan Treggiari (1969) 
In her influential monograph Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic57, Treggiari thus 
already drew attention to the imprecisions of these lists. Writing forty years after 
Drumann & Groebe, she observed that these earlier lists “suffer either from omissions or 
from unjustifiable additions” and pointed out some inaccuracies. Most of these come 
down to a more general critique, i.e. that individuals are included whose status cannot 
be ascertained with any precision58. Her own corrected version of the list is presented as 
the shortest so far, implying a rigorous selection based on solid evidence and without 
including incerti. These certain liberti are Tiro, Laurea, M. Tullius, Chrysippus, Aegypta, 
Hilarus, Eros59, “probably” Phaetho, an unnamed operarius, and an unnamed procurer of 
 
                                                     
53 E.g. Drumann & Groebe (1929), 56. 
54 E.g. Drumann & Groebe (1929), 333, 349, 606. 
55 Treggiari (1969a), 255 note 2. Drumann & Groebe (1929), 354 note 3 actually do admit that this 
individual could not have been Cicero’s but belonged to a “nicht näher bekannten Clodius”. 
56 Att. 2.6.1; 4.4a.1; 4.8.2; 12.6.1; Quint. fr. 2.4.2. 
57 Treggiari (1969a). This list appeared also in article form in the same year, Treggiari (1969b). 
58 Treggiari (1969a), 252. 
59 This Eros is mentioned only by Plutarch (Cic. 21) and does not occur in the Correspondence. 
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statues60. To these, she adds another six individuals who were either slaves or freedmen, 
and another ten who were not Cicero’s own freedmen but who were at least temporarily 
in his service.  
Treggiari’s critique on the too extensive list of Drumman & Groebe is in part unfair 
since this list includes slaves as well as freedmen. If one would only count the 
individuals Drumann & Groebe counted as certain freedmen, the number would not be 
twenty-five but ten: exactly as many as on Treggiari’s own “short list”61. At the same 
time, the older list does include individuals for whom slave or freed status cannot be 
ascertained (e.g. Alexio, Aristocritus, …) and is in this sense indeed too long. However, 
these same individuals are incorporated in Treggiari’s list too; similarly under the 
heading of “slaves or freedmen”. The improvement Treggiari’s list claims to provide 
therefore exists in more strictly separating certain from uncertain freedmen. There are, 
however, some discrepancies between the “certainties” of the list and Treggiari’s 
treatment of these individuals throughout her monograph. Indeed, Eros is counted 
among the certain liberti alieni in the list, but described as “Atticus’ freedman or possibly 
slave” in the discussion of freed ratiocinatores62. Of this same group of liberti alieni, 
Treggiari later onwards states that they were employees “some or any of whom may 
have been libertini”63.  Similarly, the case of Lepidus’ Apella is given as an example of the 
aristocratic practice of handing over freedmen as a pledge of good faith. The same 
Apella, however, is presented twice in Index II: once as “presumably freedman of 
Lepidus” and once again as a certain freedman (?Aemilius? Lepidi l. Apella)64. The same 
goes for Billienus Demetrius, who is considered a freedman in Appendix 1 but described 
as “presumably a freedman” in Index II65. Once again, there rises considerable doubt 
about the status of individuals who are elsewhere considered certain freedmen. 
 Moreover, Treggiari’s list, much like Park’s and Drumann & Groebe’s is not an 
exhaustive summary of all the freedmen occurring in Cicero’s correspondence. Many 
individuals who were beyond any doubt ex-slaves (e.g. Gallus’ Apella, Furnius’ Dardanus, 
Lucullus’ Diodotus, …) are not included in the list nor in any discussion throughout the 
monograph66. This is, of course, understandable since many of these individuals occur 
 
                                                     
60 Treggiari (1969b), 195-196. 
61 This is due in part to Treggiari’s inclusion of unnamed freedmen whereas both Park and Drumann 
& Groebe did not. Even without the two unnamed freedmen, however, Treggiari’s list would not 
contain considerably less “certain” freedmen than Drumann & Groebe’s list. 
62 Treggiari (1969a), 150 (italics added). 
63 Treggiari (1969a), 255. 
64 Treggiari (1969a), 187 and 288 respectively. 
65 Treggiari (1969a), 248 and 288 respectively. 
66 Especially the absence of some freedmen who occur in the letters of recommendation (e.g. Naso’s 
Antigonus, Balbus’ Menander, …) is noteworthy. 
 132 
only en passant and since it was not the intention of the author to include all freedmen 
in the first place. But it also goes to show that there are still considerable barriers for 
anyone who wants to get a grasp on all the (passages relating to) freedmen in the 
correspondences. 
3.1.2.2.4 Elisabeth Smadja (1976) 
A first attempt to provide such an exhaustive list of dependents occurring in Cicero’s 
correspondence came from a French scholar. In 1976, a collection of essays appeared, 
which had the ambitious goal to analyse the system of slavery as presented by Cicero’s 
works. One of the promising contributions was Elisabeth Smadja’s Esclaves et affranchis 
dans la correspondance de Cicéron: les relations esclavagistes. Its approach was rather 
positivistic and its analysis of discourse very constructionist. The positivistic influences 
are clear immediately to any reader who opens the volume: the tables, graphs, 
schematic representations, causal arrows, visualisations of social relations, etc. are 
meant to give the whole a more “scientific” outlook.  The constructionist approach is 
more subtle, and manifests itself mostly in the passages where a specific discourse is 
linked to freedmen, and where an identification of an individual as slave rather than 
freedman (or vice versa) is based not on explicitly defined criteria but, on the contrary, 
on the need to “fit” a specific person in either one of the two categories (cf. infra).  
Preceding the actual essay is a list of slaves and freedmen, subdivided according to 
the identity of their master or patron (Cicero’s correspondents, Cicero himself, Atticus, 
and Cicero’s brother Quintus). There are, however, considerable shortcomings in each of 
these lists67. First of all, no attempt seems to have been made to exhaustively list the 
references per individual. For example, C. Avianius Hammonius receives only one 
reference (Fam. 13.21.1) although he is explicitly and meaningfully mentioned in 
another letter (Fam. 13.27.2), which also stresses his freed status by means of a 
reference to his patron (patronus suus). Theophilus occurs not only in Fam. 4.9.1 but also 
in Fam. 4.10.1, etc. Passages where freedmen are referred to, but not mentioned 
nominatim, are likewise omitted (e.g. Phanias in Fam. 3.8.5, Philo in Att. 6.1.21, …). Such 
an approach not only results in incomplete references per freedman but also, and more 
importantly, in the complete omission of nameless individuals. This has been a trait of 
 
                                                     
67 We do not include in this limited overview some of the more superficial imperfections such as 
what appears to have been mere lapses of attention or writing mistakes (e.g. the inclusion of Att. 
5.10.8 instead of Att. 5.20.8 for the freedman Philogenes). 
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all the lists discussed above (although to a slightly lesser degree in that of Treggiari’s) 
and results in at least ten freedmen not being included68.  
Secondly, Smadja sometimes fails to distinguish between two different freedmen who 
happen to bear the same name. Demetrius of Gadara, for example, is listed as the 
freedman of Pompey and is as such accompanied by references to Att. 4.11.1 and Fam. 
16.17 and 19. The latter two passages, however, refer not to Pompey’s freedman but to 
another Demetrius (a freedman of, probably, Atticus). The opposite occurs as well. 
Smadja does not consider Murena’s freedman Tyrannio (Att. 12.2.2 and 12.6) the same 
individual as the Tyrannio mentioned in five other letters (Att. 4.4a.1, 4.8.2, Quint. Fratr. 
2.4.2, 3.4.5, 3.5.6) even though we have no reason to doubt their identification69.  
Finally, the most problematic aspect of the list: it makes no explicit distinction 
between slaves and freedmen. We can only gauge Smadja’s status determination of an 
individual when it is made explicit by the mention of a tria nomina or if the column 
“mention de la dépendance” happens to include a status indicator. Caesar’s freedman 
Salvius, for example, is not attributed any specific status in the list. Only because he is 
treated as a freedman in the essay do we know that Smadja actually considered him as 
such70. Other individuals, such as Demetrius (of Gadara), receive no description or 
discussion in the list nor in the essay. Rufio or Rupa are merely described with the 
possessive tuus, and are not discussed in the essay. Even though Smadja may have 
believed they were a freedman and two slaves respectively, we cannot deduce that from 
the way she presented these individuals in the list. The grouping together of slaves and 
freedmen is an analytical choice deriving from the intention of the author to study 
relations of dependence in general, and is as such not a priori problematic. Difficulties 
arise, however, when slaves and freedmen are put on a par conceptually as well 
throughout the following discussion, and even more so when individuals are attributed 
a status based on the expediency for the argument such an identification provides, 
rather than on solid criteria.  
Smadja admits that almost forty per cent of the dependents in the correspondence 
are unavoidably incerti when it comes to their social status, and she shows justified 
caution in attributing a definite status to individuals such as Phamea, Tigellius, Alexis 
 
                                                     
68 Smadja’s subsequent list of freedmen in the letters of recommendation (p. 96) also contains all 
these slips. For example: not all recommended freedmen are included (e.g. Evander, Hilarus, 
Antigonus, …) nor are unnamed recommended freedmen (e.g. the libertus Strabonis from Fam. 13.14). 
69 She claims that “il paraît contestable de l’identifier [“Cicero’s Tyrannio”] au célèbre grammairien 
d’Amisos, affranchi de Murena”, Smadja (1976), 105 note 60. 
70 Smadja (1976), 98. The references to this Salvius moreover include Att. 9.7.1 which is more likely a 
reference to a homonymous servant of Atticus (cf. Att. 13.44.3, 16.2.6). 
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and Metrodorus, who may well have been freeborn provincials71. The same forbearance 
is abandoned in other instances, where the development of the argument forces the 
classification of certain individuals – whose status is au fond incertain – as either slaves 
or freedmen. Smadja, for example, divides Cicero’s personnel in groups based on the 
degrees of responsibility implied in their tasks (ranging from mere couriers, over librarii, 
to more trusted assistants)72. She then makes the questionable leap of attributing to 
each of these groups a certain status. Surely, Cicero and his correspondents preferred 
freedmen over slaves in positions of trust. And surely, they used slaves whenever a 
more menial job needed to be done which would otherwise take up the much more 
precious time (and services) of a freedman. But even though it is admitted that more 
delicate letters were entrusted to freedmen, the rather structuralistic opposition 
between servile courier and freed confidant is an artificial one, and stems, we believe, in 
part from the already mentioned positivistic nature of the contribution as a whole.  
The uneasiness of these rigid categories is exemplified by the discussion of Aegypta. 
Smadja considers him – probably correctly – as a slave in a letter from 53 BCE73. At that 
time, he served as a messenger between Cicero and Tiro and as such fits into Smadja’s 
lower category of dependence. She then states that four years later, the same Aegypta is 
mentioned (mentionné) as a freedman, and that he was entrusted political and delicate 
letters. When we look at this letter of 49 BCE74, however, Aegypta does indeed occur in a 
position of trust, but aside from this, we have no reason to postulate freed status at this 
point in time. In fact, the case could very well be made that Aegypta received his 
freedom only in (or shortly before) 45 BCE. It is only then (in the only other two letters 
that mention him) that he is explicitly called libertus. We can only guess why Cicero 
includes this status indicator now and not in the letter four years earlier (all of them 
addressed to Atticus), but a reasonable assumption is that Aegypta simply did not yet 
qualify for it in 49 BCE. Smadja’s claim that he was a freedman already in 49 BCE is thus a 
result of the fact that he needs to be to make her argument work (i.e. that only freedmen 
could carry confidential letters). Moreover, in one of the letters from 45 BCE75, Aegypta 
merely transfers rather banal familial news, a job which Smadja would consider the 
domain of slaves rather than freedmen. Smadja thus not only categorises individuals as 
slaves and freedmen based on her own artificial division rather than on actual internal 
 
                                                     
71 Smadja (1976), 87-88. Drumann & Groebe (1929), 356 considers Metrodorus a certain freedman, for 
example. Especially Phamea and Tigellius have been the subject of scholarly disagreement. Smadja 
mentions the debate between Treggiari (1969a), Appendix 6 and Syme (1961), 26 on the one hand 
and the more cautious stance of Shackleton Bailey (1968), IV, n. 176 on the other. 
72 Smadja (1976), 91-95. 
73 Fam. 16.15.1-2. 
74 Att. 8.15.1. 
75 Att. 12.37.1. 
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evidence, but she also misleadingly presents the source material: Aegypta is not at all 
mentionné as a freedman in the letter from 49 BCE.  
Finally, we know nothing for sure about the status of Nicanor, except that he was 
either a slave or a freedman of Atticus, lent out to Cicero who used him as a secretary76. 
In 51 BCE, Cicero planned to send him to Rome with an official dispatch because it would 
ensure a reliable delivery77. Following her own criteria of classification, therefore, 
Smadja should have considered Nicanor a freedman rather than a slave. She nonetheless 
identifies him, for reasons not made explicit, as a certain slave78. Sholars have disagreed 
in no small degree as to the status of this individual. Tyrrell and Purser, like Smadja, 
considered him a certain slave79. Shackleton Bailey listed him as a “slave/freedman” in 
his Onomasticon to Cicero’s Letters, but four years later considered him only “probably a 
slave” in the notes to his Loeb translation80. Perez (cf. infra) counted him among the 
many incerti, sticking to her very rigid methodology of keeping assumptions and 
speculation to a bare minimum81. Mouritsen, in his synthesis of The Freedman in the 
Roman World, however, did not hesitate to identify Nicanor as a freedman82. Whatever 
his status may have been at the time – and there is no way of knowing for sure – the 
point here is that Smadja’s criteria for classification are not applied very strictly 
throughout the discussion. The resulting list of “slaves and freedmen” is, for all these 
reasons, of limited use for the study of (all of the) freedmen in Cicero’s correspondence. 
3.1.2.2.5 Christine Pérez (1984-1988) 
A considerable improvement by the French scholar Christine Pérez was published only 
eight years later in the Index Thématique des Références à l’Esclavage et à la Dépendance83. 
This impressive collection of fiches containing all the dependents in Cicero’s letters was 
established in a similar positivistic spirit as mentioned above. What concerns us here is 
not so much the many (different kinds of) graphs and statistics or the seemingly endless 
 
                                                     
76 Att. 5.3.3. 
77 Att. 5.20.9. 
78 Smadja (1976), 94. 
79 Tyrell & Purser (1901), s.v. 
80 Shackleton Bailey (1995), 72. Shackleton Bailey (1999), II, 33 note 2. 
81 Perez (1984), 145. 
82 Mouritsen (2011), 49, 340. McCutcheon (2013), 199-203 provides an interesting discussion of 
Nicanor’s role as deliverer of the official dispatches. By using this individual, he argues, Cicero 
endows his dispatches with some of Atticus’ symbolic capital. He rightly remains cautious about 
Nicanor’s legal status (“one of Atticus’ slaves or freedmen”).  
83 It was published in two parts, the first treating only the letters to Atticus (1984) and the second all 
the remaining letters (1988). 
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subdivisions within the relations of dependence, but rather the evaluation of the list 
itself and its usefulness for our current purpose.  
Each fiche contains the status of the individual under consideration (“slave”, “freed”, 
“other dependent” or “uncertain”), the actual passage with the reference to the 
individual underlined, a list of numbers referring to virtual lists on which the individual 
would occur (e.g. 315e being the list of individuals connected to the production and 
circulation of goods related to artisanal, financial, and commercial activity), and 
sometimes a note to relevant literature. The fiches are arranged following the classical 
numbering of the letters (e.g. Att. 1.1.1 to 16.16.1) and do not group individuals per 
status. Interesting and erudite as the list may be, this ordering strongly impairs its 
capacity to serve as a useful tool for our purpose.  
Moreover, the list in itself is not flawless. Under the heading of Att. 1.12.1, an 
unnamed freedman is included. The passage, however, most likely does not refer to an 
actual freedman, but to a proverbial expression (libertum mitto), representing the 
decision to undertake a task. Cicero here presents it in more detail as an excuse (σκῆψις 
and ἀναβολή) for postponing the settlement of a debt84. It is highly doubtful that a 
particular freedman was meant in this instance and the inclusion of this passage in the 
list of “dependents” may therefore be misleading. The opposite also occurs. In Att. 
6.1.21, libertum mittere occurs again, but in this instance it is not used in any figurative or 
proverbial manner. Indeed, Cicero writes that Caelius had sent him a freedman with an 
elaborate letter. This passage not only shows that we are dealing with a “real” 
freedman, but also enables us to identify him as the same individual mentioned in Fam. 
8.8.10: Caelius’ own freedman Philo. However, the reference is not included in Pérez’s 
list. 
Besides other similar imprecisions, another important inaccuracy is the status 
determination of Cicero’s scriba M. Tullius. His status is nowhere specified in the 
correspondence (or elsewhere) but his name and function have unanimously led 
scholars (including all the authors of the lists mentioned earlier) to identify him as one 
of Cicero’s freed staff members. Shackleton Bailey has convincingly disproved this 
identification by raising the strong argument that Cicero could not have described 
Tullius as his servus (as is generally taken from Fam. 5.20.1). His suggestion that M. 
Tullius was in fact a freeborn scriba quaestorius assigned to Cicero during his 
proconsulate is now generally agreed upon85. Whereas the inclusion of M. Tullius 
amongst Cicero’s freedmen could be pardoned for scholars writing in the pre-
Shackleton Bailey era, it now serves as another warning to anyone who tries to establish 
 
                                                     
84 For this expression, see Mouritsen (2011), 48 (note 72), 214. 
85 Shackleton Bailey (1965-1970), III, 194-195; VII, 96; (1977), I, 466–7; (1976), 70. 
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an individual’s status based on superficial or speculative evidence. Nonetheless, some 
scholars (like Pérez) stick to the “old view”, thereby showing an astounding disregard 
for Shackleton Bailey’s solid arguments. This is even more surprising when we note that 
Pérez has studied these very arguments (they are listed extensively in a footnote) but 
chose to “maintenir le statut d’affranchi”, a decision apparently based on the then 
already outdated views of Tyrrell & Purser or Treggiari, and without any supporting 
arguments of her own86. In addition to the difficult-to-handle ordering and structure of 
the list, then, these imperfections (although considerably fewer in number when 
compared to those in earlier attempts) not only encumber the accessibility of the list 
but also tarnish the overall quality of the entries and identifications.  
3.1.2.2.6 Shackleton Bailey (1995) 
To conclude this overview of attempts to establish a list of freedmen in Cicero’s 
correspondence, we may briefly refer to Shackleton Bailey’s Onomasticon to Cicero’s 
Letters87. The unparalleled expertise of the author makes it the most useful resource for 
our purpose, especially when combined with his other publications (mentioned in note 
85 above). Paradoxically, this reference work did not have the intention to single out 
freedmen in particular. In a sense, then, it suffers from the same limitation (from our 
perspective) as Pérez’s work, namely that it does not group freedmen under a single 
heading, although this is in part compensated for by the alphabetical order in which the 
names occur. Nonetheless, there are once again certain limitations to the work88. 
First of all, it does not include references to unnamed individuals. This is of course a 
limitation related to the onomastic genre rather than due to a crack in Shackleton 
Bailey’s erudition, but a limitation none the less. References to freedmen as a group (i.e. 
a specific or general plurals such as liberti or libertini) are likewise – and for the same 
reason – omitted. This is not new: all the previous lists (besides Pérez’s) ignored these 
passages, focussing only on individual (and mostly nominatim mentioned) freedmen. 
More problematic is the fact that the onomasticon does not always take a stance in 
existing debates. The only information it provides for Alexio, for example, is that he was 
a doctor89. Both Park and Drumann & Groebe considered him a certain freedman 
because he made a will90. Treggiari pointed out that he may as well have been a freeborn 
 
                                                     
86 Pérez (1984), 22 (incl. note 10). For the collections Ad Familiares, Ad Quintum Fratrem, and Ad Brutum, 
see Pérez (1988). 
87 Shackleton Bailey (1995). 
88 We once again glimpse over the superficial imperfections due to a lapse of concentration or a 
mere writing mistake (e.g. Araus occurs not in Att. 5.19.1 but in 5.9.1). 
89 Shackleton Bailey (1995), 13. 
90 Park (1918), 68, 76; Drumann & Groebe (1929), 353. 
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immigrant but does not dismiss the possibility of freed status91. Shackleton Bailey, at 
least in his onomasticon, avoids the debate entirely. The two individuals whom Cicero 
praises for arranging his library (Dionysius and Menophilus) in a letter to Atticus92 are 
listed as “clerks of Atticus” without any specification as to their status. In another letter, 
Cicero tells Atticus to thank his people (tui) for painting his library93. The onomasticon 
considers this passage as referring to the same two “clerks”, thus listing two references 
for them in total. However, in Att. 4.4a.1, Cicero asks Atticus to send two of his library 
assistants (librarioli) to assist Tyrannio. If we take these letters to be closely related in 
time – and the uncanny similarity of subject matter strongly suggests this94 – Dionysius 
and Menophilus in Att. 4.8.2 (and 4.5.3) are without any doubt to be identified with the 
two unnamed librarioli Cicero askes for in Att. 4.4a.1. The onomasticon, in this instance, 
proves incomplete as to the references per individual.  
Moreover, the status determination of individuals is not flawless. Lepidus’ Apella is 
presented as a certain freedman although there is no evidence for this in the only 
passage in which he is mentioned95. In his Loeb edition, Shackleton Bailey is more 
cautious: he states that this Apella is “presumably” a freedman of Lepidus96. Surely, his 
acting as hostage to guarantee Lepidus’ good faith and collaboration (fides et societas) 
reveals his value and worth to both Lepidus and Cicero. Indeed, most discussions of this 
passage overlook the fact that Cicero himself desired (and most likely asked for) this 
transfer (Lepidus tamen quod ego desiderabam fecit). Although the confidential context may 
be taken as an argument for freed status, we cannot attain complete certainty. The same 
goes for Rupa, who is likewise listed as a certain freedman of Curio in the onomasticon. 
Nothing, however, points in this direction and the ungrounded easiness with which this 
identification was made is again rightly corrected in Shackleton Bailey’s Loeb edition of 
the passage97.  
 
                                                     
91 Treggiari (1969a), 254. 
92 Att. 4.8.2. 
93 Att. 4.5.3. 
94 Att. 4.4a addresses Atticus’ visit to Antium, some compliments for Tyrannio, the request for two 
librarioli, and contains references to the Greek for booklabesl (sittybae) and Atticus’ new gladiators. 
All these themes are repeated in Att. 4.8, suggesting that these two letters were not separated by a 
great lapse of time, let alone by more than two decennia as Shackleton Bailey suggests. In his Loeb 
translation of 1999, he gave as dates for letters 4a, 5 and 8 respectively: June 56, soon after 79 and 
soon after 78 BCE. The latter two dates are unjustifiable and should be readjusted to about the same 
period as 4a (i.e. Cicero’s stay in Antium in June or July 56 BCE). Cf. Taylor (1949), 217-8, 221. 
95 Fam. 10.17.3. Cf. supra. 
96 Mouritsen (2011), 40 takes a similar, careful stance. 
97 Shackleton Bailey (2001), I, 233 note 1 identifies Rupa as “an agent (not necessarily freedman) of 
Curio’s”. 
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Certain freedmen, moreover, are not always specified as such. The only description of 
Antipho in the onomasticon is his profession as an actor. Att. 4.15.6, however, clearly 
states that he had been given his freedom (manu missus). Murena’s controversial 
freedman Tyrannio is only described by his original name Theophrastus of Amisus (i.e. 
his name before he was enslaved by the Roman general Lucullus in the war with 
Pontus). Shackleton Bailey naturally knew the story behind these individuals, but the 
omission of a reference to their freed status makes the onomasticon a difficult to wield 
instrument for anyone who tries to obtain an exhaustive overview of the (certain) 
freedmen mentioned in Cicero’s correspondence.  
A final obscurity in the onomasticon, is the inconsistent application of the category 
“slave/freedman”. Chrysippus, for example, is given as “slave/freedman of Cicero’s”. 
The only explicit status indicators occur in two letters to Atticus from 50 BCE98. At this 
moment, he was clearly a freedman (Cicero tries to annul his manumission). Since 
Chrysippus was freed during Cicero’s proconsulship of Cilicia (51-50 BCE), the two 
letters that mention him four years earlier were written while he was still a slave. In 
these two letters to his brother Quintus, Cicero had mentioned Chrysippus in close 
relation to the freedman Tyrannio and the work he had done arranging the libraries of 
the Cicerones99. Shackleton Bailey thus clearly uses the “slave/freedman” category to 
denote that an individual is mentioned first as a slave and later as a freedman. However, 
since the onomasticon lists all references to an individual in a fixed order (e.g. first all the 
letters to Atticus, then to the other familiares, then to Quintus, …) rather than 
chronologically, it is not specified in which of these passages the individual occurs as a 
freedman rather than as a slave. Moreover, should we not also, by the same logic, list 
Aegypta as a “slave/freedman” instead of a “freedman” (cf. supra)? Contrarily, the 
architect Corumbus (Att. 14.31) and the messenger Menocritus (Fam. 1.9.23) are (like 
many other entries) listed as “slave/freedman” (of Balbus and Spinther respectively). In 
these instances, Shackleton Bailey undubiously meant that they were either slaves or 
freedmen (not that they occur as slaves in one instance and as freedmen in a later one). 
The exact meaning of the category “slave/freedman” therefore remains ambiguous100.  
Although the onomasticon is a vital and unsurpassed tool for any scholar engaged with 
Cicero’s correspondence (and the identification of the individuals mentioned within it), 
both the shortcomings (from our perspective) of the onomastic genre, as well as the 
 
                                                     
98 Att. 7.2.8; 7.5.3. 
99 Quint. Fratr. 3.4.5; 3.5.6. 
100 Moreover, on a different yet related note: Corumbus and Menocritus may actually not have been 
either slaves or freed. Since no clues as to their social status are provided, they may as well have 
been freeborn foreigners. 
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regular inconsistencies in mentioning (certain) freed status throughout the corpus 
make it unfit to serve our current purpose.  
3.1.2.3 Synthesis of the conclusions: an updated list 
Instead of summing up every individual for whom freed status has been claimed in the 
past (this is done in Appendix 1), the discussion above has focussed primarily on the 
causes for so great a discrepancy between the many lists of freedmen produced by 
previous scholarship. We identified the recurrent lack of analytical distinction between 
slaves and freedmen, an exclusive focus on Cicero’s household, the occasional inclusion 
of freedmen not mentioned in the correspondence, the neglect of freedmen who are not 
mentioned by name, and – not less regularly – the application of unspecified criteria or 
ungrounded assumptions. These shortcomings have resulted in considerable 
divergences between existing lists, as is clear when we take a look, for example, at an 
individual like Corumbus, who is identified as a certain slave by Treggiari, a certain 
freedman by Drumann & Groebe, and as either a slave or a freedman by Park and 
Shackleton Bailey101. 
Appendix 1 presents an overview of all the individuals in Cicero’s letters who have 
been considered freedmen in the past (by at least one modern author), as well as the 
opinion (if any) of the other list makers mentioned in the limited discussion above. It is 
important to note that this overview is not limited to the freedmen mentioned in these 
actual lists. It would be a very short list indeed if we included for Treggiari only Cicero’s 
own freedmen. Instead, we have included all the individuals mentioned throughout the 
works of which the various lists were a part. Caesar’s freedman Diochares, for example, 
is obviously not given in Treggiari’s list, but he is explicitly identified as a freedman 
within the monograph102.  
The Table in Appendix 1 elucidates multiple features of each separate list on the one 
hand, and of the methods and pitfalls of “list-making” on the other. First of all, it shows 
how some individuals were included or omitted by certain authors. The omission of a 
certain freedman by a particular author should not necessarily be taken as a sign of 
ignorance. Indeed, Treggiari never claims to incorporate in her study all of the 
freedmen mentioned in Cicero’s correspondence. The inattention to, for example, 
Dardanus is therefore understandable (albeit somewhat ill-advised considering this 
freedman’s undeniable confidential position within the social network of his patron 
 
                                                     
101 Treggiari (1969a), 134; Drumann & Groebe (1929), 338; Park (1918), 76; Shackleton Bailey (1995), 
42. 
102 Treggiari (1969a), 145. 
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Furnius)103. Whereas an omission can be pardoned under such circumstances, an 
ungrounded addition to the list of freedmen is an issue of graver consequence. Indeed, 
secondly and most importantly, the Table gives an impression of the sometimes baffling 
disagreement among scholars when it comes to identifying the status of an individual. It 
not only serves as a weighty warning to be heeded by scholars today, but it also 
accentuates the expediency and necessity of an updated, coherent list which takes into 
account all the caveats that have been touched upon in the paragraphs above.  
This seems a good opportunity to stress in more detail the purpose of our own list. It is 
not to establish an exhaustive list of all (potential) freedmen in Cicero’s social, political 
and economic networks. Instead, since we want to focus in the next two chapters on 
Cicero’s letters as a very specific locus and revelatory context for freedman socialisation, 
we limit ourselves to the freedmen occurring in this specific corpus. Ronald Syme 
already knew in 1963 that “no work that deals with a plethora of names and facts can be 
immune from error or omission. (…) It is the common lot”. To some extent, then, this 
serves as a pardon for the slip-ups of scholars mentioned above. It also means, however, 
that there is still room (and, indeed, need) for an improved list integrating the most 
recent scholarship on the matter. This is the ambition of our list. The context of Syme’s 
statement was his supplementary article to Taylor’s (then recently published) work on 
The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic104. Syme stresses the constant tension within 
this work (and similar ones) between rigour and laxity in determining an individual’s 
social status. He himself, he admits, prefers the latter method because “stringent 
method allows only the items that stand certified [and] produces a shortlist, select but 
unexciting”. A lenient and conjectural approach, on the contrary, is “if lax, (…) generous 
and beneficial”105. For our list, we decided to keep the speculation to a bare minimum. It 
should be clear that this procedure necessarily results in a minimalistic, though 
certainly no “unexciting” list. Indeed, it is meaningful in its own right that even under 
these restrictive circumstances one can still identify 61 individual freedmen throughout 
the correspondence (spread out over 248 different passages). A more inclusive attitude 
towards incerti and the application of more lenient criteria (such as Greek names or the 
(even less reliable) confidential positions and occupations of an individual) could 
increase this number to about 77 to 96 freedmen106.  
 
                                                     
103 He was present during a council of his patron’s friends, i.e. M. and Q. Cicero, Caecina, and 
Calvisius (Fam. 10.25.3). 
104 Taylor (1960). 
105 Syme (1964), 109. 
106 These numbers are the result of adding (respectively) the individuals who were certainly either 
slave or freed (16 instances) and those whose identification as slave or freed is in itself doubtful 
although not impossible (another extra 19 instances). 
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Take Athamas, for example. In 46 BCE, Cicero writes a letter to console Atticus on the 
occasion of the passing of one of his household members107. Although he is very sorry 
for Atticus’ loss and understands his pain, Cicero begs him to keep his mourning within 
reasonable bounds. Atticus’ sorrows remind us of similar cases where a master or patron 
mourns the death of his servant. Cicero himself, for example, admitted that the death of 
one of his favourite readers affected him more than the death of a slave should, and 
other letters too betray considerable emotional turmoil every time one of his servants 
fell ill108. These parallels, combined with Athamas’ Greek name indicate servile descent. 
Whether he was a slave or a freedman is, however, impossible to ascertain. Immediately 
after this passage, Cicero refers to a certain Alexis’ ill health and proposes to transfer 
him to a healthier climate. Alexis is clearly another member of Atticus’ staff, but his 
status is again uncertain. Contrary to Athamas, who is mentioned only once in the 
correspondence, Alexis is referred to five times and always in letters to Atticus109. Cicero 
clearly had a special affection for this secretary of Atticus’: he was always delighted 
when Alexis added his wishes at the end of a letter and encouraged him to do this even 
more so in the future. Even his handwriting was praised abundantly because of the 
resemblance it bore to that of his master (or patron). In 50 BCE, Cicero characterises him 
as a humanissimus puer110 and as mentioned, some four years later he vigorously looks 
out for the servant’s health and offers him the safety of his house. Noteworthy is the 
connection that is made (three times) between Alexis and Cicero’s favourite freedman 
Tiro. In 51 BCE, Cicero calls Tiro “his Alexis” (meus Alexis)111. One year later, he abruptly 
changes the subject from Alexis to Tiro with the words cuius quoniam mentio facta est, 
again clearly stressing the connection between them112. Finally, in 46 BCE, Alexis is 
described as Tiro’s counterpart (imago Tironis)113. In all these instances, Tiro had been a 
freedman for some years already. One could therefore argue that this strong link 
between Tiro and Alexis is an indication for the latter’s freed status. However, nowhere 
do we find explicit confirmation of this assumption. Moreover, it would be 
presumptuous to assume that Cicero solely or even primarily had these individuals’ 
 
                                                     
107 Cic. Att. 12.10. 
108 Cic. Att. 1.12.4: “Nam puer festivus, anagnostes noster Sositheus, decesserat meque plus quam 
servi mors debere videbatur commoverat”. Cicero’s many worrying letters about Tiro’s illness are 
(not coincidentally) echoed in Pliny’s correspondence, e.g. in the cases of his freedman Zosimus and 
his slave or freedman Encolpius (Plin. Ep. 5.19; 8.1). As a good pater familias, Pliny too is worried 
every time members of his household are afflicted by such fate (see in more general terms also Plin. 
Ep. 8.16; 8.19.1). 
109 Beside the already mentioned Att. 12.10, these are Att. 5.20.9; 7.2.3; 7.7.7 and 16.15.1. 
110 Cic. Att. 7.7.7. 
111 Cic. Att. 5.20.9. 
112 Cic. Att. 7.2.3. 
113 Cic. Att. 12.10. 
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legal status in mind when putting them on a par with one another. Considering the 
context of the passages, it is at least as likely – if not more so – that the connection 
between them was situated on another level entirely, e.g. that of a personal affection 
and appreciation between master (or patron) and domestic staff member114. Neither 
Athamus nor even Alexis, then, meet our strict criteria for identification as certain 
freedmen.  
The real number of freedmen in the Correspondence therefore lies somewhere 
between the most conservative 61 and the most generous 96. We have to bear in mind 
that (unless we adopt the latter number) a portion of freedmen necessarily eludes us. 
This is no insurmountable problem since the fraction of Cicero’s letters that has 
survived, as well as the bias towards close and confidential freedmen already precluded 
any statistical relevance of whatever number one would prefer. For our purpose, and for 
any analysis that aims at deconstructing the discourse of particular passages on several 
levels, the assurance that we are dealing only with certain freedmen is, we believe, well 
worth potentially sacrificing a number of “probable freedmen”.  
3.1.3 The data: a quantitative impression 
Before embarking on the qualitative analysis of the database, we would like to draw 
attention to some of its more “quantitative” features. This will allow the reader to get a 
clearer view on the sheer quantity of the source material, on its spread over the 
different letter corpora, and on its general content. At the same time, this section will 
allow us to formulate some provisional hypotheses and key observations that will be 
incorporated and qualified in the discussions throughout the next chapters. The three 
subsections below will adopt a strictly quantitative, an evaluative, and a comparative 
perspective respectively. The inclusion of the latter two under the heading 
“quantitative impression” is justified by the fact that both the evaluations and the 
comparisons are based on absolute numbers and relative proportions, and therein 
markedly differ from the more “qualitatively” inspired analyses of the next chapters.   
 
                                                     
114 In this regard, Fam. 7.5.1 is illuminating. In a letter addressed to Caesar, Cicero calls him his own 
alter ego, just like Alexis was Tiro’s (vide quam mihi persuaserim te me esse alterum …). In this instance, 
it is very clear that the comparison referred not to their legal status, but to their shared concern for 
Cicero’s interests and those of his friends and associates (… non modo in iis rebus quae ad me ipsum sed 
etiam in iis quae ad meos pertinent). 
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3.1.3.1 A quantitative approach 
In the following paragraphs we apply a very rudimentary taxonomy to the references to 
freedmen in Cicero’s correspondence. The most basic analytic division is between 
passages that mention an individual freedman (with or without proper name) and 
passages that mention freedmen as part of a group. The latter category is further 
subdivided in what we would call mentions of a “specific plural” (SP) on the one hand, 
and mentions of a “general plural” (GP) on the other. A SP represents a limited and 
clearly defined group of freedmen (i.e. a collection of individual freedmen who are still 
identifiable as belonging to a specific patron). A GP represents freedmen in general (i.e. 
as a separate “class”). Every mention of one or more freedmen can be classified within 
this threefold taxonomy. As we will see, there are remarkable differences between these 
groups in the correspondence, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
In Cicero’s correspondence115, 61 different individual freedmen are mentioned in 248 
passages116. This gives us an indication of how many times any random freedman is 
mentioned and/or described on average within the corpus (4,1 times). Of course, this 
figure is severely skewed by the presence of some freedmen who are mentioned 
extremely often. When Tiro is taken out of the equation, for example, we count only 3,1 
mentions per average freedman. If we exclude the four individuals who are mentioned 
more than ten times (i.e. Tiro, Statius, Terentia’s Philotimus and Dionysius), this average 
even drops to 1,7. These lower figures would be more in line with other literary corpora. 
Take, for example, Suetonius’ De vita Caesarum. With a total of 64 individual freedmen 
spread out over 84 passages, we would reach a number of 1,3 mentions per average 
freedman. This number is only slightly trumped by Tacitus’ Histories: 1,5 (19 freedmen in 
29 passages). Tacitus’ Annals, on the other hand, show a much higher average: 2,6 (32 
freedmen in 82 passages), although the number is also reduced to 1,9 if we again exclude 
the freedmen who occur more than ten times (i.e. Pallas and Narcissus).  
Although the exclusion of freedmen who occur more than ten times gives rather 
similar numbers of passages per average freedman (between 1.3 and 1.9) for these 4 
literary corpora, it could be reasonably argued that the remarkable presence of such 
freedmen in Cicero’s letters (and the corresponding high number of 4,1 mentions per 
average freedman) is precisely what makes the correspondence so different (and 
 
                                                     
115 Since no freedmen are mentioned in the Epistulae ad Brutum, “Cicero’s correspondence” refers to 
the other three corpora (ad Atticum, ad Familiares and ad Quintum Fratrem) throughout this discussion. 
116 This latter number excludes Fam. 16.13 (Tiro as a slave), Att. 1.12.1 (libertus as part of an 
expression rather than as a real freedman), and Att. 15.22 (a derivative of Cytheris, Cytherius, used to 
mockingly refer to Mark Antony). It includes, however, the passages (Fam. 16.10.1; 16.14; 16.15) 
where Tiro is technically still a slave but in which his manumission is explicitly discussed (arguably 
considering him already a freedman de facto). 
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valuable) as a source for the study of freedmen, or that these freedmen are at least an 
indication for this distinctiveness. This is a first observation to be kept in mind 
throughout the discussion. 
Besides individual freedmen, groups of freedmen also figure throughout the 
correspondence. However, it is striking that in Cicero’s letters very few SP or GP occur: 
only 5 and 3 respectively. By comparison, Suetonius contains 18 SP and 9 GP, Tacitus’ 
Histories 12 SP and 3 GP, and Tacitus’ Annals 22 SP and 6 GP. Fronto’s correspondence 
contains only 2 GP (and no SP), but Pliny’s 8 to 17 SP (and 1 or 2 GP)117. Pliny’s 
correspondence is an exception to the general impression that letters contain less of 
these instances than, for example, the works of the historians (or “detached” sources in 
general, cf. Chapter 6). As we will argue below, this exceptional character is very likely 
due to a difference in intended readership between Cicero’s and Fronto’s 
correspondences (largely intended for private use) on the one hand, and Pliny’s 
correspondence (carefully edited for publication) on the other. 
It should be clear from these numbers that when freedmen are mentioned as a group, 
they are only rarely referred to as a “class” (GP) but much more often as a specific group 
of identifiable persons (SP). Even the latter numbers, however, pale into relative 
insignificance when compared to the mentions of individual freedmen. The ratio 
between attention for individuals on the one hand versus attention for groups and “the 
class” of freedmen on the other, reveals a profound difference between Cicero’s 
correspondence and the Roman historians. For Suetonius’ De vita Caesarum and Tacitus’ 
Histories and Annals, this division results in 3,1; 1,9; 2,9 respectively (i.e. for every 
mention of freedmen in/as a group, there are this many mentions of individual 
freedmen). For Cicero’s correspondence, this number amounts to an astonishing 31118. 
Cicero’s letters, at least from a quantitative perspective but – as we shall see in a 
moment – also in qualitative terms, prove to be an exceptional source for the study of 
freedmen. For the sake of clarity, Table 1 below presents all these numbers in a 
convenient overview. 
 
 
 
                                                     
117 The range of possibilities is due to the description of many groups of dependents as mei. These 
could be slaves, freedmen, or a mixture of both. For this difficulty, see also below (3.2.1.2). 
118 We could again take Tiro out of the equation (obtaining 23,2). But even when we exclude all the 
freedmen who were mentioned more than 10 times, the number (12,5) is still considerably higher 
than in the historical works. This very high result is of course a corollary of our previous 
observation that the correspondence contains a very great number of attestations of individual 
freedmen against relatively few SP and GP.  
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Table 1 The amount and spread of freedmen in four literary corpora (Cicero’s Epistulae, 
Tacitus’ Annales and Historiae, and Suetonius’ De vita Caesarum) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (2)/(1) (2)/[(3)+(4)] 
Cicero's Epistulae 61 248 5 3 4,1 31 
Tacitus’ Annals 32 82 22 6 2,6 2,9 
Tacitus’ Histories 19 29 12 3 1,5 1,9 
Suetonius’ De vita 
Caesarum 
64 84 18 9 1,3 3,1 
 
Column (1):   # Different freedmen 
Column (2):   # Freedman mentions 
Column (3):   # Specific plural 
Column (4):   # General plural 
Column (2)/(1):   Indication of how many times an average freedman is 
mentioned in the corpus 
Column (2)/[(3)+(4)]:  Indication of the ratio between attention for individuals on 
the one hand versus attention for groups and “the class” of 
freedmen on the other. 
 
Let us now turn to Cicero’s letters in more detail and ask the question whether there is 
any noteworthy difference between the different letter corpora (ad Atticum, ad 
Familiares, and ad Quintum Fratrem). Numbers in the following paragraphs will be 
followed by a number in brackets representing the same variable after excluding the 
four freedmen who are mentioned more than 10 times throughout the correspondence 
(Tiro, Statius, Terentia’s Philotimus and Dionysius). As mentioned before, it should be 
clear that excluding these freedmen is to disregard the very uniqueness of the letters as 
a source for freedman studies. These numbers between brackets therefore serve 
primarily to compare or contrast the letters with the historical works, which will be 
done later on.    
When we look to the spread of the 248 passages over the three letter collections, it 
becomes clear in a heartbeat that most of them occur in letters written to Atticus. 
Indeed, the Epistulae ad Atticum contain no less than 159 (49) references, the Epistulae ad 
Familiares 76 (42) and the Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem only 13 (9). However, for the 
letters ad Atticum and ad Familiares, the numbers between brackets are remarkably close 
to one another, suggesting that the fundamental difference between the corpora in 
terms of freedman mentions derives primarily from the overwhelming presence of 
Philotimus, Tiro, Dionysius and Statius in the collection ad Atticum. Indeed, they are 
mentioned in 40, 33, 28 and 9 different passages respectively; much higher figures than 
the corresponding 5, 28, 0 and 1 for the ad Familiares. The lower number of attestations 
in the letters to and from Quintus is of course in no insignificant way due to its much 
more limited size when compared to the Epistulae ad Atticum and the Epistulae ad 
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Familiares (cf. supra). Moreover, the number of attestations in the ad Quintum Fratrem 
letters is also not “inflated” by multiple reoccurrences of Tiro, Statius (both mentioned 
only in 1 letter), Philotimus (mentioned in 2 letters) and Dionysius (not mentioned at 
all).  
We noted earlier that there are 61 different individual freedmen throughout the 
correspondence. Their spread over the three letter collections is much more even than 
the spread of the 248 passages in which they are mentioned: 35 (31) in the ad Atticum, 35 
(32) in the ad Familiares and 9 (6) in the ad Quintum Fratrem. When added up, this results 
in 79 freedmen (that is, 18 “too many”), revealing that some freedmen are mentioned in 
more than one collection of letters119. Indeed, fourteen freedmen occur in more than 
one collection of letters (four of these even in all three of them), and all of them appear 
at least once in the collection ad Atticum120. This was naturally to be expected in the 
cases of Tiro, Philotimus, Statius, Salvius and other relatively well-known freedmen. 
However, the spread of freedmen like Apella, Phaetho or Trypho (who are mentioned 
but twice in the correspondence) is much less obvious. Likewise, it is noteworthy that 
M. Pomponius Dionysius, who had such a profound influence on Cicero’s emotional state 
of mind, is only mentioned in the collection ad Atticum. These observations are very 
significant. Indeed, did Cicero consciously or even purposely air his joy and successive 
dissatisfaction with Dionysius to Atticus alone? What is the implication of the fact that 
some freedmen are discussed in multiple letters addressed to a variety of 
correspondents whereas others are not? Can we here see traces of “bonding” versus 
“bridging” social capital at work? These are issues that will be taken up in the next 
chapter, but it is important to keep these and similar observations in mind. Table 2 
below summarises this second set of quantitative data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
119 These are Apella (EaF and EaA), Chrysippus (EaA and EaQ), Cytheris (EaF and EaA), Trypho (EaF 
and EaA), Phaetho (EaA and EaQ), Philo (EaF and EaA), Cicero’s Philotimus (EaF; EaQ and EaA), 
Terentia’s Philotimus (EaA and EaQ), Salvius (EaF; EaQ and EaA), Syrus (EaF and EaA), Tyrannio (EaA 
and EaQ), Vettius Chrysippus (EaF and EaA), Statius (EaF; EaQ and EaA) and Tiro (EaF; EaQ and EaA). 
120 It is only logical that much less freedmen are mentioned in both of Tacitus’ works which comprise 
two clearly demarcated historical periods. Only two freedmen occur both in the Annals and in the 
Histories (Polyclitus and Antonius Felix), a testimony to their renown at the time. 
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Table 2 The amount and spread of freedmen per Ciceronian letter collection 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ad Atticum 35 (31) 159 (49) 14 
Ad Familiares 35 (32) 76 (42) 10 
Ad Quintum Fratrem 9 (6) 13 (9) 8 
 
Column (1):  # Different freedmen 
Column (2):  # Freedman mentions  
Column (3): # Freedmen mentioned also in another letter corpus 
 
3.1.3.2 An evaluative approach 
Up till now, we have only looked at the numbers and relative spread of freedman 
references. We compared the letters in this regard to the historical works of Tacitus and 
Suetonius, but we also looked in more detail at these variables within the letter corpora 
themselves. We now turn to a slightly more qualitative analysis of these passages and 
address the way they “evaluated” both the ex-slaves themselves and the contexts in 
which they appeared. For every passage, we have added a field for such an evaluation in 
our Table (cf. Appendix 2). A freedman can be mentioned in a positive context (POS) or 
in a negative one (NEG). Of course, the social reality of which Cicero’s letters are in 
many ways a reflection is more complex than this. Although a binary, Levi-Straussian 
classification might facilitate general comprehension, it risks oversimplification and 
necessarily implies reduction. Many of the passages simply cannot be categorised 
adequately (and exclusively) as either positive or negative. The spectrum of evaluations 
(both ancient and modern) is essentially more multifaceted and requires more nuance. 
To compensate for this deficiency, we added two more categorisations: neutral (NEU) 
and nuanced (NUA). Many nuances within these categories (especially POS and NEG) 
remain unappreciated when dividing and “branding” the many different passages in 
this way. Nevertheless, we refrain from introducing more categories or criteria in order 
not to lose ourselves in a whirlpool of specification. Our goal for the time being is not to 
assess individual passages in their own right (this will be done mainly in the next 
chapters), but rather to situate them on a (limited) scale of evaluations (e.g. leaning 
more to a positive than to a negative categorisation).  
A passage is considered POS when the freedman in it is explicitly described in 
positive terms (e.g. Philotimus’ fides, honestas and sedulitas121) or when he occurs in a 
clear positive context (e.g. a letter of recommendation). In many instances these 
 
                                                     
121 Fam. 8.3.2. 
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conditions overlap. NEG is used to mark the passages that present the freedman in 
explicitly negative wordings (e.g. Chrysippus’ furta, fuga and scelus122) or those that 
mention him in a general negative context (e.g. embezzling his patron’s patrimonium123). 
In cases where a freedman is presented neither explicitly positive nor explicitly 
negative, the categorisation NEU was used. This is, for example, the case for many of the 
freedmen who are mentioned as couriers and messengers or of freedmen who are 
mentioned only en passant124. Finally, the most delicate category (NUA) is reserved for 
freedmen whose evaluation does not adequately fit into any of the other three 
categories. For Cicero’s letters, we only used this category three times, all of them 
pertaining to Atticus’ freedman Dionysius. In one letter, for example, Cicero refers on 
the one hand to earlier letters in which he sang the freedman’s praise, but expresses on 
the other his surprise that Dionysius had not told Atticus he was grateful to him 
(Cicero): a lack of consideration which would turn out to be the first sign of an enduring 
indignation and resentment between Cicero and Dionysius125. Not wanting his previous 
appraisals to seem naïve and premature, Cicero does not really condemn the freedman, 
but instead coldly concludes that he is in fact a good person even though he did not live 
up to his expectation. The same cold and distant description of Dionysius in other 
letters (indulgent gestures towards his friendship with Atticus more than actual tokens 
of respect for his freedman) results in these passages being a twilight zone in our 
evaluative spectrum. They are therefore categorised under NUA126. 
In the following paragraphs, we discuss 1) how many of the “freedman passages” 
could be termed POS, NEG, NEU and NUA respectively; 2) how many different individual 
freedmen were presented as such; 3) the spread of these categories over the three 
collections of letters; and 4) another comparison with the works of Tacitus and 
Suetonius. 
Of the 248 passages that contain references to individual freedmen, 61 are POS (20 
different freedmen), 43 are NEG (14 different freedmen), 141 are NEU (44 different 
freedmen) and 3 are NUA (1 freedman). These mentions are quite unevenly spread out 
over the three collections (see Table 3). Of the 61 POS passages, 20 (3) occur in the ad 
 
                                                     
122 Att. 7.2.8. 
123 Fam. 12.26.2. 
124 E.g. Att. 3.8.3 (Trypho); 6.1.21 (Philo); Fam. 2.7.3 (Thraso); Quint. Fratr. 3.4.5 (Chrysippus); … 
125 Att. 7.7.1. See also Chapter 7. 
126 The other two instances of this nuanced evaluation of Dionysius occur in Att. 7.8.1 (Cicero cannot 
blatantly ignore Atticus’ attempts to reconcile him with Dionysius and therefore gruntingly accepts 
Atticus’ positive evaluation of the freedman) and in 7.26.3 (Cicero tries to avoid talking about 
Dionysius in letters to Atticus and explains this wish as a concern with not wanting to disturb the 
freedman; an excuse again inspired Atticus’ positive evaluation of Dionysius). 
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Atticum and 41 (15) in the ad Familiares127. None are found in the ad Quintum Fratrem. Of 
the 43 NEG passages, 34 (8) occur in the ad Atticum, 7 (6) in the ad Familiares and 2 (1) in 
the ad Quintum Fratrem. Of the 141 NEU passages, 102 (38) occur in the ad Atticum, 28 (21) 
in the ad Familiares and 11 (8) in the ad Quintum Fratrem. Finally, as mentioned before, the 
NUA passages all relate to Dionysius and are therefore to be found solely in the letters 
ad Atticum. 
 
Table 3 The evaluative assessment of freedmen passages per Ciceronian letter collection 
 POS NEG NEU NUA 
Ad Atticum 20 (3) 34 (8) 102 (38) 3 (0) 
Ad Familiares 41 (15) 7 (6) 28 (21) 0 (0) 
Ad Quintum Fratrem 0 (0) 2 (1) 11 (8) 0 (0) 
Total 61 43 141 3 
 
The results – especially the great difference between the first number and that between 
brackets – clearly reveal that it are in particular the four frequently mentioned 
freedmen who receive explicit positive or negative evaluations in both ad Atticum and ad 
Familiares. Overall, the former corpus contains more negative than positive attestations, 
whereas the situation is the exact opposite for the ad Familiares (regardless of whether 
we include the “big four”). On a general level, it may therefore be safe to say that Cicero 
reserved his doubts (and rants) about certain freedmen for the confidential context of 
his relation with Atticus (and his brother Quintus). In letters addressed to the rest of his 
correspondents, he but rarely wrote or acted hostile towards freedmen. This was due, to 
no insignificant degree, to the role freedmen played in elite networks, and to the 
freedman’s identity as an extension of his patron’s (cf. Chapter 4). The same rationale 
may explain the large amount of neutral attestations in the ad Atticum, which 
dramatically outnumber the specifically positive or negative ones (especially when 
compared to those in the ad Familiares, and again regardless of whether or not we 
include the “big four”). The close relation with Atticus did not require or compel Cicero 
to praise freedmen as a gesture towards their patron, nor did he write any letters of 
recommendation on behalf of freedmen to his intimate friend (cf. Chapter 5). 
The same method of evaluative quantification can be applied to the 61 different 
individual freedmen mentioned. The results are given in Table 4 below. 
 
 
                                                     
127 The number between brackets is, again, the representation of a hypothetical situation in which 
Tiro, Dionysius, Philotimus and Statius are not included. 
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Table 4 The evaluative assessment of individual freedmen per Ciceronian letter 
collection 
 POS NEG NEU NUA Total 
Ad Atticum 4 (2) 10 (7) 29 (25) 1 (0) 44 (34) 
Ad Familiares 17 (14) 5 (4) 19 (17) 0 (0) 41 (35) 
Ad Quintum Fratrem 0 (0) 2 (1) 8 (6) 0 (0) 10 (7) 
Total 20128 14129 44130 1 79 
 
As becomes clear immediately, the totals per collection of letters (the last column) do 
not match – and always exceed – the totals presented in Table 2 (first column), 
indicating that there is a considerable amount of freedmen in each corpus that is 
evaluated differently throughout the letters131. This is an important observation, since it 
warns us against seeing any freedman in a monolithic way as having a static persona, and 
since it nuances absolute categories such as the “good” or the “bad” freedman. It shows 
us the great flexibility and the dynamic nature of the relations freedmen in Cicero’s 
letters maintained with both their patrons and the correspondents of these patrons. Not 
only could the relation between a freedman and a letter-writer change over time, the 
same freedman could be evaluated differently at any point in time depending on the 
person evaluating. The evolution of a relation, the divergence in simultaneous 
evaluations, and the implications for our purpose are issues that are considered in the 
next chapter. 
If we want to obtain an impression of how often the letter writers elaborated on a 
positive or negative situation respectively, we could divide the data in Table 3 by those 
of Table 4. This operation gives us an indication of, for example, how many POS 
references an average POS freedman receives (these figures are shown in Table 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
128 Tiro appears POS in both EaA and EaF. 
129 Cytheris and Philotimus appear NEG in both EaA and EaF; Statius in EaA and EaQ. 
130 Apella, Philo, Syrus and Chrysippus appear NEU in both EaA and EaF; Phaetho, Philotimus (2) and 
Tyrannio in EaA and EaQ; Philotimus and Tiro in EaQ, EaA and EaF; Salvius in EaF and EaQ. 
131 For the ad Atticum collection, these individuals are Eutychides (NEU and POS); Chrysippus (NEU 
and NEG); Philotimus (NEU and NEG); Tyrannio (NEU and POS); Dionysius (NEU, POS, NEG and NUA); 
Statius (NEG and NEU) and Tiro (NEU and POS). For the ad Familiares collection, these are Evander 
(NEU and POS); Phania (NEU and POS); Philotimus (NEU, NEG and POS); Theophilus (NEU and POS); 
Tiro (NEU and POS). Finally, for the ad Quintum Fratrem collection, this is Tyrannio (NEG and NEU). 
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Table 5 The discursive elaboration of evaluative assessments of freedmen per Ciceronian 
letter collection 
 POS NEG NEU NUA Total 
Ad Atticum 5 (1,5) 3,4 (1,1) 3,5 (1,5) 3 (0) 3,6 (1,4) 
Ad Familiares 2,4 (1,1) 1,4 (1,5) 1,5 (1,2) 0 (0) 1,8 (1,2) 
Ad Quintum Fratrem 0 (0) 1 (1) 1,4 (1,3) 0 (0) 1,3 (1,3) 
 
The results of this exercise are once more very interesting. They show us 
unambiguously that in the ad Atticum collection, the writer on average elaborates more 
often on (i.e. dedicates more passages to) positive and negative freedmen than in the ad 
Familiares or the ad Quintum Fratrem. Moreover, in both the ad Atticum and the ad 
Familiares, the letter writers elaborate on “positive” freedmen more than on “negative” 
ones. In both instances, however, the differences are all but completely effaced when 
excluding the four extraordinarily often mentioned freedmen. This tells us that these 
insights may apply above all to these four freedmen in particular, rather than to any 
average freedmen. This will once more be confirmed in our qualitative analysis. 
Similar conclusions can be reached by a different method (henceforth referred to as 
“method 2”). We can plot out all the words (verbs, nouns, adverbs and adjectives) that 
are directly attributed to freedmen and that imply some kind of qualitative assessment 
of these persons132. This results in a list of 94 different entries, together occurring 234 
times in total throughout the letters. Some of these, it can be argued, are not necessarily 
“qualitative assessments”. Adulescens, for example, is not really meant to have a 
particularly positive or negative connotation, even though it appears only in the 
context of the very cordial relationship between Cicero and Tiro133. Likewise, terms like 
coniunctio, familiaris, necessitudo, officium, and opera may be naturally associated with 
freedmen and the relation of dependence with their patron (and as such be 
instrumental in presenting to the outside world the latter’s social capital) but the words 
in themselves do not add a (moral) evaluation. Freedmen who were necessarii of Cicero 
or who carried out operae tend of course to be described positively134. The point here is 
 
                                                     
132 The data underlying this analysis are included in Appendix 8. 
133 Att. 6.7.2; 7.2.3. 
134 Necessarii included both cognati and adfines (Paulus in Festus, s.v.: “necessarii sunt, ut Gallus Aelius 
ait, qui aut cognati aut adfines sunt, in quo necessaria officia conferuntur praetor ceteros” and Gell. 
Noct. Att. 13.3: “…qui ob hoc ipsum ius adfinitatis familiaritatisve coniuncti sunt, necessarii 
dicuntur”). Freedmen could act as necessarii as well, e.g. Dig. 42.4.5 where during the defence of a 
minor, liberti could take up the role of defender if no tutor, cognate, or adfinis was available or 
willing to do so (… alii forte sunt, quos verisimile est defensionem pupilli pupillae non omissuros vel propter 
necessitudinem vel propter caritatem vel qua alia ratione liberti etiam si qui sunt idonei, evocandi 
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that the wish to positively present a freedman evoked other, more explicitly positive, 
terms. Our list contains 58 of those, occurring 174 times in total. The letter writers were 
more reluctant in their use of negative characterisations, but (on average) repeated the 
same words on fewer occasions (when compared to the positive terms). Our list only 
contains 30 of such negative descriptions, occurring but 37 times in total. This might 
indicate that there existed a “specific set of virtues” or a “fairly well established format 
for the praise of freedmen”135. Indeed, the positive characterisations are used roughly 
three times each (on average), whereas the negative ones barely once. However, the 
first category is highly distorted because of the many attestations of words like fides, 
amare, diligere, and the like136. These are of course not at all specific “freedman virtues” 
but occur throughout the correspondence as descriptions of various kinds of persons 
and relations. The issue of a “freedman vocabulary” will be taken up in detail in Chapter 
7.  
Rather than being proof for the existence of “common stereotypes used to praise 
freedmen”, this spread unmistakably shows us that Cicero and his correspondents were 
generally well disposed towards freedmen. Indeed, 74% of the total amount of 
references (and 62% of the different words used) served to praise freedmen or at least to 
present them in a positive light. We have to take into account, however, that the neutral 
mentions are not accounted for by this second method. As we saw earlier, most of the 
passages mentioning freedmen did so in a value-free, neutral way. This second method 
does not render these neutral attestations adequately since it only quantifies positive 
and negative mentions, ignoring the fields where no qualitative assessments were made 
at all. Although the distribution of positive and negative assessments is illuminating, we 
should always keep in mind that they pale in comparison with the neutral passages. 
The differences between the three corpora of letters discussed above are also 
confirmed by this second method. First of all, in the ad Familiares, each passage contains 
– on average – two descriptions, whereas a characterisation occurs only every two 
passages in the ad Atticum137. The distribution of positive and negative characterisations 
is even more indicative. Of the 174 positive terms, 128 (74%) occur in the ad Familiares 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
exquirendaque defensio). In Cicero’s correspondence, the freedman Mithres is described as homo 
intimus ac pernecessarius (Fam. 13.69) and Hammonius as being connected to Cicery by summa 
necessitudo (Fam. 13.27), cf. infra. 
135 Mouritsen (2011), 61. 
136 Together, the mentions of fides, amare, diligere and their derivatives already amount to 55 of the 
179 positive references. 
137 The number for the ad Quintum Fratrem is negligible: 0,2 or one evaluative characterisation every 
five passages. 
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and only 44 (25%) in the ad Atticum138. These proportions are completely reversed when 
we look at the negative mentions: 3 out of 37 (8%) occur in the ad Familiares but 33 (89%) 
are mentioned in the ad Atticum139. This seems a clear confirmation of the conclusions 
drawn previously. Table 6 below shows the spread of the positive or negative “spirit” of 
a whole passage (“method 1”) on the one hand, and the spread of individual positive and 
negative words (“method 2”) on the other. 
 
Table 6 Two methods for quantifying evaluative assessments of freedmen in Cicero’s 
correspondence 
 
 
POS NEG 
Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 
Ad Atticum 20 44 34 33 
Ad Familiares 41 128 7 3 
 
Method 2 therefore confirms the previous observation, viz. that Cicero was much less 
inclined to speak ill of freedmen in his correspondence with familiares with whom he did 
not quite have the same intimate relationship as with Atticus. We suggested earlier that 
this can be explained primarily by the “bridging” role of these freedmen, by the social 
capital (of their patron) they represented, and by the implicit denunciation of this 
patron a manifest sneer towards one of his freedmen would amount to (explaining the 
very limited amount of pejorative references to freedmen in the ad Familiares). Praising a 
freedman, in other words, was tantamount to consolidating and enhancing relations 
with his patron as well, and was therefore particularly deemed needed in those contexts 
where a close connection and good understanding was not already implied by years of 
friendship. These points will be taken up in further detail in Chapter 4. 
3.1.3.3 A comparative approach 
So far, we have considered the amounts and spread of “freedman passages” in mere 
quantitative (3.1.3.1) and evaluative (3.1.3.2) terms. A third and final approach, briefly 
touched upon earlier already, exists in comparing the attestations (and evaluations) of 
freedmen with other literary works. Since this will be done more comprehensively in 
Chapters 6 and 7, we here limit ourselves again to the works of Tacitus and Suetonius. A 
 
                                                     
138 With only 2 positive mentions (1%), the letters ad Quintum Fratrem are again rather insignificant in 
this respect. 
139 One negative attestation (2,5%) occurs in the ad Quintum Fratrem. 
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comparison with the correspondences of Pliny and Fronto is less illuminating, as these 
contain but very few certain individual freedmen (25 and 9 respectively140). 
When compared to the 61 different freedmen (spread out over 248 passages) in 
Cicero’s letters, the number of 49 freedmen141 (in 111 passages) in Tacitus’ combined 
works is remarkably similar in relative terms (i.e. when accounting for the fact that 
Cicero’s correspondence is considerably larger than Tacitus’ combined extant works). 
Suetonius, on the other hand, mentions 64 different freedmen, but spread out over only 
84 passages. Suetonius, in short, mentions more different freedmen than both Cicero 
and Tacitus (especially when considering that his Lives are much shorter than both of 
the other corpora), but he mentions each of these freedmen less often than the other 
two writers (see column 5 in Table 1).   
The three authors differ the most, however, on the evaluation and qualitative 
assessment of freedmen. Table 7 gives the total amount of attestations per qualitative 
category, with the number of different individual freedmen they were attributed to 
between brackets. 
 
Table 7 Evaluative assessment of freedmen in the works of Tacitus and Suetonius 
 POS NEG NEU NUA 
Annales 4 (4) 55 (22) 9 (8) 14 (8) 
Historiae 2 (2) 21 (14) 1 (1) 5 (4) 
De vita Caesarum 11 (10) 35 (27) 26 (24) 12 (12) 
 
Parallel to the case of Cicero’s letters, the numbers between brackets add up to 42, 21, 
and 73 for the three works respectively and thus exceed the number of individual 
freedmen we presented earlier. This again indicates that there were freedmen who were 
throughout the same work presented in different ways (i.e. attributed a different 
qualitative assessment): 9 individuals in the Annals, 1 in the Histories, and 8 in 
Suetonius142. Similar to what we saw in Cicero’s letters, these double (or triple) 
qualifications include a “neutral” one in most cases. Freedmen who were considered 
positive in one instance and negative in another, however, are attested as well (e.g. 
 
                                                     
140 See below (section 3.2) and the prosopographical Tables in Appendices 3 and 4. 
141 32 in the Annals and 19 in the Histories. Polyclitus and Antonius Felix are mentioned in both works. 
142 For the Annals, these are Callistus (NEG, NEU and NUA); Narcissus (NEG and NUA); Pallas (NEG and 
NUA); Acte (NEG and NUA); Atimetus (NEG and NUA); Paris (NEG and NUA); Agermus (NEU and 
"NEG"); Epicharis (NEG and POS); Milichus (NEG and NEU). For the Histories: Hormus (NEG, NEU and 
NUA). For the De vita Caesarum: Antonius Musa (NEU and POS); Mnester (NEG and NEU); Narcissus 
(NEG and NEU); Acte (NUA and NEU); Phaon (NEU and POS); Epaphroditus (POS and NEG); Icelus 
(NUA, NEU and NEG); Caenis (NUA and NEU). 
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Epicharis in the Annals, Epaphroditus in the Lives, Dionysius in the ad Atticum, or 
Philotimus in the ad Familiares). 
The operation we used for Cicero’s letters to assess how often the writers elaborated 
on either one of the qualitative categories, does not yield particularly interesting results 
for either Tacitus or Suetonius since – as mentioned before – the total amount of 
mentions is relatively small when compared to the amount of different freedmen 
mentioned. The result is that most values are situated around 1 [category] mention per 
average [category] freedman, as is shown in Table 8. The “negative” column, however, 
escapes this pattern in all three cases (albeit slightly less obvious in Suetonius’ case). 
Where the previous Table showed that both Suetonius and Tacitus were rather 
negatively disposed towards freedmen in their works, these figures confirm this image 
by indicating that, on average, more space and references were committed to negatively 
perceived freedmen. This stands in stark contrast with the practice in Cicero’s letters 
(both ad Atticum and ad Familiares) where we found the exact opposite situation (see 
Table 5). 
 
Table 8 The discursive elaboration of evaluative assessments of freedmen in the works of 
Tacitus and Suetonius 
 POS NEG NEU NUA 
Annales 1 2,5 1,1 1,8 
Historiae 1 1,5 1 1,3 
De vita Caesarum 1,1 1,3 1,1 1 
 
Another fundamental difference between Cicero’s correspondence on the one hand, and 
the historical works of Tacitus and Suetonius on the other is the relative importance of 
the two groups we have barely touched upon so far: SP and GP. In the correspondence 
they figure very rarely (5 and 3 times respectively), amounting to no more than 3% of 
the total fields in our database (the rest being occupied by individual freedmen). The 
Annals and Histories, however, contain 22 and 12 SP and 6 and 3 GP respectively, together 
covering 25% and 34% of the respective databases. Similarly, roughly a quarter (24%) of 
the fields in the database of Suetonius’ Lives contains SP (18) and GP (9). Whereas the 
limited amount of SP and GP precluded any relevant quantification (or qualification) for 
Cicero’s letters, the considerable amount in the “historical” works lends itself to such an 
effort. The last Table (Table 9) presents the results. 
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Table 9 Specific and general plurals in the works of Tacitus and Suetonius 
 POS NEG NEU NUA 
 SP GP SP GP SP GP SP GP 
Annales 2 0 9 5 7 0 4 1 
Historiae 0 0 6 3 3 0 3 0 
De vita Caesarum 1 0 11 4 5 3 1 2 
 
Although neutral SP occur quite regularly, the spread between the positive and negative 
categories is telling for both SP and GP. Very notable is the general negative tone when 
both Tacitus and Suetonius mention groups of freedmen. These observations are in line 
with our findings regarding individual freedmen, and are therefore a reflection of the 
general attitude and intent of the authors rather than a specific trait of groups of 
freedmen in these works (cf. Chapter 6). Nonetheless, the complete absence of positively 
mentioned GP (and the very scarce amount of ditto SP) is striking. Without stressing the 
point too hard (the sample is very limited), we can suggest that negativity prevails in all 
three works, but that it seems to be even more deeply felt when freedmen as a group are 
treated. This may point to a fundamental difference between the evaluation of liberti on 
the one hand, and libertini on the other, a distinction that will be given its due attention 
throughout the next chapters (esp. Chapter 6). 
3.1.4 Conclusion 
Previous attempts to compile a list of freedmen mentioned in Cicero’s correspondence 
are tainted by both methodological obscurities or imprecisions, and by ungrounded 
(and often implicit) assumptions and speculation. With a few exceptions, most of these 
lists have moreover focused in particular on Cicero’s own freedmen in an effort to 
reconstruct his social networks. An exhaustive list of freedmen within the 
correspondence, i.e. as a useful and necessary tool for studying freedmen rather than 
Cicero, has not been the objective of any scholar so far. The aim of our list is to fill up 
this gap and serves as a basis for the analysis undertaken in the next two chapters.  
Before embarking on this analysis, we have found it relevant to analyse the list in its 
own right by a more or less quantitative approach. Due to the relative limited amount of 
entries, the observations obtained in this manner are admittedly tentative at times. We 
must therefore first and foremost keep in mind that the suggestions made in the 
previous paragraphs are useful only when we account for, and respect, their 
preliminary nature. No final, representative “truth” can be obtained through such 
quantitative operations on a limited sample that is, in the end, our list. The next 
chapters provide us with ample occasions to show, however, that many of the 
observations and suggestions touched upon above are indeed qualifiable trends. 
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The total number of freedmen we know of in Cicero’s correspondence is the result of 
(at least) a four-layered selection. A first choice was made by the ancient writers 
themselves, namely whom to mention and whom not to mention. Indeed, there is the 
well-known issue of the a priori unrepresentative amount, and the very one-sided 
nature of the selection of freedmen mentioned in the letters (e.g. as members of a familia 
urbana and as trusted personnel). A second sifting occurred when the letters were edited 
and “published”. The fact that we have not one letter written by a freedman – even 
though these must have existed in considerable numbers – is telling. Thirdly, the 
vicissitudes of time have eliminated even more individuals from the written record. 
Indeed, we can only guess how many more relevant passages the lost corpora of letters 
to and from Caesar, Pompey, and the like would have yielded. A final selection occurred 
as a result of our own imposed criteria, which are – as mentioned before – rather strict 
and conservative. All of the numbers mentioned so far should therefore be seen as mere 
indicators rather than statistical data reflecting ancient reality. However, the 
observations we drew from these simple calculations are based on internal evidence of 
the letters alone. Whereas these quantitative data cannot be taken as representative for 
ancient reality, they are very much so for trends and peculiarities in Cicero’s 
correspondence, provided that we bear in mind the four layers mentioned just now. 
Finally, let us briefly summarise the conclusions from the preliminary quantitative 
approach.  
(1) A first important point was that Cicero’s correspondence has a very high average of references to, or 
mentions per, individual freedman, especially when compared to the works of Tacitus and Suetonius. 
This is probably one of the most significant features that make the corpus so attractive for freedman 
studies, even though it is in large part due to the presence of a few often mentioned individuals.  
(2) On the other hand, the references to freedmen in general (as SP or GP) are very scarce, especially 
when compared to the works of the historians.  
(3) The spread of freedmen over the ad Atticum and ad Familiares (as well as the spread of positive and 
negative qualifications) is revealing for Cicero’s (and his correspondents’) willingness to show 
discontent or anger with freedmen. For reasons inherently related to the unique character of letters 
as network embedded documents (cf. Chapter 4), Cicero and his correspondents were reluctant to 
negatively describe freedmen in their letters, unless they were addressed to very intimate confidants 
(the letters ad Atticum). Nor did Cicero feel the need to explicitly glorify freedmen in such a context 
(cf. the many neutral attestations in the ad Atticum). A clear difference in Cicero’s public persona on 
the one hand, and his intimate exchanges with Atticus (and his brother) on the other thus becomes 
manifest. Since Tacitus and Suetonius were not writing about freedmen of their own social network 
– the most vital distinction between these works and Cicero’s correspondence – and since they, as a 
consequence, did not share Cicero’s preoccupation with strengthening their bridging and bonding 
social capital, their works reveal a much less careful (or “positive”) attitude towards freedmen (cf. 
Chapter 6).  
(4) No less than fifteen individual freedmen occur both in the many letters to Atticus and in letters to 
many different familiares. This too is a significant observation because it illuminates Cicero’s 
networking strategy as well as his activation of social capital in a variety of ways (cf. Chapter 4).  
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(5) The spread of positive and negative mentions and especially the fact that freedmen could be 
presented both positively and negatively at the same moment (or over time) reminded us that a 
static view of certain freedmen as either good or bad is inadequate. This observation serves as a very 
important nuance to many attestations in other literary genres, which precisely portray freedmen in 
such a binary and mutually exclusive way143.  
(6) Attributing a qualification to each passage based on the context in which the freedman is mentioned 
(method 1) and plotting out the individual terms by which freedmen are characterised (method 2) 
yielded very similar results. Indeed, the second method confirmed and more specifically qualified 
the results of the first one. Compared to Tacitus and Suetonius, Cicero is overall more positively 
inclined towards freedmen in his letters. A “positive” freedman, moreover, receives on average more 
descriptions than a “negative” one, a tendency which is reversed in Tacitus and Suetonius.  
(7) The treatment of freedmen mentioned in Tacitus and Suetonius as part of a group, either as a 
collection of specific individuals (SP) or as part of a “class” (GP), revealed the propensity of these 
authors to evaluate both groups as even more categorically negative. We have no way of comparing 
this observation with Cicero’s attitude since very few SP or GP occur in the letters (which is in itself 
significant). It may indicate a different attitude towards “freedmen as a group” (libertini) as opposed 
to individual freedmen belonging to a specific patron (liberti). Perhaps even more than any other 
preliminary observation made so far, this one is in need of further qualification (cf. Chapter 6). 
3.2 Other epistolographic corpora 
We have treated Cicero’s correspondence and the occurrence of freedmen in it in 
particular detail because it constitutes the single most important epistolographic corpus 
for our purposes. Two other famous collections of letters should be taken into 
consideration, both in their own right, and for the comparative perspective on Cicero’s 
they provide us with. These are the collections of Pliny the Younger and Marcus 
Cornelius Fronto who wrote much later than Cicero (ca. 150 and 200 years respectively). 
To round up this chapter, we briefly contextualise both these corpora and their value 
for our purpose in the next chapters. 
 
                                                     
143 Only Epicharis in Tacitus’ Annals and Epaphroditus in Suetonius’ Lives receive a similar nuance by 
the respective authors.    
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3.2.1 Pliny the Younger (61 – c. 112 CE) 
3.2.1.1 The correspondence of Pliny 
Pliny’s correspondence consists of 9 books that contain a total of 247 letters, written to a 
wide range of correspondents. Contrary to Cicero’s correspondence, the letters in each 
separate book are not arranged per correspondent or per theme, and were addressed 
not only to fellow senators, but also to (as of yet) relatively undistinguished men, like 
municipal officials. In addition, a tenth book comprises 121 letters written to or by the 
emperor Trajan, while Pliny was holding the office of legatus Augusti in Bithynia and 
Pontus in 110 CE. Like in the case of Cicero’s correspondence, the date of publication of 
the letters is uncertain. It is generally assumed that Pliny did not start to gradually 
publish them before 104 CE, but any further narrowing down of publication dates is 
impossible, as only termini post quem can be deduced from internal evidence of 
individual letters144. 
In any case, books 1 to 9 were selected, edited, and polished by Pliny himself, as he 
lets his readers know in the first letter of the collection (addressed to Septicius Clarus, 
on whose request he had started to collect his letters): “I have now made a collection, 
not keeping to the original order as I was not writing history, but taking them as they 
came to my hand”145. Book 10, on the contrary, is generally believed to have been 
published posthumously without meaningful revision146. However, Woolf has recently 
argued that at least the first part of this book has been as profoundly “edited” as the 
other 9 books. One of his many convincing arguments is that all of the letters are 
comprehensible even to an audience entirely disconnected from their context of 
genesis. He compares this situation with Cicero’s letters, the contents of which are often 
much more elusive, and require considerable inside knowledge of historical persons and 
events147.  
In his unsurpassed commentary on Pliny’s correspondence, Sherwin-White argued – 
in a section called “The authenticity of the letters as correspondence” – that the letters 
we have today were greatly revised and polished by Pliny himself, but that they 
nonetheless originate from, and resemble, “genuine correspondence”148. In her 
introduction to the Loeb translation of the letters, Radice made very similar claims: 
 
                                                     
144 See the extensive treatment in Sherwin-White (1966), 54-62.  
145 Plin. Ep. 1.1: “collegi non servato temporis ordine (neque enim historiam componebam), sed ut 
quaeque in manus venerat”. 
146 Radice (1969), xvi; Williams (1990), 2-5. 
147 Woolf (2006), 97. Other arguments include the fact that each letter in book 10 has a carefully 
delineated subject, and that as a whole, the correspondence consitutes a coherent narrative. 
148 Sherwin-White (1966), 11-20. 
  161 
“[t]he personal letters, carefully revised and selected though they are, must also be 
regarded as genuine first-hand documentation (…). They provide the normal, if more 
humdrum pattern of life (…)”149. This view, however, was immediately challenged after 
the appearance of these works, by scholars who rightly criticised them for 
underestimating the well-crafted and literary nature of both individual letters and their 
arrangement in the correspondence150. They argued, from different perspectives, that 
the correspondence is a consciously constructed literary document, in which moralising 
thoughts and an idealising representation of Pliny, Trajan, and other historical actors 
and events, feature far too prominently to warrant a consideration of this historical 
document as an authentic correspondence. 
Although Trapp has warned us that too rigid a conceptual separation between “real” 
and “fictional” letters treacherously absolutises and exalts the nature of the former 
ones – ignoring that they too were not “direct transcripts of reality” –, it is now 
generally accepted that Pliny’s correspondence differs from both Cicero’s and Fronto’s 
in the much more manifest editorial interventions it underwent prior to publication151. 
Mayer even argued that the books were designed merely as corollaries to Pliny’s 
speeches (for example, as an introduction or “teaser”)152. As we will see below, this 
much more “artificial” nature of the correspondence has great repercussions for the 
study of (the representation of) freedmen in it. 
3.2.1.2 The freedmen in Pliny’s Letters 
Pliny’s correspondence is permeated by references to his household staff or that of his 
correspondents. In the majority of cases, however, the letter writer groups them 
together under the headings mei or tui. Pliny thus individualises his personnel much less 
frequently than Cicero did. As a consequence, a status determination of these groups of 
people becomes difficult. In most cases, Pliny and his correspondents denote their 
entire household, so we can confidently state that both slaves and freedmen are meant. 
When Pliny writes that some of his mei are educated (eruditi) or when he tells about the 
prosecution of the household of the murdered Afranius Dexter, it is clear that the mei 
cover both status groups153. In other cases, the mei or sui are undoubtedly only (or 
 
                                                     
149 Radice (1969), xvi. She also considered the letters as an unproblematic reflection of “the sort of 
man Pliny was himself” (xvii). 
150 See most recently, Ludolph (1997); Riggsby (1998); Henderson (2002).  Woolf (2006) dismantles the 
notion that book 10 was any different in this regard (p. 94-7 contains a comprehensible overview of 
the evolution in scholarly opinion on the nature and historical value of Pliny’s correspondence). 
151 Trapp (2003), 3-5. 
152 Mayer (2003). 
153 Plin. Ep. 9.36.4; 8.14.12; 7.27.12. 
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primarily) slaves154. What these passages have in common, however, is that the status of 
these individuals does nowhere really matter. In fact, these groups of people are rarely 
seen as a collective of individual persons, but are instead clustered as such only because 
they share with each other their relation to Pliny (or his correspondent), who is the 
main theme of these passages.  
As we will argue, this lack of individualisation and status indicators is due indeed to 
the context in which the dependents are mentioned, but also to the fact that Pliny’s 
correspondence was much less “embedded” in social reality than Cicero’s. The trust 
context that is so fundamentally intertwined with mentions of libertination (cf. Chapter 
4) is lacking almost entirely in Pliny’s passages that refer to mei or tui. When Pliny 
mentions that his own personnel is lazy but that he was courteously received by his 
mother-in-law’s servants, or that his friend Allifanus’ household had offered him many 
delicacies, these men are not acting as trusted agents155. Similarly, no embeddedness in 
a trust network is implied when Pliny repeatedly tells about the health of his household 
members or the kind treatment of Valerius’ dependents by their master/patron156. In all 
these cases, the specific status of these persons is subordinated to the presentation of 
Pliny and his correspondents as loving patres familias whose humanitas ensured a friendly 
and respectful treatment of their subordinates not only in theory but also in practice. 
The lack of a trust context and the focus on the letter writer and his correspondents 
made explicit status markers obsolete (cf. infra). 
The contrast with the freedmen who are mentioned with libertination is very clear. 
33 references to freedmen are spread out over 36 different letters157. Besides a general 
plural and seven specific plurals, 35 individual freedmen are mentioned. These are 
secretaries, recently manumitted slaves, intimate readers, imperial procurators, heirs to 
a deceased patron, financial agents, individuals who had proved important services to 
Pliny in the past, …158. But even in many of these cases is the focus of the letter more on 
Pliny’s rhetorical skills, his success in the courts, or his domestic humanitas. In a letter to 
Caecilius Macrinus, Pliny has his correspondent relive one of his greatest victories as a 
lawyer. Two freedmen had been accused of murdering their deceased patron and 
forging his will. After a very brief introduction of this case (barely 2 lines), Pliny’s focus 
 
                                                     
154 E.g. Plin. Ep. 1.4.2-3; 6.25.4; 7.1.3; 8.16. 
155 Plin. Ep. 1.4.2; 6.28.2. 
156 Plin. Ep. 5.6.46; 5.19; 8.1; 8.16. 
157 The most recent onomasticon to Pliny’s letters – Birley (2000) – does not contain, by its very 
nature, unnamed freedpersons. The fugitive freedwoman of the convicted Vestal Virgin Cornelia or 
the freedman who was asked by Trajan to support Pliny during one of his exhaustive speeches are, 
for example, not included (Plin. Ep. 2.11.15; 4.11.11). They are all included in our own list (see 
Appendix 3). 
158 E.g. Plin. Ep. 2.11.15; 4.10; 5.19; 6.31.8-12; 7.4.3-6; 7.8.8-9; 7.11.1,6; 7.14; 10.5; 10.6; … 
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shifts to the way he had successfully handled the defence (18 lines)159. Similarly, the 
account of his defence of Afranius Dexter’s freedmen centres entirely around his 
arguments and forensic prowess, rather than on the specifics of the case itself, let alone 
the freedmen160.  Pliny’s allowing some of his slaves to die as free men or at least giving 
them a chance to leave their peculium to whom they wished (as long as it stayed in the 
familia of course) is yet another example of his showcasing his humanitas161. 
A quantitative analysis like the one conducted above for Cicero’s letters would be 
neither representative nor meaningful due to the rather limited amount of attestations, 
but a general impression can be presented. The references to freedmen (both individual 
and as a group) are mostly positive throughout the correspondence. A glaring exception 
is Pliny’s very uncharacteristic vituperation against the imperial freedman Pallas who 
had received rewards and – more importantly – honours by a senatorial decree, which 
Pliny deemed as despicable as the conferment itself162. Similarly, the imperial freedman 
Eurythmus was put on trial (together with the knight Sempronius Senecio) for forging 
the will of the rich Julius Tiro, but the accusers, Pliny writes, were too faint of heart to 
push through the prosecution in the face of Eurythmus’ influence. Trajan, always 
worried about the public opinion about his freedmen’s position, personally made sure 
that the trial was conducted nonetheless by exclaiming that “he was not a Nero, nor 
Eurythmus a Polyclitus”, referring of course to the infamous influence of this freedman 
of Nero’s163. It is no coincidence at all that these two cases implicate imperial freedmen 
(cf. Chapter 6).  
The other “negative” mentions are much more nuanced: freedmen accused of 
murder or embezzlement are either acquitted entirely, or convicted with Pliny implying 
that even such a mild punishment was unjustified164. Similarly, a freedman that had 
fallen from grace with his patron was subsequently reconciled, and one of Pliny’s own 
freedmen who was accused of prematurely selling his patron’s inherited estates was 
vigorously defended by his patron on account of his acting on his specific orders165. 
Very interesting, finally, are the nine freedmen Pliny recommends to Trajan in book 10 
of the correspondence. They were either freedmen of peregrini (who would not receive 
Roman citizenship on manumission due to the non-Roman status of their patrons), or 
 
                                                     
159 Plin. Ep. 7.6.7-13. The “lines” refer to the rendering of the text by B. Radice in the 1969 Loeb 
edition. For the legal details of the case, see Sherwin-White (1966), 409-10. 
160 Plin. Ep. 8.14.12-26. 
161 Plin. Ep. 8.16. 
162 Plin. Ep. 7.29; 8.6. 
163 Plin. Ep. 6.31.8-12. For Trajans preoccupation with the position and influence of his freedmen, see 
e.g. Plin. Pan. 88.1-3. 
164 Plin. Ep. 7.6.8-9; 8.14.12-26;  
165 Plin. Ep. 7.11.1,6; 7.14; 9.21; 9.24;  
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Latini Iuniani. These letters are fascinating for any scholar interested in the spread and 
conveyance of Roman citizenship, but the freedmen (and -women!) are unfortunately 
only mentioned by name, without any further individualising description166. The reason 
for Pliny’s requests was either an appropriate reciprocating of past services (as in the 
case of his doctor Arpocras167), a request by the freedpersons’ patron(ess)168, or Pliny’s 
own preoccupation with being (or seeming to be) a generous pater familias169. 
All in all, Pliny’s correspondence provides much less (and much less differentiated) 
information about freedmen and their role in their patron’s social network when 
compared to Cicero’s collection. The fact that he had at least books 1 to 9 published 
during his life, implies an editing process that has in many cases effaced the clear signs 
of network embeddedness that make a correspondence like Cicero’s so unique as a 
historical source (cf. Chapter 4). To be sure, Cicero’s correspondence too was the result 
of an editing process, but the fact that Pliny’s letters were disseminated by the author 
himself suggests that the intended readership of the letters was altered in a way most of 
Cicero’s were not170. Both this observation and the (relative) scarcity of freedman 
mentions limits the value of the correspondence for our purposes. However, it does 
remain a valuable corpus for comparison, and will be drawn on extensively to highlight 
the Ciceronian features throughout the next chapters. 
3.2.2 Marcus Cornelius Fronto (c.95 – c.167 CE) 
3.2.2.1 The correspondence of Fronto 
When compared to Cicero’s or Pliny’s correspondences, our knowledge about Fronto’s is 
very limited. We barely have any information about its date of publication, or about the 
 
                                                     
166 They differ in this regard from many of the “real” recommendation letters composed for 
freedmen in Cicero’s correspondence (cf. infra). The requests in book 10 of Pliny’s always ask for 
citizenship for multiple persons at the same time (three times three persons are thus 
“recommended”). The individuals are summed up because Trajan would need their full names to 
actually confer the citizenship, but remain “anonymous” in every other respect. 
167 Plin. Ep. 10.5; 10.6; 10.7; 10.10.1. This is the only case where some details are given of the 
freedperson, although the description does not extend further than a short mention of past service. 
The sequence of letters focusses foremost on the technical procedure of the case (which, given 
Arpocras’ Egyptian identity, was rather complicated. See Sherwin-White (1966), 566-71 for the legal 
details. 
168 Plin. Ep. 10.5.2; 10.6.1; 10.11.2. 
169 Plin. Ep. 10.104; 10.105. 
170 As noted above, neither of the Ciceronian corpora can be safely labelled as “spontaneous” 
writings, but we would nonetheless maintain that they are more “authenthic” than Pliny’s because 
of the reasons stated. 
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circumstances under which it eventually came into circulation. The only thing that can 
be stated with relative certainty is that Fronto’s letters were not edited before the 4th 
century CE, and that he himself had never wanted or tried to publish them171. The 
obscure passages, and the many references to matters only the correspondent would be 
familiar with, indicate that – perhaps even more so than Cicero’s – Fronto’s letters 
clearly resemble their original form (although mild polishing by editors cannot be 
excluded). The modest amount of sholarship on Fronto’s correspondence generally 
reiterates the few details we do know about it, although van den Hout’s recent 
commentary is likely to remain the standard reference work for quite some time172. 
Unfortunately, our understanding of both individual letters, and of the correspondence 
as a literary work, is greatly impeded by the many lacunae and erasures that occur 
throughout it.  
Most of the letters in Fronto’s correspondence were exchanged between Fronto 
himself and his pupils at the imperial court (the later emperors Marcus Aurelius and 
Lucius Verus), although a considerable amount was addressed to several “friends” 
(similar to Cicero’s ad Familiares). The books were established by collecting all letters per 
correspondent, amounting to 5 different collections (apart from some isolated – 
sometimes Greek – letters): ad Marcum Caesarem (5 books), ad Antoninum Imperatorem (4 
books), ad Verum Imperatorem (2 books), ad Pium (1 book), and ad Amicos (2 books); good 
for a total of some 220 letters. Within a single book, the letters were roughly placed in 
chronological order, but subsequent books did not continue the chronology of a 
previous one. The content of the letters is, at any rate, much less varied than Cicero’s or 
Pliny’s correspondences, and usually relates to Fronto’s tasks and duties as a rhetorics 
teacher of the young emperors. 
Fronto’s correspondence can arguably be labelled as the most authentic of the three 
letter collections discussed in this chapter. Edited several decades after his death, very 
little – if any – concern was felt to enhance the image of either writer or correspondents 
(as is clear also from the rather gloomy impression we get from Fronto as a person). 
Unfortunately, however, for our current purpose, these documents have very limited 
value, since freedpersons feature but very rarely throughout them. 
3.2.2.2 The freedmen in Fronto’s Letters 
Like in the previous two collections, many members of household staff and other 
dependents are referred to in Fronto’s letters. He often mentions the librarii who write 
 
                                                     
171 Champlin (1980), 3; Goodyear (1987), 676-7; van den Hout (1999), x; Trapp (2003), 15. Pace 
Mommsen (1874), 198ff; Russel (1990), 13. For the general debate, see Freisenbruch (2004), 23-30. 
172 van den Hout (1999). 
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his letters for him because he is in too much pain to do so himself, the servants who 
come to call him to his bath, the many literary assistants, the deliverers of letters, etc.173 
None of these, however, are accompanied by a status indicator, and most of them even 
remain unnamed. In most cases, these assistants would have been either slaves or 
freedmen, but we cannot confidently identify them either way. And even if we could, 
this would not yield much information since these men are typically referred to only en 
passant. Some slaves occur in the correspondence, but the number is negligible when 
compared to Cicero’s (or even Pliny’s). Certain slaves include a few cooks, the men who 
dashed Fronto’s sedan-chair into a wall (scraping their master’s knee), those whom 
Appianus sent as a gift to Fronto, etc.174 
Similarly, very few certain freedmen are mentioned in Fronto’s correspondence, but 
none are represented in a negative way. Only 10 certain freedmen occur in 8 different 
letters. Moreover, 6 of these are referred to but superficially. In a letter to Marcus 
Aurelius, for example, Fronto is elated that his speech will survive in the handwriting of 
the emperor. Fronto considered himself a lucky man because he knew that the literary 
works of Cato, Ennius, Cicero, and others were valued more highly (pretiosior) and had 
the greatest renown (summa gloria) because they were written by Octavius Lampadio, 
Staberius Eros, Tullius Tiro, and others175. The men in the first group are famous authors 
and mostly nobles, whereas the men in the second group are known to be editors or 
secretaries and mostly of lower rank176. Staberius Eros, Tullius Tiro, Aurelius Opilius, 
and probably also Octavius Lampadio were actually freedmen. They are, however, not 
elaborated upon and figure only in their capacity as publishers or literary assistants of 
the writers in the first group. The passage is significant because prominent aristocrats 
like Aelius Stilo and Pomponius Atticus are indiscriminately included in the second 
group. In fact, Fronto places himself in the first category, but the emperor in the second 
when he writes that his fame will endure thanks to M. Aurelius’ handwriting177. Legal or 
social status takes second place (if any at all) to literary aptitude, which is clearly 
considered all these persons’ most salient feature throughout the passage. Not only, 
 
                                                     
173 E.g. Fronto Ad Amicos 2.3; De Eloq. 2 (letter writing librarii); ad M. Caes. 2.12 (a “bath” nuntius); ad 
M. Caes. 2.10.2; 5.26; De Fer. Als. 3 (assisting librarii); Ad M. Caes. 1.3.2; 1.3.9; 4.7 (tabelarii). 
174 Fronto De Bello Parthico 5; ad M. Caes. 5.44; Epist. Graec. 5.6, 8 respectively. 
175 Fronto ad M. Caes. 1.7.4. 
176 L. Aelius Stilo and M. Pomponius Atticus being obvious exeptions. The connections Fronto makes 
are: M. Porcius Cato (linked with Staberius Eros); Q. Ennius (linked with C. Octavius Lampadio); Gaius 
Gracchus (linked with “Plautius”, perhaps L. Plotius Gallus); Titius poeta (linked with D. Aurelius 
Opilius); Scipio (linked with an unknown Autrico); Numidicus (linked with L. Aelius Stilo); and Cicero 
(linked with M. Tullius Tiro and M. Pomponius Atticus). See Richlin (2006), 121. 
177 Richlin (2006), 122. 
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then, are the freedmen mentioned only by name (and implied function), but the passage 
does not draw attention to their status.  
The same holds true for two (maybe three) other freedmen who are only briefly 
referred to as pantomime dancers in a humorous passage by Lucius Verus to Fronto178. 
The freed Stoic philosopher Epictetus is briefly mentioned once but only in the context 
of an exemplum invented by Fronto to convince Verus (or Marcus Aurelius) that it is 
allowed to use inventive words and elaborate phrases when these come naturally to the 
writer179. Finally, the imperial freedman Egatheus – Imperatoris Antonini Augusti libertus a 
codicillis – is referenced very briefly as the personification and pars pro toto of the 
imperial administration in a letter treating a complex legal case180.  
The few remaining cases are more interesting. They include two general plurals: the 
reverence of freedmen to their patrons is compared to that of freeborn clients to 
theirs181, and the role of freedmen manumitted ex testamento in the lamentation of their 
patron is contrasted to that of other family members, friends, and clients182. The other 
two mentions are of individual persons, both of whom are imperial freedmen. The 
recommendation of Aridelus to the emperor Marcus Aurelius will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5183. In yet another letter, Fronto quotes a message he had sent to the 
imperial freedman Charilas in which he had asked him if he could (and should) visit the 
emperors Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius after the death of their father Pius. Fronto 
reproduces the original message as truthfully as possible (si recte memini verbis) and it 
starts out promisingly by describing Charilas as a “sensible man and friend of mine” (… 
σύ μοι δήλωσον ὡσανεὶ ἔμφρων κἀμοὶ φίλος κἀμοί σε …)184. It is a very rare case of a letter 
actually addressed to a freedman and would as such have been extremely interesting in 
many respects, if only the manuscript had not broken off shortly afterwards. Charilas’ 
answer, which would undoubtedly have followed the quote, is lost as well. Despite the 
unfortunate coincidence, the letter gives a good impression of the role of imperial 
freedmen as intermediaries between their patron(s) and potential petitioners – even 
 
                                                     
178 Fronto ad Verum Imp. 1.2: L. Aurelius Pylades; P. Aelius Pylades (his magister); and probably 
another imperial freedman named Apolaustus. 
179 Fronto ad Verum Imp. 1.1.5. See Haines (1929), II, 47 (note 2) and 53 (note 1) for the addressee of 
this letter. Epictetus is mentioned again in De Eloq. 1.16 but the text is too fragmented to make sense 
of. 
180 Fronto ad M. Caes. 2.16. Egatheus is attested epigraphically as well in CIL 6, 8440 (= ILS 1529). 
181 Fronto ad Verum Imp. 2.7.2. 
182 Fronto ad M. Caes. 1.6.6. This is technically not an “epistolographic reference” to freedmen since 
the passage in which it occurs is a quote from one of Fronto’s speeches. 
183 Fronto ad M. Caes. 5.37. 
184 Fronto ad Verum Imp. 1.4.2. Fronto gives the Greek version instead of a Latin summary to stress 
the authenticity of the message’s content. As his name suggests, Charilas was of Greek origin. 
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though Fronto would surely have been welcome in the palace regardless of Charilas’ 
answer185. 
All in all, the correspondence of Fronto contains even less information regarding 
freedmen than that of Pliny. A structural analysis is simply impossible. The few relevant 
references will therefore be treated as complementary to the other two letter 
collections and as providing a comparative perspective.  
 
                                                     
185 The whole letter, in fact, constitutes Fronto’s explanation why he had not yet visited the 
emperors. Apparently, Lucius Verus had (amiably) reprimanded him for not coming over any 
sooner.  
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Chapter 4 Tabellarii, libertination, and social 
capital in Cicero’s correspondence  
4.1 “Network embedded” versus “detached” sources 
4.1.1 The network embeddedness of letters 
One of the unique features of letters as a historical source, is their embeddedness in 
“real life” and their performativity in the important social practice of networking. By 
“letters”, we here mean those that were actually delivered, or that were at least written 
with that intent. These may have been edited later on (in various degrees), but are at 
any rate to be distinguished from letters that were written as a rhetorical exercise, as 
poetry, as exemplum, etc.1 “Embeddedness” is a widely proliferated term and has several 
meanings when used in relation to epistolography. On a very basic level, it can 
heuristically refer to a letter’s transference through partial or entire citation in either 
another letter or in another literary document. Examples include a passage in a letter to 
Atticus where Cicero quotes a message he had written earlier to Caesar, or the letter 
Verres’ freedman Timarchides wrote to one of his patron’s henchmen, and that was 
cited (and commented on) in Cicero’s second oratio against Verres (cf. Chapter 6)2.  
Embeddedness in social theory, on the other hand, refers to the fact that “behaviours 
and institutions (…) [are] constrained by ongoing social relations”. It denotes that 
agency cannot be considered outside of the contextual factors that necessarily shape it 
 
                                                     
1 See Trapp (2003), 6-33 for the extensive spectrum in which letters can thus be subdivided. 
2 Cic. Att. 11.12.2; Ver. 2.3.154-7. For embeddedness in this sence, see Trapp (2003), 33-4; White 
(2010), 172-3. 
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(and that are in turn shaped by it)3. As a contextualised expression of such agency, 
letters are addressed to (or talk about) real people whom the writer had (in most cases) 
already met in person, whom he might expect to meet again in the future, but who at 
any rate were firmly situated within his own social network. When composing a letter, a 
writer is at all times aware of his historical and network embeddedness, in the sense 
that potential repercussions (positive or negative) of what is entrusted to paper will 
affect this network in a much more direct and pervasive way than is the case for any 
type of public discourse4. Wilcox sublimely grasps this unique feature of letter writing in 
her study that analyses it as a particular form of gift exchange. She notes that there are 
“important differences between the instrumentality of correspondence fully embedded 
in ordinary social practice and the more attenuated (or at least differently 
misrecognised) social instrumentality of literary works produced qua literature”5. 
Writers of the latter type of works (and Cicero-the-orator as opposed to Cicero-the-
letter writer is, for example, one of these) are much more “detached” from concerns 
related to trust, social capital, “learning”, or “control”, and feel the need to adhere to 
the social conventions of “acting in a social network” – so consistently respected in 
epistolary documents – much less profoundly. 
Cicero wrote his letters in real life (i.e. in the reality in which he and his social 
network were at the time “embedded”), whereas authors of fiction, poetry, satire, … 
wrote mainly about real life. Rather than a product, the writing, sending, and answering 
of a letter was an embedded and performative social practice. Roman historians are 
arguably the most “detached” from their subject matter because in addition to the fact 
that they wrote about individuals who were never entrenched in their own social 
networks, they were also separated from them temporally. Surely, Tacitus would not 
have obtained  the praetorship under Domitian if he had at that time and in that context 
disclosed his condemnation of the emperor (if any existed at all before Domitian’s fall). 
It is only after Domitian’s assassination in 96 CE that he could (and would) publish his 
Agricola, in which the protagonist is presented as the ultimate example of how “great 
men could exist even under bad emperors” and of how “obedience and submission in 
 
                                                     
3 Granovetter (1985), 481-2. Embeddedness in this sense is closely related to the Bourdieusian notion 
of habitus and to NIE’s concept of path dependency. 
4 This is why the standardised formulae at the beginning and ending of a letter typically (but 
implicitly) direct the reader to read the text as a letter. Cf. Cugusi (1983), 47-64 and Violi (1985) 
discuss these formulae and their “directive” funtion. Cf. McCutcheon (2013), 179. 
5 Wilcox (2012), 12. The term “misrecognised” in this quote is implicitly derived from the 
Bourdieusian notion of “méconnaissance”. It does, however, in no way denote the meaning 
attributed to it by Bourdieu in his symbolic violence theory (i.e. misrecognition by the dominated of 
the structures and ideologies that constitute their subordination). 
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combination with industry and vigour could still lead to glory”6. Similarly, Pliny could 
safely publish a letter, harshly condemning the influence of the imperial freedman 
Pallas, because neither the latter nor his patron were still alive to take offense. When 
referring to the freedmen of his own emperor Trajan, however, the same Pliny politely 
stressed their modest role in state affairs and the emperor’s strong control over them7. 
Likewise, Seneca’s Consolatio ad Polybium was written to comfort the imperial freedman 
Polybius after the death of his brother. This consolatio – like those “adressed to” Seneca’s 
mother or the influential Marcia – were literary and philosophical essays rather than 
personal letters. They were written during Seneca’s exile in Corsica, and especially the 
ad Polybium and the ad Marciam are generally identified as attempts to regain favour in 
important circles, in order to facilitate Seneca’s reinstatement8. The same Polybius is 
mentioned by Suetonius in his De vita Caesarum – many years post mortem – as highly 
influential, as usurping positions he should not hold, and even as often walking in 
between the two consuls9. While both accounts insinuate the influence of Polybius, 
Seneca’s work was highly embedded since he was not only Polybius’ contemporary, but 
also needed to gain favour with him and his patron in order to return from exile. 
Because the works of the historians provide some of the clearest instances of “detached 
narratives” (as defined above), they will be treated as a point of comparison in Chapter 6 
(i.e. after having focussed on the network embedded letters in this and the next 
chapter). 
One of the many indications of the difference between “network embedded” and 
“detached” documents was already hinted at in the previous chapter. Cicero’s letters 
barely contain any reference to freedmen as a group or class (the specific or general 
plurals as defined earlier). They almost consistently feature individual, concrete, and 
identifiable liberti, rather than libertini. The latter occur much more often in the 
historical works, whose writers are typically conditioned by thematic topoi and genre-
related attention to recurrent stereotypes. This is not to say, of course, that the 
epistolary genre did not impose similar restraints. Standardisation, formulae, and 
recurrent themes and subjects unambiguously betray conventional straightjacketing of 
 
                                                     
6 Tac. Agr. 42.5: “Sciant (…) posse etiam sub malis principibus magnos viros esse, obsequiumque ac 
modestiam, si industria ac vigor adsint, eo laudis excedere”. It is well known that the entire work is, 
besides a laudatio of his father-in-law, an apologetic account of Tacitus’ own behaviour under (and 
lack of resistance against) Domitian’s reign. See Syme (1958), 25-6; Turner (1997); Devillers (2007). 
See Birley (2009), 49 (esp. note 5) for further references. 
7 Plin. Ep. 7.29; 8.6; Pan. 88.1-3. Trajan was very well aware that the degree of potentia libertorum was 
a sure sign of a ruler’s qualities. He did not, for example, want his own court to be considered filled 
with Polycliti (Plin. Ep. 6.31.9). Cf. Mouritsen (2011), 93. 
8 Cf. Abel (1985), 718; Sauer (2014), 168. 
9 Suet. Claud. 28. 
 172 
both form and content in these documents as well. However, as network embedded 
sources, letters were much less likely to reproduce the same kind of stereotypes that 
permeated satire, historiography, etc. This point will be taken up extensively 
throughout this chapter. In any case, Cicero (and his correspondents) felt much more 
intensely the potential ramifications of insulting, harassing, or negatively describing 
freedmen in a letter. The quintessential role of freedmen as nodes in various (trust) 
networks, but also the reflection onto the reputation of a patron as a consequence of 
any disparagement directed at his freedman, at least partially explains the difference 
with the more “detached” genres of literature. It is certainly no coincidence that a great 
majority of the negative mentions of freedmen in Cicero’s letters concern his own 
freedmen or those of his closest connections (e.g. Hilarus, Philotimus, Dionysius, 
Statius), and that these usually occur in letters to his intimate friend Atticus or his 
brother Quintus. For the same reason it comes as no surprise that Pliny’s and Fronto’s 
correspondences barely contain any negative references at all. 
Letter writing as an embedded social practice does not only position the writer in his 
social network, but it also activates, reproduces, and occasionally extends it. The many 
dangers to which a writer thereby exposes himself (misunderstanding, rejection, but 
also detection and undesired proliferation of intimate thoughts) explain the many 
linguistic and rhetorical strategies that are used in epistolography10, but at the same 
time constitute the inherent value of this type of sources for the ancient historian. 
Through these letters, we can detect strategies of social and political networking, of 
conflict mediation, or of dealing with the more menial requirements of “real life” that 
remain hidden by the more formal – detached – genres of literature. 
4.1.2 Couriers and letters of recommendation 
Cicero’s letters allow us a unique and fascinating glimpse into how freedmen and their 
role in the elite’s networks were perceived. This chapter is closely linked to the next 
one, which similarly analyses the representation and function of freedmen in these 
documents, but which does so from a different perspective. The current chapter 
focusses on the many freedmen that were used as couriers or messengers. These men – 
unsurprisingly, no women are attested – were vital constituting components of their 
patron’s and his correspondents’ social capital. The focus throughout this chapter is 
directed toward the use of libertination in these cases. It will be argued that 
 
                                                     
10 See, for example, Hall (2009) on the strategies of linguistic politeness in Cicero’s correspondence. 
Cf. Hutchinson (1998), passim (for Cicero’s letters specifically); Trapp (2003), 3 (for the epistolary 
genre as a whole); Wilcox (2012), 90, 96 (for recommendation letters in particular). 
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libertination was not a neutral or random way of describing freedmen. Instead of 
employing one standardised formula when mentioning freedmen, the range of different 
denominations that discursively rendered liberti is large. This variety reveals a set of 
subtextual assumptions or beliefs of which the different kinds of libertination (or lack 
thereof) are textual expressions. Whereas deliberate calculation or choices on the one 
hand, and unconscious habit or routine on the other, are often difficult to discern, very 
specific and highly significant patterns emerge that preclude dismissing these different 
ways of referencing freedmen as merely coincidental.  
John D’Arms already noted that “descriptions of freedman/patron relationships in 
modern works tend to be ‘patron-oriented’”. He rightly questioned a view that sees 
freedmen as either continuing to perform the services they had rendered as slaves, or as 
“performing more responsible tasks” unilaterally imposed by their ex-masters11. Service 
as confidential couriers could be seen as an example of the latter option: freedmen serve 
as trusted agents, but derive this (and other) praiseworthy qualities only by and 
through patronal approval that is therefore a conditio sine qua non for their validation12. 
Whereas this chapter analyses the recurrent discursive construction of a typical triad of 
elements that linked together libertination, trustworthiness, and the connection to a 
patron, the next one questions the assumption that this was (perceived as) a deliberate 
stratifying strategy to stress social inferiority, thus infringing on the public transcript of 
principled equality. In order to do so, this next chapter focusses on letters that 
recommended freedmen to an influential correspondent. It will be argued that previous 
attempts to trace fundamental differences between freedman and freeborn 
recommendations make sense only when we accept the implied macula vision of the 
respective analyses. In-depth inquiry into both lexical and structural patterns in these 
documents does not only contradict the alleged existence of a “special” freedman 
recommendation, but it also suggests that patterns hitherto identified as emanations of 
the claim that freedmen received their virtues only through their patrons, served 
another purpose entirely. Rather than perceiving freed status as a “liability” (a typical 
consequence of transposing the reading of “detached” sources on “embedded” ones), 
these two chapters suggest that it was rather an “asset” that – not unlike the 
accentuation of the networks of freeborn couriers and commendati – instilled and 
guaranteed trustworthiness through processes of network embedded “learning” and 
“control” (cf. Chapter 1). 
Finally, in both these chapters, the correspondences of Pliny and Fronto will be used 
– whenever possible or useful – to complement Cicero’s, or to compare the latter with a 
 
                                                     
11 D’Arms (1981), 142. The observation introduced his discussion of the “independent freedmen”.  
12 Smadja (1976), 97-8; Mouritsen (2011), 64. 
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somewhat less authentic collection (especially Pliny’s) in terms of freedman 
representation. The almost complete lack of any certain freed messengers and freedman 
recommendations in these collections will, however, necessitate a more lenient 
definition of both categories. 
4.2 Libertination in epigraphic sources: a liability? 
The fact that there existed a separate word to denote an ex-slave – two even, if we count 
libertus and libertinus separately –, and especially the fact that it was as common a 
denominator as servus, liber, or ingenuus, is in itself a noteworthy observation. Not all 
slave-holding societies were as willing to make explicit the legal status of subaltern (and 
often highly discriminated) marginal groups. When determining the “kinds” of people 
that made up the legitimate population of a State, for example, the original US 
Constitution, contrasted “free persons” with the euphemising “other persons” rather 
than “slaves”13. The manifest unwillingness to use the everyday language of slavery in 
19th century American law texts is generally considered highly significant14. As is well 
known, the average Roman author (or jurist) did not struggle with similar concerns. 
Both the deliberation of whether or not to draw attention to a freedman’s status, and 
the subsequent choice of words to do so, are always a contextual reflection of ideology 
and beliefs. Embedded sources, however, feature these deliberations and choices in a 
relational context, reflecting not only ideology, but also the awareness that utterances 
of assumptions and beliefs affect and impact one’s social network.  
By “libertination”, we mean throughout this chapter the mention of a freedman by 
(at least) his legal status (libertus). This interpretation of the term should be stressed, 
since it deviates slightly from the standard notion of “libertination” in epigraphy. In 
epigraphic sources, libertination – sometimes called “pseudo-filiation” because of the 
obvious similarities with filiation15 – is traditionally conceived as the standardised 
 
                                                     
13 US Constitution, Article 1, Section 2. In the aftermath of the abolition of slavery, this passage was 
modified by the 14th Amendment (Section 2).  
14 Cf. Lee (2012), 7. 
15 Duff (1958), 52 calls the patron a freedman’s “legal father” and Fabre (1981), 114 wrote that 
libertination “souligne la place du patronus par rapport à l'affranchi, au même titre que celle du pater 
par rapport au filius”. Corbier (2008), 319-20, Mouritsen (2011), 38-9, and Perry (2014), 109-10 are 
more nuanced by equating filiation and libertination only functionally, pointing to the analogy 
between father and patron as providing children and freedpersons with a social identity. The word 
“pseudo-filiation” may well capture the structural similarities between filiation and libertination in 
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identification of an individual by a reference not only to his or her legal status (libertus/-
a), but also to the relation to his or her patron (by a genitive of the latter’s proper name, 
usually preceding libertus/-a)16. Libertination in this sense was often part of a prae- or 
postscriptum to a more elaborate text (e.g. a carmen epigraphicum) or of a couple of lines 
containing only a few highly standardised aspects of identity (e.g. profession, age, a 
description as bene merens, etc.). In both epigraphic and epistolary sources, this 
constitutes but one way of using the word libertus. Others include a generalised and 
isolated libertus, a libertus as appositional to a proper name, or a set of variations to the 
juxtaposition of libertus and a possessive pronoun in the genitive case (cf. infra). 
“Libertination” throughout this chapter refers to all mentions that include legal status, 
and not only those that take the “standard epigraphic form”. 
The motives for formally publicising one’s freed status were numerous and highly 
contextual. In this regard too, network embedded sources (like letters) provide another 
image entirely when compared to “detached” sources17. They do not seem to “fit” 
within a macula servitutis framework, and attempts at analysing them in these terms 
have led to rather problematic or ungrounded hypotheses. As noted earlier, Lily Ross 
Taylor has famously claimed that the decline in use of libertination in Roman epitaphs 
at the end of the first century CE must be explained by ex-slaves no longer wanting to 
publicise the stain on their identity (cf. Chapter 2). She argued that it was “the 
freedman’s unwillingness to declare his inferior status” that led to a general omission of 
explicit status markers among freedmen18. Similarly, Andreau assumed that freedmen 
strove “to merge anonymously into the throng of the ingenui, the true Quirites” (i.e. by 
omitting status indicators), and that they vainly tried to “fool people about [their] true 
social rank”, thus likewise considering legal status a primary identity dimension in 
freedpersons’ self-appraisal and “a constant constraint in their daily life”19. 
This view has had repercussions on, for example, the debate about the adoption of 
freedmen, which we will briefly address here as an example of the extent to which the 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
epigraphic sources, but it risks – as an analytical term – to obscure or misrepresent its content, cf. 
Crook (2004), 230-1; Bruun (2015), 608. 
16 Perry (2014), 101 notices a “more flexible use of libertination” (i.e. deviating from the formulaic 
“(praenomen-)nomen – genitive – libertus/-a – cognomen”) and also includes, for example, “nomen + 
libertus/-a”. A connection to the patron usually remains obvious, but the rendering is less 
standardised. Huttunen (1974), 178 noted that, on average, rather few people (ca. 8%) chose to 
explicitly publicise their status (cf. infra). 
17 The reasons and occasions for libertination in “detached” sources (i.c. the writings of the Roman 
historians) will be discussed comparatively in Chapter 6. 
18 Taylor (1961), 122-3. See also Huttunen (1974), 129f. One of the obvious problems with this 
suggestion is that it lacks any explanatory power as to why libertination declined precisely the 
moment it did. 
19 Andreau (1993), 197. 
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macula framework has permeated different branches of scholarship20. Gardner took a 
remark of the famous jurist Masurius Sabinus – preserved in Gellius’ Noctes Atticae – to 
mean that adopted freedmen (technically “adrogated” since ex-slaves were sui iuris21) 
habitually used filiation instead of libertination after they had legally become filii, and 
that they did so because they wanted to “disguise” their true status22. Gellius’ actual 
comment reads: “But he [Sabinus] says that it is not, and should not be, allowed that 
men of the order of freedmen should through adoption usurp the legal rights of the 
freeborn” (sed id neque permitti dicit neque permittendum esse umquam putat, ut homines 
libertini ordinis per adoptiones in iura ingenuorum invadant)23. However, the assumption that 
this usurpation would take the form of omitting libertination (and even replacing it 
with filiation) is entirely speculative, and the assumption that freedmen did so en masse 
is perhaps a reflection of the influence of Taylor’s opinion – and that of the macula 
servitutis framework in general – rather than of the mind-set of ancient freedmen. 
Neither the passage itself nor the context in which it appears suggests that this is what 
Sabinus had in mind when referring to freedmen who “invaded” the iura ingenuorum. 
The closest our sources come to Gardner’s reading is a passage from Ulpian24:  
“Patronum autem accipimus etiam si capite minutus sit; vel si libertus capite 
minutus, dum adrogetur per obreptionem. Cum enim hoc ipso, quo adrogatur, 
celat condicionem, non id actum videtur, ut fieret ingenuum”. 
 
“We consider even him a patron who has undergone change of status, or whose 
freedman has undergone change of status as a result of illegal adrogation [i.e. 
without permission of the patron]. Because by this act, namely that he is 
adrogated, he conceals his condition, it should not be regarded as having made 
him freeborn”. 
It seems to be too literal an interpretation to consider celare as referring to the 
freedman’s epigraphic habit. More likely, it refers to the private ingenuitas of adopted 
 
                                                     
20 For the adoption of freedmen in general, see especially Lavaggi (1946); Watson (1967), 90ff; 
Gardner (1989); (1998), 179-90; Lindsay (2009), 130-7. 
21 Adrogatio was the term for the adoption of someone who was sui iuris. When a pater familias, for 
example, was adrogated – consensus was obviously required – he, his possessions, and his children 
in potestas would follow him into the family of the person adopting. Since it meant the legal 
extinction of an entire family line, Roman law carefully circumscribed the procedure. Cf. Dig. 
1.7.15pr; Gaius Inst. 1.98-107. On manumission, freedmen became sui iuris, so their adoption would 
necessarily happen via an adrogatio procedure. 
22 Gardner (1989), 256-7, followed by Bernstein (2005), 268 note 57. 
23 Gell. NA 5.19.12. 
24 Dig. 2.4.10.2. Capite minutus refers to the least pervasive form of capitis diminutio (i.e. minima), which 
does not take away either freedom or citizenship, but merely refers to a change of status as a 
consequence of adoption (Gaius, Inst. 1.162). 
  177 
freedmen in a general sense, and to the temptation felt by at least some of them to 
aspire the (public) privileges of ingenui that had never before been so closely within 
their reach, but that nonetheless remained strictly off limits for libertini. It is this 
potential usurpation of libertini in the public sphere rather than in the private sphere 
(e.g. when expressing their status on their epitaphs in conjunction with their patron or 
“father” in the genitive) which is also hinted at in Gellius’ passage. Furthermore, it is 
very likely that in the second mention of adrogare, the per obreptionem is still insinuated 
(which is also implied by the strong connection made by hoc ipso). The “concealing” of 
the freedman’s condition would then refer to his patron not having given explicit 
permission for the adrogation, and perhaps even to the freedman not having informed 
his adrogator of his legal status. In that case, it was important for the law to stress that 
the original patron would not lose his rights over the freedman, even though 
interestingly enough, the adrogation in itself would remain valid25. 
As a remarkable counterpart of the ius anulorum, the adoption of a freedman by a 
freeborn citizen granted the former ingenuitas in the private relation with his new 
“father”, but would not abolish his public status (and resulting restrictions) as a 
freedman26. Even if we account for the possibility that some adopted freedmen 
preferred to present themselves as filii rather than as liberti – there is no possible way of 
determining this –, no evidence exists for the assumption that this desire stemmed from 
concerns about legal status or about the “shame” that it supposedly publicised. It is 
equally plausible that expectations of pietas and reverentia towards a pater inspired the 
self-presentation as filii. In more than a few cases – for example when a biological father 
adrogated his filius libertinus – such feelings would be greatly enhanced27. Thus Tiberius 
Claudius Strenuus was libertus et filius of the imperial freedman Diomedes28. The libertus 
indicates that Strenuus had originally been a slave of his mother’s owner, that Diomedes 
had subsequently bought him, and that he had finally manumitted him, thus becoming 
 
                                                     
25 Dig. 38.2.49. Cf. Gardner (1989), 248. 
26 In addition to Gell. NA 5.19.12, see also Dig. 1.5.27: “Eum, qui se libertinum esse fatetur, nec 
adoptando patronus ingenuum facere potuit”; 23.2.32: “Sciendum est libertinum, qui se ingenuo 
dedit adrogandum, quamvis in eius familia ingenui iura sit consecutus, ut libertinum tamen a 
senatoriis nuptiis repellendum esse”. For a more detailed discussion, including an account of the 
chronological evolution in the adoption of freedmen, see Gardner (1989), 238-42. If the adrogator was 
not the freedman’s patron, but, for example, the freedman’s biological father, the patron would 
retain his patronal rights over him, regardless of his new private status as ingenuus in another familia 
(245-8). 
27 E.g. Dig. 1.7.46: “In servitute mea quaesitus mihi filius in potestatem meam redigi beneficio 
principis potest: libertinum tamen eum manere non dubitatur. 
28 CIL 6, 22423: “Meroe Felix / una / viximus ann(os) XXXVI / s<i>ne stomaco / Ti(berius) Claudius 
Aug(usti) l(ibertus) / Diomedes / coniugi bene merenti / et sibi et / Ti(berio) Claudio Strenuo / 
l(iberto) et f(ilio) et / Ti(berio) Claudio Soterico / l(iberto) et fratri et / Cratino suo / merentibus”. 
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his natural son’s legal patronus. Whether he also adrogated him cannot be definitely 
concluded as filius may merely signify a biological relation rather than a legal one29. The 
same goes for the freedman Lucius Iulius Narcissus, who commemorated (among others) 
his filius et libertus Lucius Iulius Cerialis30. In the first example, Diomedes also 
commemorates his libertus et frater Sotericus, the latter designation clearly referring 
only to a biological relationship, as sibling relations rooted in slavery were not legally 
recognised after manumission. When a woman refers to her filia et liberta, the former 
term similarly did not indicate a legal relationship since women were under normal 
circumstances not allowed to adrogate (indeed, not even their own children were under 
their potestas)31.  
The inscription Sextus Calvenus Clemens and his wife Calvena Silvina made for their 
son Fortunatus is particularly interesting. Fortunatus is initially presented with formal 
libertination, followed by the description filius piissimus. One could tentatively argue 
that the superlative is an indication of an emotional rather than a formal, legal bond, 
although further on in the inscription, Fortunatus is similarly described as filius et 
libertus pientissimus32. Considering the fact that he had died at the age of 24, the inclusion 
of filius may reflect a desire to accentuate the iusta causa of the manumission (before 30), 
rather than a formal adrogation33. The latter possibility seems unlikely also in light of 
the fact that libertination had trumped filiation when formally presenting the deceased 
in a personal, familial context like this. By comparison, a certain Passienius Sabinus had 
received no “formal” libertination or filiation, but was instead only described as filius et 
libertus sanctissimus by his father Saturninus34. In this case too, a justification of the 
manumission as iusta may have been the primary purpose of filius. Although Sabinus’ 
age is not given in the epitaph, the two reliefs that depict him seem to imply a rather 
 
                                                     
29 For a similar caveat, see Gardner (1989), 254. 
30 CIL 3, 2371: “L(ucius) Iulius L(uci) lib(ertus) / Narcissus / v(ivus) f(ecit) sibi et Iuliae / Helpidi 
coniug(i) / et l(ibertae) et L(ucio) Iulio Ceri/ali f(ilio) et l(iberto) et L(ucio) Iulio libert(is) / 
libertabusq(ue) suis / posterisq(ue) eorum / ex [---] p(?) d(?)”. 
31 Cod. Iust. 8.47.5; Dig. 5.2.29.3. For adoption by women, see Lindsay (2009), 71-73. For a woman who 
calls her daughter filia et liberta, see CIL 6, 22555: “Di{i}s Manib(us) / Minucia Hesperis / vixit annis 
XX mensibus II / Minucia Damalis filiae / et libert(ae/is) suae / fecit”.  
32 CIL 9, 3538: “Sex(to) Calveno Sex(ti) / lib(erto) Fortunato fil(io) / piissimo vixit an(nis) / XXIIII 
mensib(us) VII / Sex(tus) Calvenus Cl[e]/mens et Calvena / Silvina f(ilio) e[t] lib(erto) pient(issimo) / 
fecerunt sibi et pos/teris suis in f(ronte) p(edes) XX / in [a]g[r(o)] p(edes) XX” 
33 This has been suggested (for the next inscription in particular) by Gardner (1989), 254 note 44, and 
may also be applicable to the case of Minucia Hesperis – only 20 years old (cf. note 31 above). 
34 CIL 6, 23848: “D(is) M(anibus) / Passieniae Gemel/lae co(n)iugi et lib(ertae) / suae carissimae / 
obsequentissi/mae et L(ucio) Passie/nio Doryphoro / filio et Passienio / Sabino filio et lib(erto) / 
sanctissimis // L(ucius) Passienus Saturninus fecit”. 
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young age (at any rate below 30)35. Importantly, his younger brother Doryphorus was 
merely filius sanctissimus. This contrast between the two brothers suggests that the latter 
was freeborn (i.e. born after his father had freed his mother, who was his coniunx et 
liberta). If a careful parallel could be drawn with the inscription of Fortunatus, it would 
suggest that if the Passienii brothers had similarly received full nomenclature, 
Doryphorus would be L(uci) filius, but Sabinus L(uci) libertus. 
This did not necessarily mean that the latter description was considered more 
“derogative”36. For example, when patrons erected a monument to commemorate their 
freedwomen-spouses (or vice versa), they occasionally omitted any explicit reference to 
the nuptial bond, and preferred to define the relationship primarily (and often even 
solely) as a patronage relation. Thus Marcus Iulius Successus had an epitaph made for 
his freedwoman Agrippina, but the only reason we know for sure that Successus and 
Agrippina were a couple – though perhaps not formally – is the additional reference to 
Iulius Callistus, who is meaningfully described as libertus et filius eorum37. This not only 
suggests that the connection between Successus and Agrippina was no source of shame 
for the freedwoman, but it also shows that the relation between freedwoman and patron 
could in itself express an emotional bond similar to marriage38. It is likewise plausible 
that the same held true for the bond between freed sons and patron-fathers, especially 
when taking into account both the additional references to the pietas or sanctitas of 
these sons, and the clear signs of affection on the monument’s reliefs. 
In short, it is not possible to ascertain whether these and similar references – and 
they are at any rate very scarce – put in evidence the adrogation of freedmen. Either 
way, it is meaningful that, at least in some cases, libertination was retained and a 
description as filius merely considered as an additional feature (especially in Fortunatus’ 
case). In all of these cases, the sons could have easily been presented by their tria nomina 
(without formal libertination), and in a further line been called filii (covering either a 
biological or a legal relation, or both). The fact that at least some inscriptions explicitly 
retained libertus (either in formal libertination or as an informal reference) points to a 
desire to fully describe the family’s history, even at the “cost” – if any such notion or 
 
                                                     
35 The front of the altar depicts Passienia Gemella, flanked by Doryphorus on her left and Sabinus on 
her right. Both sons are individually depicted on both sides of the altar (both embracing their 
mother). Although Sabinus is clearly older than Doryphorus and is wearing the toga of a Roman 
citizen, he still needs a low step to be able to reach his mother. For pictures of the altar, see Davies 
(2010), 187-8. 
36 For example, a certain freedman Anthus chose to describe himself as Anthus l(ibertus) instead of 
Anthus l(ibertus) et f(ilius)” in an inscription mentioning the statues he had set up for his patronus et 
pater, CIL 6, 27137. 
37 CIL 6, 20283: “D(is) M(anibus) / M(arcus) Iulius Suc(c)es/sus fecit Iuliae / Agrippinae lib(ertae) / et 
Iulio Callis/to lib(erto) et filio / eorum et lib(ertis) li/bertab(us)q(ue) posterisq(ue) eor(um)”. 
38 This has been convincingly argued by Perry (2014), 110-4, who also cites further examples. 
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feeling was entertained by the family members themselves39 – of publicising the legal 
status of ex-slave.  
The influence of the assumption that freedmen remained tainted and therefore 
ashamed is thus clearly detectable in the scholarship on the adoption of freedmen (e.g. 
Gardner’s ungrounded assumption that adrogated freedmen preferred filiation over 
libertination). But the ramifications of this framework extend far beyond freedman 
studies, as we have shown in Chapter 2 (and briefly touched on in the Introduction). We 
noted that it led to the untenable assumption that the majority of epigraphically 
attested incerti were ashamed freedmen, and that scholars like Demaille thought that 
the freed duumvir of Dion (P. Anthestius Amphio) omitted libertination because he did 
not want to highlight this “tâche indigne”40. Very similarly, Galvao-Sobrinho suggested 
that the decline of libertination “may have been linked to [a] desire to construct an 
identity apart from servility”41.  
The a priori assumption that freedmen were tainted and ashamed because of their 
servile past thus steered the analysis of scholars like Taylor, Gardner, or Demaille (and 
many others) into a self-fulfilling and circular argument: freedmen are tainted so they 
omit libertination, and the decline of libertination is subsequently proof of ashamed 
freedmen. Joshel – drawing on the work of Richlin – has rightly noted that the idea of 
“[e]x-slaves seeking to hide their origin [approximates] the freedman of satire who 
always tries to cover the stain of slavery, whether by beauty patches or the 
accoutrements of wealth”42. Putting on the glasses of a Roman satirist, poet, or historian 
to look at network embedded sources (be it epigraphic or epistolary) not only steers 
attention in certain directions, but it also produces biased arguments and conclusions 
by ignoring and distorting the unique character of these sources. 
The debate has not yet been extended to literary sources, let alone “network 
embedded” ones such as letters. As we will argue in the first part of this chapter, the 
fundamental mismatch between the assumptions of the macula servitutis framework on 
the one hand and ancient reality that is reflected by this “embedded” material on the 
other, manifests itself equally profound (if not more so) as in the debate on epigraphic 
libertination. The following paragraphs argue that libertination was anything but a 
 
                                                     
39 Aulus Memmius Urbanus, for one, seems not to have had too many scruples about his past when 
he explicitly mentioned the fact that he had met his collibertus Clarus (to whom the epitaph is 
dedicated) while both were still venalicii (CIL 6.22355a). Similarly, freedpersons occasionally chose to 
present themselves as conservi/-ae rather than colliberti/-ae, or their marital bond as contubernium 
instead of conubium (e.g. CIL 10, 695; 7685 respectively). For the “rhetorical significance of replacing 
colliberti with conservi”, see MacLean (2012), 128-35. 
40 Taylor (1961), 122; Perry (2014), 100. For Amphio, see Demaille (2008), 3. Cf. Chapter 2. 
41 Galvao-Sobrinho (2012), 158 note 95. 
42 Joshel (1992), 185; Richlin (1984), 67. 
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“liability” in a network embedded context, and that it rather was – quite on the 
contrary – a valuable “asset”. The next section (4.3) focusses on the “reasons” (without 
necessarily insinuating rigid strategies or deliberation) why Cicero and his 
correspondents chose (not) to include libertination in their letters. The section after 
that (4.4) analyses in detail how the representation of freed couriers elucidates the 
notion that libertination was an asset, and expounds its vital role in constructing and 
consolidating trust networks and (thus) social capital. 
4.3 Libertination in Cicero’s letters 
4.3.1 An identifying function? 
Whether or not to include libertination when referring to a freedman may at first sight 
seem a deliberation not particularly important to Cicero and his correspondents. Many 
of the individuals who are labelled liberti in one letter occur without this identification 
in others. The status of Theophilus, a freedman of M. Marcellus, for example, is omitted 
in one letter but explicitly invoked in another43. Both letters were addressed to 
Marcellus himself, and are temporally separated from each other by no more than a few 
months. The same goes for the descriptions of Appius Claudius’ freedman Phania, 
Caesar’s freedman Diochares, M. Fabius’ freedman Apella, etc.44 Vettius Chrysippus was 
presented as Cyri architecti libertus in a letter to Trebatius, but merely as Vettius or 
Chrysippus in the letters to Atticus45. Conversely, Caesar’s freedman is referred to 
merely as Salvius in letters to Dolabella and Quintus Cicero, but as Salvius libertus in a 
letter to Atticus46. These observations beg the question when and why the writers of 
letters decided to apply this label, and it suggests that the context and content of a 
letter, rather than a fixed “epistolary habit” moved Cicero and his correspondents to 
either include or omit status indicators47. Moreover, when libertus is explicitly 
mentioned, it is regularly accompanied by a possessive genitive or pronoun to stress the 
freedman’s connection with his patron. We will henceforth refer to this construction as 
 
                                                     
43 Cic. Fam. 4.9.1; 4.10.1. 
44 For Phania, see Cic. Fam. 3.1.1-2; 3.5.3; 3.6.1-2; 3.8.5 (same writer and same addressee). For 
Diochares, see Att. 11.6.6; 13.45.1 (idem). For Apella, see Fam. 7.25.2; Att. 5.19.1.. 
45 Cic. Fam. 7.14.1 (to Trebatius); Att. 2.4.7; 11.2.3; 13.29.1; 14.9.1 (to Atticus). 
46 Cic. Fam. 9.10.1 (to Dolabella); Quint. Fratr. 3.1.21; 3.2.1 (to Quintus); Att. 10.18.1 (to Atticus). 
47 The same holds true, of course, for epigraphic texts, cf. Perry (2014), 99-106. 
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a “relational identification”. When libertus occurs without a genitive or possessive 
pronoun, we use “classification” to denote its function. Both terms are borrowed from 
CDA, where they are used in social actor analysis48. The presentation of actors is, as we 
will see, always revealing for how a writer thinks of them, although specific “choices” 
may be both unconscious, and are at any rate always contextual. 
In a few instances, libertus is mentioned without even an accompanying proper name. 
The intention of the writer in these cases, was to very generally define an individual 
without drawing particular attention to his personal identity. When Servius Sulpicius 
reported to Cicero that he had visited their common friend M. Marcellus’ deathbed at 
Piraeus, he wrote that he had encountered only two of his freedmen and a few slaves 
(duo liberti et pauculi servi) because the rest had fled due to the violent nature of their 
dominus’ passing (he was stabbed to death by a “friend”)49. The narrative immediately 
continues with an elaborate account of Marcellus’ burial without paying any further 
attention to the freedmen, to their virtue in staying at their deceased patron’s side, or to 
the fate of the dependents who had chosen to flee instead. In light of the grave news 
Sulpicius was reporting, such details were considered unimportant and banal. 
Another reason for the use of libertus (be it as relational identification or 
classification) is its explanatory and clarifying function. On occasion, the writer of a 
letter had reason to suspect that an individual he wrote about was not known to his 
addressee, and that some context should be provided. In some cases, this preoccupation 
is made explicit. When in June 45 BCE Cicero complains to Atticus about the carelessness 
of his personnel in securing an official document of transaction (professio), he tells his 
friend that in the end, his freedman Philotimus was entrusted with the job. This 
individual should not be mistaken for Terentia’s freedman of the same name, but 
apparently Cicero feared that Atticus might do precisely this. For this reason, he 
presented him as “the freedman Philotimus, you know him, I think: the copyist” 
(Philotimus libertus: nosti, credo, librarium)50.  
Especially when recommending freedmen, Cicero typically wrote with the 
assumption that his correspondents were not as familiar with them as he was. 
Introduction was after all the entire purpose of most of these letters. The 
recommendation of P. Crassus’ freedman Apollonius to Caesar, for example, prompted 
the inclusion of libertus to situate the man in Cicero’s extensive networks, to clarify his 
 
                                                     
48 Machin & Mayr (2008), 102-3, referring to the method developed in van Leeuwen (1996). Note that 
in strict grammatical terms, libertus is already in itself a relational noun because it implies a 
relationship with another entity, cf. Devine & Stephens (2006), 352ff. 
49 Cic. Fam. 4.12.3. 
50 Cic. Att. 13.33.1. 
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status, but also to stress the excellent relation with his patron (cf. Chapter 5)51. All this 
information was deemed necessary for Caesar to be able to correctly evaluate the 
request. The same goes for Menander, freedman of T. Balbus, who was introduced in a 
letter of recommendation to Servilius Isauricus in the exact same way a modern study 
would present him to unfamiliar readers today (eius libertus, T. Ampius Menander)52. 
Finally, when Cicero informed Atticus about the state of affairs in Rome at the end of 
October 54 BCE, a large part of the letter was dedicated to his indignation at the 
acquittal of Pompey’s henchman Gabinius on the charge of maiestas53. In earlier letters 
to his brother, Cicero had already expressed his doubts about the way the trial would be 
conducted. On 11 October, he had been reassured that a competent prosecutor would be 
appointed and that Gabinius was under very real pressure (probe premitur). In the same 
letter, however, he also realised that Pompey could exert his influence to steer the 
course of events, and that the entire affair might turn out to be a mock-trial (Ἀπότευγμα 
formido)54. Ten days later, Cicero repeated these concerns. Gabinius, he admitted, had 
both his unpopularity with all classes and the accounts of the witnesses playing against 
him, but the corruption of the jury, the incompetence of the prosecutors, as well as 
Pompey’s meddling were public knowledge by now55. On 24 October, Cicero’s fears 
turned out to be justified. Gabinius was acquitted against popular (and senatorial) 
sentiment. Nevertheless, despite the influence exerted in favour of Gabinius, it had been 
a close call as merely 38 out of 70 judges had voted against conviction.  
The widespread resentment found a scapegoat in Antiochus, a freedman and accensus 
of Gabinius. “Within an hour of Gabinius’ acquittal”, Cicero writes, “a freedman, his 
orderly, one Gabinius Antiochus, a pupil of Sopolis the painter, was found guilty by 
another jury under the lex Papia, in sheer irritation at the result [i.e. Gabinius’ 
acquittal]”56. Gabinius may have gotten away with lese majesty by virtue of his 
abundant wealth and his powerful friends, but his freedman would end up paying the 
 
                                                     
51 Cic. Fam. 13.16.1. 
52 Cic. Fam. 13.70. 
53 Cic. Att. 4.18.1. Gabinius had been tribunus plebis in 67 BCE and had in that capacity proposed the 
lex Gabinia, conferring and unseen command (and ditto powers) on Pompey against the 
Mediterranean pirates (Dio 36.23-24; Plut. Pomp. 25). He kept advancing through the cursus honorum 
until he received the consulship in 58 BCE (App. Bell. Civ. 14). After his proconsulship in Syria (57 
BCE), he was put to trial on the charges of maiestas, repetundae, and ambitus. He was acquitted on the 
first charge (cf. infra) but convicted on the second (rendering the last one redundant). Gabinius was 
subsequently exiled, and recalled only in 49 BCE by Caesar. For his life and career, see especially 
Sanford (1939); Badian (1959); Williams (1973). 
54 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 3.2.1-2. 
55 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 3.3.3. Dio 39.55.4, too, blames Pompey’s influence for the acquittal. 39.62 gives an 
indication of the widespread hatred for Gabinius. 
56 Cic. Att. 4.18.4: “Absoluto Gabinio stomachantes alii iudices hora post Antiochum Gabinium nescio 
quem <de> Sopolidis pictoribus libertum, accensum Gabini, lege Papia condemnarunt”.  
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price. It would be very unwise (if possible at all) for Gabinius or his associates to secure 
the acquittal of this freedman in addition to his own. Indeed, the populace – already 
blaming the extraordinary floods in Rome at the time on the blatant instance of 
injustice57 – needed some form of satisfaction. 
In his letter informing Atticus about the event, Cicero was clearly telling a story he 
assumed his friend – in Asia at the time – had not yet heard from other contacts. He 
therefore considered it likely that Atticus would not be familiar with this Gabinius 
Antiochus, and that a more detailed identification would be appropriate. Indeed, 
Antiochus being a libertus and accensus of Gabinius seemed particularly relevant and 
worthy of mention, since it were precisely these identity dimensions that had made him 
the target of popular resentment in the first place. The reference to the freedman’s 
occupation as a painter, on the other hand, contributes in no way to the story and 
comes across as rather odd to the modern reader. Its inclusion in the letter, however, is 
a clear indication that the description of Antiochus was meant to elucidate his identity 
to an addressee who would potentially not have realised it otherwise.  
That libertination was often included to clarify a freedman’s identity is illustrated also 
by the fact that it was regularly omitted in letters to correspondents of whom it was 
known that they already knew the freedman. When Cicero heard about a meeting 
between Pompey and Crassus in 55 BCE, he was eager to know what it was about and 
asked Atticus to find out more details: “I am dying to know everything that goes on. 
Would you find out what this means? – you can, from Demetrius”58. Although Demetrius 
was a very common name among slaves and freedmen, the context in which the phrase 
appears renders further specification redundant. Atticus would have known that Cicero 
meant Pompey’s freedman Demetrius of Gadara, not least because the consul and his 
colleague were themselves the subjects of the next passages. Similarly, when referring 
to Atticus’ freedman Eutychides in letters addressed to Atticus himself, Cicero did not 
deem it worthwhile or necessary to include libertination, but instead described him as 
meus amicus Eutychides59. In a letter to another good friend, M. Fabius Gallus, Cicero 
repeatedly mentioned a sculptor who had provided Cicero with many expensive 
statues60. The man is only referred to as “Avianius” but his profession clearly identifies 
him as the beneficiary of one of Cicero’s recommendations written in the same year 
(Avianius Evander)61. Because Fabius Gallus had only very recently negotiated with 
 
                                                     
57 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 3.5.8. 
58 Cic. Att. 4.11.1: “Gestio scire ista omnia. Etiam illud cuius modi sit velim perspicias; potes a 
Demetrio”. 
59 Cic. Att. 5.9.1. 
60 Cic. Fam. 7.23.1-3. Avianius is mentioned once in each of the first three sections of the letter. 
61 Cic. Fam. 13.2. 
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Evander to procure these statues on Cicero’s behalf, he would have undoubtedly known 
which person Cicero was referring to, especially since the entire letter is dedicated to 
the acquisition and assessment of said statues. Libertination thus simply seemed 
unnecessary. A final illuminating example is the mention of C. Fadius in a letter to 
Atticus (briefly referred to in the previous chapter)62. In it, Cicero scorns Antony for 
having children by the daughter of a certain – and not further identified – C. Fadius. We 
only learn from one of Cicero’s speeches that this Fadius was a freedman, and that 
Antony’s union with his daughter was disreputable for that very reason63. It is likely 
that this union was public knowledge already, but Atticus would at any rate have known 
Fadius’ legal status since he was at the time reviewing the speech in which the affair was 
disapprovingly publicised64. The status of Fadius was therefore already considered 
known to Atticus and it would come across as superfluous or even pedantic to repeat it 
in the letter. The same goes for the most frequently mentioned freedmen in the 
correspondence (e.g. Dionysius, Tiro, Statius, Philotimus, …), whose legal status is rarely 
explicitly included in the letters65. 
4.3.2 Limitations of the identification-explanation 
Although an identification purpose may well have been a factor in “deciding” whether 
or not to include libertination, many instances cannot be accounted for by this 
seemingly straightforward explanation. A first problem with the conception of 
libertination merely as an identifying and specifying “tool” comes to the fore when we 
consider the letters that were written to a person who already knew the freedman, but 
that nonetheless contained a specific status marker. In both letters Cicero wrote to 
Atticus in the Spring of 45 BCE, for example, he mentions his freedman Aegypta. In one 
of them, Cicero writes that “the freedman Aegypta” had brought him good news about 
Atticus’ wife and daughter (accepi ab Aegypta liberto eodem die Piliam et Atticam plane belle 
se habere)66. Less than a month later, he does exactly the same when he ends a letter 
with the news that “the freedman Aegypta” had delivered a letter, this time from Brutus 
 
                                                     
62 Cic. Att. 16.11.1. 
63 Cic. Phil. 2.3. He is named Q. Fadius instead of C. Fadius in the Second Philippic. 
64 Cic. Att. 15.13.1. 
65 Dionysius is only once (and rather indirectly) referred to as a libertinus (Att. 7.4.1); Philotimus two 
or three times as libertus (Fam. 3.9.1; 8.3.2; maybe Att. 10.7.2) and twice with a Greek equivalent (Att. 
6.4.3; 6.5.1); Statius once receives a reference to his status (Att. 6.2.1-2) although he is elsewhere 
indirectly referred to as libertus aut servus (Quint. Fratr. 1.2.3) and his manumission is explicitly 
stated on two occasions (Att. 2.18.4; 2.19.1); Tiro is nowhere described with his legal status, although 
the references to his manumission are well-known (Fam. 16.10.1; 16.14; 16.15; 16.16.1). 
66 Cic. Att. 12.37.1. 
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(attulerat ab eo [Bruto] Aegypta libertus litteras)67. In the first instance, the inclusion of 
libertus seems “superfluous” because Aegypta had recently had contact with Atticus and 
his family who doubtlessly knew him to be Cicero’s freedman. Even in the unlikely event 
that Atticus had forgotten about Aegypta the first time, he would certainly not have 
done so a few weeks later when Cicero again presented Aegypta as libertus. Similarly, in 
another letter to Atticus a year later, Cicero notes that he had received the letter his 
friend had entrusted for delivery to Demetrius libertus68. Demetrius may have been a 
freedman of Cicero or Atticus, but we cannot know this for sure since his 
characterisation is generalised instead of relational. In any case, we have once again a 
very precise indication of the temporal spread between the sending of the letter and its 
reception by Cicero. Atticus had sent the letter on 29 April and Cicero had received it on 
3 May. It would again amount to an insult to either Atticus’ intelligence or to his 
networking abilities if Cicero included libertination simply to identify Demetrius. 
Atticus would surely have remembered entrusting the freedman with a letter only a few 
days earlier, especially since it contained a delicate account of Atticus’ views on the 
present political situation. 
Moreover, the idea that libertination was primarily meant to specify an individual 
(e.g. to differentiate him from a namesake) or to elucidate his status, is contradicted also 
by the many instances in which it is used to describe a freedman in a letter to his own 
patron, who would of course know the libertus very well. Examples include Cilix 
(freedman of Ap. Claudius), Apella (freedman of M. Fabius), and Dardanus (freedman of 
C. Furnius)69. Finally, the libertination included in letters such as the one recommending 
Mithres (cf. Chapter 5) clearly suggests that it was not meant to introduce him as a 
freedmen. Mithres est, ut scit, libertus Postumi indicates that Isauricus already knew 
Mithres, and that he knew him to be a freedman of Postumus70. 
These and similar observations point to a “function” of libertination not merely 
aimed at clarifying the identity of specific individuals. The fact that Cicero mentions the 
freedmen at all (instead of omitting them as the deliverers of letters, or instead of 
simply calling them tabellarii), should therefore be accounted for and respected in its 
own right. For this reason, and because many of the freedmen in Cicero’s 
correspondence function at least once as courier or messenger, this group constitutes a 
good basis for a case study on the use of libertination.  
 
                                                     
67 Cic. Att. 13.3.2. 
68 Cic. Att. 14.17.1: “Ibi mihi cenanti litterae tuae sunt redditae quas dederas Demetrio liberto prid. 
Kal.”. 
69 Cic. Fam. 3.1.2; 7.25.2; 10.25.3. 
70 Cic. Fam. 13.69.1. 
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4.4 Couriers in Cicero’s correspondence 
4.4.1 Couriers and letter delivery in ancient Rome 
In 1962, the Canadian communication theorist Marshall McLuhan coined the term 
“global village” to describe the world as people perceived it at the time71. McLuhan 
thereby captured how technological developments would eventually make every place 
on Earth immediately accessible in both time and space. In a world like that, it is very 
hard to imagine a situation where quick and smooth exchange of messages is much 
more difficult, if not nigh impossible. This has been a problem all historical societies 
have struggled with, and to which various different solutions were devised, depending 
on as many contextual factors. One of the most common ones was the development of 
some form of postal system. 
Although “[d]ie Universalform der Nachrichtenbeförderung im Altertum war und 
blieb der Brief”, Romans in Republican times did not yet have a formal postal service at 
their disposal72. It was only during the Principate that the emperor Augustus would 
install the cursus publicus73. This did not mean, however, that delivering a letter in the 
Republic was necessarily a difficult thing to do. Indeed, one could rely on the lictores of 
provincial governors, on the extensive networks of the tax farmers (publicani), on 
household personnel, and on travelling friends74. One of the most frequently employed 
means to send a letter, were the tabellarii domestici. These were members of the 
household personnel of an aristocrat or his correspondents, usually slaves or 
freedmen75.  
The rather informal systems of letter transport did not always ensure a safe or timely 
delivery. When Cicero was anxiously awaiting news about the condition of his ill slave 
Tiro in April 53 BCE, the one-day delay of the expected letter resulted in a restless and 
 
                                                     
71 McLuhan (1962). 
72 Riepl (1913), 124. The absence of a formal postal service is somewhat surprising, especially 
considering the famous quality of the Roman road system as well as the existence of such services in 
earlier or contemporary cultures like the Persian Empire or the territories controlled by Alexander 
the Great. It has baffled sholars to the extent that some have nonetheless tried to prove some kind 
of Republican postal infrastructure. E.g. Ramsey (1920). For a critique on the arguments, see 
Nicholson (1994), 33. 
73 Suet. Aug. 49; Plin. Ep. 10.120. For the cursus publicus, see Kolb (2000). 
74 For the means available to Cicero and his contemporaries, see esp. Nicholson (1994), 33-4; 
Nikitinski (2001), 230-3; White (2010), 11-5; McCutcheon (2013), 180-1. It goes without saying that 
most of these were reserved only for those who possessed the required economic and social capital.  
75 See most recently White (2010), 15-8 for the “involvement of the household” in delivering letters. 
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fearful night (noxa plena timoris ac miseriae)76. The possible reasons for the delay or loss of 
a letter were legion: bandits, official control posts, the remoteness of a region, 
interception by political adversaries, or bad weather conditions77. No wonder Cicero 
always felt relieved when a response to his letter arrived, signalling that the initial one 
had been delivered successfully78. Because of the many dangers along the way, Cicero 
often refrained from confiding delicate information to paper79. When clarifying to 
Cassius why he would not write about political matters in late December 46 BCE, he 
explains that writing about serious matters (σπουδάζειν) is no longer possible without 
considerable risk, and that the only communication allowed those days was silly 
nonsense (φλύαροι)80. Cicero repeats the same concern in many another letters, like the 
one written only days later – and again addressed to Cassius – where he bitterly states 
that what he thinks was not pleasant or allowed to write down81. A possible solution was 
to give an oral message to a courier as annex or clarification to the letter, instead of 
conveying all the information directly via the written text. This would require not only 
a very loyal courier, but also one with something of a memory82. An oral message would 
have the added benefit of preventing misunderstanding – a danger inherent in 
unilateral written communication – as it allows for the clarification of potential 
ambiguities, thus partly dismissing Isocrates’ famous critique on letter writing (… 
ἀπόντος γὰρ τοῦ γράψαντος ἔρημα τοῦ βοηθήσοντός ἐστιν)83. Of course, if a courier was 
unwilling or unable to deliver the message entrusted to him, and instead relegated the 
task to yet someone else, the entire purpose of selecting trustworthy messengers would 
be defeated. When Cicero received a letter from Sulpicius Rufus without much 
supplementary information, he regretted that his freedman Philotimus – who had 
 
                                                     
76 Cic. Fam. 16.14. 
77 E.g. Cic. Fam. 10.31.1; 10.33.1; 2.9.1; 12.12.1; Att. 3.8.2. 
78 Cic. Fam. 12.19.1: “Libentissime legi tuas litteras, in quibus iucundissimum mihi fuit quod cognovi 
meas tibi redditas esse. Non enim dubitabam quin eas libenter lecturus esses; verebar ut 
redderentur”. 
79 E.g. Cic. Fam. 13.68.2: “Ego ad te de re publica summa quid sentiam non saepe scribam propter 
periculum eius modi litterarum (…)”. 
80 Cic. Fam. 15.18.1.  
81 Cic. Fam. 15.16.3: “Nec enim quod sentio libet scribere”. Note how the nuanced meanings of nec 
libet (the subjective “it is not pleasing” and the more prohibitive “it is not allowed”) could be 
interpreted in multiple ways. Cicero could not be writing about politics because he – quite suddenly 
– found no more pleasure in it, or because what he had to say about it was not allowed to be spoken 
out loud. Cf. also Cic. Att. 1.17.10; 10.7.1; 10.18.1; Quint. Fratr. 3.7.3; … 
82 Cic. Fam. 9.2.1: “(…) sed cum eo ut cum homine docto et amantissimo tui locutus ea sum quae 
pertulisse illum ad te existimo” (talking about Caninius, the common friend of Cicero and Varro). 
Other examples include Fam. 1.7.1; 1.9.23; 6.2.3; 10.8.5; 10.24.4; 11.10.2; Att. 11.3.1; 11.4a; … Cf. 
Nicholson (1994), 42 note 16; Nikitinski (2001), 239-44. 
83 Isocr. Ep. 1.3. The conviction is one of the few Isocrates shared with Plato, who condemned 
“writing” in general in his Phaedrus.  
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originally been entrusted with the delivery of both the letter and an accompanying oral 
message – had not come in person, but had instead forwarded the letter84. 
Because they did not trust certain messengers, correspondents would even send 
more than one version of the same letter, or repeat the central theme of a letter in 
several subsequent ones85. Or as Cicero put it himself in numerous letters to Atticus: “Of 
family worries with all their pricks and pains I shall say nothing. I won’t commit them to 
this letter and an unknown courier” or “My letters to you being of the kind they 
generally are [i.e. confidential], I don’t like giving them to anybody unless I can be sure 
that he will deliver them to you”86. Indeed, Cicero realised that his prominent position 
in the state was so vulnerable that his letters could not miss their destination without 
causing serious damage. Because of the many secrets (mysteria) contained within them, 
he often did not even entrust them to his librarii for fear something might leak out 
(excidare)87. 
Slaves were generally considered not trustworthy enough to carry important or 
sensitive news88. At least one instance reveals that this prejudice may not always have 
been mere elite snobbery. When Cicero was eagerly awaiting a letter from Atticus in 
April 59 BCE, the arrival of a few slaves made him temporarily elated. When they told 
him they were not carrying any letters, however, Cicero’s tone and face, when uttering 
his surprise, scared the slaves so much that they immediately started confessing. They 
 
                                                     
84 Cic. Fam. 4.2.1: “accepi tuas litteras; quibus lectis cognovi non satis prudenter fecisse Philotimum, 
qui, cum abs te mandata haberet, ut scribis, de omnibus rebus, ipse ad me non venisset, litteras tuas 
misisset, quas intellexi breviores fuisse quod eum perlaturum putasses”. Cf. also the case of Phania 
discussed below. 
85 Cic. Fam. 4.4.1: “Accipio excusationem tuam qua usus es cur saepius ad me litteras uno exemplo 
dedisses, sed accipio ex ea parte quatenus aut neglegentia aut improbitate eorum qui epistulas 
accipiant fieri scribis ne ad nos perferantur (…)”. See also Fam. 10.5.1; 11.11.1; 12.30.7; Att. 6.1.9; 
13.29.3. For repetition of the same theme in multiple letters, see e.g. Fam. 14.14 and 18 or Att. 6.9 and 
7.1. 
86 Cic. Att. 1.18.2: “Ac domesticarum quidem sollicitudinum aculeos omnis et scrupulos occultabo 
neque ego huic epistulae atque ignoto tabellario committam”; Att. 4.15.3: “Genus autem mearum ad 
te quidem litterarum eius modi fere est ut non libeat cuiquam dare nisi de quo exploratum sit tibi 
eum redditurum”. Cf. Att. 1.13.1; 15.4.4. See Nicholson (1994), 39 note 12 for many further examples 
of fear for unsafe delivery of letters. 
87 Cic. Att. 4.17.1: “Neque enim <eae> sunt epistulae nostrae quae si perlatae non sint nihil ea res nos 
offensura sit; quae tantum habent mysteriorum ut eas ne librariis quidem fere committamus ne quid 
quo excidat”. Cicero is no doubt exaggerating in this instance, because he stresses the 
confidentiality of his own staff on multiple occasions, e.g. Fam. 11.21.5 (si quid erit occultius et, ut 
scribis, reconditum, meorum aliquem mittam, quo fidelius ad te litterae perferantur); Att. 8.1.2 (hominemque 
certum misi de comitibus meis); 11.17 (properantibus tabellariis alienis hanc epistulam dedi. Eo brevior est, et 
quod eram missurus nostros); 15.4.4 (hanc epistulam si illius tabellario dedissem, veritus sum ne solveret; 
itaque misi dedita); … 
88 Treggiari (1969a), 145; Smadja (1976), 92; McCutcheon (2013), 204-5. 
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had in fact been given a letter, but had lost it along the way89. The fact that Cicero and 
his correspondents sealed some of the letters they entrusted to slaves may be another 
indicator of this lack of trust in servile dependents90. The practice of sealing letters was 
of course well established, and it was often a safeguard against manipulation of the 
letter by third parties in general rather than by the couriers in particular91. Indeed, in 
May 49 BCE Cicero decided not to send a letter – even though it was sealed – because he 
did not trust the courier92. This decision signifies that Cicero and his correspondents did 
not assume (and quite rightly so) that a seal would prevent a perfidious courier from 
opening and reading the letter. However, the reason for the distrust in this case was the 
fact that the courier did not belong to Cicero’s or Atticus’ staff, but was instead an 
alienus. This in turn suggests that the seal would have been enough (or at least more) 
insurance if the courier had been Cicero’s own dependent, and that at least to a certain 
extent, seals were used also to prevent intrusion by one’s own slaves. In 48 BCE, for 
instance, Atticus used the slave Anteros to deliver a sealed letter to Cicero, even though 
it contained no important or sensitive news whatsoever, as Cicero already remarked in 
his reply: “I have received your sealed communication, conveyed by Anteros, from 
which I could learn nothing about my private affairs”93.  
Although the source material is too scarce to positively conclude the correlation 
between the use of slaves and the practice of sealing letters, it is certain that couriers 
needed to be trustworthy and that the expected fides of a freedman made him a 
reasonable candidate to transfer particularly sensitive messages. As various scholars 
already noted: “(…) für wichtigere Meldungen entsandte man lieber die Freigelassenen”, 
“Il vaut mieux confier certaines lettres à d’autres membres du personnel dont on a pu 
apprécier la fidélité, des affranchis surtout (…)”, and “[f]reedmen, not slaves, were 
generally used for confidential secretarial duties or for carrying important letters”94. In 
 
                                                     
89 Cic. Att. 2.8.1: “Perterriti voce et vultu confessi sunt se accepisse sed excidisse in via”. 
90 Surely they sealed letters entrusted to freedmen from time to time too. The fact that none of such 
instances is recorded, however, might be an indication (but nothing more than that) for the 
difference in relative occurrence, or at least for the sensibilities related to freedmen’s fides, cf. infra. 
91 For the regularity of sealing letters, see e.g. Cic. Att. 5.19.1; 8.6.1; 10.11.1; 12.11.1; 15.6.4; … Ad Brut. 
2.5.4 shows that the lack of a seal may be interpreted as the letter being a forgery (falsa). Cf. Att. 
11.2.4. For the sealing of letters in Cicero’s time, see Nicholson (1994), esp. 42-43. 
92 Cic. Att. 10.11.1: “Obsignata iam epistula superiore non placuit ei dari cui constitueram quod erat 
alienus”. 
93 Cic. Att. 11.1.1: “Accepi a te signatum libellum quem Anteros attulerat; ex quo nihil scire potui de 
nostris domesticis rebus”. 
94 Blänsdorf (2001), 448; Smadja (1976), 92-3; Treggiari (1969b), 197. We should nonetheless avoid an 
artificial and binary distinction between “slaves as untrustworthy” and “freedmen as trustworthy”, 
pace the rigid opinion of Smadja (1976) as discussed earlier. A focus on the case of Tiro, for example, 
clearly suggests that his confidential responsibilities well preceded his manumission. In fact, Tiro’s 
confidential position may well have been the cause rather than a consequence of his social 
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fact, many freedmen in Cicero’s correspondence are only known to us because they 
occur once as letter carriers: Libo’s Hilarus, Pompeius’ Philo, Curio’s Thraso, Q. Cicero’s 
Philogonus, etc.95 Moreover, Cicero exhorted his correspondents to answer his letters 
only if reliable couriers were at hand96. Because it is unlikely that these correspondents 
did not have any slaves available to entrust their letters to, it seems plausible to 
conclude once more that close friends and freedmen rather than slaves were considered 
the trustworthy couriers par excellence – at least in the case of delicate letters97.  
The difference between slaves and freedmen can be linked to the contrast between 
confidence and trust (cf. Chapter 1). Or to slightly modify Seneca’s words: post 
manumissionem credendum est, ante manumissionem iudicandum98. Confidence ensues from 
the knowledge that there exist institutions and rules that ensure the respecting of trust, 
or that can be resorted to if it is damaged. Confiding letters to slaves would therefore be 
based on the realisation that slaves themselves knew that their chances of manumission 
would be forfeited, should they blatantly betray their master’s confidence, or that such 
misconduct could be severely punished. After Cicero’s slave Dionysius had stolen some 
books from his master’s library, for example, he thought the best course of action was to 
run away in order to evade such punishments99. That his reaction may not have been 
entirely ungrounded is clear from a later letter in which Cicero threatens to parade the 
slave during the triumph of the Illyrian governor Vatinius if he resisted arrest any 
further100. Licinus, another runaway slave, even pretended to be a free man (pro libero 
fuit) in Athens. We can only guess which punishments his master Aesopus had in mind, 
but the tone of the letter in which Cicero mentions Licinus’ recapture does not bode 
very well for the slave101. Similarly, when the emperor Augustus found out that one of 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
promotion. See for example Cic. Fam. 16.16.2: “De Tirone (…) mihi gratissimum fecisti cum eum 
indignum illa fortuna ac nobis amicum quam servum esse maluisti”. 
95 Cic. Att. 16.4.1; Fam. 2.7.3; Quint. Fratr. 1.3.4; … This is true also for slaves although in a lesser 
degree and usually in contexts where trust was not a priority: Att. 5.21.4 (Canuleius’ Hermo); 9.14.2; 
11.1.1 (Q. Cicero’s Anteros); Fam. 16.13-14.1 (M. Cicero’s Menander); … 
96 Roesch (2000), 105-6. E.g. Cic. Fam. 1.9.23; 11.20.4; Att. 5.17.1; 16.2.6; … 
97 All the letters mentioned in the previous note were highly confidential. Cic. Fam. 1.9.23 reveals 
Cicero’s willingness to entrust the valuable drafts of his De Oratore en De temporibus meis only to a 
reliable (rectus) courier; Fam. 11.20.4 features Brutus exhorting Cicero to use only his own people 
(tui) to convey confidential news in the dangerous year 43 BCE (11.21.5 is Cicero’s similar sounding 
answer); in Att. 5.17.1 Cicero tells Atticus he is waiting for reliable couriers (certi homines) to entrust 
his letters to; … 
98 Sen. Ep. 3.1. Seneca was of course writing about amicitia, not manumissio. 
99 Cic. Fam. 13.77.3: “Dionysius, servus meus, qui meam bibliothecen multorum nummorum 
tractavit, cum multos libros surripuisset nec se impune laturum putaret, aufugit” 
100 Cic. Fam. 5.11.3: “Si vero improbus fuerit, ut est, duces eum captivum in triompho”. 
101 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 1.2.14: “(…) hominem comprehendit et in custodiam Ephesi tradidit; sed in 
publicamne an in pistrinum, non satis ex litteris eius intellegere potuimus. (…) Noli spectare quanti 
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his slaves – an a manu named Thallus – had accepted 500 denarii to expose the content 
of one of his letters, he had the man’s legs broken102. The anecdote appears in a 
discussion where Suetonius highlights both the strictness (severitas) and the 
mercifulness (clementia) of Augustus as a master and patron. Another imperial slave who 
had spoken ill of his patron, for example, was “merely” put in shackles (non ultra quam 
compedibus coercuit103). The fact that the emperor’s clemency could not save Thallus, 
reveals the gravity of his offense, which was not coincidentally juxtaposed to other 
heinous crimes such as the adultery of a freedman with multiple Roman matrons, or the 
arrogance (superbia) and greed (avaritia) of servants and tutors of the emperor’s son 
Gaius (all of whom were consequently condemned to death). The confidence in slaves 
thus resulted at least as much from repressive tools as from preventive assurances. 
Because slaves were at least theoretically incapable of virtues like gratitude, trust, or 
loyalty, external factors (be it the “stick” or the “carrot”) had to be relied on when 
confiding letters to them. Or in Propertius’ words: “[although] every messenger should 
be free from deceit, one who is also a slave should be even more reliable out of fear” and 
“there exist punishments for slave witnesses who damage trust”104. 
Freedmen, on the other hand, could not be punished as easily. Especially since patrons 
during the Republic did not yet have the more extensive powers their imperial 
successors eventually obtained, the hold on their freedmen was of an entirely different 
nature. Indeed, Cicero’s powerlessness and the lack of controlling mechanisms would 
become painfully clear in the cases of Hilarus and Chrysippus, two ingrati liberti whom 
Cicero desperately tried (but essentially failed) to punish on his own terms (cf. infra). 
The ideology of manumission was based on the release from servitude of only the most 
worthy slaves, and freedmen were expected to have internalised the above mentioned 
virtues of gratia, obsequium, and fides. Patrons could therefore, at least in theory, trust 
(instead of merely confide in) these dependents. Moreover, freedmen – especially after 
formal manumission – could not be subjected to corporal punishment, and their 
respectability as citizens in the public transcript of equality would have to be 
acknowledged at all times. The trust in freedmen therefore leaned on prevention – 
dyadic and network embedded “learning” and “control” – rather than repression, and 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
homo sit. Parvi enim preti est qui tam nihil<i> sit. Sed tanto dolore Aesopus est adfectus propter 
servi scelus et audaciam ut nihil ei gratius facere possis quam si illum per te reciperarit”. 
102 Suet. Aug. 67.2. Boulvert (1974), 87 rightly considered Thallus a slave rather than a freedman, 
based on the cruel castigation he received. Moreover, the epigraphic record similarly suggests that 
Augustus relied on his slaves to fulfil this particular post (CIL 6, 8885; 33754). 
103 Suet. Aug. 67.1. 
104 Prop. 3.6.3-4: “Omnis enim debet sine vano nuntius esse, maioremque metu servus habere fidem”; 
20: “Est poena et servo rumpere teste fidem”. 
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was therefore of a nature completely opposite to that of the confidence in slaves. A bond 
of trust was not only considered more solid than conditional confidence, but repression 
in the case of slaves could also be resorted to only after any damage was already done105. 
In other words, only with freedmen could patrons maintain a real trust network106.  
Freeborn clients and friends were obvious candidates too. In his study on how 
material and paratextual aspects influence the content, reception, and effect of Cicero’s 
letters, Robert McCutcheon has convincingly shown how the choice of couriers was 
often well reflected on because it would steer the reading of the letter by the addressee, 
due to the “horizon of expectation” these messengers created. Having one courier for 
financial matters and another for familial ones, for example, would thus create a 
specific atmosphere for the lecture even before any reading actually took place107. The 
role of amicitia in letter-carrying (and, conversely, the role of letter-carrying in 
consolidating bonds of amicitia) as well as the importance of fides therein, features 
prominently throughout McCutcheon’s work108. However, he does not particularly focus 
on the differences in legal status of Cicero’s couriers, nor to their discursive 
rendering109. Where such attention does occur, the focus is on unnamed pueri and the 
 
                                                     
105 Theoretically, the prospect of punishment or diminished reputation would withhold a slave from 
betraying his master (and therefore served as a kind of “prevention”), but reality did not always 
correspond do this ideal situation, as examples like that of Dionysius make abundantly clear. At any 
rate, the repressive foundation of the confidentiality would cause significant tension and suspicion, 
cf. Zelnick-Abramovitz (2005), 54. 
106 Cf. Granovetter (1985), 490: “The widespread preference for transacting with individuals of 
known reputation implies that few are actually content to rely on either generalised morality or 
institutional arrangements to guard against trouble”. Granovetter implicity refers to dyadic and 
network embedded learning and control when he sums up four advantages of trusting individuals 
whom one knows very well personally : “(1) it is cheap; (2) one trusts one’s own information best – it 
is richer, more detailed, and known to be accurate; (3) individuals with whom one has a continuing 
relation have an economic motivation to be trustworthy, so as not to discourage future transactions; 
and (4) departing from pure economic motives, continuing economic relations often become 
overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from 
opportunism” (ibid). 
107 McCutcheon (2013), 175-217. He draws on Jauss’ (1982), esp. 22-8 literary reception theory. Both 
scholars are in my view greatly indebted to Koselleck’s insights (cf. supra; especially his notion of 
Erwartungshorizont) but do not explicitly acknowledge this. For the use of a particular dependant for 
a specific kind of letter, see especially 188-90. 
108 See especially McCutcheon (2013), 206-17. 
109 Functionality (e.g. financial subjects versus political ones) and contextuality (e.g. specific 
attention to the addressee and his relation to Cicero) predominate as analytical focus. The cases of 
Phania and (to a slightly lesser degree) Cilix are discussed, but attention to their status remains 
mostly peripheral (192-5) insofar as they are not really distinguished from freeborn couriers. Cf. our 
discussion of these two couriers below. Pages 209-14 suggest that employing someone as a courier is 
also a statement of trust in the person, but the two examples concern freeborn individuals (and do 
not differentiate these in terms of status from slaves or freedmen). 
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examination is at times rather dubious110. Part of our analysis will therefore constitute a 
qualification of his (or rather Jauss’) notion of “horizon of expectation” by suggesting 
that sending a freedman (rather than a slave or even a friend) created not only a climate 
of mutual trust, but also accentuated the respect of the writer for the addressee in 
committing valuable social capital. 
4.4.2 Couriers, libertination, and trustworthiness in Cicero’s letters 
Of the 100 different passages referring to a freedman in Cicero’s correspondence111, 52 
include libertination. Roughly one in two freedmen thus receives the identification 
libertus (either in the generalising or the relational sense)112. The same 100 passages 
contain 33 instances in which the freedman mentioned fulfils the purpose of messenger 
or courier. By the latter function, we mean that he is explicitly sent to deliver a message 
or that his relation to the writer and addressee of the letter is primarily that of an 
intermediate regularly passing information. If libertination were a randomly applied 
description, occurring arbitrarily throughout the correspondence, we would expect the 
rate of couriers-with-libertination to couriers-without-libertination to broadly reflect 
or at least somehow resemble the general libertination-rate of 52%. However, of the 33 
messengers, no less than 28 (85%) are explicitly called libertus. As always, any 
quantitative or statistical impression is a priori flawed because of the various 
“selection” processes the correspondence has historically gone through (cf. Chapter 3), 
but the general trend in this case is unmistakably clear. The strong correlation between 
the function of courier and an explicit mention of libertination suggests that these 
person’s legal status was a feature particularly worth stressing in these cases.  
By explicitly including libertination when mentioning his own freedmen as couriers, 
Cicero stressed the extensiveness and total reach of his (and his correspondent’s) trust 
 
                                                     
110 McCutcheon (2013), 204-5 argues that not mentioning a courier (i.c. a puer) by name is an explicit 
strategy to imply closeness, informality, and intimacy with the correspondent. Although some 
exceptions are fairly listed (note 534), the discussion greatly underestimates the many named pueri 
used to deliver messages to close intimates on the one hand, and the many unnamed pueri referred 
to in letters to less familiar correspondents on the other. The contrast (p. 205) between named 
tabellarii (freed or about to be) and unnamed pueri (slaves) also seems too artificial to be convincing. 
In addition to the “exceptions” listed by McCutcheon’s, see e.g. Cic. Fam. 3.7.4; 4.12.2; 6.20.1; 13.41.2 
(unnamed pueri to less intimate connections); 2.7.3; 3.3.1; 9.9.3; 10.33.3; 15.18.2 (unnamed tabellarii); 
Att. 5.21.4; 9.14.2; 11.1.1 (named slaves to intimates). Cf. the critique on Smadja (1976), 91-2 in 
Chapter 3. The argument, finally, also implicitly takes for granted that Cicero could at all times be 
picky in choosing which dependent to send out as letter bearer. 
111 We exclude, for the time being, the “big four” (Dionysius, Philotimus, Statius, and Tiro). 
112 This number includes the Greek variant in Cic. Att. 6.5.2 and the derogatively used verna in Fam. 
8.15.2. 
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network. In the above mentioned example of Aegypta, Cicero accentuated that it was his 
own freedman that constituted the “bridging social capital” between himself on the one 
hand, and both Brutus and Atticus’ wife and daughter on the other. Likewise, in a reply 
message to Appius Pulcher, Cicero refers to Appius’ original letter by stressing that it 
was the one “you gave to my freedman (libertus meus) Philotimus”113. A few months 
later, Cicero sent the same Philotimus with a letter to Servius Sulpicius in order to 
obtain a reconciliation114. The letter is dated to late April 49 BCE and addressed to 
Atticus, who at the time knew Philotimus very well through repeated interactions. 
Indeed, the many preceding letters to Atticus that mention Philotimus, had not included 
libertination. Their tone implies that Cicero and Atticus had been continuously relying 
on Philotimus on many different occasions115. Nonetheless, Cicero suddenly decides to 
write misi Philotimum libertum in the letter reporting about Philotimus’ reconciliation 
mission. Clearly, the stakes were high and Cicero not only meant to advertise the extent 
of his own network, but he also wanted to express that he had chosen a very valuable 
freedman for the important job. Besides accentuating the nodal role of his own 
freedmen as couriers and thereby publicising his own bridging social capital, the 
explicit use of libertination also served to convince a correspondent of the efforts and 
seriousness with which Cicero undertook certain communications. 
In another letter to Appius Pulcher at the end of 53 BCE, Cicero praised Appius’ 
freedman Cilix (Cilix libertus tuus), whom he had started to respect as a kind and 
considerate agent of his patron. Surely, the relational clause would have been 
redundant if we consider it to serve only a clarifying function. The inclusion of explicit 
libertination becomes clear only once we realise that by portraying Cilix’s many 
qualities, Cicero was at the same time praising Appius. He would not even have noticed 
Cilix’s commendable character (antea mihi minus fuit notus …) if he had not first delivered 
his patron’s affectionate and friendly letter (… sed ut mihi reddidit a te litteras plenas et 
amoris et offici) which the freedman followed up with his own kind words (mirifice ipse quo 
sermone subsecutus humanitatem litterarum tuarum)116. The link between Cilix and Appius 
is moreover accentuated by presenting the former as the mouthpiece of his patron. 
Indeed, his most commendable feature was that he could express the feelings of his 
patron towards Cicero like no other (iucunda mihi eius oratio fuit cum de animo tuo, de 
 
                                                     
113 Cic. Fam. 3.9.1. It was of course Terentia’s freedman, but Cicero – for all means and purposes – 
considered him his own on many occasions. 
114 Cic. Att. 10.7.2. 
115 On the sixteenth of the same month, Cicero had mentioned Philotimus as a financial agent 
without any reference to his status (Att. 10.5.3). A month earlier, he had described Philotimus – 
again without libertination – as the deliverer of a book (Att. 9.9.2). Another few days earlier, he had 
referred to his capacity as an accountant (Att. 9.7.6); … 
116 Cic. Fam. 3.1.1. 
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sermonibus quos de me haberes cottidie, mihi narraret). By explicitly referring to Cilix as 
libertus tuus – and, moreover, by stressing the clause by placing it at the very beginning 
of a new paragraph – Cicero set the stage for the main theme of the passage. Both the 
position of the libertination and the shrewdness with which Cicero composed all his 
letters to Appius117, suggest that this letter is one of the instances in which libertination 
is used more “deliberately”. 
Finally, in a very long letter to Atticus, Cicero writes about his rejection of a request 
made by Caelius Rufus. A couple of months earlier, Caelius had sent a freedman with a 
letter and a message to Cicero – proconsul in Cilicia at the time –, asking him to send 
over some wild animals; a request Cicero could not reconcile with his standing and 
reputation118. Whereas Caelius had mentioned the freedman by name (libertum Philonem 
istoc misi et Diogenem Graecum), Cicero in his letter to Atticus stuck to a general 
classification (libertus) without further identifying him (Caelius libertum ad me misit)119. 
Caelius of course wanted Cicero to know that he was exhausting his own resources 
when making the request, thus trying to increase the chances of its being received more 
positively. Philo was accompanied by Diogenes, a free Greek who would perhaps be 
more familiar with the region than his travel companion. Libertus Philo may therefore 
also have served to distinguish both messengers (at least in terms of their status). At any 
rate, it is significant that Philo precedes Diogenes in Caelius’ description, and that focus 
is directed toward his freed status. This is done not only by having libertum precede 
Philonem, but also by again placing it at the very beginning of the sentence. Moreover, 
libertum Philonem forms a noteworthy chiasmus with Diogenem Graecum, which all the 
more persistently brings out the accentuation of libertum. 
All these concerns were of less importance to Cicero in the letter that relates the 
story to Atticus, although the fact that he retained at least libertus suggests that he 
acknowledged and respected Caelius’ effort and commitment, and that he deemed it 
equally important that Atticus should also be aware of it. Furthermore, Cicero leaves 
Philo’s companion Diogenes entirely out of the picture and presents Philo (or rather the 
unnamed libertus) as sole conveyer of the message. Philo is mentioned only one more 
time in the correspondence a few months later. Both he and Diogenes, so Cicero writes 
in another letter to Caelius, had been staying with him for a while in Cilicia but were by 
 
                                                     
117 Hall (2009), 46, 58-9, 139ff. McCutcheon (2013), 195-6 very rightly notes that Appius may not have 
had the intention of declaring his great affection for Cicero, but that Cicero uses the freedman (as 
reflection of Appius) to “read” this sentiment in the letter to lubricate his relationship with Appius. 
118 Cic. Fam. 8.8.10: “Libertum Philonem istoc misi et Diogenem Graecum, quibus mandata et litteras 
ad te dedi”. 
119 Cic. Att. 6.1.21: “Nam Caelius libertum ad me misit et litteras accurate scriptas et de pantheris et 
[lacuna] a civitatibus”. 
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now leaving again for Pessinus120. Interestingly, it is Diogenes this time who takes pride 
of place. Not only is he now situated at the very beginning of the sentence, but he is also 
described as Diogenes tuus. He even receives a short description (homo modestus) and it is 
the Greek who is the grammatical subject of the verb discessit (Diogenes tuus, homo 
modestus, a me cum Philone Pessinunte<m> discessit). Philo is attributed less (discursive) 
agency and only seems to accompany Diogenes. Whereas Caelius had placed Philo 
before the Greek to stress the resources he was stretching by sending his own 
dependent all the way to Cilicia, Cicero half a year later reverses the order. In the latter 
letter, however, neither Diogenes nor Philo occur in a context of trust relations between 
Caelius and Cicero: they are just said to be leaving Cicero. It is no coincidence that this is 
the only letter in which Philo’s status is not made explicit through libertination. Instead, 
Diogenes takes first place, receives a possessive pronoun, and is further commended for 
his modest character. 
Mentioning the freed status of a letter carrier also served to guarantee that the 
information obtained was trustworthy and correct. Not only the freed status of the 
courier – a token of his being deemed “worthy” and “capable” in his patron’s eyes – but 
also the connection to his patron as a guarantee for this trustworthiness was explicitly 
included. In these instances, literary “libertination” often approximated epigraphic 
libertination. In a carefully composed letter, Cicero apologises to his brother for an 
angry letter he had sent him earlier in a whir of agitation: “I was annoyed by what 
Lucullus’ freedman Diodotus said, and wrote in some irritation immediately after 
hearing about the agreement”121. Cicero had clearly written impulsively and now 
regretted his outburst. One of the disadvantages of communicating via written letters 
instead of oral messages, is that any such impulse was much more difficult to make up 
for since the receiver would at all times be reminded of it when going through his 
previous correspondence with his contact122. Cicero therefore wanted to (perhaps quite 
literally) revoke (revocare) the letter. The fact that the angry letter has not made it into 
the published correspondence suggests that not only Cicero himself, but also the later 
editor deemed it better to erase it from memory altogether. In it, Cicero had 
undoubtedly included the conveyer of the information that had infuriated him 
(Diodotus), like he usually does. Repeating rather formally his full identity (Diodotus 
Luculli libertus) in the second letter is therefore unlikely to have originated from a 
 
                                                     
120 Cic. Fam. 2.12.2. 
121 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 1.2.12: “Litteras ad te parum fraterne scripseram, quas oratione Diodoti, Luculli 
liberti, commotus, de pactione statim quod audieram, iracundius scripseram et revocare cupiebam”. 
We are neither told the nature of the news nor provided with information about the pactio it must 
have related to. 
122 McCutcheon (2013), 187. 
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sorrow that Quintus would not remember the man. Instead, both his status marker and 
the specific relation to his patron stress the trustworthiness of the initial news Diodotus 
had delivered, and somehow legitimated Cicero’s severe reaction to it – even though he 
admitted it was wrong to take it out on Quintus. It were no mere rumours that had 
inflamed Cicero, it was reliable news from a reliable bearer.  
Similarly, in a letter to Atticus, Cicero wrote that Libo intruded on a conversation 
between himself and Brutus by announcing that “Pompey’s freedman Philo and his own 
freedman Hilarus had arrived from Sextus [Pompeius] with letters to the Consuls, or 
whatever else they are called”123. Although this is how Cicero reports the events to 
Atticus, it is difficult to imagine that Libo’s words on entrance were actually Philo Pompei 
libertus et Hilarus meus libertus venerunt (or a similar extensive formulation hardly 
befitting conversational parlance). Cicero thus transformed the announcement in his 
letter to identify both individuals in detail to his correspondent. Like in the case of 
Diodotus, Cicero could (and Libo perhaps did) just refer to the bearers of the news as 
tabelarii – like so many individuals who for that very reason remain incerti – instead of 
the much more elaborate Philo Pompei libertus et Hilarus suus libertus. The emphasis on 
their trustworthiness and the “proximity” of their “vouching” patron (Libo was not only 
discursively but also physically present) was, however, important considering the 
function of these men in the narrative. Not only were they en route to deliver sensitive 
reports to the consuls, but they also reported important and detailed political news 
from Sextus Pompeius (still in Africa at the time) in the immediate aftermath of Caesar’s 
assassination124. 
The focus on the trustworthiness of the freed courier often prompted the exclusion 
of any identifying proper name. Instead, the focus was directed to his status and to his 
patron. In a letter to Atticus from 58 BCE, for instance, Cicero writes that he had 
received consistently sad reports about his brother (de Quinto fratre nuntii nobis tristes nec 
varii venerant). However (autem), L. Regulus had sent his freedman Livineius to reassure 
Cicero that nothing damaging had been said in public (Livineius, L. Reguli libertus, ad me a 
Regulo missus venit)125. The initial unidentified nuntii thus contrast sharply with what 
Cicero conceived (and hoped) to be more reliable information. The freedman in 
question is very likely the Livineius Trypho, whom Cicero would recommend to C. 
 
                                                     
123 Cic. Att. 16.4.1: “Is Philonem Pompei libertum et Hilarum suum libertum venisse a Sexto cum 
litteris ad consules sive quo alio nomine sunt”. As usual, Cicero made use of the opportunity to 
subtly air his discontent about the election of Antony as consul (and Dolabella as suffectus). In his 
eyes, they were not “real” consuls. 
124 Cic. Att. 16.4.2. 
125 Cic. Att. 3.17.1. 
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Munatius the next year126. Whether he was or not, however, seems not to have been of 
great importance: his cognomen is not mentioned. By referring to him only by his nomen 
(Livineius) he could have been any one of Regulus’ freedmen, and this was precisely the 
point Cicero wanted to make. The attention is drawn away from the actual individual 
and is instead centred on his identity dimension as a trusted agent. The fact that 
Regulus had sent him in person (a Regulo missus) further enhances the impression (or 
hope) that this message rather than that of the many nuntii was accurate127. Cicero 
surely wanted this news to be truthful, and by closely connecting the trusted agent to 
his patron, the latter’s symbolic presence is invoked to vouch for the authenticity of the 
news.  
The stress on the trustworthiness of the “agent as freedman” rather than the “agent 
as specific individual” is a recurrent phenomenon, especially among couriers. In March 
47, Cicero complained that he had not yet received any letter from Murena’s unnamed 
freedman (a Murenae liberto)128; an anonymous freedman of C. Trebonius (C. Treboni 
libertus) carried vital news about Q. Cicero’s activities in the East in August 47129; and 
Cicero received important political information from Atticus through the letters 
delivered by Vestorius’ otherwise unknown freedman (a Vestori liberto) in April 44130. 
Likewise, in August 58, Cicero summarised the content of four letters he had 
simultaneously received from Atticus, but none of which are preserved today. In one of 
them, he refers to a freedman of Crassus who apparently had told Atticus about Cicero’s 
anxiety and frail condition. Cicero reassures Atticus later on in the letter that the 
freedman was mistaken: “Crassus’ freedman (Crassi libertus) must have spoken not very 
sincerely”131. It mattered less who this freedman was, and at any rate Atticus would 
probably remember which freedman had told him this “false” information anyway. The 
most important objective of the letter was to refute the claims made by this freedman, 
which Atticus had apparently readily believed. No named freedmen of Murena, 
Trebonius, Vestorius, or Crassus are mentioned elsewhere in the correspondence 
around this time132 so we cannot even make an educated guess about their name. Unlike 
 
                                                     
126 Cic. Fam. 13.60. For Trypho, see also the section on recommendation letters. 
127 A few days later, however, Atticus would send a message that seems to validate the various nuntii 
rather than Regulus’ information. Cicero consequently resorts to Atticus and asks his friend to send 
him all he knows about the matter of his brother, even if the truth was painful (tuas litteras semper 
maxime exspecto; in quibus cave vereare ne aut diligentia tua mihi molesta aut veritas acerba sit), Att. 3.17.3. 
128 Cic. Att. 11.13.1. 
129 Cic. Att. 11.20.1. 
130 Cic. Att. 14.9.1.  
131 Cic. Att. 3.15.1, 3: “(…) alteram [epistulam] qua Crassi libertum ais tibi de mea sollicitudine 
macieque narrasse (…)”; “Crassi libertum nihil puto sincere locutum”. 
132 The only freedman of Crassus mentioned by name is Apollonius (Fam. 13.16). However, this letter 
is dated at least 12 years later and there is no reason to assume that Apollonius should be identified 
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Livineius – whom we could quite safely identify as Trypho – these freedmen therefore 
remain anonymous. It is their explicit status mention, the stress on the connection with 
their patron, and the thereby implied trustworthiness that is their most salient identity 
dimension in the letters that refer to them. 
Similarly, in the aftermath of a strong disagreement Cicero had had with Ap. Claudius 
Pulcher133, he wrote him a letter, explaining why he had counteracted Appius’ 
endeavours in Cilicia, and how this should not be perceived as an attack on Appius 
personally: “Had I ever had it in mind to derogate from your good name in the province, 
I should not have [lacuna] your son-in-law, nor should I have consulted your freedman 
at Brundisium or your Prefect of Engineers at Corcyra as to where you wished me to 
go”134. Cicero mentions no names, but instead describes these individuals by their 
relation to Appius (gener tuus, libertus, praefectus fabrum). He wanted to make sure that 
Appius knew he had consulted the most trustworthy people in his circle in order to 
convince his predecessor that any accusations of deliberate malice were unjustified135. 
The case of Atticus’ freedman Philogenes is particularly illuminating. The freedman 
occurs 6 times in the correspondence, and every time in letters written by Cicero to 
Atticus himself. He is mentioned as a business representative of his patron in July 51 and 
twice as a financial agent in December 50136. In none of these letters, Cicero used 
libertination to describe Philogenes. It could be argued that the recurrent mentions of 
the freedman made consistent libertination redundant, and that Atticus knew 
Philogenes very well (as his own trusted freedman) either way. However, like in 
Philotimus’ case touched on above, this does not explain why in the other three letters 
Philogenes does receive explicit libertination. These letters are all dated to somewhere 
in between July 51 and December 50, and thus form part of the same continuous 
exchange of correspondence between Cicero (in Cilicia) and Atticus. Moreover, the 
libertination is in all three cases accompanied by the possessive pronoun tuus (Philogenes 
libertus tuus). Cicero thus deemed it particularly worthwhile in these instances to not 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
with the unnamed Crassi libertus. Tyrannio appears as Murena’s freedman in several of Cicero’s 
letters (cf. Appendix 2). It is equally unlikely, however, that the Murenae libertus of Att. 11.13 is to be 
identified with Tyrannio. Not only would this be the only passage (out of 9) that describes him with 
libertination, but the widespread dismay at the demotion of the eminent freeborn prisoner of war to 
freed status moreover implies a more general reluctance to call Tyrannio a libertus, Plut. Luc. 19.7. 
Cf. Treggiari (1969a), 116; Yarrow (2006), 39-40. 
133 See below for these tensions and for the role of the freedman Phania in them. 
134 Cic. Fam. 3.8.5: “Ego, si in provincia de tua fama detrahere umquam cogitassem, non generum 
tuum [lacuna] libertum Brundisi neque ad praefectum fabrum Corcyrae quem in locum me venire 
velles rettulissem”. 
135 We know this libertus to have been Phania (see the discussion below).  
136 Cic. Att. 5.13.2; 7.5.3; 7.7.2 respectively. 
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only specifically stress Philogenes’ status, but also his connection to Atticus. When we 
look closer at these letters and to Philogenes’ function in them, we begin to understand 
why.  
Indeed, in all three of them, he functions as a courier137. In the earliest letter, Cicero 
heartily thanks Atticus for the important political news he had sent him via Philogenes, 
who had gone through considerable trouble to “ensure its safe delivery over a very long 
and not too safe route” (eas [litteras] diligentissime Philogenes, libertus tuus, curavit perlonga 
et non satis tuta via perferendas). In fact, another letter Atticus had at the same time 
entrusted for delivery to some slaves had not reached Cicero (nam quas Laeni pueris scribis 
datas non acceperam)138. Cicero does not explicitly blame the slaves for non-delivery – the 
road was long and difficult indeed – but the contrast between the success of Philogenes 
libertus tuus and the juxtaposed failure of the Laeni pueri could hardly have been greater. 
A few months later, Cicero – still in Cilicia – is again visited by Philogenes who had come 
merely to pay his respects to his patron’s friend (cum Philogenes, libertus tuus, Laodiceam 
ad me salutandi causa venisset …). Since he could not stay long and immediately wanted to 
return to Atticus by sea, Cicero decided to assign to him the reply to a letter he had 
received earlier via Brutus’ courier (… has ei litteras dedi, quibus ad eas rescripsi quas 
acceperam a Bruti tabellario)139. Cicero thus preferred to entrust the reply to Philogenes 
libertus tuus rather than to the original Bruti tabellarius, who – like the Laeni pueri – 
remains not only unspecified, but is also again contrasted with Philogenes. In the last 
letter, Cicero rhetorically claims that he does not really have anything to report (the 
letter goes on for several pages afterwards); nothing, at least, “subsequent to the letter I 
gave to your freedman Philogenes” (etsi nihil sane habebam novi quod post accidisset quam 
dedissem ad te Philogeni liberto tuo litteras)140. Philogenes thus once more appears as 
explicitly facilitating (“bonding”) communication between Cicero and his own patron. 
There was nothing Cicero had withheld in the letter he had entrusted to the freedman 
and thus nothing new he could include in the current letter that would be sent to 
Atticus via Terentia’s freedman Philotimus. The latter is not referred to by libertination 
(he is not in most of the 47 passages that mention him). Although it is made less explicit 
than in the previous two letters, Philogenes libertus tuus is thus once again juxtaposed to 
another courier that ranked second to him.  
In short, the inclusion of libertination in these cases is significant when we take into 
account that it is done in a context where Philogenes is often and continuously 
mentioned in letters without libertination. Including not only libertination but also the 
 
                                                     
137 Cic. Att. 5.20.8; 6.2.1; 6.3.1. 
138 Cic. Att. 5.20.8. Two months later, this letter was finally delivered by Laenius himself (Att. 5.21.4). 
139 Cic. Att. 6.2.1. 
140 Cic. Att. 6.3.1. 
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extra possessive pronoun tuus would thus seem like a manifest redundancy unless it 
served precisely to abundantly stress not only Philogenes’ trusted status as libertus and 
courier, but also his close connection to Atticus. His trustworthiness is particularly 
accentuated by contrasting him to individuals who are either explicitly (Laeni pueri) or 
implicitly (Bruti tabellarius and to a lesser extent Philotimus) deemed inferior to him (at 
least in letters to his own patron). The extensive libertination moreover served to 
plainly acknowledge Atticus’ efforts of committing (and risking) his own trusted 
dependant to deliver important letters to Cicero, and thus also accentuated and 
strengthened the relation between the two friends. Finally, Philogenes was a 
particularly diligent individual to come and (apparently voluntarily) salute Cicero. As 
such, he was an excellent representation and embodiment of his patron’s good manners 
and friendship. The explicit libertination served to emphasise this connection with 
Atticus, who was thereby similarly made recipient of the compliments. 
In conclusion, both from a quantitative and a qualitative point of view, the correlation 
between a freedman’s trusted position as a courier on the one hand, and the use of 
libertination in letters that refer to him in this capacity on the other, is abundantly 
clear. All the above mentioned messengers were specifically called liberti for various 
reasons related to their trustworthiness, and to their bonding – and sometimes bridging 
– role in (or between) the networks of their patron and his correspondents. As noted 
earlier in the general outline of this chapter (and sporadically in some examples cited 
above), a “connection to a patron” was, in addition, very often associated with both 
libertination and a function as courier, thus establishing a marked triadic relationship 
between trust (and social capital), the use of libertination, and the patronage 
relationship as enabling framework. Before elaborating this third aspect in further 
detail (section 4.5), the remainder of this section (4.4) will first complete the discussion 
of the correlation between trust and libertination, by 1) briefly discussing the few 
couriers that were not referred to explicitly as liberti (4.4.3), 2) broadening the scope of 
analysis to include other freedmen, i.e. non-couriers (4.4.4), and 3) comparing Cicero’s 
correspondence with those of Pliny and Fronto. 
4.4.3 Couriers without libertination 
Although the previous discussion has thus revealed the association between 
libertination and a nodal position in a trust network, it should be clear that the social 
practice of letter writing did not conform to any rigid, binary, and post factum imposed 
categorisation. Cicero and his correspondents surely did not always consciously 
deliberate on whether or not to include libertination. But the cases in which it seems to 
be a redundant characterisation (e.g. in letters to the freedman’s own patron, or in a 
letter that forms part of a series that consequently omits it) are too numerous to ignore. 
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Both quantitative and qualitative analysis unambiguously reveals the pattern, if not the 
more deliberate rhetorical strategy, identified above, especially when compared to 
those freedmen who did not feature in a trust context (cf. infra). Only five passages 
mention freed couriers without any explicit reference to their status. These are thus not 
only highly outnumbered by the instances in which libertination did mark 
trustworthiness, but they also individually contain cues – related to both intended 
readership and contextual factors – as to why libertination was less likely to be included 
in these particular cases. It is to these passages that we will now briefly turn in order to 
“confirm by contrast” what has been suggested above. 
Diochares 
In a letter dated to August 45 BCE and addressed to Atticus, Caesar’s freedman Diochares 
is said to have recently delivered a letter to Cicero. It is a very brief passage in which 
nothing else is said about the courier. In fact, he is mentioned only in order to 
chronologically situate the arrival of another letter: “[Lamia brought me a letter] It was 
dispatched earlier than the one brought by Diochares” (quae quamquam ante data erat 
quam illae Diocharinae)141. Besides not even being the thematic or grammatical subject of 
the sentence, the freedman’s name is transformed into an adjective (Diocharinus), 
downplaying his agency even further. In other words, the focus of the passage is on 
Lamia’s letter, not on the one delivered earlier by Diochares, and certainly not on 
Diochares himself. The epistula Diocharina serves a referential purpose rather than 
expressing the trustworthiness of its deliverer. The only other letter that mentions this 
freedman does include libertination. It was written shortly after the battle of Pharsalus 
(almost three years earlier) and was similarly addressed to Atticus142. In an unpreserved 
letter, Atticus had enquired about the situation and immediate plans of Quintus Cicero 
and his son. Quintus had found himself on the losing side of the conflict, and his 
position in the immediate aftermath of Pharsalus was delicate at best. In his reply letter, 
Cicero answered that his brother had decided to abandon the Pompeian party, and that 
he had left for Asia to obtain a pardon from Caesar. He advised Atticus to contact 
Diochares, “the bearer of that letter from Alexandria” (quaere ex Diochare, Caesaris liberto 
… qui istas Alexandria litteras attulit) who was known to have seen Quintus either on his 
way to, or already in, Asia. When Diochares was recommended as informant and 
mentioned as active deliverer of an important letter, libertination was meaningfully 
included. 
 
                                                     
141 Cic. Att. 13.45.1. 
142 Cic. Att. 11.6.6. 
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Phaetho 
In another letter, this time addressed to his brother, Cicero very briefly refers to the 
freedman Phaetho, but he does not include libertination. Phaetho is not the actual 
bearer of this letter, but he is said to have delivered a previous one to Quintus (ea 
epistula quam Phaethonti dedi)143. Although we cannot know for sure, it is plausible that he 
was described as libertus in the actual letter he had delivered (as is usually the case). 
Indeed, exiled from Rome only two months earlier, Cicero would have been particularly 
careful in choosing reliable couriers to carry back his messages to the city. The letter 
entrusted to Phaetho moreover contained very delicate information about Cicero’s state 
of mind, the political situation at Rome, and the desertion of his allies (subita defectio 
Pompei, alienatio consulum, etiam praetorum, timor publicanorum, <servorum> arma. Lacrimae 
meorum me ad mortem ire prohibuerunt, quod certe et ad honestatem <tuendam> et ad 
effugiendos intolerabilis dolores fuit aptissimum). That Phaetho had been initially described 
as libertus is also suggested by a letter written to Atticus two months earlier144. Cicero 
wrote that the freedman was sent out to discover Quintus’ itinerary but that he, that is 
the freedman Phaetho (Phaetho libertus), had reported back unsuccessfully due to bad 
weather conditions at sea. Here, Phaetho’s active role in the interaction is accentuated 
much more strongly than in the later letter: he was sent out, failed to accomplish his 
task, and reported back immediately (vento reiectus … mihi praesto fuit). The case may 
therefore be similar to that of Diochares, where libertination was similarly omitted 
when the mention of a freedman merely served to specify a letter he had carried earlier, 
but included when his role as an active and confidential courier was willingly 
accentuated.  
Phania 
Of the five times the freedman Phania is mentioned in the correspondence, four present 
him as the deliverer of news in letters from Cicero to Phania’s patron Ap. Claudius 
Pulcher145. The earliest instance dates back to the end of 53 (or the beginning of 52) BCE, 
but the other three letters were written in quick succession between the end of July and 
the beginning of October 51 BCE146. In only one of these cases does Cicero omit 
 
                                                     
143 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 1.4.4 (early August 58 BCE). 
144 Cic. Att. 3.8.2 (end of May 58 BCE). 
145 See Constans (1921) for a discussion of Cicero’s correspondence with Appius. Schuricht (1994), 
162-80 and Hall (2009), 139-153 analyse it in light of the strategies of politeness both men applied. Cf. 
Hall (2009), 140-1 for the particular interactions related to the transfer of power in Cilicia discussed 
here). Cicero remained at odds with Appius afterwards, as is clear from later letters (cf. our 
discussion of Pausanias in subsection 4.5.2). 
146 These are Cic. Fam. 3.1.1-2; 3.5.3; 3.6.1-2; and 3.8.5. 
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libertination. This happens in a letter that described Phania as a man “of whose loyalty 
to you [Appius] and place in your confidence I thought I had good evidence and 
knowledge”147. To gauge the true extent of this phrase, however, we have to 
contextualise the relation between Cicero and Phania.  
Not two years earlier, Cicero had considered the freedman “a sensible and inquisitive 
man” (homo non modo prudens verum etiam, quod iuvet, curiosus) and had assigned to him 
oral messages, a sure sign of the trust placed in him. Moreover, if the res publica could 
talk for herself, Cicero ardently exclaimed, no one would be a better conveyer of her 
words than this Phania148. It is not surprising, therefore, that he later relied on him to 
ascertain Appius’ preference as to where he would like to meet his successor as 
proconsul of Cilicia. Indeed, Cicero had been appointed to this function, and since it was 
considered appropriate for a new governor to meet his predecessor on his way to the 
province, Cicero enquired with Phania at Brundisium where he should go to meet his 
patron. Phania informed him that Side would be preferable, a coastal city situated some 
60 km east of present day Antalya in southern Turkey. For Cicero, who was planning to 
enter the province via Ephesos, this meant quite a detour, but he decided to comply 
nonetheless. However, arriving at Corcyra, L. Clodius (a mutual friend and “a person so 
close to you [Appius] that in talking to him I felt I was talking to yourself”149) told Cicero 
that Appius would be waiting for him in Laodicea instead150. Despite his high opinion of 
Phania, Cicero decided to attach more worth to Clodius’ information, and set sail to 
Laodicea (perhaps in part because the latter option meant a shorter and more 
convenient itinerary). It is meaningful that Cicero felt the need to explain his decision 
(i.e. to ignore Phania’s information) by identifying L. Clodius as Appius’ mirror-image. 
Only by resorting to such language could Cicero make sure that his trusting of Clodius 
over Phania would not be considered an act of laziness or even malice towards Appius, 
but rather the result of a genuine deliberation of character. Even though he had timely 
informed Appius of his travel plans, Cicero – before even having arrived in Laodicea – 
received news that Appius had set out for Tarsus, a city on the eastern side of the 
province, and as such very remote from both Side and Laodicea. Cicero, clearly annoyed 
 
                                                     
147 Cic. Fam. 3.6.1, see below. 
148 Cic. Fam. 3.1.1: “Si ipsa res publica tibi narrare posset quo modo sese haberet, non facilius ex ea 
cognoscere posses quam ex liberto tuo Phania”. McCutcheon (2013), 193 suggests that Phania’s 
description as curiosus may imply that the freedman had been probing the “depth of Cicero’s 
commitment to his reconciliation with Pulcher”. While this may very likely have been the case, 
there is no reason to assume that such probing was considered surreptitious or inappropriate. 
Cicero even explicitly states that Phania’s curiositas is something quod iuvet, implying that through 
him he can publicise his “true” intentions. 
149 Cic. Fam. 3.6.2: “Idem ego, cum L. Clodium Corcyrae convenissem, hominem ita tibi coniunctum 
ut mihi cum illo cum loquerer tecum loqui viderer (…)”. 
150 Cic. Fam. 3.5.3; 3.6.1-2. 
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by the news but remaining polite, confronted Appius with his choice to move away 
instead of towards him151.  
In light of these events, Phania’s advise to travel to Side could be considered as part 
of a deliberate attempt to impede and delay Cicero’s arrival in Cilicia, thus prolonging 
Appius’ control over the province. Indeed, it is difficult to see how or why Phania could 
have acted like this without his patron’s knowledge and approval. Even though Cicero’s 
relationship with Appius had had its obvious complications in the past152, we should be 
careful in assessing the truth behind these statements (and implied accusations), based 
on Cicero’s letters alone. Whether Appius truly acted with bad intentions (and the 
picture does not have to be all black-and-white), and whether Phania was actually 
involved in any scheme, we can, in short, not ascertain. However, Cicero’s reaction to 
the developments is very revealing. He begins the letter explaining his change of 
itinerary (at L. Clodius’ suggestion) with the reference to Phania mentioned above. 
Cicero explains that the first destination he had in mind was suggested to him by 
Phania, “of whose loyalty to you and place in your confidence I thought I had good 
evidence and knowledge (Phania, cuius mihi videbar et fidelitatem erga te perspexisse et nosse 
locum quem apud te is teneret)”153. The use of videbar is especially significant: Cicero seems 
to imply that he only thought he had seen and known Phania’s commendable 
character154. He clearly refers back to the letter from one and a half years earlier (and 
perhaps also to more recent – yet unpreserved – similar ones), in which he had praised 
 
                                                     
151 Cic. Fam. 3.6.3-4. Appius was even accused by malevoli homines (Cicero’s term) of still exercising 
administrative and judicial powers, even though this was a highly unconventional (and by the lex 
Cornelia de maiestate also soon to be illegal) thing to do, since he was aware of Cicero’s arrival in the 
province. 
152 The history between Cicero and Appius – as brother of Cicero’s personal enemy P. Clodius – had 
been a turbulent one. However, Cicero usually went out of his way to dissociate Appius from Clodius’ 
actions (especially after Appius obtained the consulship in 54 BCE) in order to maintain practical 
relations. E.g. in 50 BCE (Fam. 3.10.8): “Quid erat autem cur ego in te tam implacabilis essem, cum te 
ex fratre meo ne tunc quidem cum tibi prope necesse esset eas agere partis inimicum mihi fuisse 
cognossem?”. Even when mentioning him as an adversary in his speeches, Cicero had often implied 
that Appius had no choice but to oppose him since he shared blood with Clodius. E.g. in 55 BCE, Pis. 
35: “De me cum omnes magistratus promulgassent praeter unum praetorem, a quo non fuit 
postulandum, fratrem inimici mei (…)”. See Hall (2009), 139-40 for Cicero’s earlier interactions with 
Appius, which were bumpy to say the least. 
153 Cic. Fam. 3.6.1. 
154 Contrast with, for example, Cic. Fam. 4.9.1. Cicero here writes that he had very plainly seen 
Theophilus’ loyalty and good will: “Theophilus (…) cuius ego fidem erga te benevolentiamque 
perspexeram (…)”. McCutcheon (2013), 197 gives another twist to the passage by suggesting that 
Cicero only now realised that Phania was not as close to Appius as he had thought. He thus invokes 
the objective relation between Appius and Phania, rather than deceit by the  freedman. Despite the 
difference in nuance, this interpretation equally gives Appius the chance of distancing himself from 
his freedman, a possibility McCutcheon ignores.  
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the qualities of the freedman155. The tone of the current letter suggests that Cicero 
realised that this praise had been premature. In order not to let the already tense 
situation escalate any further, the phrase seems designed to shift culpability for any 
deception Appius may be accused of – by malevoli homines, for example – to his 
freedman. Cicero leaves available considerable face-saving space for Appius to blame his 
freedman for dispersing incorrect information. Noteworthy in this regard is the fact 
that Cicero had very subtly increased the discursive agency of Phania throughout the 
letters. In July, he wrote that he had merely talked to Phania (loqui) and that the 
freedman had said (dicere) that Appius would like to meet him at Side156. In August, 
when Cicero was giving Appius the opportunity for pushing off responsibility to Phania, 
however, he writes that the latter explicitly asked him (rogare) to go to Side157. 
As mentioned earlier, this is the only letter in the sequence in which Phania is not 
described as Appius’ libertus. Indeed, if our suspicion is justified, this passage would not 
require a description that stressed the close link between Phania and his patron. Quite 
on the contrary, it would contradict what Cicero was actually trying to convey, i.e. that 
Phania in this instance was acting on his own accord; with or without any bad intent no 
one could say for certain, but at any rate independent of his patron. Libertus as marker 
of trustworthiness is replaced by a description that saves both Cicero’s face (he had but 
mistakenly thought Phania, as a freedman, to be trustworthy in previous instances) and 
Appius’ (potential deceptive advice was not directly traced back to his orders). 
The last mention of Phania in the correspondence occurs more than half a year later, 
and can be considered as an epilogue to the entire affair (he does not feature as a 
courier here). In a letter to Caelius Rufus, Cicero exclaims that despite previous 
tensions, he had always shown good will towards Appius. He empathically appeals to 
two witnesses that can confirm this assertion: Caelius himself and Phania. However, 
whereas the reference to Caelius is sincere and respectful (mea vero officia ei non defuisse 
tu es testis …), that to Phania is much less so (… cui iam κωμικòς μάρτυς, ut opinor, accedit 
Phania)158. While Caelius’ role in the juridical metaphor is that of a traditional testis (no 
doubt a reference to his achievements in the courts), Phania is equated to a stock 
character of Greek Comedy (a reference to his Greek name). Attention is again drawn to 
the contrast by the clear chiasmus tu es testis - κωμικòς μάρτυς accedit Phania. It is surely 
 
                                                     
155 Cic. Fam. 3.1.1-2. 
156 Cic. Fam. 3.5.3. 
157 Cic. Fam. 3.6.2. 
158 Cic. Fam. 2.13.2. 
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no coincidence that Cicero permits himself this rather belittling joke in the only letter 
that is not addressed to Phania’s patron159. 
In short, when Phania appears as a courier – and when his role as valuable bridging 
social capital was accentuated – Cicero employed libertination, as we would indeed 
expect. The only letter that does not include libertination had the specific intention of 
dissociating Appius and Phania, and of attributing to the freedman the responsibility of 
conveying wrong, and perhaps perfidious, information. If anything, then, the entire 
anecdote is a “negative” confirmation of the correlation between trustworthiness and 
libertination. 
Salvius 
The fourth freed courier not explicitly described as libertus is Caesar’s freedman Salvius 
(in a letter to Cicero’s former son-in-law Dolabella). Instead of libertus, he is presented 
with the jovial noster in the very first phrase of the letter: “I dare not to let our friend 
Salvius leave without giving him something in the way of a letter to you” (non sum ausus 
Salvio nostro nihil ad te litterarum dare)160. Salvius had very likely been a regular go-
between for Cicero in his communication with Dolabella, who was serving under Caesar 
in Spain at the time. Undoubtedly, Salvius had functioned as a bearer of news and letters 
from Caesar to Rome (and back) on more than one occasion. In fact, he had done so for 
almost a decade. On 10 October 54 BCE, for example, after having visited Cicero 
personally161, he had set out for Ostia with some items Cicero wanted him to deliver to 
his brother, who was at the time – like Dolabella 10 years later – serving under Caesar 
(in Gaul)162. It would therefore seem plausible that Salvius had served as an 
intermediary between Cicero and Dolabella before163, and in any case, the noster already 
implied a close social triangulation between the three men. Repeated interaction with 
the freedman may have rendered libertination superfluous (cf. supra). The choice for 
the jovial noster may also have sprung from Cicero’s realisation that his treatment of the 
 
                                                     
159 Cf. Smadja (1976), 107 note 102. McCutcheon (2013), 194 focusses only on the content of the 
description and on Phania’s function as κωμικòς μάρτυς of Cicero’s good will towards Appius, but 
fails to account for either the subtextual implications suggested by the chiastic contrast with the 
traditional (Latin) testis, or for the chronological evolution of the relation between Cicero and 
Phania/Appius as discussed above. 
160 Cic. Fam. 9.10.1. 
161 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 3.1.21. Salvius is mentioned here in juxtaposition with two other (freeborn) 
guests: Minucius Basilus and Pacuvius Labeo. 
162 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 3.2.1. 
163 Cicero often made use of Caesar’s tabellarii to send letters to his brother (and thus likely also to 
other familiares serving with Caesar). Cf. Quint. Fratr. 3.6.2: “Tu velim cures ut sciam quibus nos 
dare oporteat eas quas ad te deinde litteras mittemus, Caesarisne tabellariis, ut is ad te protinus 
mittat, an Labieni”. 
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freedman would influence his patron’s stance towards him. As has recently been argued 
for the letters to his brother Quintus, Cicero’s letters to Dolabella were written “to 
Caesar” as well (perhaps even more so than to Quintus or Dolabella themselves)164. In 
this regard, it is telling that four years earlier (when Cicero was still a Pompeian and had 
not yet been pardoned by Caesar), he was much more hostile towards Salvius165.  
Theophilus 
Finally, in 46 BCE, Cicero writes to M. Marcellus that “since Theophilus (Marcellus’ own 
freedman) is leaving, I could not let him go without something in the way of a letter” 
(cum Theophilus proficisceretur, non potui nihil ei litterarum dare)166. The reference bears 
striking resemblance to the mention of the same freedman in another letter to his 
patron a few months earlier: “But since your freedman Theophilus is setting out, whose 
loyalty (fides) and good will (benevolentia) towards you I have plainly seen, I did not wish 
him to go to you without a letter from me” (cum Theophilus, libertus tuus, proficisceretur … 
sine meis litteris eum ad te venire nolui)167. The difference between the two letters is of 
course the inclusion of libertination and possessive pronoun (Theophilus libertus tuus), as 
well as a description of Theophilus’ pivotal virtues in the earlier one. The quasi identical 
context of both references makes the inclusion of libertination in the first letter but not 
in the second seem rather arbitrary. And to some extent, it may certainly have been. 
However, the later letter does not stress the relation between Theophilus and his patron 
in any meaningful way, whereas the earlier one had explicitly done so: it were the 
freedman’s loyalty and good will towards Marcellus (erga te) that Cicero had gladly 
witnessed. By closely knitting together libertus tuus – benevolentia – fides, Cicero 
acknowledged and praised the quality of his correspondent’s social network as well as 
the nodal function of the loyal Theophilus in it168. Moreover, it would be a manifest and 
possibly annoying redundancy to characterise Theophilus as Marcellus’ freedman (let 
alone as loyal, benevolent, etc.) every single time Cicero mentioned him in a letter. The 
very short interval between the two letters (the only two in the correspondence that 
 
                                                     
164 Henderson (2007), passim (e.g. p. 38-9). 
165 Cic. Att. 10.18.1: “homo nequissimus a Salvio liberto depravatus est” (we do not know who the 
homo nequissimus was). Cicero explicitly refers to Caesar’s hostile attitude in the letter: “Dubitas 
igitur quin nos in hostium numero habeat?”. Cf. Münzer, RE II.1.2, 2022: “Salvius war ein 
einflußreicher Freigelassener Caesars, der in Ciceros Briefen öfter erwähnt wird, und zwar in 
achtungsvollem Tone gegenüber den mit Caesar in Verbindung stehenden Männern und in einem 
weit weniger freundlichen in den vertraulichen Briefen an Atticus”; Smadja (1976), 98.  
166 Cic. Fam. 4.10.1 
167 Cic. Fam. 4.9.1. 
168 See also the next chapter on recommendation letters, where this practice is studied in more 
detail. 
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mention Theophilus), does indeed suggest once more that this freedman repeatedly 
acted as courier between his patron and Cicero, or at least that he had already been 
introduced to Cicero earlier. As noted before, this may have led to an omission of trust 
markers that would otherwise have been considered appropriate when situating a 
freedman in the nexus of his patron’s trust network.  
This last observation thus seems to be a recurrent trait of the passages in which freed 
couriers are mentioned without status indication. Additionally, in most of these 
passages, the freedmen in question are referred to in a letter either to Atticus or to their 
own patron169. Cicero may have felt less inclined to explicitly stress the confidentiality 
of a particular freedman in a letter to his good friend Atticus (who would in most cases 
know the individual already or at least have confidence in Cicero’s judgement) or to the 
freedman’s own patron (who would even more than Cicero be aware of his freedman’s 
fides)170. 
Although we have provided some suggestions as to why these five individuals were not 
referred to as liberti explicitly, we should not stress these points too hard (except for the 
case of Phania). As mentioned at the beginning of this section, we cannot expect our 
source material to strictly adhere to the rigidly defined categories, created and applied 
by modern analysis. Trying to explain why five freedmen did not receive libertination 
when mentioned as couriers may not only be a futile endeavour, but it also risks 
drawing attention away from the clear pattern by which the status of freed couriers’ was 
usually explicitly stressed in the letters.  Rather than an agreed upon convention or an 
epistolary mannerism, it is an expression of a mind-set that considered freedmen as the 
embodiment of social capital par excellence, and as crucial nodes in the extensive trust 
networks of Cicero and his correspondents. 
4.4.4 Trust and libertination: non-couriers 
The freedman’s fides was not restricted to his role as network-bridging courier. 
Freedmen would often be personally involved in (or at least be present during) 
confidential and politically laden conversations between high ranking aristocrats who 
 
                                                     
169 The only exception is Salvius in the letter to Dolabella, Cic. Fam. 9.10.1. Either Marcus or Quintus 
Cicero was the patron of the freedman Phaetho who was mentioned in a communication between 
both brothers (Quint. Fratr. 1.4.4). 
170 However, this by no means prevented Cicero from relatively often referring to a freedman as 
libertus and even libertus tuus in a letter to his patron, e.g. Fam. 2.7.3 (Curio’s Thraso) or 4.9.1 
(Marcellus’ Theophilus). 
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were somehow connected to their patron171. In 46 BCE, for example, Cicero writes to 
Trebianus that he had freely spoken his mind (patefacere) about his correspondent’s 
restoration after the civil war to their common friends, but also recently to Trebianus’ 
freedman Theudas (Theudae liberto tuo)172. The next year, he jokingly requests Fabius 
Gallus to keep to himself the information he had sent him, and not to share it even with 
his freedman Apella (ne Apellae quidem liberto tuo), suggesting that Fabius would usually 
do precisely that173. In the tense year after Caesar’s assassination, Cicero invited 
Furnius’ freedman Dardanus (Dardanus libertus tuus) to his house to attend a confidential 
meeting between his patron’s close friends who were exchanging their opinions on 
Furnius’ aspiration to the praetorship174. In all these cases, the trusted freedman is not 
only mentioned with libertination, but the link with his patron is equally stressed 
through the addition of the possessive pronoun tuus (cf. infra).  
Less confidential contexts did not require a strong focus on the dependent’s status or 
social capital. In September 54 BCE, during a visit to Arpinum, Cicero puts his freedman 
Philotimus in charge of receiving and entertaining his fellow tribesmen (Philotimo 
tribulibus commendatis), a menial though obligatory task that clearly did not necessitate 
the accentuation of Philotimus’ trustworthiness175. Similarly, neither of the two 
references in the correspondence to the famous writer and mime player Publilius Syrus 
– whose performance Cicero was forced to attend in order not to offend Caesar to whom 
it was dedicated – included libertination176, nor did the four references to the only 
freedwoman in the correspondence (the actress and courtesan Volumnia Cytheris)177. 
The same goes for freedmen who were merely employed by Cicero to arrange his library 
and to procure books for it. Murena’s freedman Tyrannio, for example, is mentioned 
eight times – consistently without libertination – in letters to Atticus and Q. Cicero, 
where he appears as a scholar, a librarian, and a teacher178. Although making him 
responsible for the care over the Cicerones’ libraries and for the education of their 
 
                                                     
171 Cf. Smadja (1976), 101; Blänsdorf (2001), 451; Mouritsen (2011), 48-9. 
172 Cic. Fam. 6.10a.1: “Itaque et Postumuleno et Sestio et saepissime Attico nostro proximeque 
Theudae, liberto tuo, totum me patefeci (…)”. 
173 Cic. Fam. 7.25.2: “Secreto hoc audi, tecum habeto, ne Apellae quidem, liberto tuo, dixeris” 
174 Cic. Fam. 10.25.3: “Haec eadem locutus sum domi meae adhibito Quinto, fratre meo, et Caecina et 
Calvisio, studiosissimis tui, cum Dardanus, libertus tuus, interesset”. 
175 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 3.1.1. 
176 Cic. Fam. 12.18.2; Att. 14.2.1. When talking about actors and performers, Cicero would rarely 
include libertination. In one instance, Cicero mentions the manumission of an actor on stage (Att. 
4.15.6), cf. infra. 
177 Cic. Fam. 9.26.2; 14.16; Att. 10.10.5; 10.16.5. 
178 Cic. Att. 2.6.1; 4.4a.1; 4.8.2; 12.2.2; 12.6.2; Quint. Fratr. 2.4.2; 3.4.5; 3.5.6. As mentioned earlier, the 
lack of libertination may partially have stemmed from the general opinion (as represented by Plut. 
Luc. 19.7) that Tyrannio’s freed condition was an insult to his original status as a freeborn 
grammarian of some renown. Both explanations are of course not mutually exclusive. 
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household does imply trust to some extent, it is by no means comparable to the trust 
placed in freedmen who served as intermediates between focal points within a single 
network or between different networks altogether. This is the case also for freed 
architects who are mentioned only in this professional capacity179, for referential 
mentions of freedmen comprising no more than a few words and not implying any kind 
of trustworthiness180, etc. References to menial jobs, superficial allusions, and the social 
(and legal) infamia associated with performing on stage in all these cases precluded the 
inclusion of a marker that would normally accentuate the respective individual’s 
trustworthiness. Once again, these passages constitute a “negative” confirmation of the 
close correlation between the use of libertination, and the desire to accentuate 
trustworthiness (and publicise social capital). 
4.4.5  Pliny and Fronto: a comparison 
In Fronto’s letters too, freedmen who were mentioned merely as literary assistants, 
editors, or pantomime dancers were not attributed explicit status indicators181. On the 
contrary, the freedman Charilas – privy to the emperor’s thoughts and plans – served as 
a “gatekeeper” to the imperial court. People would contact him to arrange a meeting 
with the emperor, or at least to gauge whether a visit would be positively received. 
When Fronto wrote to Lucius Verus that he had done precisely that, he called the man 
libertus Charilas182. Fronto was apologising for not having visited the emperor and his 
brother after the death of their (adoptive) father Pius. His excuse was that he thought it 
inappropriate to visit them so shortly after the tragedy, and that he did not like to see 
his pupils in tears (an ego quarto post mense lacrimas vestras spectatum measque ostentatum 
venirem?). Because he neither wanted to leave the emperors in the dark, nor wanted to 
interrupt their mourning process, he had decided to write to Charilas (non sum ausus 
neque fratri tuo neque tibi scribere me ad vos esse venturum, sed ad libertum Charilam 
perscripsi). Charilas thus served as a “bridge” between Fronto and the emperors, and it 
 
                                                     
179 E.g. Cic. Att. 2.4.7; 13.29.1; 14.9.1 (Chrysippus). 
180 E.g. Cic. Fam. 4.12.3 (the two unnamed freedmen at the entrance to M. Marcellus’ deathbed); Att. 
3.8.3 (Tryphonem Caecilium non vidi); Quint. Fratr. 3.1.21 (Salvius visiting Cicero’s house); … 
181 Fronto, Ad M. Caes. 1.7.4 (three or four freed literary assistants and editors); Ad Verum Imp. 1.2 
(two pantomime dancers). It should be noted, however, that all of these men were particularly 
famous for their excellence in their respective professions, which may also have been a reason not 
to (redundantly) stress their status. The same goes for the reference to M. Aurelius’ a codicillis 
Egatheus (Ad M. Caes. 2.16) and to a lesser degree also that to Epictetus, who did not receive 
libertination but appeared in a context that made clear his servile past (Ad Verum Imp. (or ad M. 
Caes.) 1.1.5; De Eloq. 1.16). 
182 Fronto, Ad Verum Imp. 1.4.2. See also Chapter 3. 
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was important for Fronto to stress that he had relied on a trustworthy agent with close 
connections to the palace when justifying his earlier absence (of which Verus had 
complained in an earlier letter183). Similarly, in the letter of recommendation on behalf 
of the imperial freedman Aridelus, addressed to M. Aurelius, Fronto called the man 
libertus vester. Clearly, besides his studium, his officia, and the many qualities he possessed 
(he was frugi, socrius, acer, and diligens), his status and his connection to the emperor 
were the most vital features Fronto could incorporate in the recommendation in order 
to secure a procuratorship for the freedman184. As noted earlier, the correspondence 
contains far too few attestations of freedman to draw any “statistical” conclusions, but 
it is noteworthy that the use of libertination at any rate seems to follow the trends 
outlined above for Cicero’s correspondence. 
Pliny’s letters, contrary to (most of) Cicero’s and Fronto’s, were published during 
their writer’s lifetime as stylised and well-balanced semi-biographical documents185. 
Although editorial changes also occurred in the latter two corpora, it was Pliny-the-
editor himself who reworked the correspondence of Pliny-the-letter-writer to make it 
accessible (and suitable) to a much broader audience of friends, associates, and even 
unknown or later readers. Analysing the already few representations of individual 
freedmen in Pliny’s corpus may thus be considerably more problematic, since 
libertination was likely included to, for instance, identify an individual to readers other 
than the original addressee. Because the latter would (or may) have known the 
freedman in question – as was often the case in Cicero’s correspondence –, letters 
addressed to him had originally not required any clarification. The dramatically 
expanded “intended readership” Pliny-the-editor had in mind, may have prompted the 
inclusion of clarifying libertination that “contaminates” (from our perspective) the 
embedded nature of these letters. Obviously, this assertion is impossible to prove: we do 
not know what the original letters looked like, and how strongly or in which respect 
they differed from the letters transmitted to us in the published collection. But the 
Plinian passages referring to freedmen, and the aberrant pattern of libertination when 
compared to the other two correspondences, does suggest that the “editorial” context 
 
                                                     
183 Fronto, Ad Verum Imp. 1.3: “Est quod ego tecum  graviter conquerar, mi magister, et quidem ut 
querelam dolor superet, quod ego te tanto post intervallo nec complexus neque adfatus sim, quom 
et in palatium veneris et postquam ego a Domino meo fratre vixdum discesseram”. Charilus, in his 
unpreserved response to Fronto, had thus clearly answered positively to his request. Fronto had 
come to the palace, but his timing was not all too great since Verus had just left. The tone of Verus’ 
letter is certainly not hostile. If anything, it expresses the emperor’s kind disposition towards his 
magister and his disappointment that it has been so long since they last met. 
184 Fronto, Ad M. Caes. 5.37. For this recommendation, see the next section on letters of 
recommendation. 
185 Trapp (2003), 14-5. See Chapter 3 (section 3.2.1.1). 
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was more decisive a factor than the “embeddedness” of these freedmen in the social 
network of the letter writer. Indeed, in almost all cases did Pliny include an explicit 
reference to a freedman’s status. 
The freedmen in Pliny’s correspondence can be grouped roughly in two categories. 
On the one hand, there are the individuals who are mentioned only en passant in a very 
brief and referential way. A freedman who was asked by Trajan to take care of Pliny 
during one of his exhausting speeches is described only as libertus meus186. The 
freedwoman whom Licinianus was hiding on his estate after the conviction of her 
patroness (the Vestal virgin Cornelia), was merely Corneliae liberta187. Moreover, when 
Pliny wrote to his correspondent Licinius Sura about the prophetical dreams of two of 
his household members – a freedman and a slave – he referred to the former with est 
libertus mihi188. And when inviting his friends over for a lecture, he used one of his own 
freedmen (libertus meus) to do the reading189. The proper name of these persons is 
nowhere included, suggesting that the libertination merely served as an alternative for 
a name, which would in many cases not have meant anything to Pliny-the-editor’s 
readers. Trust, or a confidential link with the patron (“network embeddedness”) is 
lacking in many of these cases. Instead, it is for the sake of narrative – indeed, 
“editorial” – clarity that these freedmen are described in this way. This suggestion is 
confirmed by the second group, which contains freedmen of whom Pliny-the-editor 
knew that they would be widely known among his readers, and who were therefore not 
explicitly called liberti. Tiro appears as Tiro suus in a letter referring to the famous 
epigram Cicero had allegedly written about him190, and the infamous imperial freedmen 
Pallas and Polyclitus are similarly described with their proper name only191. Pliny did 
not have to replace (or complement) their names by a more general mention of libertus, 
because their renown made sure everyone knew whom he was talking about. 
This does not mean that the editorial process erased all signs of the trust-
libertination correlation. After Pliny had inherited a track of land worth HS 900 000, his 
freedman Hermes sold it to Corellia (the sister of Pliny’s deceased friend Q. Corellius 
Rufus) for only HS 700 000. Pliny’s grandfather-in-law Calpurnius Fabatus was surprised 
at this course of events and suspected negligence on Hermes’ side192. Quite on the 
 
                                                     
186 Plin. Ep. 2.11.15: “Caesar (…) ut libertum meum post me stantem saepius admoneret voci laterique 
consulerem (…)”. 
187 Plin. Ep. 4.11.11: “[Domitianus] adripit Licinianum, quod in agris suis occultasset Corneliae 
libertam”. 
188 Plin. Ep. 7.27.12. 
189 Plin. Ep. 9.34.1. 
190 Plin. Ep. 7.4.3-6. 
191 Plin. Ep. 6.31.9 (Polyclitus); 7.29; 8.6 (Pallas). 
192 Plin. Ep. 7.11.1-2. 
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contrary, Pliny explains, he himself had explicitly ordered his freedman to broker the 
deal, out of respect for both Corellia and the memory of her brother193. At the end of 
this response letter to Fabatus, as well as in another letter about the affair to Corellia 
herself, Pliny again uses libertus meus to stress that he had personally ordered and 
backed up the deal (vides quam ratum habere debeam, quod libertus meus meis moribus 
gessit)194. Hermes thus served as confidential financial agent, entrusted with 
considerable freedom in contracting the sale, but Pliny also wanted to have his 
grandfather-in-law know that he had not just deployed a random dependent. Both 
libertination and the possessive pronoun served to accentuate this trust and this close 
connection to Pliny.  
Contextual factors should also be taken into account when looking at Pliny’s use of 
libertination. The imperial freedman Eurythmus occurs outside of a trust context, but is 
nonetheless described with libertination (which does not replace the proper name but 
instead further specifies it). This happens in Pliny’s account of the legal proceedings 
that were initiated against this freedman after he had been accused of forging a will. It is 
precisely this narrative context that prompted Pliny to describe Eurythmus in full 
detail, as if he were presenting the case in court. The passage goes: “The persons 
charged were the Roman knight, Sempronius Senecio, and Eurythmus, a freedman and 
procurator of the Emperor” (substituebantur crimini Sempronius Senecio eques Romanus et 
Eurythmus Caesaris libertus et procurator)195. Not only Eurythmus, but also his fellow 
conman Senecio are presented by their formal legal “status” according to proper 
forensic procedures. 
Neither Pliny’s nor Fronto’s correspondence lends itself to detailed analysis of 
libertination due to either manifest editorial interference or a simple lack of data. The 
few mentions of freedmen in Fronto, as well as a few indications in Pliny’s collection do, 
however, suggest that the correlation between trustworthiness and libertination 
extended into the imperial period as well. A comparison with other extensive letter 
corpora from late Antiquity that were collected and published after their author’s death 
(e.g. that of Julian or Libanius) would prove particularly insightful, but greatly exceeds 
the scope of the current discussion. 
 
 
                                                     
193 Plin. Ep. 7.11.3-6. 
194 Plin. Ep. 7.11.7-8 (answer to Fabatus); 7.14 (letter to Corellia). 
195 Plin. Ep. 6.31.8. 
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4.5 Case studies 
This section discusses two detailed case studies of freedman passages in Cicero’s 
correspondence. The use of libertination as a trust-indicator and as a representation of 
social capital remains a central point of interest, but the scope is enlarged to include 
other elements as well. It is again argued that these “embedded” sources show freed 
status as an “asset” and a positive identity dimension, rather than as a “liability”. The 
aim of these case studies is therefore to further identify the “epistolary freedman” as 
highly entrenched in various correspondents’ social networks in order to facilitate a 
comparison (or rather contrast) with other literary genres in the next chapters 
(especially 6 and 7).  
4.5.1 Vettius Chrysippus 
At some point in 53 BCE, Cicero received the greetings of his good friend and famous 
lawyer Trebatius Testa via the travelling freedman Chrysippus. It had been a year since 
Cicero had empathically recommended Trebatius to Caesar196 – with some success, we 
might add, as Trebatius was by this time campaigning with him in Gaul. That Trebatius 
was very busy, is clear from the letter Cicero writes him in response to the news 
Chrysippus had provided. In it, Cicero jokingly complains that he had received not a 
word from Trebatius himself, but that he had had to rely instead on the bits of 
information that came through via third parties: “Chrysippus Vettius, Cyri architecti 
libertus, has made me think that you have some recollection of my existence; he has 
given me your kind regards. Very grand we have become!”197.  
The initial description of Chrysippus – meaningfully occupying the very first line of 
the letter – is quite extensive. Especially the inclusion not only of his cognomen, but also 
of his nomen, the official libertination (including his patron’s name in the genitive), and 
the profession he shared with his patron, comes across rather overwhelming and 
certainly very formal. Indeed, at least some of these attributes would be simply 
redundant if we take them to serve the sole purpose of clarifying the freedman’s 
identity. If Trebatius had asked Chrysippus to pass not only his greetings but also more 
sensitive information about his standing with Caesar (cf. infra), we (and Cicero) might 
expect him to remember to whom he had entrusted this mission. In this case, a mere 
 
                                                     
196 Cic. Fam. 7.5. 
197 Cic. Fam. 7.14.1: “Chrysippus Vettius, Cyri architecti libertus, fecit ut te non immemorem putarem 
mei; salute enim verbis tuis mihi nuntiarat. Valde iam lautus es (…)”. 
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Chrysippus Vettius, Chrysippus (Vettius) architectus, or even Chrysippus libertus would have 
sufficed. Although clarification may nonetheless have been part of the motivation for 
Cicero to identify Chrysippus the way he did198, the exceptional extensiveness of the 
identification suggests that there were other concerns involved as well.  
In trying to grasp the reason why Trebatius had not paid him the courtesy of a 
personal letter, Cicero comes up with three possible explanations. The first two are 
mere jokes: Trebatius had either forgotten how to write, or he had forgotten about his 
good friend Cicero (in which case the latter would hurry to Gaul himself to refresh his 
memory!). Both are, of course, highly unlikely but serve to lighten up the mood before 
considering a more realistic motivation for not writing: Trebatius was simply too busy 
campaigning. If this were the case, Cicero admits, the neglect is understandable, even 
though he insists that a simple excuse would still be more agreeable than not writing at 
all. However, another possibility is implied throughout the letter: Trebatius may have 
been reluctant to confide more specific information about his dealings in Gaul to paper. 
There is a hint of this in a later passage of the letter. Chrysippus not only passed 
informal greetings to Cicero, but he also informed him – via an oral message – about a 
matter significantly more sensitive: “One thing I was greatly pleased to hear from the 
same Chrysippus (idem Chrysippus), is that you are on close terms with Caesar”199. Cicero 
realised that Trebatius’ rise in Caesar’s circle was in no small part due to the 
recommendation he had written for his friend, and that Caesar, by obviously having 
accepted the request, had shown a favourable spirit towards Cicero (cf. the next chapter 
on recommendations). However, Cicero would also have liked to know more details 
about the planning of the campaign, the situation of Caesar in Gaul, and other 
information worth knowing in Rome. He was therefore also noticeably disappointed 
when Chrysippus arrived empty-handed and did not deliver a letter or message 
containing more news of this kind.  
He disguises his desire for information under the pretext of conventional friendly 
bantering: “I would rather have learned how you are getting on from your own letters 
as often as possible; it would have been more fitting. No doubt that is the way it would 
be if you had cared to study the rules of friendship (benevolentia) as thoroughly as those 
of court procedure”200. Surely Cicero preferred a letter written by Trebatius himself as a 
 
                                                     
198 The travel time from Gaul to Rome would have caused a significant time lapse between Trebatius’ 
entrustment of Chrysippus and Chrysippus’ report to Cicero on the one hand, and again between the 
delivery of Cicero’s reply back to Trebatius on the other. 
199 Cic. Fam. 7.14.2: “Illud quidem perlibenter audivi ex eodem Chrysippo, te esse Caesari 
familiarem”. 
200 Cic. Fam. 7.14.2: “Sed mehercule mallem, id quod erat aequius, de tuis rebus ex tuis litteris quam 
saepissime cognoscerem. Quod certe ita fieret, si tu maluisses benevolentiae quam litium iure 
perdiscere”. 
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token of their friendship, but he particularly wanted these letters to contain 
information about Trebatius’ affairs in Gaul (res tuae) and he wanted them as often as 
possible (saepissime)201. 
In order to encourage Trebatius to pass more information next time, Cicero goes out 
of his way to represent Chrysippus – who was likely to return to Gaul with Cicero’s 
response – as a reliable connection to whom such confidential news could be safely 
entrusted. The long description of Chrysippus at the beginning of the letter serves to 
situate him within Cicero’s network of trustworthy agents. The “exordium” of a letter, 
especially when written in a highly inflected language like Latin, was rarely chosen or 
formulated carelessly. Surely, we are not stretching anyone’s imagination by assuming 
that this was true also for letters written by Cicero. The first line(s) often served as a 
summary to draw attention immediately to the main subject of the letter202. By 
mentioning Cyrus, as well as the profession he had in common with his freedman, 
Cicero stresses the latter’s connection to his patron. Chrysippus, it can be safely 
assumed, benefited from this connection since he owed to it not only his income (as an 
architect and very likely an associate of his former master) but also his position in the 
trust network of his patron and his contacts. These stakes would serve as a strong 
incentive for Chrysippus not to damage the trust that was invested in him. The 
embeddedness in his patron’s network, in other words, was a strong element of network 
control (as defined in Chapter 1). In order for controlling mechanisms to actually facilitate 
trust, the trustor (i.c. Trebatius) needs to be aware of their existence. He must realise 
the stakes of the trustee in upholding the relationship. In this regard, it is meaningful 
that Cicero presents Chrysippus as strongly embedded in his own network as well: “Was 
it too much trouble to give him a letter for me, and him practically one of my own 
 
                                                     
201 We should not assume in a Carcopinian way that Cicero was acting insincere and merely wanted to 
wring sensitive information from his friend, rather than being interested in his personal well-being. 
We should, however, allow for the possibility that both concerns played a role without the one 
invalidating or trumping the other. 
202 Hutchinson (1998), passim (esp. the first chapter, p. 1-24) has cogently argued that we should not 
see the letters as mere historical or biographical sources, but as products of a deliberate literary 
process. Even though Cicero may not have written the letters with their publication in mind, he did 
pay attention to structure, persuasive design, and rhetorical strategies. Cf. Morello & Morrison 
(2007), vi-vii; Rees (2007), passim. Sherwin-White (1966), 5-11 catalogues and elaborates on the often 
polished openings of Pliny’s letter. Although these are clearly of a more stylised nature (and 
therefore another indication of the much more literary form of Pliny’s letters when compared to 
Cicero’s), they do reveal the widely shared notion that the first sentence(s) of a letter served as a 
preview to its content. Some letters of Cicero refer to this importance as well: e.g. Fam. 2.7.2: “Sed 
amabo te, cura et cogita[tioni] – nihil novi, sed illud idem quod initio scripsi”; 5.12.9: “(…) illa non 
cupiditas incendit de qua initio scripsi, festinationis”; 6.12.5: “Sed ut ad initium revertar (…)”. 
Especially letters of recommendation reserved the first few words to accentuate the commendatus, cf. 
Chapter 5.  
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household (homo praesertim prope domesticus)?”. More than an intention to identify the 
messenger who delivered Trebatius’ greetings (and whom Trebatius no doubt 
remembered), the extensive libertination served to express and guarantee the 
trustworthiness of the freedman as being embedded in the trust networks of both 
Chrysippus’ patron and Cicero himself. Moreover, as noted earlier, the explicit mention 
Chrysippus as libertus Cyri endowed him (and the message he conveyed) with an aura of 
his patron’s social and symbolic capital203.  
The letter ends with Cicero making explicit what was already implied throughout: “I 
am very fond of you (te valde amamus), and not only want you to be fond of me (a te amari 
volumus) but am confident (confidimus) that you are”. Three times in this last sentence 
does Cicero use the consensual ‘we’ – a classic figure of style to stress the consent and 
like-mindedness of writer and addressee. In this case, however, the first person plural 
serves an additional purpose. Indeed, it can be argued that not only Cicero, but also 
Chrysippus was its subject. Instead of rendering the majestic plural by a first person 
singular when translating this last sentence of the letter, we may in fact grasp its 
meaning more accurately if we maintain the plural. Cicero, in other words, wanted 
Trebatius to be fond of him and of Chrysippus, and stressed that the feeling in both cases 
was mutual. Read in this way, the letter as a whole becomes a large hyperbaton which 
connects the rather elaborate introduction of Chrysippus at the start to the very last 
phrase stressing the mutual affection and trust between Trebatius-Chrysippus-Cicero. 
Additionally, the very first word of the letter combined with the very last one, captures 
in no insignificant way both the content of the letter as well as the reason for the 
elaborate identification of Chrysippus: Chrysippus … confidimus204. This passage thus 
makes explicit what is often implied by accentuating the trustworthiness of a courier, 
i.e. that by sending someone trustworthy, the letter writer disarms his correspondent 
since he can no longer invoke the lack of reliable couriers as excuse for not writing205.  
The references to Chryssipus in the other four letters that mention him are much less 
extensive. All of these letters are addressed to Atticus. One was written in April 59 BCE 
 
                                                     
203 McCutcheon (2013), 200-1, similarly noted, drawing on Gurd’s (2007) notion of “corporate 
authority”, how Cicero’s use of Atticus’ tabellarii to send official reports to Rome was intended to 
impress the senators due to the patron’s prestige that was thus added to these documents.  
204 The proper name would of course have to be rendered in the dative to form a correct Latin 
phrase, but anyone paying attention to the structure of the letter would notice the cohesion, 
regardless of the nominative. 
205 Such excuses were regularly invoked. E.g. Cic. Att. 4.16.1; 5.17.1. McCutcheon (2013), 183-5 
observes a similar strategy in Fam. 11.16.1 where Cicero explicitly writes that he had instructed his 
courier to deliver the letter only when the addressee (Brutus) was free of sorrow (sollicitudo) or 
irritation (molestia) in order to prevent his correspondent from using precisely these arguments as 
excuse for not answering the letter. 
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and thus predates the letter to Trebatius by six years. In it, Cicero advises Atticus to 
consult Chrysippus (tu censeo tamen adhibeas Vettium) on the building of a wall since he 
does not want his sister-in-law Pomponia and his nephew Quintus to “live in fear of 
falling masonry” (versari in timore ruinae)206. He is only very briefly mentioned and only 
in his capacity as a skilled architect. The next time he appears is eleven years later 
(March 48 BCE). Cicero was greatly distressed at the time since Caesar and Pompey were 
on full collision course – the battle of Pharsalus would take place only months after the 
writing of this letter. He cynically receives Atticus’ exhortation to stay positive and to 
keep his courage up. How could he, Cicero wonders, when Chrysippus had recently 
mentioned (Chrysippus dixit) certain dangers pending over his house. We do not know 
precisely what threats Cicero was referring to, but it seems plausible that he feared a 
confiscation by Caesarian supporters. In any case, Chrysippus is only mentioned en 
passant as the source of the news. However, Cicero does not seem to have 
unconditionally trusted this information: “[how could I keep my courage up] if there has 
been added to my other misfortunes what Chrysippus told me was in preparation (you 
give no hint of it) against me, about my town house”207. Not only does Cicero express his 
reservations about the truth of the rumour by framing it in a conditional clause (si … 
accessit), but he also does so by explicitly stating that he had heard nothing on the 
matter from his intimate friend Atticus (tu nihil significasti). Three years later, 
Chrysippus is again mentioned very briefly208. Throughout the month of May of 45 BCE, 
Cicero had been asking Atticus on a daily basis to report on the state of a property he 
wanted to buy209. In this letter, Cicero writes that he had finally received Atticus’ 
account and that Chrysippus too had reported his findings (de hortis ex tuis litteris cognovi 
et Chrysippo). Apparently, the freedman had assisted Atticus in judging the value of the 
property and had contributed to the assessment with his own professional opinion. He 
is again only very briefly mentioned and again only in his professional capacity as 
architect. The last record of Chrysippus dates to April 44 BCE210. Cicero writes that he 
had sent for him (arcessivi Chrysippum) because two of his shops (tabernae) had collapsed 
and the others were showing similar signs of decay. No further information is provided 
and Chrysippus is again described only as a respected architect.  
When referred to merely as an architect or as the source of a dubious rumour, then, 
the same level of trust (if any) as implied in the letter to Trebatius is strikingly lacking. 
 
                                                     
206 Cic. Att. 2.4.7. 
207 Cic. Att. 11.2.3: “sed si ad ceteras miserias accessit etiam id quod mihi Chrysippus dixit parari (tu 
nihil significasti) de domo, quis me miserior umquam fuit? “. 
208 Cic. Att. 13.29.1. 
209 E.g. Cic. Att. 13.1.2 (23 May); 13.27.2 (25 May); 13.28.1 (26 May); … 
210 Cic. Att. 14.9.1. 
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In none of these passages does Cicero refer either to Chrysippus’ status, nor does he 
ever link him to his patron. These two features were considered salient only in the letter 
to Trebatius, where Cicero’s faith in the freedman (and the latter’s network 
embeddedness) had to be expressed explicitly to convince his correspondent of 
Chrysippus’ trustworthiness.  
4.5.2 Pausanias 
In February 50 BCE, Cicero was well established as proconsul of Cilicia although he had 
initially taken up this function very much against his own wish211. In what is probably 
the most elaborate proslepsis in Latin epistolography, he aired his discontent with 
Pompey’s new lex de provinciis, which imposed a five year interval between the tenure of 
a praetorship or consulship in Rome on the one hand, and a governorship of a province 
on the other212. Usually, magistrates would be assigned to a province immediately or 
shortly after having laid down their office. By imposing an interval of five years, the 
senate and Pompey hoped to check the boundless ambition of some of these men213. One 
of the side-effects of the law was that there were suddenly not enough qualified ex-
magistrates available to fill all provinces. The agreed upon solution to this problem was 
to draw lots from among the names of ex-praetors and ex-consuls who had not yet 
“enjoyed” the command over a province in the past. Precisely because Cicero had 
ardently avoided a similar appointment in the past, he was one of the most obvious 
candidates in 51 BCE. Fate decided to give him Cilicia, but it could not bring about any 
enthusiastic acceptance of the function by Cicero. The already tense relationship with 
his predecessor Ap. Claudius Pulcher with whom he would have to at least meet, if not 
collaborate, to smoothen the transition of power, certainly did not ameliorate his 
overall opinion on the matter. 
As mentioned above, this tension had already come to the fore even before Cicero 
arrived in the province214. These initial difficulties had only just subsided when another 
problem arose. In February 50 BCE, Cicero felt the need to explain some of his most 
recent decisions to Appius. The latter had been greatly vexed by Cicero’s shutting down 
 
                                                     
211 E.g. Cic. Fam. 2.11.1; 2.12.2; 15.12.2; Att. 5.15.1. 
212 Cic. Att. 8.3.3.  
213 Dio 40.46.2 mentions that the measure was at first a senatusconsultum (53 BCE), that Pompey had 
enforced it as a law in the next year (40.56.1), but that the leading citizen did not entirely respected 
it himself (40.56.2-3). Cf. Marshall (1972); Gagliardi (2011), 89-104. See Steel (2012) for the suggestion 
that the Senate’s and Pompey’s motives had been to lift governorships out of the traditional cursus 
honorum.  
214 See above (4.4.3) for the case of Phania, and for Appius’ deliberate avoidance of his successor 
throughout the preceding months. 
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one of his personal building projects in the province. Cicero explains his motives, but it 
is clear that his relationship with Appius had suffered another serious blow. Moreover, 
in the same letter he writes that he had received even more disturbing news from 
Pausanias Lentuli libertus accensus meus215. Apparently, Appius had been complaining to 
the freedman in very grave terms about Cicero not having gone to meet him: an 
accusation similar to the one he had uttered a few months earlier in another context (cf. 
supra). Cicero, so Appius thought, had thereby shown unacceptable contempt and 
arrogance (scilicet contempsi te, nec potest fieri me quicquam superbius). As was the case a 
few months earlier, however, Appius merely seems to have been looking for a pretext to 
disparage Cicero – that is, if we can rely on Cicero’s version of the events in this letter216. 
Indeed, Cicero apologetically explains, he had actually done his very best once again to 
meet him. After he had learned that Appius would be joining him in Iconium, Cicero had 
planned to set out to meet him along the way as a gesture of courtesy. Because there 
were two roads that Appius might be taking to Iconium, Cicero had sent out scouts to 
ascertain which direction he himself should head out for in order to meet his colleague. 
As it turned out, however, Appius had already left and Cicero was too late.   
Cicero continues the letter, expressing his surprise and indignation that Appius 
would act in this way. Pausanias (mentioned for the second time now) had also told 
Cicero of a particularly heinous remark made by the former governor: “Well, of course! 
Appius went to meet Lentulus, Lentulus went to meet Ampius; but Cicero go to meet 
Appius, oh no!”217. Appius, Lentulus’ successor as proconsular governor of Cilicia, had 
set out to meet his predecessor, as Lentulus had done when succeeding Ampius218. 
Cicero not paying the same homage to Appius, the latter repeated, was a sure sign of his 
arrogance. Appius thereby subtly referred to Cicero’s position as homo novus and implied 
that his rapid rise to the top had made him believe that showing respect to his “peers” 
was unnecessary219.  
 
                                                     
215 Cic. Fam. 3.7.4. 
216 We have little reason to suspect that Cicero blatantly distorted facts in his correspondence with 
Appius. In fact, as far we know, he had always tried to defuse delicate encounters with him in the 
past (see note 152). For Cicero’s good intent in this particular affair, see also Fam. 3.6.6 in which he 
provides Appius with detailed dates and itineraries so that he (Appius) could chose a convenient 
date and place for the meeting: “Nunc tu et ex diebus et ex ratione itineris, si putabis me esse 
conveniendum, constitues quo loco id commodissime fieri possit et quo die”. 
217 Cic. Fam. 3.7.5: “Illud idem Pausania dicebat te dixisse: ‘quidni? Appius Lentulo, Lentulus Ampio 
processit obviam, Cicero Appio noluit’”. 
218 See Broughton (1952), II 210, 218, 224 (Lentulus: 56-53 BCE); 229, 237, 242 (Appius: 53-51 BCE); 251 
(Cicero: 51-50 BCE). It is not known who held the proconsulship of Cilicia in the years 62-56 BCE, but 
Cic. Fam. 1.3.2 suggests it was (at least temporarily) T. Ampius, who is referred to as Lentulus’ 
predecessor in this letter that addresses the latter as proconsul of Cilicia. 
219 This is, at least, Cicero’s interpretation of the accusation, as becomes clear in the following lines 
of the letter. Cf. also Hall (2009), 149-50. 
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Pausanias is not referred to as either libertus or accensus in this latter passage, most 
likely because this would amount to superfluous repetition (these identity dimensions 
having already been expressed only a few phrases earlier). This first extensive mention 
is, however, worthy of note. Indeed, Cicero does not only stress his own relation to the 
informant (as accensus meus220), but also the latter’s status as a freedman, as well as his 
patron (Pausanias Lentuli libertus accensus meus). These descriptions seem somewhat 
redundant, since accensi were almost exclusively drawn from among the freed 
population anyway. Indeed, in a famous letter to his brother – governor of Asia at the 
time – Cicero explained how the head of a province should act and deal with various 
affairs. He wrote: “Let your orderly (accensus) be what our forebears meant him to be. 
Except for some good reason they gave this function to none but their own freedmen, 
and that not as a favour (beneficium) but as a task and duty (labor ac munus)”221. It is no 
coincidence then, that the only other mention of an individual accensus in Cicero’s 
correspondence is that of Gabinius’ Antiochus, also a freedman222.  
Cicero did not arbitrarily describe Pausanius in such terms. Most importantly, it was 
imperative to let Appius know that he had received the information from a reliable 
source. Cicero did not merely rely on random people and common rumours. Indeed, he 
would often be approached by such persons – “malicious persons” (malevoli homines) as 
he calls them in another letter – trying to drive a wedge between him and Appius. Their 
talk, Cicero explicitly writes, has no effect on him (horum ego sermone non movebar)223. 
When the news comes from someone as reliable as Pausanius, however, it was (expected 
to be) taken seriously. But why also mention Pausanias’ patron when in so many other 
instances, libertination is simply given as a generalising trait instead of a relational one? 
As a freedman of Lentulus, it was not unlikely that the situation would reach the ex-
governor’s ears as well. Although accensi were supposed to tacitly work behind the 
scenes224, the patronal bond with Lentulus undoubtedly put strains on this expectation 
on occasions like this. More than just wanting to inform Cicero about his discontent, 
Appius’ decision to deliberately pick Pausanias as the recipient of his rants, potentially 
risked the accusation against Cicero becoming a public rumour. This was all the more 
 
                                                     
220 Accensi were attendants of magistrates and usually part of the administrative personnel they took 
with them on their travels. See Manzella (2000) for a good introduction to accensi. 
221 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 1.1.13.  
222 Cic. Att. 4.18.4. Cf. note 56 above. 
223 Cic. Fam. 3.6.4-5. 
224 Ideally, accensi were supposed to work in the background, assisting the magistrate in a range of 
duties, but never truly showing that they held these responsibilities. Indeed, a good accensus 
typically kept his mouth shut. Cic. Quint. Fratr. 1.1.21 describes the serene and admirable 
praetorship of C. Octavius (61 BCE) as one in which anyone could speak his mind, but where the the 
accensus held his tongue (tacuit accensus). 
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likely because Pausanias had probably been his patron’s accensus during Lentulus’ own 
governorship of Cilicia (56-53 BCE), and had kept the office under the next governors, 
first Appius, and later Cicero. During his time of service then, Pausanius had built up a 
considerable network of communications225. Appius, Cicero is implying, might as well 
have exclaimed his grievances publicly. 
Cicero obliquely accuses Appius of having had this intention in mind all along by 
singling out Pausanias as the source from which he had received the news, and to which 
Appius had confided it in person. Indeed, Pausanius did not report about Appius 
grumblingly complaining to friends or associates in general. Instead, he had addressed 
Pausanias in person with this grievances (a Pausania … audivi cum diceret te secum esse 
questum). By using the official channel of communications, Appius not only made sure 
that his message would reach Cicero, but he also elevated his resentment to the level of 
a formal accusation. Clearly, Appius’ conduct did not sit well with Cicero. The tone of 
the letter quickly turns from submissive and appeasing to a much more aggressive and 
sneering one. Although his language remains careful and relatively polite throughout 
the next passages, Appius is subtly accused of snobbery and a lack of knowledge about 
the true meaning of nobility (εὐγένεια)226. Moreover, Cicero concludes the letter by 
implying that he does not even care anymore whether Appius is interested in remaining 
his friend because he deems him a man too prone to accuse others anyway (φιλαίτιος)227. 
Cicero thus seems to confirm that Appius’ discontent amounted to actual accusations. 
Especially the fact that they were addressed to him personally and formally (through 
Pausanias accensus), as well as the possibility of the accusation oozing out in public and 
reaching Rome (through Pausanius libertus Lentuli) were severely resented by Cicero. 
Libertination in this instance served to stress Pausanias’ pivotal position as a node in an 
extended network of communications that involved both Cicero himself and his patron 
Lentulus, but that might prove damaging to the former due to Appius’ misuse (or rather 
abuse) of it. 
 
                                                     
225 Accensi can therefore be considered the predecessors of the imperial freedmen during the 
Principate; the Imperial Republic foreshadowing the Republican Empire, as it were. Eventually, they 
too transcended the reigns of individual emperors and became an imperial bureaucracy. Cf. 
Chapters 1 and 6. 
226 Cic. Fam. 3.7.5. This was Cicero’s response to Appius’ sneer to his position as homo novus. See note 
219 above. 
227 Cf. Hall (2009), 150-2 who describes the remarks as “uncharacteristically ill-tempered”, 
expressing “an unfamiliar sniping attitude”. The tone of this part of the letter is “pugnacious”. 
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4.5.3 Extrapolating the case studies 
This final section elaborates on the third element in the triadic intertwinement of 
libertination use, trustworthiness, and connection to a patron. As hinted at in passing 
earlier, a letter writer – after the “choice” had been made whether or not to include 
libertination – could opt to either leave it at that (resulting in a general classification 
“libertus”), or he could further describe the individual by including a reference to his 
patron (resulting in a relational identification “libertus + possessive pronoun/genitive”). 
These “choices” were doubtlessly intuitive in most cases, but especially in the more 
delicate, polite and formal letters, they could be the result of careful deliberation (like in 
the cases of Pausanias and Chrysippus above). Whether intuitive or calculated, however, 
a specific format of libertination (i.e. rather than an alternative one), like any choice of 
words, betrays assumptions that are either internalised by the writer or considered taken 
for granted by the correspondent (or both). 
These subtle but meaningful nuances in the use of libertination are usually 
overlooked. Shackleton Bailey, in one of the best and most widely used English 
translations of Cicero’s letters, thus translates Caelius’ libertum Philonem misi or Cicero’s 
professus est Philotimus libertus by “I have sent out my freedman Philo” and “it was made 
by my freedman Philotimus” respectively228. The English text thus exceeds mere 
translation and adds both an interpretation (i.c. that Philo and Philotimus are Caelius’ 
and Cicero’s own freedmen), and an implication (that both men also explicitly stressed 
this relation). The context surely suggests that Philo was in fact an ex-slave of Caelius, 
and we know Cicero to have been Philotimus’ patron. The content of the letter is 
therefore not altered by the interpretational layer of the translation. The point is, 
however, that Caelius and Cicero did not include a possessive indicator, and that 
translating the Latin in this way loses the distinctiveness of the phrase when compared 
to instances where such indicator was deliberately included. In a letter to Appius 
Pulcher, for example, Cicero explicitly describes the same Philotimus as libertus meus. 
The translation “my freedman Philotimus” is straightforward in this case, but the 
difference with, for example, Philo’s description is effaced entirely229. 
Contrarily, Cicero’s Phaetho libertus non vidit or Demetrio liberto are translated by “the 
freedman Phaetho did not see him” and “to the freedman Demetrius” respectively230. In 
 
                                                     
228 Cic. Fam. 8.8.10; Att. 13.33.1. Cicero’s response to the first letter similarly does not include a 
possessive indicator (Caelius libertum ad me misit), Fam. 6.1.21. The translation in question is of course 
Shackleton Bailey’s 1999 (Epistulae ad Atticum), 2001 (Epistulae ad Familiares), and 2002 (Epistulae ad 
Quintum Fratrem et Brutum) Loeb edition. 
229 Cic. Fam. 3.9.1. 
230 Cic. Att. 3.8.2.; 14.17.1. 
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these instances, Shackleton Bailey was reluctant to identify the freedmen beyond their 
mere status, and omits a possessive pronoun in his translation (rightly, of course, since 
we do not know for sure who the respective patrons were). Although he usually renders 
Latin general classifications by English relational identifications (either based on 
external knowledge of the freedman’s patron or on a contextual interpretation), this 
modus operandi is thus not consistently applied. 
The validity of these interpretations should, again, not be questioned: Shackleton 
Bailey usually had good reasons to assume the possessive pronoun was correct, and 
when he did not, he left the matter untouched (like in the cases of Phaetho and 
Demetrius, whom he describes in his Onomasticon to Cicero’s Letters as “freedman of M. or 
Q. Cicero” and “freedman, of Atticus?” respectively). We would like to draw attention 
here to the subtextual meaning that is lost by the interpretative style of translating231. In 
the next paragraphs, we therefore focus on the different ways freedmen were referred 
to in the original text and what considerations motivated a specific use of libertination 
in one instance, but another in a different one. 
Of the 100 letters that mention a freedman232, 30 do not mention the patron in any way 
throughout the passage. In the other 70 letters, the patron is either implicitly or 
explicitly present. By “implicit”, we mean that 1) the patron is mentioned but not in 
immediate connection to the freedman (= IPd, 12 cases); or 2) that the writer or the 
addressee is himself the patron without this link being made explicit (= IPw/a, 17 cases). 
All general classifications of liberti therefore fall within this “implicit”-category. By 
“explicit”, we mean that 1) the patron is explicitly mentioned in relation to the 
freedman by a possessive pronoun (eius/suus) or a possessive genitive (= EPd, 25 cases); 
or 2) that the writer or the addressee is himself the patron and that this link is made 
explicit by inclusion of a possessive pronoun (tuus/meus) (= EPw/a, 16 cases). All relational 
identifications therefore fall within this “explicit”-category. The number between 
brackets in Table 10 below represents how many times each separate variable was 
accompanied by libertination. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
231 For a more detailed enquiry into the “translator’s invisibility” and, especially, the often ignored 
influence of modern requirements of “readability”, “fluency”, and “transparency” (i.e. the 
“domesticating” practice of translation), see Venuti (2008), especially Chapter 1 (p. 1-34). 
232 We again exclude in this discussion “the big four” (Statius, Dionysius, Philotimus, and Tiro). They 
are usually mentioned only by their proper name without explicit mention of their freed status, let 
alone any relational identification. 
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Table 10 The correlation between the use of libertination and the discursive presence of a 
patron in Cicero’s correspondence 
 No 
patron 
Implicit patron Explicit patron 
IPd IPw/a EPd EPw/a 
Ad Atticum 19 (3) 4 (2) 12 (3) 10 (10) 4 (4233) 
Ad Familiares 5 (0) 8 (5) 4 (1) 14 (14234) 11 (11) 
Ad Quint. Fratr. 6 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 1 (1) 1 (1) 
Total  
30 (3) 
12 (7) 17 (4) 25 (25) 16 (16) 
29 (11) 41 (41) 
 
There exists a clear correlation between libertination on the one hand and the 
importance of the patron in the passage on the other. Libertination rarely occurs when 
the patron is not “present” at all in the passage (10%). When the patron is implicitly 
“present” (i.e. referred to but not in direct connection to the freedman), the percentage 
of libertination increases to 38%. However, every time the patron is explicitly present 
(i.e. in a relational identification of the freedman), libertination is included235. 
The latter observation begs the question whether a relational identification does not 
by its very nature require the structure “libertus + possessive pronoun/genitive”. In 
other words, is it not the “epistolary habit” (presenting freedmen as more than merely a 
“possession” of their patron, as a “name + possessive pronoun/genitive” without 
“libertus” would imply), rather than a feature of libertination-use that prompts the 
close fit between “explicit patron” and “libertination”? To account for this possibility, 
we have to gauge the extent to which the structure “proper name + possessive 
pronoun/genitive” (i.e. without status indicator of any kind) is feasible at all throughout 
 
                                                     
233 One of those four cases (Hilarus’ in Att. 1.12.2) is not grammatically a relational identification as 
defined earlier. Cicero writes libertum ego habeo instead of meus libertus. The connection between 
patron and freedman, however, is as strong (if not more so due to this more explicit formulation) as 
in the cases where genitive pronouns are used. We therefore included the passage in the EP category 
instead of the IP one. Moreover, the deliberate deviation from the more standard libertus meus is 
likely related to Hilarus’ deviation from his role as trustworthy agent. 
234 Of these 14, 10 are described as libertus, 1 by the derogative verna, and 3 by a direct link to their 
patron (patronus). 
235 Strictly speaking, verna, libertum ego habeo, or a litteral reference to a patronus are not instances of 
libertination as defined earlier (see, however, note 233). But even when we exclude these five cases, 
36 out of 41 passages in the EP category (88%) would still contain “real” libertination. The general 
trend thus remains unaltered. 
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the correspondence. The caveat here is that our stringent selection criteria often 
excluded these cases when the status of the individuals could not be ascertained by 
information outside the passage itself. Nicanor tuus, Democritus tuus, or Pamphilus tuus in 
the letters to Atticus, or Philargyrus tuus, Seleucus tuus, or Rufio tuus in the letters to other 
familiares may thus have been either slaves or freedmen236. Although there is no way of 
knowing for sure, some identifiable cases, like that of Cicero’s Dionysius (Dionysius 
tuus)237, meaningfully use the possessive pronoun to refer to slaves, and, conversely, no 
instances are known where this was done for freedmen. In addition, we cannot even 
exclude the possibility that some of the individuals thus described were freeborn 
clients. Indeed, the freeborn Greek Diogenes whom Caelius Rufus sent out to Cicero was 
described by the latter as Diogenes tuus238, and Sabinus tuus in a letter to Trebonius refers 
to a freeborn friend of the latter239. Slaves and freeborn clients or friends could thus be 
rendered by the formula “name + possessive pronoun” (in the latter case serving as a 
jovial and amiable address), but as far as we can deduce from the list of identifiable 
individuals, similar references to freedmen consistently included an explicit mention of 
their legal status. 
Atticus’ freedman Dionysius is once presented as tuus without libertination, but this 
only happened because Cicero wanted to air his indignation by replacing the endearing 
Dionysius noster by Dionysius tuus (Dionysius quidem tuus potius quam noster)240. The same 
goes for the many instances in which Cicero calls his confidential freedman Tiro meus, or 
heads his letters by the conventional Tironi suo. The meus or suus are here not so much 
expressions of “possession” as terms of “endearment” (i.e. short not for “Tiro libertus 
meus” but instead meaning “my dear Tiro”). Indeed, people other than Cicero could 
similarly refer to the freedman as Tiro meus or Tiro suus as well241. 
It is equally significant that of the limited amount of persons described as “name + 
possessive genitive” (and thus without status indicator), only two are potentially 
freedmen. The others we can safely identify, via other letters or internal cues, as certain 
slaves. Thus, the slaves Antheros and Eros are presented as Anteros Quinti and Eros 
 
                                                     
236 Cic. Att. 5.3.3; 6.1.13; 7.2.2; Fam. 6.1.6; 6.18.1; 7.20.1. 
237 Cic. Fam. 5.10a.1. 
238 Cic. Fam. 2.12.2. 
239 Cic. Fam. 15.20.1 (a letter addressed to M. Marius). 
240 Cic. Att. 8.4.1. Cf. Fam. 9.10.1; Att. 7.3.10; 13.2b. 
241 E.g. Cic. Fam. 7.29.2 (Manius Curius). In Cic. Fam. 16.18.1 we learn that Tiro had found it 
inappropriate that Cicero – in a letter that would be read by a wider circle of correspondents – had 
started out by writing TULLIUS TIRONI S., which the freedman apparently thought too familiar. 
Cicero would not accept the critique. In fact, he would even have liked to add suo to the phrase, 
confirming that this was a term of “endearment”: “Quid igitur? Non sic oportet? Equidem censeo sic, 
addendum etiam ‘suo’”. Quintus Cicero too, habitually headed his letters to Tiro with Q. CICERO 
TIRONI SUO, e.g. Fam. 16.26-7. 
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Philotimi in letters to Atticus242. Contrarily, the only potential freedmen in this category 
are Corumbus (Corumbus Balbi) and Protogenes (Protogenes tuus)243. As we noted earlier, 
Corumbus is one of the most contested individuals in Cicero’s correspondence (in terms 
of the opinions about his status, cf. Appendix 1) and he could have been either a slave or 
a freedman. The same goes for Protogenes, whose function as a reader (anagnostes) 
suggests that he was a slave, but the possibility of freed status cannot be excluded244. In 
light of the observations made above, however, servile status could reasonably be 
argued for both individuals, although the supporting argumentation would evidently 
become circular. 
In any case, the fact that we know of no certain freedman with relational 
identification but without libertination is meaningful. It strongly suggests a correlation 
between libertination on the one hand and a close connection to the patron on the 
other. Philogenes and Phania, for example, are always libertus tuus and not Philogenes 
tuus or Phania tuus, and Trypho is similarly libertus L. Reguli and not Trypho L. Reguli. 
Moreover, of the 33 letters that were written by or to the patron of a freedman (the *w/a 
categories), libertination was included 20 times. In 16 of these 20 cases (80%), the link 
with the patron was further accentuated by the possessive pronouns meus or tuus. The 
same goes for the letters that refer to a patron who was not the writer or addressee of 
the letter (the *d categories). Libertination is used 32 times and in 25 of these instances 
(78%) the link with the patron is explicitly stressed by a possessive genitive or pronoun.  
In 11 out of the 16 EPw/a cases, the freedmen mentioned act as couriers245. In the other 
5 letters, the freedmen similarly appear as highly confidential agents or associates of 
their patrons, but in another function246. All 16 freedmen that are explicitly connected 
to their patron therefore not only receive libertination but also occur in a very specific 
trust context. A similar observation can be made when looking at the EPd category. 21 
out of 25 of these individuals feature either as couriers or as recommended persons, two 
 
                                                     
242 Cic. Att. 9.14.2; 10.15.1. 
243 Cic. Att. 14.3.1; Fam. 7.1.3. 
244 The only other readers mentioned in Cicero’s correspondence (Sositheus and Dionysius) are 
slaves, Att. 1.12.4; Fam. 5.9.2. The readers in Pliny’s correspondence, however, (Zosimus and an 
unnamed individual) are freedmen (Ep. 5.19; 9.34), although a third may have been a slave: 
Encolpius (Ep. 8.1). 
245 Cic. Fam. 2.7.3; 3.1.1-2; 3.5.3; 3.8.5; 4.9.1; 5.20.8; 6.2.1,10; 6.3.1; 8.7.1; Quint. Fratr. 1.3.4. 
246 Cic. Fam. 6.10a.1 (Cicero entrusts Theudas with his thoughts on his patron’s political future); 
7.23.3 (Cicero gives an unnamed freedman definite commissions and considerable freedom in 
procuring statues); 7.25.2 (Apella as confidant of his patron); 10.25.3 (Dardanus is present during a 
confidential meeting between his patron’s friends); Att. 1.12.2 (the shocking accentuation of Hilarus’ 
wickedness by stressing first his identity dimensions (libertus, ratiocinator, and cliens) that would 
normally ensure trustworthiness, cf. note 233 above);  
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contexts that prominently highlight trust and trustworthiness (cf. also Chapter 5)247. By 
comparison, all of Pliny’s references to individual freedpersons include either a 
possessive pronoun or a possessive genitive and are therefore explicitly connected to 
their patron (EP category). However, as noted before, this is very likely to be (at least in 
part) a consequence of editorial “retouching” of the letters to make them accessible and 
understandable to a broader audience. Pliny’s correspondence can therefore not be 
analysed in terms of “embeddedness”. Neither can that of Fronto’s, although the reason 
here is rather a lack of attestations than a potential “contamination” of their 
authenticity248.  
The distinction between the three categories (N, IP, and EP) should not be taken too 
strictly. It is an analytical conceptualisation, not an ancient “rule of thumb” of letter 
writing. Three freedmen who were not connected to their patron (N category), for 
example, occurred nonetheless in a trust context and with libertination249. However, the 
general trends are unambiguous, and do reveal a recurrent inclination toward 
presenting freedmen as highly network embedded, and as constituting a vital 
component of the elite’s social capital by explicitly referring to their legal status and by 
framing them in relation to their patron.  
It is significant that the four freedmen who are mentioned more than ten times in the 
correspondence are rarely attributed libertination250. These men were usually 
mentioned in letters that “bonded” rather than “bridged” networks. They typically 
occur in letters of which either the writer or the addressee was the patron, and which 
are situated in a continuous transmission back and forth between these men. Thus all 
letters containing a reference to M. Pomponius Dionysius (28 in total) are addressed to 
his patron Atticus and none include libertination251. Similarly, Philotimus is usually 
mentioned (ca. 43 times in total) in letters written by Cicero to Atticus as well. It is 
certainly no coincidence that he is called libertus only in two letters that markedly 
deviate from this pattern (i.e. a letter that was addressed to Appius Pulcher rather than 
 
                                                     
247 Cic. Fam. 3.7.4-5; 7.14.1-2; Att. 3.15.1,3; 3.17.1; 11.6.6; 11.13.1; 11.20.1; 14.9.1; 16.4.1 (two cases); 
Quint. Fratr. 1.2.12 (= couriers); Fam. 13.2; 13.14.2; 13.16; 13.21.2; 13.23.1; 13.27.2; 13.46; 13.60.1; 
13.69.1-2; 13.70 (= recommendations). The other four cases are that of the unnamed freedman of 
Brinnius who was also Cicero’s coheir (Att. 13.13-14.4); Turius’ freedman Eros who abused his central 
position in Turius’ network to usurp part of his inheritance (Fam. 12.26.2); Bellienus’ freedman 
Demetrius who similarly abused his function of garisson commander (Fam. 8.15.2); and Gabinius’ 
freedman and accensus Antiochus (Att. 4.18.4). 
248 Only Aridelus (Ad M. Caes. 5.37) and Charilas (Ad Verum Imp. 1.4.2) receive libertination, and only 
the former was formally connected to his patron, not coincidentally in a recommendation to the 
latter (libertus vester). 
249 Phaetho (Att. 3.8.2); Demetrius (Att. 14.17.1); Salvius (Fam. 9.10.1).  
250 See note 232. 
251 Cic. Att. 7.4.1 includes libertinus but this is not done to directly identify Dionysius (cf. Chapter 7).  
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Atticus, or one that was written by Caelius Rufus instead of Cicero)252. Statius and Tiro 
too only occur in letters between Cicero, his brother Quintus, and Atticus, with none of 
these containing libertination253. The strong bonds that already existed between these 
three men precluded a description of their trusted freedmen as liberti. Libertination was 
thus typically included in letters that mentioned liberti alieni or that were addressed to 
correspondents who were less closely connected to Cicero than his immediate family or 
Atticus254. This observation becomes even more clear in the discussion of letters of 
recommendation in the next chapter. Libertination, in short, served a particularly 
useful purpose in stressing the freedman’s function as bridging social capital; as 
connector of more remote networks. The depiction as trustworthy and connective 
capital was greatly beneficial for both freedman and patron alike (cf. Chapter 5). 
4.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, there clearly existed a triadic intertwinement of 1) discursive connection 
to a patron, 2) inclusion of libertination, and 3) a context of trust. The connection to the 
patron was both an expression and a consolidation of the freedman’s trustworthiness: 
he had been deemed worthy of manumission at first, but also continued to act according 
to the expectations imposed on him. This patronal bond is widely recognised as one of 
the main reasons for the relatively high manumission rate in the Roman slavery 
system255, and the discursive connection of trustworthy freedmen to a patron in Cicero’s 
 
                                                     
252 Cic. Att. 3.9.1; Fam. 8.3.2. Philotimus is called libertus in a letter to Atticus as well (Att. 10.7.2-3), 
but this may well be Cicero’s rather than Terentia’s freedman. Cf. Shackleton Bailey (1995), 77-8. The 
Greek references to his status (ἀπελεύθερος and οὑξελεύθερος in Att. 6.4.3 and 6.5.1) are clearly 
exceptional. 
253 Cic. Att. 6.2.1-2 and Quint. Fratr. 1.2.1-3,8 contain libertus but it is used referential and not as 
“libertination”. 
254 This binary opposition should again not be taken too rigorously. We have encountered instances 
where, for example, freedmen were in fact called libertus in letters to Atticus (e.g. Aegypta in Att. 
12.37.1 and 13.3.2).  
255 D’Arms (1981), 44, 104; Kirschenbaum (1987), 133-4 (for a mainly economic view); Mouritsen 
(2011), 146f, (esp. 152-9 for other factors like moral obligations, powerful social and familial factors, 
risk of abandonment and chance of promotion, but also basic economic dependency). For a critical 
note to the often impressionistic rather than statistical assumption that manumission was a 
frequent phenomenon and for the inadequacy of the source material to reach firm quantitative 
conclusions, see Wiedemann (1985); Scheidel (1997), 160, 165-6; Temin (2004), 531f; Kleijwegt 
(2006a), 9; (2006b), 89. Mouritsen (2011), 131-41 provides an extensive discussion on the sources and 
methods available and pursued in the past. 
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letters may well reflect a reality where many freedmen also remained physically 
connected to their ex-master. The numerous letters Cicero wrote exhorting Tiro to get 
well and to re-join his patron, as well as the fact that Tiro only very late in life obtained 
a property of his own, suggest that he had resided in his patron’s house up till then256. 
Remaining physically close to one’s patron was a quality some freedmen even felt worth 
stressing in their epitaphs. Thus Marcus Hostilius Dicaeus found pride in that he never 
left the house of his dominus before he was ripped away from it by death after 56 years of 
living beside him (neque domum neque dominum mutavi)257. Similarly, both law texts and 
literature casually reference freedmen living with their patron without any indication 
that this was considered exceptional (the opposite seems more likely)258. Both the 
physical and the discursive connection to the patron, ensured a perception of the 
freedman as trustworthy. The next section will argue that this process should not 
necessarily be understood as a stratificational one in the sense that the inherent 
benefits for the freedman were perversely derived from a lifelong subjugation to 
“paternal guidance”259. Instead, a close integration in the networks of their patrons 
served a purpose very similar to the accentuation of upward ties in patronage relations 
between freeborn individuals. Social capital was an asset aspired by social groups, 
regardless of their (legal) background.  
Whereas in highlighting the discursive habits and strategies of Cicero and his 
correspondents (as well as the capital they thereby wanted to obtain or accentuate) this 
chapter has approached the subject from a rather top-down perspective, Chapter 8 will 
 
                                                     
256 For the passages written to Tiro during his many ilnesses, see the entries in the prosopography 
(Appendix 2). For the freedman buying an estate (praedium) in 44 BCE, see Fam. 16.21.7. 
257 AE 1980, 503: M(arcus) Hostilius / Dicaeus / veni in hanc civitat(em) / ann(orum) XIIII in qua 
domu / [v]eni neq(ue) domum neq(ue) / dominum mutavi nisi / hanc aeternal(em) / vixi ann(os) 
LXX / in ius me vocavit / nemo ad iudicem nemo / tu qui stas et legis si hoc optimum / non est doc 
quid melius sit / Clodia Paullina optuma / locum dedit. Kleijwegt (2006b), 96-100 (esp. 98-9) 
cautiously argued that Dicaeus was probably a slave (and later freedman) with financial 
responsibilities. One of the arguments is that he seems to have been able to “marry upwards” with 
the freeborn Clodia Paullina. 
258 Dig. 21.1.17.15: “(…) liberti apud patronum habitantis sic, ut sub una clave tota eius habitatio esset 
(…)”; 29.5.1.5: “(…) ne puniatur ob hoc quod sub eodem tecto fuit (…)”; 48.19.11.1: “(…) libertus a 
patrono, in cuius domo moratur (…)”; Plin. Ep. 2.17.9: “Reliqua pars [villae meae] lateris huius 
servorum libertorumque usibus detinetur”; Tac. Ann. 14.43: “(…) liberti quoque, qui sub eodem tecto 
fuissent (…)”. For other examples from literature, see Mouritsen (2011), 149-51 (including the 
observation that the job titles of freedmen in columbaria suggest that these men and women had 
never left their patron’s house). Fabre (1981), 131-2 argued that during the Republic, there existed a 
legal obligation for freedmen to continue living with their patron. See, however, Waldstein (1986), 
85 and Perry (2014), 204 note 9. Rather than a legal obligation, there may have been a practical 
necessity for some freedpersons. Epictetus (himself a freedman) noted how freedmen could be 
worse off than slaves if they left from their patron’s protections (Disc. 4.1.33-7). Cf. Pomeroy (1975), 
202 (for freedwomen in particular). 
259 As Fabre (1981), passim or Mouritsen (2011), e.g. p. 35-6, 51, 82 would have it. 
  233 
take up this theme by focussing on “the freedman’s perspective”. Both Chapters 5 and 8 
will draw attention to the benefits “network embeddedness” implied for freedmen 
themselves, and how trustworthiness, libertination and a connection to a patron was 
valued not only by the party who – at first sight at least – seems to have benefited from 
it the most. 
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Chapter 5 Freedmen and social capital in letters 
of recommendation 
This chapter is conceived as an elaboration of the previous one. It similarly focusses on 
the network embedded letters of Cicero, though a very specific subset is singled out this 
time: the letters of recommendation. It reassesses the ingrained assumption that 
recommendations of freedmen were essentially different from recommendations of 
ingenui because the former (allegedly) had to endorse and vouch for an essentially 
different “kind” of person (an unquestioned premise closely associated with the macula 
framework, and similarly steering analysis into predetermined paths of enquiry). We 
start out by firmly framing the social practice of “recommending” in its historical 
context (5.1), before introducing the freedmen that were the beneficiaries of at least one 
recommendation (5.2). Section 5.3 will focus on three aspects of freedman 
recommendations that have been traditionally (though mostly implicitly) considered as 
evidence for their sui generis character: the vocabulary used in them, their overall 
structure, and the predominance of the patronage relation as the framework facilitating 
“libertine” praise. The latter observation is closely associated with some observations 
made in the previous chapter (e.g. the close discursive association of libertination with 
the presence of a patron). This chapter, however, fundamentally challenges the 
ingrained notion that this patronage relationship was the only context in which 
freedmen could display their virtue, and instead argues that it was but one strategy of 
accentuating social capital (a strategy, moreover, that was as fervently resorted to in 
recommendations of ingenui). The central argument of the chapter, then, is that letters 
of recommendations are not only yet another example of the profound influence of the 
macula servitutis interpretative framework, but that they also provide a valuable insight 
into the discursive representation of freedmen (a theme that will be taken up in further 
detail in Chapter 7). 
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5.1 Roman letters of recommendation 
5.1.1 Modern scholarship 
The literature on the sub-genre in Roman epistolography dedicated to introducing 
friends and associates is extensive. The work of Hannah Cotton – both her unpublished 
doctoral dissertation but also many subsequent contributions – remains the standard 
reference. It treats the history and nature of the genre as well as the writings of its most 
important proponents Cicero, Pliny, and Fronto1. Both Alessandro Plantera and 
Agnès Bérenger-Badel have studied more specific features of the different 
recommendation corpora from a comparative and diachronic point of view2. The 
prosopographical study by Élizabeth Deniaux focusses in particular on Cicero’s letters of 
recommendation and their role in the Republican elite’s networks of patronage and 
power3. Roger Rees has drawn attention to how letters of recommendation entangled 
the three parties involved in a process of “social triangulation”, accentuating the vital 
importance of these letters for the writers themselves4. Even more recently, Peter White 
has stressed the value of Book 13 of the Epistulae ad Familiares for our understanding of 
Late Republican editorial practices, and dedicated ample space to Cicero’s letters of 
recommendation throughout his monograph on the context and content of Cicero’s 
correspondence5. The current section, therefore, does not aspire to give an overview of 
all the debates that have taken place and the developments that have accrued over the 
past few decades. Instead, it wishes to focus on the peculiarities of recommendations of 
freedmen. 
The many contributions to the genre of recommendation rarely pay any structural 
attention to the distinction between recommendations of freedmen on the one hand, 
and recommendations of freeborn clients on the other. However, in most of them, 
 
                                                     
1 The succinct introduction in Cotton (1977), 1-10 includes discussion of the Greek origins of the 
genre (with attention to papyri), the relationship between Greco-Roman handbooks and actual 
letters, the influence of Greek theory on Roman recommendations, issues of terminology, 
similarities between different Latin writers of recommendations (contesting the idea that Cicero 
was a first “model” to which everyone adhered afterwards), etc. The other most influential 
contributions include Cotton (1985); (1986); (2014). 
2 Plantera (1977-8); Bérenger-Badel (2000). 
3 Deniaux (1993). 
4 Rees (2007). Rees also adopts a notable diachronic stance by involving in his analysis 
recommendations from Cicero, Pliny, and Fronto. In the letters of these last two authors, for 
example, he observes a “considerable continuity in the form from Cicero’s Ad Familiares, but also a 
tendency towards amplifcation of the character of the subject” (p. 159-64, quote from p. 164). 
5 White (2010), esp. p. 46-51. 
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intuitive assumptions are made and certain differences taken for granted. Bloomer, for 
example, implicitly made such distinction by stating that “Pliny (…) and Fronto (…) 
demonstrate the restraint with which to compose letters of recommendation for worthy 
freedmen”6. More explicit is Wilcox’s approach in her treatment of letters of 
recommendation. She promisingly announces a differentiation between 
recommendations of “political and economic elites” on the one hand, and 
recommendations of slaves and freedmen on the other. The latter, she argues, are 
fundamentally different because “the differing social status of at least one of the 
exchange’s participants creates a power gradient that is permanent and steep”. 
However, the promised “differentiation” turns out to consist solely in the discussion of 
the deteriorating relationship between Cicero and Atticus’ freedman Dionysius after the 
latter had failed to reciprocate Cicero’s kindness towards him. The entire argument 
moreover, hinges on the identification of Att. 7.4.1 as a letter of recommendation, on 
which no authority on the study of letters of recommendation seems to agree7. Finally, 
although her analysis of this exchange relation between Cicero and Dionysius is very 
thorough and although it does give an impression of how failure to reciprocate could 
hurt the original donor’s feelings, reputation, and “face”, it does not lay bare any 
structural contrasts or similarities between recommendations of freedmen on the one 
hand and freeborn clients on the other.  
In support of his claim that there existed a “fairly well established format for the 
praise of freedmen”, Henrik Mouritsen has drawn from the letters of recommendation 
to argue that “freedmen are praised for a different set of qualities than Cicero’s other 
clients”. He stresses the fundamental role of loyalty, industry, modesty, and frugality; 
the fact that probatus is only mentioned in a recommendation of a freedman; and, 
conversely, that certain words or expressions like virtus or vir bonus are never attributed 
to freedmen8. He thus focusses primarily on the vocabulary deployed in 
recommendations of freedmen. Some examples are given, but a structural comparison is 
not undertaken. In fact, the secundum comparationis (i.c. recommendations of freeborn 
clients) is entirely omitted. Almost twenty years earlier, similar claims by Deniaux were 
 
                                                     
6 Bloomer (1997), 139. The quote rightly accentuated the highly construed and very careful tone of 
the letters, but this was a feature of all letters of recommendation Pliny and Fronto – as well as 
Cicero – wrote. 
7 Wilcox (2012), 92-5. See notes 26 and 27 below for the communis opinio (to which Wilcox herself 
adheres) on how letters of recommendation should be structured. Att. 7.4.1 does not meet several of 
the requirements.  
8 Mouritsen (2011), 61-63. For the use of probatus, see also Fabre (1981), 229; Deniaux (1993), 181. 
Smadja (1976), 97 similarly thought that “les relations [des affranchis] avec Cicéron sont 
exclusivement établies par l’intermédiaire de leur patron”. As we will show below, this was hardly a 
unique feature of freedman recommendations. 
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supported primarily by lexical analysis as well. Although both her argumentation and 
conclusions were more reserved and at any rate more nuanced, Mouritsen’s claims are 
already foreshadowed in her final remarks: “[l]es qualités qui définissent les commendati 
(…) sont parfois les marques d’un statut ou d’un état, plus que d’un individu”9. Because 
the issue of “the freedman vocabulary” will be taken up more extensively in Chapter 7, 
we will focus here on a more structural comparison of the letters of recommendation. A 
short introduction of their general features and functions aims to situate them in our 
framework of social capital and trust. Because the remaining recommendations of 
freedmen are relatively limited in number, a second section will analyse them in depth, 
and compare them structurally to recommendations of freeborn clients. As noted 
already, we will argue that the recommendations written for freedmen differ in no 
fundamental way from those of freeborn persons. Neither the vocabulary employed, nor 
the connection that was regularly made with their patron differentiates these 
recommendations from other ones. The latter feature, in fact, constituted a compelling 
parallel to the habit of embedding the subject of a recommendation in as many 
networks as possible to increase his trustworthiness through processes of dyadic and 
network learning and control (cf. infra). 
5.1.2 Recommending and networking 
5.1.2.1 The purpose of letters of recommendation 
In letters of recommendation, a respected member of society deploys his social, cultural, 
and symbolic capital to recommend an individual (usually a protégé of inferior social 
and legal status10) or a community. The addressees of these letters were typically 
provincial officials that could exert their imperium or potestas in obtaining favours for, 
and advancing the interests of the recommended persons11. Because of the high status 
of these receivers, and their important official functions, Kelly saw letters of 
recommendation as intrusions on lawful administration of provinces, since “favours” 
(gratia), so the argument goes, are by definition incompatible with “justice” (iustitia)12. 
Cotton, however, already alluding to Kelly in the title of her article, noticed that Cicero 
 
                                                     
9 See Deniaux (1993), 180-3. 
10 See Deniaux (1993), 145-60 for a list of people that were recommended in Cicero’s (extant) 
recommendations. Cf. already Cotton (1977), Appendix to part II. Deniaux does not include the 
unnamed freedman of L. Titius Strabo (Fam. 13.14.2) but does mention him later on (p. 238). 
11 See Deniaux (1993), 96-108 for a list of the people that received Cicero’s (extant) 
recommendations.  
12 Kelly (1966), 31-68. 
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never really mentioned the formal authority of the addressee, but instead stressed his 
personal virtues (e.g. integritas, humanitas, clementia, etc.)13. She considers 
recommendations an essential part of provincial government, and does not see them as 
impeding on a correct adhering to the law. The “wide discretionary powers” of 
governors, for example, were flexible and could be steered towards a certain outcome. 
But a recommendation was only one of many means to do so, and was never considered 
an intrusion on the law. One of her arguments draws on a comparison of 
recommendations as “evidence of character” with the equally accepted weight of 
testimonies of court witnesses14. Fronto, at any rate, seems to explicitly confirm this 
connection in a letter to Claudius Severus15.  
Already in Cicero’s time, writing letters of recommendation was considered a specific 
subgenre of epistolography, and even though it may have been inspired by the much 
older Greek examples, the Latin tradition was highly sui generis16. Letters of 
recommendation survive in all the extant ancient correspondences: not only Cicero, but 
also Pliny, Fronto, and later Symmachus and Christian authors wrote them. In March 
2015, the Italian news website Panorama published an article about favouritism in 
national politics, meaningfully heading it by the title: “L'Italia è una Repubblica fondata 
sulla raccomandazione”17. Judging from the prominence of letters of recommendation 
in ancient correspondences, Cicero may well have said the same about his own Republic 
more than 2000 years ago (though less disdainfully than Panorama did). Only a few 
decades after Cicero’s death, Velleius Paterculus presented the influence the orator had 
been able to wield as follows: “The Roman senate and people yielded such honours to 
Marcus Tullius that on his recommendation, he could secure positions of importance 
almost for anyone he chose”18. And he certainly did not shy away from exerting this 
influence accordingly. Indeed, book 13 of the Epistulae ad Familiares comprises more than 
twice as many letters as any other book and is entirely dedicated to the so-called litterae 
commendaticiae19. Besides the eighty recommendations in this book, another thirty-eight 
are spread out randomly over the four collections of letters (ad Familiares, ad Atticum, ad 
 
                                                     
13 Cotton (1986), esp. 447-60. 
14 Cotton (1986), 457-8. 
15 Fronto, ad Amicos 1.1.1. Cf. also Cotton (2014), 44-7. The subsequent pages of this contribution 
nuance (but do not abandon) Cotton’s earlier position by integrating evidence that focusses on 
“proceedings” rather than on “principles”. 
16 Cotton (1985), 329-30. 
17 Panorama (Gruppo Mondadori), 18 March 2015 (<http://www.panorama.it>). 
18 Vell. Paterc. 2.128.3: “[illi [= senatus populusque romanus] qui M. Tullio tantum tribuere, ut paene 
adsentatione sua quibus vellet principatus conciliaret”. 
19 Only one letter in the corpus is (quite remarkably) no recommendation: Fam. 13.68. 
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Quintum Fratrem, and ad M. Brutum)20. Thus 118 out of a total of 946 letters (12%) are at 
least in part dedicated to the act of recommending someone. The great majority of these 
were written by Cicero and addressed to one of his many connections, but the opposite 
occurred as well21. Although the authors did not include a date, Shackleton Bailey has 
dated most of the recommendations in book 13 of the ad Familiares to or around 46 
BCE22. This has led scholars to believe, quite reasonably, that book 13 was edited and 
maybe even published during Cicero’s life23. The lack of any original temporal indication 
gives these recommendations a “timeless” character, both literally and figuratively, and 
this may have been precisely the intention of their authors. By deliberately omitting a 
date, they seem to imply that their trust in the recommended person is so solid that 
they have no doubts about the continuing, indeed “timelessness” of their mutual 
relation24.  
Of the extant letters written by and to Pliny and Fronto, twenty-two and sixteen 
respectively were recommendations25. They were – unlike most of Cicero’s 
recommendations – not gathered in a separate book. Although these numbers are very 
low (both in absolute terms when compared  to Cicero’s recommendations, and in 
relative terms when considered as a percentage of the respective correspondences), the 
recommendations serve a similar function of deploying, publicising and increasing the 
social, cultural, and symbolic capital of their writers (and to a lesser extent of their 
addressees and subjects).  
5.1.2.2 Features of letters of recommendation 
Deniaux rightly recognised four distinctive parts constituting “le ‘rituel’ de la 
recommendation”: 1) the presentation of the recommended person; 2) a eulogy on his 
character and the accentuation of his connections to the writer; 3) the actual request for 
acceptance or assistance; and 4) an expression of gratitude and the guarantee that the 
new relationship will bring forth many benefits26. Wilcox identified only three elements 
 
                                                     
20 These are Fam. 1.3; 2.6; 2.14; 3.1.3; 5.5; 6.9; 7.5; 7.21; 9.13; 9.25.2–3; 10.1.4; 11.16; 11.17; 11.19.2*; 
11.22; 12.6; 12.21; 12.24.3; 12.26; 12.27; 12.29; Att . 11.12.2; 15.14.2–3; 16.16A-F; ad Quint. Fratr. 1.2.10–
11, 2.13.3; ad Brut. 1.1; 1.6.2,4*; 1.7*; 1.8; 1.11*; 1.13*; 1.15.1–2. For the reasons why not all these 
letters were confined to one or more “recommendation books”, see White (2010), 47-51.  
21 These are indicated with a an asterisk (*) in the previous note. 
22 See his 2001 Loeb edition of Cicero’s correspondence. 
23 See the somehow speculative, but nonetheless appealing, claim made by Gurlitt (1879), as 
discussed in Cotton (1985), 328 note 1. 
24 On a similar note, see White (2010), 76. Only a severing of the ties between recommender and 
receiver might endanger the validity of a recommendation, as is suggested by Fam. 2.17.7. 
25 See Rees (2007), 151-2, including references; Bérenger-Badel (2000), 165-71. 
26 Deniaux (1993), 46. 
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by basically collating Deniaux’ first two: 1) an explicit recognition of the existing 
relation between Cicero on the one hand and the recommended persons as well as the 
addressee on the other; 2) the actual request; and 3) the promise of a reward after a 
positive reply by the addressee. She furthermore observes that the order in which these 
structural elements occur is not necessarily fixed27. Even though scholars might 
disagree on precisely how to demarcate its different elements, they all concur that the 
general structure of a recommendation is highly standardised28. This standardisation is 
not typical only for Cicero’s recommendations, but also for those extant in Pliny’s and 
Fronto’s correspondences29.  
The ancient authors themselves were very well aware of this feature. When reassuring 
someone that he had written a sincere letter of recommendation, Cicero not 
uncommonly stressed that he had gone beyond the mere conventions and standard 
phrases in doing so. To C. Trebatius Testa, for example, he writes: “Every letter I write to 
Caesar or to Balbus carries as a kind of statutory bonus a recommendation of yourself, 
and not the standard sort (vulgaris) but phrased with some special indication of my 
regard (benevolentia) for you”30. Elsewhere, he states that the recommended person’s 
character is so elevated that “I hardly think it will be enough for me to use the phrases 
which we normally employ when we are making a very pressing request”. Cicero even 
goes on to claim that this particular instance requires an innovation in the genre of 
recommendations (nova) and that the addressee might even be surprised when reading 
it (mirificum genus commendationis)31. When Cicero felt that the receiver of a 
recommendation might perceive its conventional structure as a sign of insincerity, he 
would explicitly express his worries and anxiety. Rees compellingly argued that this 
anxiety was  a “rhetorical pose”, and that it served precisely to convince the receiver of 
Cicero’s sincerity. “One way to assert the sincerity of claims which others might assume 
 
                                                     
27 Wilcox (2012), 80-1. Cotton (1985), 331 tacitly agrees and considers only those letters that are 
structured like this as true recommendations: “A recommendation at the end does not turn any 
letter into a litterae commendaticiae, unless the pattern, the flow of the argument, and the content 
make it such”. 
28 See also Hall (2009), 31. 
29 Plantera (1977–8) 8; Cugusi (1983), 99-100; Cotton (1985), 333-4. 
30 Fam. 7.6.1: “In omnibus meis epistulis quas ad Caesarem aut ad Balbum mitto legitima quaedam est 
accessio commendationis tuae, nec ea vulgaris sed cum aliquo insigni indicio meae erga te 
benevolentiae”. In the previous letter of the correspondence (Fam. 7.5), we learn that Cicero had 
indeed done precisely this.  
31 Fam. 13.6.3: “Eius ego studio vix videor mihi satis facere posse si utar verbis iis quibus, cum 
diligentissime quid agimus, uti solemus. Nova quaedam postulat et putat me eius generis artificium 
quoddam tenere. Ei ego pollicitus sum me ex intima nostra arte deprompturum mirificum genus 
commendationis”. Cf. Fam. 13.15.3 to Caesar: “genere novo sum litterarum ad te usus ut intellegeres 
non vulgarem esse commendationem”. For further examples, see Cotton (1985), 333. 
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are inflated”, he notes, “is to admit to the general problem of inflation in the genre only 
then to deny it in one’s own case”32. Cotton similarly argued that the “elaborate 
attempts to free himself from a fixed format constitute strong proof for the 
entrenchment of the practice of writing recommendations in Cicero's Rome, stronger 
than the presence of a pattern and the recurrence of traditional set phrases 
themselves”33. 
In every act of recommending, there were typically three parties involved. Rees has 
stressed the importance of paying due attention to this social triangulation he called the 
“amicitia triangle”, and pointed out that this analytical integration of all three parties 
involved is “[m]ore persuasive as an argument than the bald assertion of the 
relationship between the author and the subject, or between the author and the 
recipient”34. Each recommendation should thus be conceptualised as a triangle of 
interactions, with the recommender A, the recommended person B, and the receiver C 
in its three vertices. Debt was acknowledged and gratitude expected between all 
partners involved (A-B, A-C, B-C). This is made clear explicitly in a letter Cicero wrote to 
Sulpicius Rufus. Rufus had very recently acted on one of Cicero’s recommendations by 
advancing the interests of M. Aemilius Avianianus and his freedman Hammonius. Cicero 
begins the letter by extensively thanking Rufus for having shown such kind regards to 
him in respecting his request (A-C). He was aware of Rufus’ good cares because he had 
recently received a very cheerful letter from Hammonius, in turn expressing his thanks 
to Cicero for having secured Rufus’ good will (A-B). Cicero moreover writes that Rufus 
would not be sorry for his efforts since, so he reassured him, both Hammonius and his 
patron were men of gratitude (homines grati) (B-C)35. Similarly, after Cicero had 
recommended M. Marcilius to Minucius Thermus, he thanked the latter because 
Marcilius had come to him (Cicero) to tell him that “he was very grateful to you 
(Minucius), and to me because of you”36.  
Accepting a recommendation benefits all parties, not least the receiver of the letter. 
By positively welcoming the recommendation, he would not only consolidate his ties of 
familiaritas and amicitia with Cicero, but he would also gain another connection in his 
social network. Wilcox has elaborated on the concept of social triangulation by stressing 
that the recommended individual is not only passively constructed in this letter, but 
also becomes an active partner in the creation of the triangle (e.g. by delivering his own 
 
                                                     
32 Rees (2007), 164-7 (the quote is from p. 167). 
33 Cotton (1985), 331-4 (the quote is from p. 334). Cf. Deniaux (1993), 44-6. 
34 Rees (2007), 156. See also Deniaux (1993), 28. 
35 Fam. 13.27. 
36 Fam. 13.54.1. 
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letter of recommendation). All three parties are thus actively involved in both the 
formation and the intended workings of the triangle37.  
The entire operation of recommending was thus a means to strengthen bonds 
(“strong ties”) that already existed within a network (A-B and A-C), but also to link 
together in a reciprocal relation previously unconnected networks (B-C), creating “weak 
ties”. Granovetter defined the strength of a tie as depending on “the amount of time, the 
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which 
characterise the tie”38. It are precisely those features that Cicero stresses when 
describing his relationships with receivers and recommended persons. Letters of 
recommendation, in other words, can be conceptualised as an embodiment of both 
bonding and bridging social capital. It was through the agency of the recommender (A) 
and his activation and engagement of his social capital, that connections were created 
and strengthened; in short, that social capital was generated and/or (re)structured. The 
benefits for the receiving (C) and recommended (B) partner consisted in both the 
“quantitative” extension of their social capital – by the bridging-process between them 
both – and in its “qualitative” improvement – by the bonding-process with the 
recommender (A). Of course, the economic capital of the recommended freedman may 
have also received a considerable boost after a successful recommendation. It is surely 
no coincidence that in many cases, not merely the freedman in question, but also his 
negotia (and that of his patron) were similarly “recommended”39. Since the financial 
interests of patrons were often closely intertwined with those of their freedmen, and 
since at least part of a deceased freedman’s possessions would usually revert to his 
patron, the importance of a freedman recommendation in increasing not only the 
patron’s social but also his economic capital should not be underestimated40. The 
benefit of the recommender consisted mainly in the strengthening of his ties with 
receiver and recommended through a bonding-process by which he both incurred debt 
and created the expectation of repayment via a process or reciprocal bonding. However, 
his gains were more extensive than that, since a successful recommendation would 
consolidate and increase his cultural and symbolic capital as well.  
Indeed, it has been argued that the writer of a letter of recommendation benefits 
most of all from the interaction. As mentioned earlier, a vital element of a 
recommendations was the stressing of one’s relations with both addressee and 
recommended. By doing so, the author stressed his own social capital and his 
 
                                                     
37 Wilcox (2012), 82. 
38 Granovetter (1973), 1361. Cf. the discussion in Chapter 1 of the importance of “weak ties” for any 
network. 
39 E.g. Fam. 1.3.2; 13.33. 
40 Cf. McCutcheon (2013), 213-4. 
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embeddedness and nodal function in the networks of both the other parties involved. 
Scholars nowadays agree that the elaboration on the relation between writer and 
addressee is in fact a part of the letter more important than the introduction or 
description of the recommended person itself. Rees has argued that the entire book 13 
of the Epistulae ad Familiares served precisely to stress the influence (symbolic power 
rather than actual potestas) Cicero still enjoyed in 46 BCE and that its “raison d’être (…) is 
Cicero himself”41. Although recommendations traditionally included a description of 
their subject’s character and worth, the fact that this was only of secondary importance 
when compared to the stress on the author’s social network, is made clear in an 
extraordinary letter of Pliny. In an initial interaction with Pompeius Falco, Pliny had 
asked his friend and consul suffectus to bestow a tribunate on one of his friends. 
Apparently, however, Pliny’s request had not mentioned or described the beneficiary, 
but had relied entirely on Falco’s realising and respecting the status of, and his 
connection to the person that was asking and providing guarantees. It is only after Falco 
had agreed to the request that Pliny revealed the identity of his friend (it was the 
Roman knight Cornelius Minicianus)42. Pliny realised that his initial request had been 
somewhat unconventional (tam instanter petivi) but he seemed to have been confident 
that his relation with Falco (social capital) as well as his own reputation and Falco’s 
recognition of it (symbolic capital) were enough to make the latter agree to the 
recommendation without requiring further information43. Similarly, Cicero did not 
want to expand on the legitimacy of his requests too much lest “it might seem to have 
prevailed with you in virtue of a strong case (causa) rather than by my personal 
influence (gratia)”44. 
In addition to highlighting his social capital, the author’s cultural capital expressed 
itself through his knowledge of literary conventions and of the correct “codes” of 
behaviour a writer of recommendations should at all times adhere to. In this regard, the 
observance of the standardised forms Cicero so vehemently apologised for, was not 
necessarily due to any lack of inspiration, let alone a mark of insincerity. It assured 
 
                                                     
41 Rees (2007), 152: “[the book served] to heighten appreciation of the influence [Cicero] was still 
able to wield through social contacts and networks. No individual letter of reference could convey 
this impression, so perhaps the monotony of book 13 was a price worth paying in the service of the 
promotion (…) of Cicero as a widely connected and respected patron”. Cf. Deniaux (1993), 1-2, 28; 
White (2010), 47, 185 contrasts the ancient habit of stressing the relation between writer and 
receiver with the modern practice of downplaying or even hiding it in the interest of “objectivity”. 
42 Plin. Ep. 7.22. 
43 See Rees (2007), 154-6 for the centrality of the writer in the letters of recommendation (p. 155 
treats this letter of Pliny’s in particular). 
44 Fam. 13.5.2. 
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anyone reading the letter that the writer was well schooled in the conventions of 
recommending and could as such be relied on to reciprocate a granted favour.  
Finally, the simple fact that people approached the writer to ask for a 
recommendation was a confirmation of the latter’s prestige, influence, and social 
standing. Moreover, the acceptance of a recommendation by the receiver was an 
acknowledgment of this very symbolic capital. It is important to note that in the eyes of 
the writer, it was not enough that his symbolic capital should only be tacitly confirmed 
by the whole interaction. Indeed, together with a note of gratitude and the promise of 
future benefits, letters of recommendation regularly end with the message that it would 
particularly oblige the writer if the receiver should not only accept the 
recommendation, but also let the recommended person know that he owes his 
promotion to this intervention. The letter recommending Philoxenus to Acilius, for 
example, ends with the phrase “Let him understand that this letter of mine has been 
very useful to him”45. The habit of sending a copy of the letter of recommendation not 
only to the intended receiver but also to the commendatus, served the very same purpose 
of publicising Cicero’s influence. After Atticus had asked Cicero to recommend him to L. 
Plancus – praetor designatus at the time – Cicero not only did so quite extensively, but he 
also included a copy of the recommendation in his next letter to Atticus himself46. 
Moreover, there are many indications in Cicero’s correspondence that letters of 
recommendation were usually delivered by the commendati themselves, and that it was 
expected that the letter would be present at its first reading47. That this might 
occasionally lead to awkward situations, is clear from an anecdote told by Epictetus. One 
of his letters of recommendation was apparently refused by the very person it was 
supposed to recommend because its tone was considered by the latter to be too pitiful48. 
The submissive tone of letters of recommendation moreover placed the receiver in a 
position of power which would prove detrimental to his relationship with the writer 
should he decide to abuse that power (i.c. by refusing the request). In the eyes of the 
recommended individual, the power to recommend rests with the writer of the letter. 
The latter, however, transfers the initiative to the receiver, who is thus endowed with 
power over both the writer and the recommended person. The subtle use of language 
 
                                                     
45 Fam. 13.35: “(…) perficiasque ut intellegat has litteras meas magno sibi usui fuisse”. Other 
examples are legion: Fam. 13.20: “(…) ut intellegat (…) meamque commendationem usui magno sibi 
fuisse”; 13.25: “ (…) ut is intellegat hanc meam commendationem magnum apud te pondus 
habuisse”; 13.38: “(…) ut intellegat (…) hanc meam commendationem sibi magno adiumento fuisse”; 
… For even more examples, see Rees (2007), 154 which also confirms that these expressions are 
“common conceits which reveal Cicero’s concern to be seen to be influential”. 
46 Att. 16.16A (the recommendation to Plancus); 16.16 (Cicero’s confirmation to Atticus). 
47 E.g. Fam. 2.17.7; 6.8.3; 13.63.2; Att. 10.17.1; … Cf. Cotton (1977), 1 note 4; White (2010), 182 note 10. 
48 Epict. Disc. 1.9.27-8. Cf. Wilcox (2012), 85-6. 
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and rhetorical manoeuvres that permeate almost every letter of recommendation, 
reveal that this “power-play” between writer and receiver is highly organised and 
subjected to strong social conventions. Each participant was in some way “empowered” 
in the interaction, but everyone knew that abusing the power would be disadvantageous 
for all parties. By correctly deciding what to do with the power invested in him by the 
writer, the receiver used this power in the way he was supposed to. In a sense, it was 
again an acknowledgment of the influence of the writer49. 
However, the cost of this potential increase in capital was a constant risk of 
considerable loss of it, should the receiver of the letter choose to reject the 
recommendation despite carefully crafted phrases and social conventions. This is the 
reason why nearly every letter of recommendation includes a “saving clause”, that is, an 
“out” or a “face-saving” option for both the writer and the receiver. Typical examples 
are:  “[please accept my request] insofar as seems to you right and fair”, “[please do so] 
provided you see nothing inconsistent therein with your own high standing”, or 
“[please oblige me] when you can without trouble to yourself”50. They give the 
addressee an excuse should he (for whatever reason) choose to refuse the request, but 
they also save the writer’s face because they depersonalise a potential refusal by 
situating the reasons for it “outside” of the actual relationship: “I am sure you love me 
so much you will do everything for me. Ergo: anything you cannot get done is 
undoubtedly due to force majeure”. A subtle example of this practice can be found in the 
exchange of letters between Cicero and Atticus that treated the latter’s freedman 
Eutychides. 
At the beginning of July 54 BCE, Atticus was about to set out for Asia. Cicero, realising 
that he may not hear from his good friend for quite a while, decided to write him a long 
letter, containing news about political affairs in Rome. He ended this letter with the 
question when Atticus would be returning to Rome, and what he had done in the 
 
                                                     
49 For an excellent analysis of the act of recommending as an interplay between domination and 
uncertainty in which everyone has “power”, see Wilcox (2012), 85-92. She presents the interaction 
as a theatrical performance in which the letter is the script, the writer the director, and the receiver 
the actor who (ideally) follows the director’s instructions to the benefit of the audience (i.e. the 
recommended). 
50 Fam. 13.14.2: “(…) quoad tibi aequum et rectum videbitur” (to M. Brutus); 13.26.3: “(…) si non 
alienum tua dignitate putabis esse” (to Sulpicius Rufus); Fam. 13.70: “Vehementer mihi gratum 
feceris si, quibuscumque rebus sine tua molestia poteris, ei commodaris” (to Servilius Isauricus). Cf. 
Cotton (1986), 446-8; Wilcox (2012), 85. Kelly (1966) considers these “saving clauses” insincere 
formalities, essentially concealing a request for intruding on the correct workings of the law (see 
note 12 above). This interpretation fails to see them in their specific context as part and parcel of 
the many rhetorical subtleties involved in smoothening the “inherently face-threatening business” 
that are recommendations, cf. Hall (2009), 31ff (pages 5-6 situate Hall’s framework in Erving 
Goffman’s theory of “face”). 
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meantime about Eutychides (facias me certiorem velim et de Eutychide quid egeris)51. The 
letter does not provide us with any information about this Eutychides or about what 
Atticus should have done “about” him. However, Atticus must have responded quickly 
(in an unpreserved answer), since at the end of the month, we find Cicero writing him 
another letter, this time thanking him for the news about Eutychides (de Eutychide 
gratum). We learn that Cicero had originally requested Atticus to free this slave, who had 
been of great help to Cicero in the past: “I am really very much pleased (valde mehercule 
mihi gratum est) that Eutychides has found out, through your kindness (benevolentia) to 
me, that I noticed his sympathy (συμπάϑειαν) in my dark days and have not forgotten it 
since”52. We will see momentarily that Cicero repaid freedmen who had performed 
similar services in times of need, by recommending them to one of his high-placed 
familiares. In this case, Cicero’s initial gratitude seems to have been at least as profound, 
since he had written Atticus not merely to recommend the slave, but also to obtain his 
manumission. We can deduce this from Cicero’s enthusiasm at hearing of Eutychides’ 
new tria nomina: “So he will be T. Caecilius in the future, the old forename with the new 
name (…)”53. 
As both his careful enquiry into Atticus’ decision, and his unleashed joy in the 
subsequent letter suggest, Cicero recognised the possibility that his request might be 
rejected even by his best friend. He knew very well that he was asking no small thing. 
Although Eutychides had clearly proven to be useful and loyal to Atticus’ familiares, 
freeing him would entail all the risks inherently attached to manumission as an act of 
trust. Not only would Atticus expose his trust network by allowing a new member to 
join it, but he alone would bear the risk of potential betrayal. Cicero had therefore 
undoubtedly formulated the request as an act of kindness by one friend (Atticus) to 
another (Cicero), rather than as a gift that would primarily benefit the freedman. By 
doing so, he framed it as but one link in a chain of reciprocal interactions. In this sense, 
Cicero’s original letter must have looked a lot like a letter of recommendation, in that 
writer and addressee were stressed much more conspicuously than the actual subject. If 
the praise of Eutychides in Cicero’s letter of thanks is any indication for the content of 
 
                                                     
51 Cic. Att. 4.16.9. 
52 Cic. Att. 4.15.1: “Valde mehercule mihi gratum est Eutychidem tua erga me benevolentia cognosse 
suam illam meo dolore συμπάϑειαν neque tum mihi obscuram neque post ingratam fuisse”. 
53 Cic. Att. 4.15.1: “(…) qui vetere praenomine novo nomine T. erit Caecilius (…). Normally, 
Eutychides would have received the names T. Pomponius, but since Atticus was recently adopted by 
his maternal uncle Q. Caecilius (Att. 3.20.1), he received the nomen Caecilius. His praenomen remained 
Titus, however, a consequence no doubt of Atticus’ persisting (informal) attachment to his former 
name. Cf. Lindsay (2009), 85. 
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his original letter of request – and this does not seem unlikely54 – it would have 
uncannily resembled a true letter of recommendation. In this respect, it is meaningful 
that after Atticus’ positive answer, Cicero described the manumission as an expression 
of Atticus’ benevolentia towards him (Cicero), and that he extensively thanked him for it 
as if he was the greatest beneficiary of the interaction.  
Indeed, the first two sentences of the letter of thanks start out crescendo-wise with 
de Eutychide gratum and valde me hercule mihi gratum est. More than just granting a 
request, Atticus had acknowledged Cicero’s symbolic capital by showing that he trusted 
his judgment up to the point where he would even risk abuse and potential degradation, 
should it turn out to be unjustified. In addition, Cicero was particularly elated that 
Eutychides would have realised (cognoscere) that his manumission was due to his 
lobbying with Atticus. Moreover, the vagueness of Cicero’s reminder at the beginning of 
July 54 BCE (de Eutychide quid feceris?) could be interpreted as a “saving clause”. Other 
letter writers similarly used indirectness or ambiguity to reduce the impact of a 
potential rejection. In the shortest of his extant letters, for example, Paul famously 
seems to ask his correspondent Philemon to manumit one of his slaves named 
Onesimus55. The ambiguity of this request has given rise to a heated debate among 
scholars about Paul’s true intentions56. The wide scope of possibilities he leaves open to 
his correspondent (of which manumission is but one) is characteristic of polite letter-
writing, but also serves to safeguard against any friction that might arise as a 
consequence of Philemon’s not wanting or not being able to agree to the implied 
request (which Philemon would have understood more clearly than any modern 
reader)57. As noted before, all of these techniques were typical features of a letter of 
recommendation, and increased the strength of the ties between Cicero and Atticus on 
the one hand, and between Cicero and Eutychides on the other.  
That it had done so particularly successfully in this case, and that Atticus (but 
especially Cicero) had thought it a good decision to free Eutychides, is confirmed by the 
fact that even three years later we see Eutychides acting as “bonding” social capital 
between Cicero and his own patron in the only other letter in the correspondence that 
mentions him. When on his way to Cilicia in his capacity as proconsul, Cicero made 
 
                                                     
54 The letter thanking Sulpicius for acting on the recommendation of Hammonius and his patron 
(Fam. 13.27.2) is, for example, also reminiscent of the letter Cicero wrote to initiate the “social 
triangulation” in the first place (Fam. 13.21.2). 
55 Paul, Phil. 1.16: “οὐκέτι ὡς δοῦλον ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ δοῦλον, ἀδελφὸν ἀγαπητόν, μάλιστα ἐμοί, πόσῳ δὲ 
μᾶλλον σοὶ καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ καὶ ἐν Κυρίῳ”.  
56 Some scholars, for example, are not convinced that Paul was requesting Onesimus’ manumission, 
e.g. Church (1978), 30-1; Dunn (1996), 334-5. For a detailed discussion of Paul’s meaning and 
intention, see de Vos (2001), including many references. 
57 Cf. Barclay (1991), 184. 
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stops at the islands of Corcyra and Sybota. In a letter to Atticus he wrote at the time, he 
informs him: “We reached Actium on 14 June, after feasting like aldermen both at 
Corcyra and at Sybota on the fare provided by your bounty (munera tua) and assembled 
for us in most hospitable profusion (φιλοπροσηνέστατα) by Araus and my good friend 
Eutychides (meus amicus Eutychides)”58. We here see Eutychides acting not only as a 
trusted financial agent of his patron, in charge of collecting and correctly deploying his 
patron’s financial capital oversees, but also as a link between Atticus and Cicero. Clearly, 
Cicero’s relation with the man had remained optimal for many years after his 
manumission. 
Despite the careful use of “saving clauses”, refusing a recommendation remained a very 
delicate affair. In early 50 BCE, for example, Brutus wrote a letter to Cicero, 
recommending the interests of M. Scaptius and P. Matinius, who had lent the people of 
Salamis a considerable sum of money (creditores Salaminorum). Cicero promised the men 
he would comply, but he would not grant Scaptius the praefectura he subsequently asked 
for to put extra pressure on the Salaminians59. Cicero could not reconcile this with his 
reputation and dignitas, and was therefore unable to fully oblige Scaptius (and Brutus). 
In fact, he had already publically declared earlier that he would not give praefecturae to 
any private businessman in Cilicia while he was governor, and making an exception for 
either Scaptius or Matinius would be manifestly inconsistent. When it became known 
later that both men had taken recourse to force in their attempts to pressure the 
Salaminians, Cicero was naturally pleased, knowing he had done right in sticking to his 
principles. However, in the meantime, he had to inform Brutus about his decision on the 
matter. He was fully aware of the precariousness of this task, but hoped that Brutus 
would understand his predicament (tu autem velim ad eum scribas de his rebus, ut sciam quo 
modo haec accipiat). Cicero, in this instance, preferred a clear conscience (sine peccato meo 
fiat) over the full acceptance of Brutus’ recommendation60. Rejections of 
recommendations could be much less gentle, like the Greek Craton (venustissimus homo 
et professus Asianus) of whom Seneca the Elder notes in one of his Controversiae that when 
he was recommended by the Emperor to Passienus (cum commendaretur a Caesare 
 
                                                     
58 Cic. Att. 5.9.1. 
59 Fam. 5.21.10. The affair is further described in the letter: Appius granted Scaptius a praefectura 
anyhow, Cicero had to intervene to stop the resulting harassment of the Salaminians, a meeting 
between the people and Scaptius revealed a contradiction between Cicero’s own edict (which 
postulated a moderate interest rate of 1%) and a senatorial decree Scaptius was able to produce 
(allowing him to demand 4%). The matter was eventually settled to great vexation of the 
Salaminians and Cicero still looked back on the painful affair almost half a year later (Att. 6.2.7-9; 
6.3.5-7). See also Cotton (1986), 449-50 for the oral annexes to recommendations and this case in 
particular. 
60 Att. 6.1.7. 
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Passieno), he did not care for it (nec curaret) since he only desired imperial patronage61. 
The anecdote is clearly exaggerated and perhaps fictional, but it does demonstrate – by its 
conspicuous rudeness – the bounds and norms that were supposed to be respected by all 
parties involved in a recommendation. 
An additional danger lurked in the unpredictable behaviour of the recommended 
person. A letter of recommendation goes through a whole lot of trouble to present its 
subject in a positive light. A personal guarantee that this individual would generate 
great benefits for the receiver is potentially harmful for the writer who vouches for the 
individual by staking his own reputation. Many letters of recommendation, however, 
reveal – not at all coincidentally – that Cicero had had very positive relations and 
experiences with the commendati in the past. It were these experiences through which 
he had “dyadically learned” to trust the recommended person, and which made him 
confident enough to extend this trust by way of a recommendation. In many cases, this 
learning had been not only dyadic but also network embedded. Cicero’s vouching for 
the freedman Anchialus, for example, was not only inspired by his own impression of 
the man, but also by the observation that he had been most pleasing (probatissimus) to 
his patron and all of his connections (necessarii)62. Similarly, C. Curtius Mithres – the 
freedman of C. Rabirius Postumus, the Jack of all trades whom Cicero had defended 
against a charge of extortion in 54 BCE63 – was connected to many of Cicero’s 
associates64. Both the temporal and network embeddedness of his relation with the 
freedman increased Cicero’s trust in him up to the point where he would risk the always 
delicate endeavour of recommending him. It follows that the descriptions of individuals 
and their qualities were never just empty rhetoric, especially because a standard 
recommendation would confidently make explicit that a betrayal of trust by the 
recommended person was impossible. Cicero and his contemporaries would therefore 
rarely, if ever, recommend persons of whose fidelity they were not convinced, or whose 
trustworthiness could not be vouched for by a personal connection65. They would to a 
 
                                                     
61 Sen. Contr. 10.5.21. The case is of course less interesting than Cicero’s since it is not told by one of 
the actual participants, and since it has a highly rhetorical purpose. It does show, however, the scale 
on which a refusal of a recommendation could be based. 
62 Fam. 13.23.1. 
63 The speech is extant (Pro Rabirio Postumo). Mithres’ name differs from that of his patron because 
the latter was – after Mithres’ manumission – adopted by his uncle C. Rabirius, whose name he took. 
For the many sides of Rabirius Postumus (he was a banker, shady usurer, publicanus, wine producer, 
etc.), see White (1995); Siani-Davies (2001), 38-65. 
64 Fam. 13.69.1. 
65 Quint. Fratr. 1.2.3: “Quod autem me maxime movere solebat, cum audiebam illum plus apud te 
posse, quam gravitas istius aetatis, imperii, prudentiae postularet – quam multos enim mecum 
egisse putas, ut se Statio commendarem?”. Cf. Treggiari (1969a), 181. 
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considerable extent believe that there was a certain veracity to their claims (at least if 
they thought previous experiences of “learning” to be more or less representative and 
reliable). This careful and selective attitude also extended to the choice of 
recommendation receivers. Cicero, for example, would not write letters of 
recommendations to his brother’s freedman Statius because this would reveal the 
influence the latter had over his patron. 
Since all parties – and the writer in particular – stood to benefit from the interaction, 
recommendations cannot be considered selfless acts of magnanimity66. In his 
recommendation of Mithres, for example, Cicero felt the need to accentuate that he did 
not “write from a self-regarding motive, but on behalf of a really intimate personal 
connection”67. Although Cicero was not necessarily being less than honest when he 
described his feelings towards this freedman like this, a closer inspection of the 
structure, content, and standardisation of recommendations reveals that other 
considerations were at least as relevant. This is not to say that the entire endeavour of 
recommending should be dismissed as hypocrisy covered by a veil of good intentions. 
True affection and more pragmatic intentions are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
even though they are nearly always impossible to discern68. Nor should every letter be 
categorised under one heading or the other. In reality, every case and every letter was 
situated on a scale from superficial routine to honest concern. The letter for Apollonius 
libertus, for example, seems to have shifted more towards the latter, whereas that 
recommending Antigonus libertus is clearly an example of a more practical consideration 
(cf. infra)69. However, we should be careful in assessing the “real” intentions of any 
letter merely by analysing its length or degree of standardisation70. As mentioned 
above, authors may (pretend to) fear that their recommendation was too standardised 
or even too short. Nevertheless, brevity, standardisation, or rhetorical tricks never seem 
to have resulted in blatant rejection. Stylisation, rhetoric, and convention were 
expected and even deemed necessary to publicise the writer’s cultural capital and as 
 
                                                     
66 Pace Williams (1929), 4-5: “Insipid and monotonous, however, as [the letters of recommendation] 
must appear to those who read them en masse, they are yet impressive evidence of Cicero’s large-
hearted bonhomie, and his unfailing readiness to do a friend, or even an acquaintance, a good turn; 
in short, of that humanitas which was one of his dominant characteristics”. 
67 Fam. 13.69: “Haec ad te eo pluribus scripsi ut intellegeres me non vulga<ri mo>re nec ambitiose 
sed ut pro homine intimo ac mihi pernecessario scribere”. Such clauses are usually accompanied by 
expressions of originality and honesty. 
68 On the difference between “sincere” and “insincere” recommendations, and the difficulty to 
distinguis them, see Cotton (1985), 331-2; White (2010), 46–51. 
69 Fam. 13.16; 13.33. 
70 Rees (2007), 156 already observed that “the marked brevity of many ancient letters which attempt 
no characterisation of their subject certainly did not disqualify them from inclusion in the published 
collection”. 
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such increase the chances of the recommendation being considered trustworthy71. 
Bernecque already pointed out the significant presence of metrical prose in 
recommendations when compared to other letters without this (or similar) functions, 
and Wilcox convincingly argued that functionality and artistry do not exclude one 
another72. 
5.2 Freedmen in letters of recommendation 
The correspondence of Cicero contains 13 letters of recommendation for freedmen, all 
of which occur in book 13 of the Epistulae ad Familiares. There exist, in addition, two 
introduction letters (not in book 13) that recommend all the business affairs (negotia), 
freedmen (liberti), agents (procuratores), and household (familia) of A. Trebonius and L. 
Lamia. Because the freedmen are not named, singled out, or described, but are instead 
considered merely a part of their patron’s interests in Cilicia, they are not considered 
here73. We get thus but a glimpse of the numerous letters Cicero must have written in 
favour of his or his familiares’ ex-slaves74. Freedmen with some influence could 
themselves be the authors or receivers of letters of recommendation, but no such 
examples are extant in any correspondence75.  
Cicero’s recommendations of freedmen moreover constitute extremely important 
source material since the letters that are preserved in other epistolary corpora rarely 
 
                                                     
71 For this observation, see above (and note 32). 
72 Bornecque (1898), 125-6; Wilcox (2012): “utilitarian functionality does not preclude artistry” (p. 
96), “function dictates [the letters’] form, while style simultaneously works to cloak function” (p. 
90). Trapp (2003) acknowledge throughout his anthology of Greek and Latin letters that these may 
be “implicated in both life and literature” (p. 3). For Cicero’s letters as loci for rhetorical and 
strategic literacy, see especially Hutchinson (1998). 
73 Fam. 1.3.2; 12.29.2. The same goes for freedmen who are positively referred to in letters they carry 
to their patron, since these do not constitute real recommendations (e.g. Fam. 3.1.2; 3.6.1; 4.9.1; …). 
For the requirements that have to be met in order to qualify as a recommendation, see notes 26-9 
above. 
74 Cicero often refers to letters in which he had recommended Tiro (e.g. Fam. 16.12.6: 16.14.1;…) but 
none of these is preserved. Only one slave is recommended (Anchialus in Fam. 13.45; not to be 
confused with his freed namesake L. Cossinius Anchialus in Fam. 13.23), but slaves too must have 
featured more prominently in recommendations than our fractured corpus suggests. 
75 Epictetus, for example, was asked to recommend a man to some important contacts in Rome 
(Epict. Disc. 1.9.27-8). That recommendations could also be written to freedmen, is suggested by Fam. 
13.69.1 in which Cicero mentions that if any of his associates ever needed something in Asia, he 
would contact the freedman Mithres on their behalf. Cf. also Quint. Fratr. 1.2.3, cited in note 65 
above. 
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include freedmen recommendations at all. In a letter to his friend and consul suffectus 
Valerius Paulinus, Pliny asks to receive his sick freedman Zosimus on his estate at 
Forum Julii in Gallia Narbonensis (present day Fréjus), and to make sure that his people 
would take good care of him. Although Zosimus is extensively described and praised for 
his literary talents, the letter does not meet the criteria of a “real” letter of 
recommendation as defined above (cf. notes 26 and 27 above). Most importantly, it 
keeps Pliny’s relation to Valerius completely out of the picture, and any expenses the 
latter would incur by taking care of Zosimus would be repaid in full by Pliny76. Similarly, 
the letter in which Pliny negotiates a reconciliation between Sabinianus and his 
unnamed renegade freedman resembles a recommendation. In fact, many elements are 
reminiscent of the formulas used in recommendations. The freedman had flung himself 
at Pliny’s feet as if he were his patron (pedibus meis tamquam tuis haesit)77, Pliny explicitly 
realises that what he asks may put a strain on his relationship with Sabinianus (vereor ne 
videar non rogare sed cogere, si precibus eius meas iunxero), and he ends the letter with a 
“saving clause” (sit modo tale, ut rogare me, ut praestare te deceat)78. However, the 
relationship which is crucially stressed in “real” recommendations (i.c. that between 
Pliny and Sabinianus) is once again ignored, and the letter as a whole is structurally 
more related to letters of consolation than to recommendations.  
The same goes for the letter to Trajan in which Pliny gives a testimony of the 
imperial freedman Maximus’ qualities. Maximus had been an assistant of Virdius 
Gemellinus, the procurator Augusti Ponti et Bithyniae, for over a year but was eventually 
discharged from his duties. On Maximus’ return to Rome, Pliny deemed it appropriate to 
give him a testimonial (libenter apud te testimonio prosequor, ea fide quam tibi debeo). In it, 
he describes the freedman as an honest (probus), hard-working (industrius), and 
conscientious (diligens) man who was always devoted to Trajan’s interests (rei tuae 
amantissimus), and who had shown himself to be a strict upholder of discipline 
(disciplinae tenacissimus expertus)79. Although the freedman is extensively described and 
the link between Pliny and Trajan made explicit, a testimonium like this can hardly be 
compared to a real commendatio80. Maximus is not introduced via an intermediary 
recommender into another network, and perhaps even more importantly, Pliny does 
not make an actual request, nor does he stake his own reputation in vouching for the 
 
                                                     
76 Plin. Ep. 5.19. 
77 See below for the recurrent practice of praising a freedman for showing respect to someone as if 
that person was his real patron. 
78 Plin. Ep. 9.21. 
79 Plin. Ep. 10.85. For the other letters mentioning Maximus in his capacity as procurator, see Ep. 
10.27 and 10.28. 
80 Pace Bloomer (1997), 139. See also note 158 below. 
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freedman. Fundamental features of the social triangulation process – essential to 
recommendations – are thus entirely lacking in this particular interaction. 
In the end, then, only one real recommendation of a (probable81) freedman is 
referred to in a reply letter to Pliny’s friend and Roman knight Voconius Romanus. Pliny 
mentions that he had received Voconius’ introduction of Popilius Artemisius (eadem 
[epistula] commendas Popilium Artemisium), and that he had carried out his request 
immediately (statim praestiti quod petebat)82. Since no more words are dedicated to the 
case (and since we are consequently left in the dark as to the nature of the request or 
the form and content of the actual recommendation), this letter is of no use for the 
analysis of freedman recommendations. If anything, it shows us that the omission of 
such letters in Pliny’s correspondence was not due to any reluctance to mention them 
or any unwillingness to act upon them83.  
Fronto’s extant correspondence too includes only one freedman recommendation. In a 
letter to the emperor Marcus Aurelius, he recommends Aridelus for a procuratorship. 
Interestingly, Aridelus was an imperial freedman but Fronto clearly feared that the 
emperor (and thus officially the freedman’s own patron) might not recognise him84. The 
typical structural parts of a recommendation are respected, including a description of 
the freedman (homo frugi et sobrius et acer et diligens), his connection to Fronto (a pueritia 
me curavit a studio perdicum usque ad seria officia), the benefits he will provide the emperor 
with (procurabit vobis industrie), and a phrase resembling the more extensive Ciceronian 
“saving clauses” (faveto ei, Domine, quod poteris). Because neither Pliny’s nor Fronto’s 
correspondence lends itself to a structural analysis of freedmen recommendations, we 
will mainly focus on Cicero’s letters, broadening the perspective to the other corpora 
only when this contributes to a further clarification of Ciceronian features. 
Finally, and this point will be taken up in more detail below, the majority of Cicero’s 
letters recommending freedmen include libertination. In only three cases is an ex-slave 
not explicitly called libertus. In these cases, we know of their status via a reference to a 
 
                                                     
81 His cognomen is Greek and his nomen seems to be derived from Voconius’ wife Popilia. Although we 
would be reluctant to categorise him as “evidently” a freedman (Sherwin-White (1966), 510), the 
evidence seems to suggest he was. 
82 Plin. Ep. 9.28.2. 
83 We excluded from this discussion the three (sequences of) letters in which Pliny requests civitas 
Romana or ius Quiritium for foreign freedmen and Latini Iuniani respectively (Ep. 10.5; 10.6; 10.7; 
10.10.1; 10.11.2; 10.104; 10.105). Not only do they lack some essential elements to qualify them as real 
recommendations (promise of benefits, saving clause, network embeddedness of subjects, …), they 
also do not contain any information about the freedmen that could be of use for the current 
discussion. 
84 Fronto Ad M. Caes. 5.37. Aridelus was not necessarily a freedman of Marcus Aurelius, and could 
have been freed by one of his predecessors. 
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patron. C. Avianius Evander is recommended in a letter that stresses the particularly 
good bond between his patron M. Aemilius and Cicero (utor patronus eius M. Aemilius 
familiarissime)85. When recommending L. Nostius Zoilus, Cicero mentions that this man 
was favoured by his ex-master (patroni iudicio ornatus erat), and that he was an heir to his 
estate (heres patroni sui)86. In an unpreserved letter already referred to above, C. Avianius 
Hammonius expressed his gratitude on his own and his patron’s behalf ([Hammonius] 
mihi gratias egit et suo et Aemili Avianiani, patroni sui, nomine)87. In the original letter that 
recommended Hammonius, libertination had been included88. 
The next section will, as outlined at the start of this chapter, focus on the three features 
of freedmen recommendations that are often considered evidence for their sui generis 
character: their vocabulary, their overall structure, and the framework of the patronage 
relationship. At the end of the chapter, section 5.4 will integrate the various conclusions 
of these discussions by singling out as a case study the recommendation of Crassus’ 
freedman Apollonius. 
5.3 “Libertine” letters of recommendation? 
5.3.1 A status-specific vocabulary? 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, most scholars implicitly or explicitly 
assume a difference between the recommendations of freedmen on the one hand, and 
those of freeborn friends and clients on the other. The vocabulary of the 
recommendations is often singled out to support such structural differences. Smadja 
thought that recommendations of freedmen were “different” because of the connection 
made with their fides or fidelitas, and with terms like officium, prudentia, studium, or 
benevolentia89. By focussing only on these freedman recommendations – thereby losing 
sight of the obvious secundum comparationis (other recommendations) – she fails to notice 
that when, for example, Terentius Varro is recommended to Brutus, Cicero – in a letter 
comparing Varro’s position as quaestor of Brutus to that of a child to a parent – stresses 
 
                                                     
85 Cic. Fam. 13.2. 
86 Cic. Fam. 13.46. 
87 Cic. Fam. 13.27. Cicero’s excellent relationship with Aemilius is accentuated in the subsequent 
phrases. 
88 Fam. 13.21. 
89 Smadja (1976), 97. 
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Varro’s fides (twice), his probitas (also twice), his modestia, and his prudentia. Cicero 
moreover guaranteed that he would make a pleasant (voluptas) and useful (usus) 
associate because of his magnus labor and summa industria90. Likewise, the freeborn 
physician Asclapo, whose companionship (consuetudo) was pleasing to Cicero (mihi 
iucunda fuit), is commended not only for his ars and scientia (arguably parallels to studium 
and officium) he had shown in treating Cicero’s household, but also for his fidelitas and 
benevolentia91. Finally, Cicero’s legate M. Anneius is praised not only for his fides, but also 
for his prudentia, fides, and benevolentia towards Cicero in a recommendation addressed 
to Minucius Thermus92. It should be noted that in this case, the description is 
accompanied by a reference to Anneius’ virtus, and that he is called an optimus vir at the 
end of the letter. These words were never used to describe freedmen (whether in 
recommendations or in other texts). However, reserving certain terms for freeborn 
officials is something else entirely than ascribing a “specific vocabulary” to freedmen. 
This point will be taken up more extensively in Chapter 7. 
Crook even went so far as to discern a “manumission loyalty” that is typically 
defined, contrary to the loyalty of freeborn clients, by “a marked concern that the 
loyalty be expressed, that it not be forgotten or, worse, neglected”, and that in the case 
of freedmen constituted a “far greater concern than was typical in patron-benefactor 
and client relations”93. The fundamental role of fides in the patron-freedman relation is 
established beyond any doubt, but singling out “manumission loyalty” as a specific form 
of trust is a consequence more of the author’s own agenda than of a structural 
comparative analysis of fides manifestations94. Mouritsen is certainly not wrong in 
claiming that fides was “the key virtue of a freedman”, but it was a virtue that 
permeated Roman society on all social levels, both within and outside patron-client or 
patron-freedman relations95. 
 
                                                     
90 Fam. 13.10.2-3. 
91 Fam. 13.20. 
92 Fam. 13.55. 
93 Crook (2004), 234. Contra Treggiari (1969a), 80-1, 217 which is (as usual) more reluctant to state a 
fundamental difference between freedman fides and freeborn client fides. 
94 For the role of fides in the patron-freedman relationship, see esp. Fabre (1981), 226ff, incl. the 
many references which are too numerous (and thematically divergent) to repeat here. Damon 
(1997), 48 noted that the “label freedman may have provided Roman poets with an easy explanation 
for the patron’s confidence that he would be served”, explicitly invoking the freedman’s fides and 
taciturnitas in her argumentation. 
95 Mouritsen (2011), 61. The literature on fides is notoriously extensive. For its use in (especially) 
political relations, see Hellegouarc'h (1963), 23ff. For its appreciation in slaves, see Vogt (1965), 83-
96. For fides as a lubricant of business interactions, see Wiedemann (2003). Rich (1989), passim (esp. 
128-30) shows that fides was similarly stressed in relations between Rome and her dependent 
territories. Gruen (1982) confirms for the Greek world that πίστις is used in very similar context as 
the Latin fides. 
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Mouritsen similarly implied that words like officiosus and probitas were typically 
invoked to stress the relationship between patron and freedman96. Indeed, Cicero did 
mention Trypho’s summa officia and benevolentia. However, the letter in which he did 
starts out with a description of Cicero’s own relation to Trypho’s patron Regulus, that 
employs the exact same terms (officiosus and benevolens)97. Likewise, probitas and 
humanitas were invoked to describe both a freedman (Anchialus) and a freeborn patron 
(Otacilius Naso)98. When Cicero recommended M. Laenius to P. Silius, propraetor of 
Bithynia and Pontus (where Laenius was conducting business), he praised this friend 
and protégé of Atticus by stressing his plurima officia, his summa probitas, his singularis 
modestia, and his consilium fidele ac bonum99. Deniaux already indicated that words like 
modestia and observantia imply inferiority of status, but her analysis unambiguously lays 
bare that this inferiority was not just related to freed status, but also applied to freeborn 
clients, and even to young aristocrats who had already started the cursus honorum100. 
Likewise, prudentia, frugi, probus, humanitas, etc. are all words by which freedmen, 
freeborn clients, and even esteemed magistrates were indiscriminately described101. 
Deniaux’ conclusion on the use of probitas in recommendations, for example, is: “(…) le 
registre social de la probitas est très vaste. La probitas qualifie celui qui respecte les 
obligations de la fides, que cet homme soit un hospes, comme Démocrite de Sicyone, un 
simple citoyen comme M. Fabius Gallus, un chevalier, comme A. Caecina, (…) ou un 
magistrat come M. Terentius Varro (…)”102. Similarly “L’homme probus peut être un 
affranchi (…) ou un chevalier romain”. She similarly argued that the status of the 37 
commendati who were recommended in particularly strong terms, ranged from 
freedmen over ordinary citizens to knights and senators103. In this respect too, 
freedmen do not form a separate category: the preoccupation with presenting the 
recommendations as sincere and enthusiastic is noticeable also in freedman 
recommendations. Moreover, the application of specific qualities is nowhere restricted 
 
                                                     
96 Mouritsen (2011), 62-63.  
97 Fam. 13.60.1. 
98 Fam. 13.23.2; 13.33. 
99 Fam. 13.63.1. Although the letter does not state it, Laenius had been recommended by Atticus to 
Cicero, e.g. Att. 5.21.4; 6.3.5. The recommendation is therefore arguably at least as much a gesture to 
Atticus as to Laenius himself. Quintus Cicero is more explicitly invoked to make the 
recommendation more compelling (incredibile est quanti faciamus et ego et frater meus, qui mihi 
carissimus est, M. Laenium; id mihi fratrique meo gratissimum feceris). See below (esp. note 151) for the 
practice of referencing third parties to enhance a recommendation with their symbolic capital and 
to accentuate the commendatus’ network embeddedness.  
100 Deniaux (1993), 143-4; 191-2. 
101 McCutcheon (2013), 212 (referring to officia, probitas, modestia, consilium and fidelitas) remarks that 
“such qualities are regularly cited in nearly all commendationes” but does not qualify the statement. 
102 Deniaux (1993), 181. 
103 Deniaux (1993), 138. 
 258 
to freedmen, nor are all recommended freedmen connected to their patron through 
such virtues (see below).  
Two terms deserve particular attention, however. It is indeed true that probatus is only 
employed to describe freedmen in Cicero’s letters of recommendation, and that 
conversely only freeborn friends and clients are referred to as familiares104. However, 
when we expand our look to include not only the rather limited collection of thirteen 
letters of recommendation for freedmen, but also the other letters (and contemporary 
writings in general), we notice that probatus is eagerly used to describe and praise 
freeborn individuals as well. When Cicero sends his praefectus evocatorum, D. Antonius, to 
Appius Pulcher to take the command over several cohorts, for example, he describes 
him as a steadfast officer and enjoying his fullest confidence (mihi probatus)105. When 
defending the value of one of the literary sources for his De Republica, Cicero feels that 
describing the author as “a man approved by your own judgment” (homo tuo iudicio 
probatus) would carry weight with Atticus106. Note that the freedman Zoilus was 
recommended in very similar terms (patroni iudicio ornatus est)107. Not only Cicero 
himself, but also his correspondents make no status distinction throughout the letters 
when characterising individuals as probatus. Brutus, for example, reassures Cicero that 
Marcus junior had his approval (mihi se probat) by his “industry, endurance, hard work, 
and unselfish spirit, in fact by every kind of service”108.  
With regard to the omission of familiaris in descriptions of freedmen, Deniaux noted: 
“L’infériorité de son statut juridique initial ne lui permet pas, semble-t-il, d’entrer dans 
la familiarité de Cicéron”109. This is, again, true indeed for the limited amount of letters 
of recommendation, but expanding the scope of analysis reveals that the description of 
freedmen as familiares was not per se considered inappropriate. In a letter to Appius 
Pulcher, for example, Cicero praised his freedman Cilix for passionately conveying 
Appius’ feelings good will. Cicero enjoyed listening to him and “within a couple of days 
 
                                                     
104 These observations were made by Mouritsen (2011), 62 and Deniaux (1933), 143-4 respectively. 
105 Fam. 3.6.5. 
106 Att. 6.2.3. 
107 Fam. 13.46. 
108 Brut. 2.3.6: “Cicero, filius tuus, sic mihi se probat industria, patientia, labore, animi magnitudine, 
omni denique officio”. Although not explicitly mentioned as an attributive adjective, the meaning of 
probat is of course very similar, if not identical, to probatus in this context. Furthermore, it is linked 
here to qualities which could very easily be associated with “freedman virtues” (industria, patientia, 
and labor). See for example MacLean’s claim that such a combination of activity and respect was 
typically libertine in the Republic, MacLean (2012), passim, e.g. p. 30ff. Further instances of probatus 
being used to describe or praise freeborn individuals include Fam. 5.12.7; 15.2.6; Att. 1.17.7; 3.15.2; 
6.2.8; 13.28.4; 16.21.5 (non esse probatus). 
109 Deniaux (1993), 143-4. 
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he has become my friend (familiaris)”110. In his speeches too, freedmen are presented as 
familiares of individuals who were not their patron. Thus Mallius Glauca, the man who 
first brought the news of Sextus Roscius’ murder to Rome, is described as a man of low 
standing, a freedman, and a client and friend (familiaris) of T. Roscius Magnus111. 
Conversely, being the familiaris of a freedman was not at all looked down upon112.  
Without discarding altogether the possibility that the lack of probatus in descriptions 
of freeborn clients, and the lack of familiaris in descriptions of freedmen might be 
significant, a wider scope suggests that these particularities may just as likely be due to 
the rather limited amount of freedmen recommendations that we have available for 
consideration. It is precisely for that reason that Chapter 7 will adopt a broader 
perspective, and evaluate the notion of “a freedman vocabulary” in more detail. 
5.3.2 Structural differences? 
In other – more structural – respects, the recommendations of freedmen resemble those 
of freeborn clients as well. The excellent relation between the recommender (i.c. Cicero) 
and the commendatus (i.c. the freedman), for example, is usually made explicit. The letter 
for Regulus’ freedman Trypho reserved quite some space to refer to the many delicate 
services the man had selflessly rendered Cicero during the latter’s exile in Thessalonica, 
and for which Cicero owed him a debt of gratitude113. Similarly, one of the motivations 
that made Cicero agree to recommend Avianianus’ freedman Hammonius were his many 
services and his availability during a time Cicero needed them the most114. In many 
instances Cicero applied a very specific strategy to stress his connection to the 
freedman. Anchialus, for example, is recommended as warmly “as if he was my own 
 
                                                     
110 Fam. 3.1.2. 
111 Cic. S. Rosc. 19: “homo tenuis, libertinus, cliens et familiaris istius”. Many commentaries on this 
passage consider Glaucia the freedman of Magnus, e.g. Dyck (2010), 7. Others limit the relation 
between Glaucia and Magnus to the latter being cliens and familiaris only. E.g. Robinson (2007), 52. 
The latter opinion is undoubtedly correct. If he were Magnus’ own freedman, Glaucia would have 
been described as libertus instead of libertinus. Cf. the introductory discussion on both terms in 
Crumley (1904). Even more compelling is the impossibility of freedmen being the clients of their 
own patron. 
112 E.g. Cic. Fam. 7.23.3 (an unknown man called Junius is called the familiaris of Avianianus’ freedman 
Evander); Suet. Gramm. 2 (the famous satirist and Roman knight Lucilius is called the familiaris of 
one or two freedmen). 
113 Fam. 13.60.1: “Summa enim eius erga me officia exstiterunt iis nostris temporibus quibus facillime 
benevolentiam hominum et fidem perspicere potui”. Cicero praised the same utility (i.e. aiding 
Cicero during his exile) in recommendations for freeborn friends as well. E.g. Fam. 2.6.5, cf. note 116 
below. 
114 Fam. 13.21.2: “(…) tum etiam in me ipsum magna officia contulit mihique molestissimis 
temporibus ita fideliter benevoleque praesto fuit (…)”. 
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freedman and as if his relation to me was of the same excellent nature as that to his 
patron”115. Naso’s business interests and freedmen in Sicily are commended by Cicero 
“exactly as though they were his own”, and each time he or one of his friends needed 
something in Asia, Cicero exclaims, he used to “write to Mithres and use his faithful 
service, his house and even his purse, as though they were my own”116. Similarly, Zoilus 
is recommended “as if he were one of my own household”117. In the case of Hammonius, 
a similar link between Cicero and the freedman is expressed even more poignantly: 
“[Hammonius has supported me] with as much loyalty and good will as if I had given 
him his freedom”118. Representing liberti alieni as if they were his own, was evidently a 
strategy to increase the persuasiveness of the recommendation. 
 However, this was not a strategy employed only in recommendations of freedmen. 
Indeed, when recommending M. Fabius Gallus to Caelius Rufus, Cicero implores the 
latter to “take up Fabius’ case as though it was an affair of my own”119. He uses the same 
tactic somewhat more elaborately in a letter introducing an unknown C. Curtius to 
Valerius Orca by asking the latter “to regard C. Curtius’ estate as mine and to do for C. 
Curtius’ sake whatever you would do for mine”120. Similarly, to Cornificius, Cicero 
recommended all the affairs of his intimate friend Aelius Lamia “as though they were 
mine”121. Finally, in a letter recommending Egnatius Rufus’ interests in Philomelium, 
Cicero asked a certain Q. Gallius too look after these affairs “just as though they were 
mine”122. He repeats this request in two subsequent letters that contain the exact same 
phrase: “I should not be more concerned if my own money were at stake”123. It is in a 
fourth letter on behalf of this Egnatius (mentioned earlier) that besides his negotia, his 
slave Anchialus was also recommended as if he were Cicero’s. The description of this 
 
                                                     
115 Fam. 13.23.2: “Hunc tibi ita commendo ut, si meus libertus esset eodemque apud me loco esset 
quo [et] est apud suum patronum, maiore studio commendare non possem”. 
116 Fam. 13.33: “(…) liberti Hilarus, Antigonus, Demostratus; quos tibi negotiaque omnia Nasonis non 
secus commendo ac si mea essent”; Fam. 13.69: “Itaque si quid aut mihi aut meorum cuipiam in Asia 
opus est, ad hunc scribere consuevi, huius cum opera et fide tum domo et re uti tamquam mea”. 
Cicero praised the exact same utility (i.e. providing housing and accommodation in the East) in 
recommendations for freeborn friends as well. E.g. Fam. 13.17.1, cf. note 113 above. 
117 Fam. 13.46: “Eum tibi igitur sic commendo ut unum ex nostra domo”. 
118 Fam. 13.21.2: “(…) ita fideliter benevoleque praesto fuit ut si a me manumissus esset”. 
119 Fam. 2.14: “Eius negotium sic velim suscipias ut si esset res mea”. 
120 Fam. 13.5.2: “Quam ob rem te in maiorem modum rogo ut C. Curti rem meam putes esse, quicquid 
mea causa faceres, ut, id C. Curti causa cum feceris (…)”. 
121 Fam. 12.29.3: “(…) rogo ut omnia Lamiae negotia mea putes esse curesque ut intellegat hanc 
commendationem maximo sibi usui fuisse”. Cf. Fam. 11.16.3 
122 Fam. 13.43.1: “(…) Egnati absentis rem ut tueare aeque a te peto ac si mea negotia essent”. 
123 Fam. 13.44; 13.74: “(…) ut, si mea res esset, non magis laborarem”. 
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slave (and in extenso that of liberti alieni) as if he were Cicero’s, should thus be seen as a 
rhetorical strategy that was applied regardless of a commendatus’ legal status124. 
Similarly, the convention of including a note of thanks at the end of the letter was 
respected in the recommendations of freedmen. Any kindness Caesar would show 
towards Apollonius, for example, would “particlularly oblige” Cicero125. The wish to 
publicise his connections and his influence – another traditional element in letters of 
recommendation – is clear from the regular inclusion of phrases that were observed for 
non-freedman recommendations as well. Cicero thus ends his letter recommending the 
three freedmen of Cn. Otacilius Naso to Acilius with the remark that it would oblige him 
deeply “if [he (Cicero)] finds that the recommendation has carried much weight with 
[him (Acilius)]”126. In addition, the letter to Appuleius on behalf of Zoilus reveals that “it 
would be very agreeable to me [Cicero] if you [Appuleius] would let him [Zoilus] 
understand that this recommendation has done him great service with you”127.  
Moreover, besides stressing his relation to the freedman, Cicero also goes through 
considerable trouble to depict his excellent connection to the freedman’s patron. This 
can be done through a highly standardised mention of their familiaritas and 
necessitudo128, but often it was considered important to expand on this bond. Before even 
introducing the three freedmen of Naso, for example, Cicero writes in a letter to Acilius: 
“I am on a very familiar footing with Cn. Otacilius Naso, as familiar in fact as with any 
gentleman of his rank. His attractive manners and worth of character make my daily 
contacts with him very agreeable”129. In the letter recommending Avianianus’ freedman 
Hammonius, Cicero wrote about the many previous favours (beneficia) for which he had 
always been very grateful (gratissimus)130. Sometimes then, this bond between Cicero 
and the patron is highlighted before the freedman is even introduced. This may at first 
 
                                                     
124 Trapp (2003), 39-40 points out that these strategies are a “standard element” in letters of 
recommendation in general. 
125 Fam. 13.16: “Quicquid ei commodaveris, erit id mihi maiorem in modum gratum”. 
126 Fam. 13.33: “Gratissimum mihi feceris si intellexero hanc commendationem magnum apud te 
pondus habuisse”. 
127 Fam. 13.46: “Valde mihi gratum erit si curaris ut intellegat hanc commendationem sibi apud te 
magno adiumento fuisse”. Cf. also Fam. 13.60.2 (Trypho). Similar endings occur throughout the 
letters written for freeborn protégés. E.g. Att. 2.25.1: “Cum aliquem apud te laudaro tuorum 
familiarium, volam illum scire ex te me id fecisse”. Note that Cicero deemed it equally important to 
include a similar remark in his only extant recommendation of a slave: Fam. 13.45: “Quam ob rem 
etiam atque etiam a te peto ut cures ut intellegat me ad te satis diligenter scripsisse”. 
128 E.g. Fam. 13.70: “Nam cum T. Ampio Balbo mihi summa familiaritas necessitudoque est”. 
129 Fam. 13.33: “Cn. Otacilio Nasone, utor familiarissime, ita prorsus ut illius ordinis nullo familiarius; 
nam et humanitate eius et probitate in consuetudine cottidiana magno opere delector”. 
130 Fam. 13.21. 
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sight seem like a structural “order of importance”131, but a closer look at these instances 
shows that they occur precisely in those letters that recommend not only the freedman 
himself but also the patron in his own right. Thus Naso, in the same letter, is explicitly 
recommended (commendare) to Acilius before his freedmen are. Similarly, Avianianus 
himself is recommended before Cicero draws attention to his interests in Sicyon and to 
his freedman Hammonius. In such instances, however, Cicero makes sure to stress that 
these freedmen are recommended suis nominibus as well. In the letter recommending 
Hammonius, Cicero thus stresses that he commends the freedman as “the agent of the 
person whom I am recommending to you” but also “to hold him in regard for his own 
sake”132. Deniaux has claimed that it was the status of a recommended person that could 
make him either “un commendatus véritable” or “un individu introduit dans la 
recommendation de quelqu’un d’autre”. She gives the cases of the only recommended 
slave Anchialus and of the three freedmen of Naso as an example of the second 
category. At the end of her discussion, however, it is made clear that other freedmen are 
on the contrary presented as commendati in their own right, i.e. “à la manière 
traditionelle”133. 
5.3.3 The patronage relation as distinctive feature? 
A recurrent argument in favour of a fundamental distinction between freedman 
recommendations and recommendations of ingenui is the claim that freedmen were 
consistently framed in relations of dependence vis-à-vis their patrons, and that their 
virtues essentially boiled down to a pleasing of these patrons134. It is undeniable that 
this does indeed seem to occur on several occasions. Zoilus is presented in the beginning 
of a letter to Appuleius as his patron’s heir (heres patroni sui) and as an individual held in 
high esteem by him (patroni iudicio ornatus erat)135. After Hammonius is first mentioned 
in a letter to Sulpicius Rufus, he is praised for his “exceptional conscientiousness and 
fidelity towards his former master” (nam cum propterea mihi est probatus quod est in 
 
                                                     
131 Thus Fabre (1981), 246 (on the cases of Hammonius and Trypho): “le ‘portrait’ du patron avait 
précédé celui du libertus qui n’apparaissait que comme un prolongement du premier” or Smadja 
(1976), 98: “Ces compliments adressés par Cicéron ne visent pas la personne de l’affranchi ; en fait 
celui-ci les réfléchit vers son patron, à qui en dernier ressort ils sont adressés. Le ton que Cicéron 
emploie pour parler d’un affranchi révèle l’importance de son patron”. 
132 Fam. 13.21.2: “Itaque peto a te ut eum [Hammonium] et in patroni eius negotio sic tueare ut eius 
procuratorem quem tibi commendo et ipsum suo nomine diligas (…)”. 
133 Deniaux (1993), 57, 134. 
134 See note 131 and the notes to Mouritsen above (8, 95, 96, and 104). 
135 Fam. 13.46.  
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patronum suum officio et fide singulari)136. Menander is described immediately after his 
introduction as “a worthy, modest person, of whom both his former master and I have 
an excellent opinion” (homo frugi et modestus et patono et nobis vehementer probatus)137. 
And Anchialus, to give a final example, is praised as “a person very highly thought of by 
his former master and his former master’s connections” (homo et patrono et patroni 
necessariis probatissimus)138. An important feature for which these particular freedmen 
were praised, was thus their connection to both Cicero and their patron. But 
embeddedness in a patronage relation or being agreeable and pleasing to an individual 
of higher social rank was not a virtue in freedmen alone. This point is taken up below, 
but it should be clear here already that even in letters that do not truly recommend 
someone, freeborn individuals are praised for very similar features. Cicero, for instance, 
writes to Lentulus Spinther that no one is more caring, more faithful, or more loving 
towards him than Q. Selicius (neque enim prudentiorem quemquam ex tuis neque fide maiore 
esse iudico neque amantiorem tui)139.  
Cicero usually reserved the first line of a letter of recommendation (and its first few 
words in particular) to accentuate its subject. These letters therefore traditionally begin 
with L. Genucilio Curvo iam pridem utor familiarissime…, Cluvius Puteolanus valde me 
observant…, or L. Custidius est tribulis et municeps et familiaris meus…140. Similarly, when 
entire communities are recommended, their name occupies this pivotal position. Thus 
Nec Lacedaemonios dubitare arbitror…, or In Halaesina civitate tam lauta tamque nobili…141. 
Even when Cicero uses the language of recommendations to jokingly refer to innate 
objects, the latter are given pride of place in the letter. When he entrusts (commendare) 
his Orator to Trebonius, Cicero starts his letter with Oratorem meum (…) commendavi, thus 
not only personifying his work, but also giving it its due stress (as if, indeed, it were a 
real individual that was being recommended)142. At first sight, the letters 
recommending freedmen seem to follow this trend. Examples include the letter for 
Evander (C. Avianio Evandro, qui habitat …), Trypho (L. Livineius Trypho est omnino …), and 
Mithres (C. Curtius Mithres est ille …)143. Yet other letters that contain a recommendation 
of freedmen, however, start out with the name of the patron. Thus the recommendation 
 
                                                     
136 Fam. 13.21.2. 
137 Fam. 13.70. 
138 Fam. 13.23.1. 
139 Fam. 1.5a.4. 
140 Fam. 13.53; 13.56; 13.58; … Examples are of course legion. 
141 Fam. 13.28a; 13.32. 
142 E.g. Fam. 15.20.1. 
143 Fam. 13.2; 13.60; 13.69. 
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of the unnamed freedman of Strabo starts with L. Titio Strabone (…) familiarissime utor144. 
That of Menander first introduces his patron Ampius Balbus (for whom Cicero writes 
the recommendation in the first place), but eventually also separately recommends the 
freedman (commendo maiorem in modum). Indeed, in most of these cases, this “deviation” 
can again easily be explained by noticing how these letters not only recommend the 
freedmen in question, but also their patrons. Like the primacy of Balbus in the letter 
recommending (also) his freedman, it are Strabo’s interests and business that are first 
and foremost being recommended in the first example. The unnamed freedman is only 
recommended because he serves as the agent who will take care of the practicalities of 
the transactions. The central request is the safeguarding of Strabo’s interests, not the 
interests of the freedman.  
The letters that do start out with the names of the freedmen themselves, moreover, 
recommend only the freedmen and not their patrons. The structure of these letters is 
meaningfully different than the letters that also recommend the patrons. The latter, as 
mentioned before, typically start out with a description of the patron’s relation with 
Cicero, only later introducing the freedman, who is nonetheless said to be 
recommended in his own right as well. The letters that recommend only the freedman 
not only begin with describing the freedman and his relations with Cicero, but the 
patronage-relation is barely mentioned at all throughout the letter. Thus Fam. 13.2 
starts with C. Avianio Evandro, foreshadowing that it is this freedman in particular that is 
the main subject of the letter. He is first described as “a person with whom I have a good 
deal to do” (ipso multum utor). Only then is Cicero’s relation with his patron highlighted: 
“I am on very friendly terms with his former master” (utor patrono eius M. Aemilio 
familiarissime), followed immediately by the actual request of providing Evander with a 
place to live. The letter ends with the traditional elements (a saving clause and a note of 
thanks). Any additional reference to the relation between Evander and his patron is 
entirely omitted.  
Similarly, the letter on behalf of Mithres starts with C. Curtius Mithres who is thereby 
highlighted as the central figure in the recommendation. The first sentence of the letter 
is: “C. Curtius Mithres is, as you know, the freedman of my very good friend Postumus, 
but he pays as much respect and attention to me as to his own ex-master”145. Besides the 
rendering of the patron in the possessive genitive after libertus, the connection between 
Mithres and his patron is not further elaborated upon throughout the letter. Instead of 
describing this bond in further detail, Cicero accentuates his own relationship with the 
freedman. The first sentence thus presents the triad of relations between the three men 
 
                                                     
144 Fam. 13.14.1. 
145 Fam. 13.69: “C. Curtius Mithres est ille quidem, ut scis, libertus Postumi, familiarissimi mei, sed 
me colit et observat aeque atque illum ipsum patronum suum”. 
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before introducing any of them to Isauricus: Mithres is the freedman of Postumus, 
Postumus is the familiaris of Cicero, and Mithres is very observant towards Cicero as 
well. The rest of the relatively long letter is dedicated to the extraordinary help Mithres 
had been able to provide Cicero and his friends with. His relation to Cicero thus 
constitutes the core of the letter (e.g. his being a homo intimus ac mihi pernecessarius). 
Nowhere else is the bond with his patron repeated. This is especially significant since 
Cicero’s request is rather delicate. Indeed, besides asking Isauricus (as his friend) to 
receive Mithres in his circle (recipere in fidem et habere in numero tuorum) he asks him (as 
proconsul of Asia at the time) to “accommodate Mithres in the dispute he has on hand 
with a certain citizen of Colophon concerning a rural property”. Surely, if a good 
relationship with his patron was the most praiseworthy attribute of Mithres, Cicero 
would have stressed it more vehemently throughout the letter. Instead, Mithres is 
presented rather as an independent figure, and his many – apparently voluntary – 
services to Cicero are considered more salient in presenting him as a trustworthy 
candidate for Isauricus’ consideration146. 
Finally, the letter on behalf of Trypho starts out with L. Livineus Trypho (and not with 
L. Regulus, his patron). Again, our expectation that he will thus be the key figure in the 
recommendation is confirmed. The letter starts: “L. Livineius Trypho is to be sure a 
freedman of my close friend L. Regulus, whose misfortune has made me even more 
anxious to serve him – feel more kindly than I always did I cannot. But I am fond of his 
freedman for his own sake”147. It is therefore practically identical to the first phrase of 
Mithres’ recommendation: the patron is rendered in the (possessive) genitive after 
libertus, and both the bond of strong familiaritas between Cicero and Regulus, and 
Cicero’s good relation with the freedman are stressed. Even omnino can be seen as a 
parallel to ut scis of the previous letter. Trypho, moreover, is the sole subject of the 
subsequent lines in which Cicero highlights the freedman’s many services to him (cf. 
supra). Besides the initial mention of the patron (which is arguably no more than a part 
of the pseudo-formal libertination like we saw in the previous case), the patron L. 
Regulus is not once referred to. The relation with his patron as a means to praise the 
freedman is clearly considered less effective than the extensive description of his 
relation with Cicero. 
All the letters that start out with the freedman’s name treat him as the most important 
(and in fact sole) beneficiary of the recommendation. The bond with the patron is – 
 
                                                     
146 Cf. in the same vein Treggiari (1969a), 221. 
147 Fam. 13.60: “L. Livineius Trypho est omnino L. Reguli, familiarissimi mei, libertus; cuius calamitas 
etiam officiosiorem me facit in illum; nam benevolentior quam semper fui esse non possum. Sed ego 
libertum eius per se ipsum diligo”. 
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besides an occasional formal remark at the start of the letter – never stressed. If the 
profiling of a freedman as “pleasing or useful to his patron” were a unique feature of 
freedmen recommendations that distinguished them from recommendations of 
freeborn friends, are the letters in which this feature does not occur mere exceptions? 
A part of the answer may be found in those recommendations of freeborn friends 
that present the beneficiaries as “clients” of a “(pseudo-)patron”. On certain occasions a 
recommendation is inspired by a friend of Cicero’s who vouches for one of his own 
protégés, and who thereby adds more weight to the recommendation itself. When 
recommending Manius Curius and his business to Sulpicius Rufus, for example, Cicero 
adheres to the normal conventions of recommendation: he stresses his good 
relationship with Curius, makes the actual request, promises future benefits, and 
includes a note of thanks. Interestingly, Cicero’s closest tie (maximum vinculum) to 
Curius, so he writes, consists in their mutual friendship (familiaritas) with Atticus, whom 
Curius cultivates (observare) and regards (diligere) more than anybody in the world148. 
Likewise, Cicero writes to Q. Gallius to recommend his familiaris L. Oppius not only 
because of the regard he has for the man himself (commendo eo magis quod cum ipsum 
diligo…), but especially because he is managing the affairs of Egnatius Rufus (… tum quod 
negotia procurat L. Egnati Rufi). Like some of the freedmen mentioned above, Oppius is 
thus recommended both in his own right and as a protégé of Egnatius, whose relation 
with both Cicero and Oppius is arguably the central theme of the letter149. Similarly, 
Patro’s recommendation to C. Memmius is enhanced by stressing his close relation to 
Atticus who very much likes him (diligere)150. These “pseudo-patrons” are usually 
representative for the addressee’s peers, and by greatly approving of the commendatus 
(and therefore of the recommendation as a whole), they endow him with this social 
group’s “corporate authority”151. 
In a letter to Valerius Orca, Cicero moreover praises the good qualities of his friend 
Cuspius. Because he completely trusts the latter’s judgment, Cicero feels confident to 
recommend a certain L. Iulius on Cuspius’ instigation. However, since the entire letter is 
dedicated to the trust between Cicero and Cuspius, barely any space is reserved for the 
actual description of this Iulius. In fact, Iulius is only halfway through the letter 
mentioned for the first time in a single phrase that has Cuspius as its thematic and 
grammatical subject: “P. Cuspius has been extraordinarily urgent to have me give L. 
 
                                                     
148 Fam. 13.17.1. 
149 Fam. 13.43. 
150 Fam. 13.1.5 
151 The term, as noted before, is derived from Gurd’s (2007), 54-5 discussion on how literary works 
were often “tested” in front of a small group of people that represented the intended audience. By 
approving of the “first draft”, they endowed it with their symbolic and cultural capital which the 
author could subsequently invoke throughout the text.  
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Iulius a most particular recommendation to you”152. The letter continues by mentioning, 
again, Cuspius’ insistence to make the recommendation particularly compelling. 
Whatever Iulius’ qualities or characteristics may have been, they are completely 
subordinated to the much more compelling argument: Cuspius’ solicitation and Iulius’ 
agreeable character in the eyes of his “pseudo-patron”. The second (and also last) 
reference to Iulius  is illustrative. Cicero does not even bother to mention his name 
again: “That the person whom I am recommending is very worthy to be your friend I 
believe not only because Cuspius tells me so, though that ought to be enough, but 
because I know his good judgement in choosing men and friends”153.  
A final example is the recommendation of Avianius Philoxenus, an old host and 
familiaris of Cicero’s. The only things that Cicero thought worthy of mention were the 
fact that he had been made a citizen of Novum Comum by Caesar, and that he had taken 
the nomen Avianius because of his close relation to Avianius Flaccus. Cicero ends the 
letter by writing that he has put these two facts together to let Acilius “understand that 
this recommendation of mine is outside the ordinary”154. Philoxenus’ own character 
once again plays second fiddle to his relation with Caesar and Flaccus, which is the most 
important (and in fact only) identity dimension Cicero thought worth including.  
In all of these (and many other similar) cases, the recommended person’s worth and 
trustworthiness is increased by (or even entirely reduced to) his relation with a social 
superior who had often not only instigated the recommendation, but whose relation to 
the commendatus constituted the latter’s most important asset. People like Atticus, 
Rufus, Cuspius, and Flaccus thus acted as “pseudo-patrons” in the sense that the 
recommended individuals derive their most salient identity dimension from their 
connection to them. Because none of these men were of course freedmen, we might 
legitimately ask the question whether the framing of a freedman’s “pivotal virtues” 
within the relation with his patron is a practice that was typically reserved for them. 
Especially when we take into account that the words used to do so differ not as 
substantially – if at all – from freeborn recommendations as has been argued in the past, 
and that there existed freedmen who were recommended independently and without 
consistent references to their patron, the artificial divide between freedman 
recommendations and recommendations of freeborn friends crumbles even further. 
 
                                                     
152 Fam. 13.6.3: “Nam P. Cuspius singulari studio contendit a me, ut tibi quam diligentissime L. Iulium 
commendarem”. 
153 Fam. 13.6.4: “Ipsum hominem, quem tibi commendo, perdignum esse tua amicitia, non solum, 
quia mihi Cuspius dicit, credo – tametsi id satis esse debebat –, sed quia novi eius iudicium in 
hominibus et amicis deligendis”. 
154 Fam. 13.34. 
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In short, neither the vocabulary, nor the structural composition, nor the presence of a 
patronage relationship in letters that recommend freedmen provide conclusive 
evidence for the alleged sui generis character of freedmen recommendations. Before 
comprehensively summarising the conclusions that can be drawn from the observations 
made above, we will briefly illustrate them by way of a detailed case study. 
5.4 Casus: Apollonius 
In the previous paragraphs, the case of Apollonius has been deliberately kept out of the 
discussion. As the most extensive (surviving) recommendation of a freedman, this letter 
lends itself particularly well to more detailed case study. The letter is addressed to 
Caesar, and contains the following structural components155: 
Lines 1-4: Description of P. Crassus (Apollonius’ patron) and his excellent relationship 
with both Cicero and Caesar. It is a very schoolbook instance of social triangulation, and 
one of the cases where the patron is referenced before the freedman is introduced. 
P. Crassum ex omni nobilitate adulescentem dilexi plurimum et ex eo cum ab 
ineunte eius aetate bene speravissem, tum optime existimare coepi [ex] iis iudiciis 
quae de eo feceras, cognitis. 
Lines 4-7: Introduction of Apollonius and accentuation of his good relationship with both 
his patron and Cicero.  
Eius libertum Apollonium iam tum equidem cum ille viveret et magni faciebam et 
probabam. Erat enim et studiosus Crassi et ad eius optima studia vehementer 
aptus; itaque ab eo admodum diligebatur. 
Lines 7-11: After Crassus’ death at Carrhae (53 BCE), Cicero had admitted Apollonius to his 
fides and amicitia. The initiative came from Apollonius himself, since he thought it 
proper to honour his patron by respecting the latter’s loved ones (among whom Cicero 
figured prominently). 
 
                                                     
155 Fam. 13.16. The “lines” each time refer to the Loeb edition by Shackleton Bailey (2001), and are 
included merely to give an indication of the attention paid to certain themes within the letter. 
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Post mortem autem Crassi eo mihi etiam dignior visus est quem in fidem atque 
amicitiam meam reciperem quod eos a se observandos et colendos putabat quos 
ille dilexisset et quibus carus fuisset. 
Lines 11-14: Apollonius had subsequently assisted Cicero during his proconsulship in 
Cilicia. There, his fides and prudentia had proved very useful. Three years later, 
Apollonius was still (or again) in the East, this time applying his studium and fidelitas to 
help Caesar in his Alexandrian War. 
Itaque et ad me in Ciliciam venit multisque in rebus mihi magno usui fuit et fides 
eius et prudentia, et, ut opinor, tibi in Alexandrino bello, quantum studio et 
fidelitate consequi potuit, non defuit. 
Lines 15-24: The actual request. Apollonius is leaving for Spain to join Caesar. Again, the 
initiative was his own, although Cicero did encourage him. Cicero is convinced that his 
recommendation would carry weight with Caesar. Moreover, it was expected that 
Caesar would already be inclined to receive Apollonius because 1) he would remember 
him from his contributions during the Alexandrian War, and 2) the memory of Crassus’ 
friendship with Caesar would move the latter to accommodate his family-members 
(once again a good example of “social triangulation”).  
Quod cum speraret te quoque ita existimare, in Hispaniam ad te maxime ille 
quidem suo consilio sed etiam me auctore est profectus. Cui ego commendationem 
non sum pollicitus, non quin eam valituram apud te arbitrarer, sed neque egere 
mihi commendatione videbatur, qui et in bello tecum fuisset et propter 
memoriam Crassi de tuis unus esset, et, si uti commendationibus vellet, etiam per 
alios eum videbam id consequi posse; testimonium mei de eo iudici, quod et ipse 
magni aestimabat et ego apud te valere eram expertus, ei libenter dedi. 
Lines 25-32: Description of Apollonius. His literary talents and experience in particular 
are highlighted in their own right, but a connection to their usefulness for Caesar is 
made since Apollonius had expressed his wish to write an account of Caesar’s Res Gestae 
in Greek.  
Doctum igitur hominem cognovi et studiis optimis deditum, idque a puero. Nam 
domi meae cum Diodoto Stoico, homine meo iudicio eruditissimo, multum a puero 
fuit; nunc autem, incensus studio rerum tuarum eas litteris Graecis mandare 
cupiebat. Posse arbitror; valet ingenio, habet usum, iam pridem in eo genere studi 
litterarumque versatur, satis facere immortalitati laudum tuarum mirabiliter 
cupit. 
Lines 33-34: Saving clause: “by all means, judge for yourself”. 
Habes opinionis meae testimonium, sed tu hoc facilius multo pro tua singulari 
prudentia iudicabis. 
 270 
Lines 34-36: Note of thanks. 
Et tamen, quod negaveram, commendo tibi eum. Quidquid ei commodaveris, erit 
id mihi maiorem in modum gratum. 
 
The recommendation takes place at a moment when Caesar is at the apex of his power, 
as he was hunting down the last remnants of Pompeian resistance in Spain. Cicero is 
thus recommending a freedman to arguably the most powerful man in the known world 
at the time. And he is very well aware of it too. It is no coincidence that Apollonius is 
said to have been of great assistance to both a proconsul and a military commander. The 
recommendation, moreover, is the only instance in Cicero’s correspondence where a 
freedman is (discursively) connected to military activity and war, with the exception of 
Bellienus Demetrius, who, as a bribed garrison commander, found himself on the 
receiving end of the only vituperation in Cicero’s letters that describes a freedman as 
verna and Psecade natus, two particularly derogative references to Demetrius’ servile 
past156. Evidently, the mention of Apollonius in the context of the Alexandrian War does 
not necessarily imply that he engaged in actual fighting. In fact, the virtues that Cicero 
deemed noteworthy in this context, were his studio and fidelitas; hardly the qualities by 
which military prowess would be celebrated. Apollonius more than likely served in 
Caesar’s administrative staff, but the help he thereby indirectly provided in winning the 
war must have struck (or was intended to strike) a sensitive chord with the veteran 
commander. It is at any rate a good example of how Cicero would carefully select the 
most salient aspects of the commendatus’ identity, depending on the particular context 
of the recommendation. 
When he discusses the case of Apollonius’ recommendation, Mouritsen mentions 
only the freedman’s reception in Cicero’s fides and amicitia, his fides and prudentia in 
Cilicia, and his studio and fidelitas in Alexandria157. By focussing only on the vocabulary 
in the first 15 lines of the letter, and thereby trying to support the claim that freedmen 
were typically (and differently) described with terms that firmly rooted them in the 
relation with their patron, Mouritsen undervalues both the passage extending over lines 
25-32, which stresses Apollonius’ literary qualities (without any reference to his patron), 
as well as the fact that Apollonius is at least twice credited with taking independent 
initiative in important matters.  
Nearly all the elements and conventions that are traditionally identified and 
deployed in letters of recommendation are included in this one. Cicero’s excellent 
 
                                                     
156 Fam. 8.15.2. 
157 Mouritsen (2011), 62-3. 
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relationship with Crassus, the saving clause, and the note of thanks at the end are 
quickly noticed. The denial (until the very end of the letter) that he is in fact 
recommending (commendare) Apollonius, and the claim that he is instead merely giving 
a testimony (testimonium) of his character, is Cicero’s original way of preventing that the 
letter would come across as dull, formal, and standardised158. Like Hammonius’ 
recommendation, Apollonius’ takes a middle ground between letters that situate the 
freedman solely in relation to his patron, and letters that focus entirely on the 
freedman’s own qualities and character. As we have seen, however, both extremes are 
found also among freeborn commendati. 
The constant switching between Cicero and Caesar throughout the letter is a clear 
confirmation of the suggestion by Rees and others that both writer and addressee rather 
than the commendatus were in fact the protagonists of a letter of recommendation. 
Already in the first sentence, Cicero and Caesar are given a prominent role. After 
Apollonius is initially treated mainly in relation to his patron (and as owing some of his 
commendable virtues to his association with him), the rest of the letter – as a reflection 
of the consequences of Crassus’ death – focusses alternatingly on the freedman’s new 
“patrons” Cicero and Caesar. He joined Cicero in Cilicia – he joined Caesar in Alexandria; 
he now travels to Caesar in Spain – he relies on Cicero to publicise his reputation; he had 
devoted himself to liberal studies in Cicero’s house – now he wants to write Caesar’s Res 
Gestae; etc. 
Embeddedness in important networks, and connections to influential individuals are 
features that are stressed in recommendations whenever it is possible. Cicero is 
confident that Apollonius can obtain a recommendation from other people than himself 
should he desire one. Not only is Cicero thereby rhetorically denying that he is writing a 
recommendation, he also suggests that Apollonius has extensive networks on which he 
can safely rely. This was already suggested at the beginning of the letter, where Cicero 
mentions not only that he had received the freedman in his own trust network (recipere 
in fidem atque amicitiam), but that he had done so because Apollonius obervabat and 
colebat the persons Crassus had loved and who had loved him in return. Apollonius is 
thus presented not only as closely connected to his patron, but also to Cicero, Caesar, 
both these men’s networks, and Crassus’ friends. Like in the cases of freeborn friends 
and clients, such instances serve to highlight the social capital of the commendatus, as 
well as the ensuing “control” which would make the receiver of the letter all the more 
confident to accept the request. 
 
                                                     
158 Cf. Cotton (1977), 9; (1985), 334. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
The observation that the virtues and qualities of some freedmen derive primarily from 
the relation with their patron is in itself not wrong. It is, however, far from conclusive 
evidence for the existence of a specific format of praise or recommendations for ex-
slaves. As we saw, freedmen could just as well be depicted much more independently by 
omitting the patron almost entirely from the letter, and by focussing instead on their 
relation with Cicero; a recurrent trait also in letters for freeborn friends and clients. It is 
no coincidence that in these cases, Cicero clearly had had close personal interactions 
with the freedmen in question. The virtues of these men, and the guarantee that he had 
experienced them in person (“dyadic control”), were in these cases considered more 
effective than merely framing them in the patron-freedman relationship.  
In many recommendations of freeborn friends, the most important feature would 
equally derive from the relation to a “(pseudo-)patron”. In these letters, the connection 
between such “(pseudo-)patrons” and the recommended persons forms the framework 
in which the virtues of the latter are presented. Moreover, it could be argued that in 
letters that do not refer to a third party acting as a “(pseudo-)patron” or protector of 
the recommended person, Cicero himself fulfilled this role. The virtues of the 
recommended individuals are in these cases framed within the relationship between 
these individuals and Cicero. The embeddedness in a (pseudo-)patronage relation with 
Cicero is in these cases less obvious, since its expression overlaps in no small degree 
with the traditional feature of recommendation by which the bond between writer and 
recommended person is stressed. Thus with Anchialus, for instance, Cicero seems not to 
have had many (if any) personal contacts or experiences worth mentioning. In any case, 
he did not deem them convincing enough to include them in the letter. The excellent 
relationship with his patron was the next best thing to praise Anchialus and his 
trustworthiness with. The same goes for Menander, Naso’s Antigonus, Demostratus, and 
Hilarus, etc. In contrast, with Mithres, Trypho, and Evander, Cicero could and did invoke 
past interactions which he considered more valuable or convincing than these 
freedmen’s embeddedness in the relation with their patron, which he therefore almost 
entirely omits. Finally, the cases of Hammonius or Apollonius warn us against too rigid 
an analytical opposition between the two situations. These freedmen’s embeddedness in 
the relation with their patron, as well as previous personal contacts with Cicero (and in 
the latter case even with the addressee) are stressed. It should be clear that deliberation 
about what information to include (and what not), depended on the particular context 
of the recommendation. At any rate, the already manifest diversity of these choices in 
the very limited amount of freedmen recommendations at our disposal strongly 
suggests that there may not have been any distinctive format for a “freedman 
recommendation” in the first place. 
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In a society where personal connections are vital in social promotion – and the 
prominent role of letters of recommendation in late Republican and Imperial 
epistolography is already in itself a testimony to the veracity of this claim for Rome –, 
one of the most important assets to possess was embeddedness in as much meaningful 
networks and relations as possible. It is precisely this feature that letters of 
recommendation wish to accentuate. Not only was the commendatus’ value thereby 
highly increased (the receiver would gain multiple “weak ties” to other networks), but 
his trustworthiness was at the same time guaranteed. A dense network embeddedness 
was, as we have seen, an important trust-increasing factor due to the possibilities of 
“network control” it generated. In the case of freedmen, this image could be established 
by framing them in the relationship with their patron, and Cicero takes recourse to this 
option especially in those cases where he could not refer to any other networks or 
qualities. Where he could, however, he perceived his own relationship with the 
freedman, as well as his personally having witnessed the freedman’s virtues, as 
potentially more compelling arguments. Instead of considering the depiction of 
freedmen realising their virtue via and through their patron as a sign of a fundamental 
difference with freeborn friends (or even of their subservience to said patron), we 
should contextualise these letters in this broader conception of the “recommendational 
habit”.  
Moreover, the deference paid to a patron does not differ substantially from the 
respect shown by freeborn clients to their patrons (or “pseudo-patrons”). When Fronto 
recommended Gavius Clarus, a younger senator of lower rank than Fronto himself but 
bound to him by yearlong familiaritas, he mentioned that Gavius had devoted himself to 
him (me curavit) from a very young age by performing many appropriate services 
(officia). He continues by equating the deference of freeborn clients towards their 
patrons with the respect paid by freedmen to theirs (sed paulatim amicitia nostra eo 
processit ut neque illum pigeret nec me puderet ea illum oboedire mihi, quae clientes, quae liberti 
fideles ac laboriosi obsequuntur)159. The link with and reverence towards a social superior 
in these cases was not considered discreditable, and even if it was, its undesirability was 
greatly made up for by the much more important advantage it produced: the 
establishment of a connection to an important individual or network. The same goes for 
one of Pliny’s letters, in which he recommends Minicius Acilianus to Junius Mauricus as 
a marriage partner for the latter’s niece. Pliny extensively praises the young man: he 
loves him (me diligit), and although he is only a little younger than Pliny himself, he 
respects him as his elder (me reveretur ut senem)160. By subtly but explicitly referencing 
 
                                                     
159 Fronto Ad Verum Imp. 2.7.2. 
160 Plin. Ep. 1.14.3. 
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his seniority (est enim minor pauculis annis), Pliny presents himself as a “pseudo-patron” 
of Minicius161. Besides his connection to Pliny, who vouches for him and who thus 
constitutes the strongest argument in the recommendation, Minicius’ other networks 
are in addition invoked throughout the subsequent passages (e.g. his connection his 
honest patria Brixia, his prominent father, …). Pliny stressed his own experience and 
connection with the man (cf. dyadic learning and control), but also accentuated his ties 
to and embeddedness in other networks that would guarantee his trustworthiness. 
Only by assuming that freedmen were a priori “different” due to their macula servitutis, 
can the claim that recommendations of freedmen fundamentally differed from 
recommendations of freeborn friends and clients be maintained (and even then only for 
the “patronal connection” argument). However, this premise not only results in a 
heavily biased and predetermined analysis of the actual source material (including 
unwarranted claims of a “specific vocabulary”), but it also betrays the fundamental 
circularity of the argument: the uniqueness of freedman recommendations is due to the 
inherent differentness of freedmen, for which these recommendations are at the same 
time “proof”.  
 
                                                     
161 On a similar note, see Sogno (2010), 58. 
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Chapter 6 Freedmen in “detached” meta-
narratives 
The previous chapters focussed predominantly on the genre of epistolography to 
reconstruct the “network embedded” contexts in which these documents were drafted, 
and in which freedmen operated on a daily basis. The network embeddedness of sources 
like letters and epitaphs, but especially their value for the study of freedman 
socialisation is, however, most clear when it is explicitly contrasted with “detached” 
sources. The current chapter aims to highlight these differences, to pinpoint where and 
how traces of embeddedness nonetheless survive in these sources, and – most 
importantly – to demonstrate how such glimpses can be useful for our purpose. This will 
be done in a first section, by drawing attention to literary passages in which direct 
speech of freedmen was (pretended to have been) truthfully integrated. The question as 
to how the “real” freedman’s voice can shed light on his socialisation and stratification 
in society at large, will be taken up in further detail in Chapter 8, where we treat the 
verse epitaphs ex-slaves composed for themselves and their relatives. 
A more extensive second section focusses on the similarities and differences in the 
representation of freedmen in the “detached” works of Suetonius and Tacitus when 
compared to network embedded sources. These works have in common with Cicero’s 
letters that they originate from elite society and therefore reflect the views, prejudices, 
and ideology of this narrow stratum of Roman society. Habinek consistently draws 
attention to this well-known aspect of literary sources in his discussion of “the politics 
of Latin literature”, as already made clear in his introductory note: “Many of the 
characteristics of Latin literature can be attributed to its production by and for an elite 
that sought to maintain and expand its dominance over other sectors of the population 
(…)”1. But such a broad observation greatly effaces fundamental differences between 
literary genres, by focussing entirely on authorship rather than on the performative 
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function of these documents. This second section therefore aims to address this issue in 
detail, and to reassess the “detached” discourse on freedmen (with the Roman 
historians2 as primary case study).  
Together, these two sections approach our main question about the extent to which a 
servile past impacted the lives of Roman freedmen from two different angles. The main 
argument put forward is that even in the most vicious attempts at social distinction, 
sneers to (and overall condemnation of) freedmen were a result of a genre-specific 
“meta-narrative” – facilitating (or even necessitating) the rhetorical generalisation of 
concrete and individual instances of transgressive behaviour – rather than a 
consequence of an all-pervasive and omnipresent moral deficiency a priori attributed to 
ex-slaves outside of these narratives.   
6.1 Echoes of freedmen’s “voices” in the literary record 
6.1.1 Freed authors 
Relatively few works from the pens of freedmen have survived. Harris has cogently 
argued that it were illiteracy and financial limitations that precluded a literary tradition 
of the lower classes as a whole3. Although clearly deserving some merit, this suggestion 
does not in itself explain the remarkable absence of wealthy and cultured freed authors 
in Latin literature.The situation of the Roman social historian is deplorable indeed when 
compared to the wealth of slave and freedman narratives written in 18th and 19th 
century America, and which often evoke sighs of envious frustration from ancient 
historians4. We know authors like Publilius Syrus, Terence, Epictetus, and (perhaps) 
Phaedrus to have been manumitted at least partially because of their literary talents5. 
 
                                                     
2 We use “historians” throughout this chapter to denote Tacitus, Dio, and Livy in particular, but also 
Suetonius. Obviously, the latter is not truly a historian, but rather a biographer. Only in the interest 
of fluency, do we categorise him here under the heading of “historian”, thereby by no means 
suggesting that the genres of historiography or biography entirely overlapped. 
3 Harris (1989), passim. 
4 E.g. Hopkins (1993), 12 note 17; Bradley (1994), 7. 
5 Christes (1979b) looks for traces of a servile past in the works of Publilius Syrus and Phaedrus. 
Bloomer (1997), Chapter 3 (p. 73-109), similarly analyses the “rhetoric of freedmen” in Phaedrus’ 
fables. Champlin (2005) has, however, convincingly questioned the communis opinio that Phaedrus 
was a freed slave, instead arguing that he was actually “a member of the Roman élite masquerading 
as a man of the people” (117). Dumont (1987), 609 compares the treatment of slaves and slavery in 
the comedies of Plautus and Terence. Interestingly, in Terence’s comedies, slaves are usually 
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But whenever these writers mention the condition of slaves or freedmen, they 
consistently adhere to the public transcript imposed by the slave-owning class, to which 
they – after all – now belonged themselves6. Publilius Syrus was an enslaved Syrian, but 
was set free by his Roman master after having shown great promise during his literary 
performances. His Sententiae, brief moralising maxims, regularly refer to or even address 
slaves. Instead of showing signs of sympathy, he advises them to settle in their roles and 
to accept their condition. “If you serve reluctantly”, he claims, “you will be miserable, 
but nonetheless still a slave” (qui invitus servit, fit miser, servit tamen), implying that one 
might as well make the best of this inexorable situation. Indeed: “If you serve wisely, 
you will have a share in your master’s rule” (qui docte servit, partem dominatus tenet)7.  
Epictetus, a freed slave of Nero’s freedman Epaphroditus, had allegedly experienced 
the full extent of the cruelty slaves could be subjected to. Apparently, his master had 
slowly and willingly broken his legs for no apparent reason. Although the anecdote was 
very likely inspired by a wish to present Epictetus as a stoic martyr, this explanation for 
his disability was not too far-fetched for a third century audience8. Epictetus himself, 
like Publilius Syrus, certainly did not deny the cruelty of slavery – he in fact stresses it 
on many occasions – but he exhorts slaves to nonetheless accept this condition, 
philosophically arguing that it is only a temporary one, and that it is nothing compared 
to the rewards they would reap after a lifetime of dutiful subservience9. He even scorns 
the naiveté of slaves who thought that they would be better off after manumission, 
describes in detail the precarious situation a recently freed slave faced, and mocks a 
slave’s realisation from hindsight that he had unjustly despised the security his master’s 
protection provided10. This discourse has remarkable similarities with the public 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
depicted as less successful individuals when compared to their counterparts in Plautius. Dumont 
however concludes that “cette constatation n'a qu'une portée relative” as both writers differed not 
significantly in their description of slaves. Cf. already Amerasinghe (1950), which discusses the 
Terentian slaves in each play separately. 
6 Finley (1980), 117; Kleijwegt (2006b), 92. 
7 Publ. Syr. 596; 616. 
8 The only authority for Epictetus’ cruel treatment is the account of the third century Church Father 
Origen of Alexandria (Orig. Contr. Cels. 7.53). Three centuries later, on the other hand, Simplicius 
(Comm. Epict. Ench. 13) stated that he was born a cripple. Cf. Weaver (1994), passim (esp. p. 475). 
9 For Epictetus drawing attention to his own servile past, see for example Disc. 1.9.29, where Rufus 
taunts him with it (“Συμβήσεταί σοι τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου”); 1.19.20-1, where Epictetus 
is asked by some people what his master was doing (“εἶδες ἂν πῶς αὐτὸν ἐτίμα ὁ Ἐπαφρόδιτος· “τί 
πράσσει Φηλικίων ὁ ἀγαθός, φιλῶ σε;” εἶτα εἴ τις ἡμῶν ἐπύθετο “τί ποιεῖ αὐτός …”). For Epictetus 
exhorting slaves to accept their present condition, see for example Disc. 1.9.16 (“ἄνθρωποι, 
ἐκδέξασθε τὸν θεόν. ὅταν ἐκεῖνος σημήνῃ καὶ ἀπολύσῃ ὑμᾶς ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας, τότ᾿ ἀπολύεσθε 
πρὸς αὐτόν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος ἀνάσχεσθε ἐνοικοῦντες ταύτην τὴν χώραν, εἰς ἣν ἐκεῖνος ὑμᾶς 
ἔταξεν”).  
10 Disc. 4.1.33-5: “Ὁ δοῦλος εὐθὺς εὔχεται ἀφεθῆναι ἐλεύθερος; διὰ τί; δοκεῖτε, ὅτι τοῖς εἰκοστώναις 
ἐπιθυμεῖ δοῦναι ἀργύριον; οὔ· ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι φαντάζεται μέχρι νῦν διὰ τὸ μὴ τετυχηκέναι τούτου 
 
 278 
discourse of slave-holders, which remained immune to change for centuries to come. A 
British observer of late 18th century Dominica, for example, wrote that the condition of 
slaves was “by no means unenviable and preferable to the situation of thousands of 
people in Great Britain, with all the accompaniments of their fancied liberties”. 
Similarly, an early 19th century plantation owner from the French colony of Saint-
Domingue (the later Haiti) minimised the institution of slavery by arguing that slaves at 
least enjoyed the protection of their masters:  
“L’esclave est moins à plaindre que ne le sont les paysans en France. Le premier, 
lorsqu’il est bon sujet, est aimé de son maître, il est assuré de son logement et de 
sa subsistance et s’il a une petite famille, elle est à la charge de son maître, qui en a 
tout soin possible”11. 
 
Paradoxically, then, not even freed Roman authors give any real insight into their own 
minds and opinions – unless, of course, we are to believe that a legal act suddenly and 
completely transformed the way they thought about slavery. Pretending precisely this 
was a popular strategy of socialisation and integration into the slave-owning classes, 
and is attested in epigraphic sources as well (cf. Chapter 8). It had the obvious advantage 
for those who had actually escaped slavery to accentuate their personal worthiness and 
merit, to the point of retroactively effacing the impact of this period of their lives. As 
such, the extant writings of freedmen were moulded and conditioned by the public 
transcript that proliferated the convenient ideology of slavery as a necessary evil from 
which worthy individuals could easily escape on their own merit12. In fact, this 
adherence to the public transcript is undoubtedly also (at least in part) the reason for 
the survival of these works. Much more promising, in any case, are those instances – few 
in number as they may be – where freedmen “talk” to us via quotations of their letters 
or speech as recorded in norm-respecting discourse. These communicative acts were 
never intended to be recorded or publicly displayed, and are therefore much more likely 
to reveal a deviating point of view. It should be noted, however, that they were always 
deliberately selected and appropriated by an elite writer to clarify a freedman’s opinion 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ἐμποδίζεσθαι καὶ δυσροεῖν. “ἂν ἀφεθῶ,” φησίν, “εὐθὺς πᾶσα εὔροια, οὐδενὸς ἐπιστρέφομαι, πᾶσιν ὡς 
ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος λαλῶ, πορεύομαι ὅπου θέλω, ἔρχομαι ὅθεν θέλω καὶ ὅπου θέλω”. The next passages 
(36-40) describe the recently freed, poor slave’s miseries. For a detailed discussion of Epictetus’ 
opinion on slavery, see Hershbell (1995). For the limited use of his works as emanations from a 
freedman’s mind, see MacLean (2012), 164. See also Plaut. Epidic. 721-30, which features a slave who 
would only “accept” manumission after his master had also promised him food  (cf. Cas. 293). 
11 Atwood 1972 [1791], 256; Ducoeurjoly (1802), 83 (both cited in Fleischmann (2005), 26).12 E.g. Cic. 
Cat. 4.16: “(…) sua virtute fortunam huius civitatis consecuti”. 
12 E.g. Cic. Cat. 4.16: “(…) sua virtute fortunam huius civitatis consecuti”. 
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or vision. As a consequence, they are always framed in a discourse that claimed the 
prerogative of interpretation, which usually added an extra layer to the citations, and 
which we must be very careful not to consider as authentic. Indeed, when direct speech 
(oral or written) of freedmen is recorded, these expressions are reconstructions by the 
elite author in whose work they feature; reconstructions that are contextually situated 
somewhere in between the two extremes of truthful citation on the one hand, and a 
tendentious – often malicious – reconstruction (and perhaps re-invention) on the other.  
6.1.2 Freedmen expressions preserved in elite literature 
Only on very rare occasions do elite authors cite (or pretend to cite) freedmen’s words. 
An example of a relatively truthful citation is Cicero’s quote – preserved in his 
correspondence with Atticus and already discussed earlier – of the freedman Antiochus’ 
mysterious exclamation after he had found out that he, instead of his patron A. 
Gabinius, was going to be punished for the latter’s crimes (itaque dixit statim res p. lege 
maiestatis ουσοιμρισαμαφιηι)13. Pliny the Elder similarly quoted (or rather, paraphrased) 
the defence speech of the freedman G. Furius Chresimus, who had become the victim of 
widespread unpopularity (invidia magna) because his small plot of land had yielded a 
larger return than the surrounding fields. He was consequently accused of witchcraft, 
but managed to obtain his acquittal after he had cleverly taken recourse to a discourse 
that accentuated his assimilation to frugal and industrious Roman citizens (veneficia mea, 
Quirites, haec sunt, nec possum vobis ostendere aut in forum adducere lucubrationes meas 
vigiliasque et sudores)14. These and similar anecdotes, however, were never intended to 
reflect the freedman’s actual thoughts or beliefs. Instead, they were – to different 
degrees – reconfigured to suit the narrator’s purpose. For example, Pliny’s portrayal of 
Chresimus – occurring in book XVIII, which is entirely dedicated to the question “how 
to run a farm” – served to show how rustic diligence was the most important element of 
 
                                                     
13 Cic. Att. 4.18.4. Cf. Chapter 4. The passage is corrupted.  
14 The anecdote is narrated in Plin. NH 18.41-3. Poisoning or magically influencing the crops of a 
neighbour was considered a serious crime throughout the Republic. It had already been prohibited 
by the Twelve Tables (Sen. NQ 4.7.2) and became a popular topos in many literary genres (e.g. Verg. 
Ecl. 8.99; Tib. 1.8.19). Scholars do not agree on the authenticity of Chresimus’ speech. Latte (1960), 6-
7, for example, questions the veracity of the entire anecdote, whereas Forsythe (1994), 376ff thinks 
the process is likely to have taken place more or less in the way Pliny described it. Schultze (2011), 
175-6 takes a position in between, arguing that the process is likely to be historical, but that Pliny’s 
account “tweaked” it in order to serve a specific purpose. Dickie (2001), 138-9 has “grave doubts” 
about the speech’s authenticity because it seems to serve Piso’s (Pliny’s source) purpose “all too 
neatly”. 
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success, and that the complacency of Chresimus’ accusers was in fact the real veneficium 
in society15.  
In many of these and similar anecdotes, the direct speech of freedmen is therefore 
not so much valuable for the information it contains, but for the motives of the writer in 
choosing this format. It is, for example, no coincidence that in Tacitus’ historical works, 
every single one of these instances concerns imperial freedmen trying to manipulate a 
weak emperor. By having them explicitly express their thoughts, feelings, and schemes, 
Tacitus endows them with a discursive agency that all but matches their (alleged) actual 
influence in court. Thus when the imperial freedmen were upset about Messalina’s 
affair with Silius – it constituted a threat to their own influence –, they did not express 
these feelings behind closed doors and among themselves, but openly and for everyone 
to hear (non iam secretis conloquiis, sed aperte fremere)16. The implication is that, under 
normal circumstances, these powerful individuals would concoct their schemes in 
secret, but the extraordinary urgency of the situation presented Tacitus with an 
opportunity to reveal to his readers how such talks would usually proceed. The train of 
thought of the freedmen is presented as follows: “While an actor [Mnester] had 
profaned the imperial bedchamber, humiliation might have been inflicted, but 
destruction had still been in the far distance. (…) The sequel to the new affair [between 
Messalina and Silius], however, would be much graver” (dum histria cubiculum principis 
insultaverit, dedecus quidem inlatum, sed excidium procul afuisse (…) nec enim occultum, quid 
post tale matrimonium superesset). The lack of pronouns (like Chresimus’ mea and vobis) or 
of verbs in first person, as well as the tense of the verbs (e.g. an imperfectum subjunctive 
– superesset – rather than, for example, a futurum indicative – supererit) reveal that this is 
not a true direct speech, but rather a description of these concerns by Tacitus, who 
narrates from hindsight and reproduces or paraphrases rather than quotes these 
freedmen’s actual words. Even more so than the citations by Cicero or Pliny the Elder, 
these passages are of very limited value to reconstruct these freedmen’s actual “voices”. 
This is confirmed by other passages where Tacitus does seem to imply that he could 
not personally confirm the veracity of what had been presented earlier as truthful 
expressions of ex-slaves. For example, when describing Narcissus’ loyalty towards 
Claudius and Britannicus, and his opposition against Agrippina’s schemes that 
threatened both of them, Tacitus writes that “Narcissus was said to have observed 
among his intimates” (prompsisse inter proximos ferebatur)17. The somewhat reticent claim 
is, however, immediately enhanced by the passage immediately following Narcissus’ 
 
                                                     
15 Cf. Graf (1997), 63-4; Ogden (2002), 277-8. Andreau (1993), 195 used the anecdote to argue that 
“public opinion was not totally hostile either to the succes of the freedmen or to their enrichment”. 
16 Tac. Ann. 11.28. 
17 Tac. Ann. 12.65. 
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words: “this and the like he repeated frequently” (haec atque talia dictitans). This again 
shows that the content and “spirit” of what Narcissus used to say was more important 
than a literal rendering of his precise words, which would have obviously differed every 
time he expressed talia. Similarly, when his clients and freedmen were repeatedly 
exhorting Nero to take action against the old Tiberius and his favourite Sejanus (dum a 
libertis et clientibus … exstimulatur), they told him that both the Roman people and the 
army would welcome him with open arms as their emperor (velle id populum Romanum, 
cupere exercitus)18. As an indication that this was only a brief summary – and not at all a 
citation of their actual words, as is also already clear from the tenses used – Tacitus once 
more adds that “Tiberius frequently listened to this and the like” (haec atque talia 
audienti). 
Somewhat more reliable are the arguments put forward by Pallas as to why Claudius 
should listen to his wife and adopt Nero as his son. The freedman invokes the example 
of Augustus adopting and selecting Tiberius as successor, even though he had natural 
grand-sons, and that of Tiberius himself, who – despite having children of his own – 
chose to adopt Germanicus. By referencing these authoritative antecedents, Pallas 
hoped to steer Claudius to accept Agrippina’s proposal of adoption19. The emperor – of 
course – yielded to the pressure (his evictus) and, so Tacitus tells us, reproduced these 
very arguments in his speech to the senate (habita apud senatum oration eundem in quem a 
liberto acceperat modum). This last mention is more than merely a sneer to Claudius’ 
inability to act on his own and to his habit of relying on his freedmen to deal with affairs 
as weighty as a senatorial address. It also serves to accentuate the authenticity of the 
story, since Tacitus implicitly claims to have found this information in the senate’s 
records (to which he, a senator himself, had access while writing the Annals). Whether 
this is actually true and, if so, whether the recorded arguments were in fact Pallas’, 
cannot be ascertained. At any rate, however, the anecdote does not provide us with 
much information about the interaction between freedmen and freeborn outside the 
highly unrepresentative context of the familia Caesaris. 
There is only one Tacitean case, then, where a freedman is presented as truly 
speaking in first person. After having crafted a plan to subtly inform Claudius about the 
dangerous adultery of Messalina with Silius, we encounter Narcissus on his knees in 
front of the emperor, begging him to forgive him for only now having come forward 
with the news. He had remained silent out of respect for the imperial house and said 
(ait) that even now he would not reproach Messalina with her adulterous relations. He 
 
                                                     
18 Tac. Ann. 4.59. 
19 Tac. Ann. 12.25: “sic apud divum Augustum, quamquam nepotibus subnixum, viguisse privignos; a 
Tiberio super propriam stirpem Germanicum adsumptum: se quoque accingeret iuvene partem 
curarum capessituro”. 
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only wanted the emperor to make sure that his reputation and that of his reign would 
not be tarnished by such illicit affairs. Tacitus then lets the freedman explain for 
himself: “‘Are you aware of your divorce?’, he [Narcissus] asked. ‘Because the people, the 
senate, and the army have seen her [Messalina’s] marriage with Silius; and, unless you 
act with speed, the new husband holds Rome’”. (an discidium, inquit, tuum nosti? nam 
matrimonium Silii vidit populus et senatus et miles; ac ni propere agis, tenet urbem maritus)20.  
The speech-introducing verbs (inquit and ait), the verbs in second person by which 
Narcissus addresses his patron (nosti and agis), as well as the fact that Tacitus did not 
relate the statements as an omniscient narrator (like he usually does), are indications 
that Narcissus had actually uttered these words – or rather, that Tacitus wanted to 
imply that he had. Once again, Tacitus exceptionally increases the (discursive) agency of 
the freedman to highlight his ability to steer the emperor’s thoughts and actions via an 
elaborate scheme. Tacitus thus makes sure that we – contrary to Claudius – are aware 
that Narcissus had only his self-interest in mind in fabricating Messalina’s downfall. To 
any reader who accepts Tacitus’ suggested causality, the dramatic claim that Narcissus 
only came forward because he was afraid for his patron’s reputation, thus comes across 
as a feigned, hypocritical, and therefore shameful performance on the part of the 
freedman. It is this sentiment first and foremost that Tacitus cleverly enhanced by 
having the freedman speak in first person.  
Of course, Tacitus had not witnessed any of these events (being only 12 years old 
when Nero ended his own life). Information about the actions and discourse of the 
imperial freedmen in these times, was therefore second-hand at best. Taken together 
with the lack of any “real” quotes (apart from Narcissus’ charade), and with the habit of 
rendering “direct” speech in third person, this observation reminds us to be very 
cautious when attributing to these utterances any historical value other than the one 
Tacitus wanted to credit them with. It is significant, however, that – when stripped of 
their “framing” by Tacitus – the thoughts and expressions attributed to the imperial 
freedmen are not nearly as wicked or depraved as the historian’s interpretation wants 
us to accept at face value. The imperial freedman who stuck their heads together during 
the affair between Messalina and Silius, for example, were inspired by a profound fear 
(metus), but although Tacitus attributes this first and foremost to their desire for self-
preservation, a more friendly or even simply unbiased observer might as well have 
interpreted their initiative to thwart Messalina’s and Silius’ ambitions as a laudable act 
of loyalty. Pallas’ advice on the matter of adoption was sound and his arguments valid, 
even though Tacitus typically frames it in a joint freedman-wife conspiracy against the 
malleable emperor. Similarly, in both cases where he “speaks”, Narcissus is acting as a 
 
                                                     
20 Tac. Ann. 11.30. 
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loyal defender of Claudius and his reputation. He is even willing to lay down his own life 
for him. To Tacitus, naturally, this was not a praiseworthy attitude of unconditional 
devotion but (in the case of his warning Claudius for Messalina) a ruse to dispose of a 
personal rival, and (in the case of his claim that he would sacrifice himself for his 
patron) a typical example of an imperial freedman’s conscious but fundamentally 
insincere self-aggrandisement. Finally, Tacitus was undoubtedly exaggerating when he 
identified a sordid hope of advancement as the true motivation of Nero’s freedmen and 
clients in encouraging their patron to act against Tiberius and Sejanus. But even if a 
selfish hope for promotion rather than a sincere advice to their patron had moved them 
to do so (and both possibilities need not be mutually exclusive), the inclusion of clients 
in addition to his personal freedmen indicates that these vices were not reserved – even 
by Tacitus – to the latter in particular, but were to be found in anyone associated with 
Nero. This is not to claim that none of these freedmen had their own advancement in 
mind when acting the way they did, but it is certainly suspicious that they all did so in 
Tacitus’ versions of events. As we will discuss in more detail in a next section, this 
rendering of facts served his meta-narrative of decay and his general denunciation of 
monarchy. Before doing this, however, we draw attention to a particularly rare and 
interesting source (a letter written by a freedman), and analyse how aspects of network 
embeddedness were pragmatically employed by both this freedman and the elite author 
that quotes his letter (Cicero).  
6.1.3 A “libertine” letter? 
There are a few instances where the “voices” of freedmen qua freedmen (i.e. not as 
appropriators of an elite discourse or as semi-invented personae in a historian’s 
narrative) are quoted in literary works. We might reasonably expect the most valuable 
traces of freedmen’s voices to be found in the private letters they wrote. Needless to say, 
however, such documents did not survive – at least in the western part of the Roman 
territories – even though they must have existed in abundance. Whereas historians of 
American slavery can draw on letter collections from masters, slaves, and freedmen21, 
even Cicero’s correspondence contains not one letter written by a freedman, although 
his many (response) letters to, for example, Tiro reveal a continuous and mutual 
exchange of communication. 
This state of our source material renders all the more interesting the letter written 
by Verres’ freedman Timarchides to Q. Apronius – tithe collector (decumanus) and 
associate of Verres –, which was partially cited by Cicero in his second oratio against 
 
                                                     
21 E.g. Starobin (1974); Blassingame (1977); Miller (1978). 
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Verres22. Its content is, however, grossly skewed by the derogative commentaries Cicero 
interjected after almost every single sentence, and by the framing of the letter in an 
overall hostile context. It is unsurprising that Cicero should want to present as gloomy a 
picture as possible of Timarchides, since the primary objective of the speech was of 
course to incriminate his patron Verres by association with this partner in crime23. Even 
the very first line of the letter is ridiculed: “Timarchides, orderly of Verres, sends his 
greetings” (Timarchides Verris accensus salutem dicit). To an unbiased reader, this phrase 
seems rather conventional and innocent, apart – perhaps – from the omission of the 
addressee. Trapp cautiously suggests that the omission may have been a safety measure 
by Timarchides, but leaves open the possibility that Cicero had left out the addressee 
precisely to insinuate this24. It seems very unlikely indeed, that Timarchides was 
reluctant to mention Apronius, but felt secure in describing all kinds of scandals and 
corruption in which he himself was involved (if that is what he actually did in the first 
place, cf. infra).  
To Cicero qua prosecutor, in any case, the entire introductory sentence is a clear sign 
of the presumptuous attitude of Timarchides, proudly invoking his function as accensus 
in Verres’ entourage. He points out that formally mentioning their function was already 
becoming a habit among the highest ranking apparitores (scribae), but sarcastically 
exclaims that if now also mere accensi began to do this, the practice might as well be 
extended to even lower assistants like lictores and viatores (iam hoc quidem non reprehendo 
quod adscribit 'accensus'; cur enim sibi hoc scribae soli sumant, 'L. Papirius scriba'? volo ego hoc 
esse commune accensorum, lictorum, viatorum)25. The position of accensus was, Cicero 
 
                                                     
22 Cic. Ver. 2.3.154-7. For an overview of the dramatis personae and a commentary on some of the 
more obscure passages, see Trapp (2003), 315-6. For (mostly selective) discussions of the letter and 
its use by Cicero, see Butler (2002), 47, 69-70, 81; Ramsey (2010), 164-5. 
23 Throughout the Verrines, Cicero regularly presents Timarchides as a representation of his patron. 
In one instance (Ver. 2.2.13), he does so very explicitly, by stating that he described the character of 
the freedman only “to show the prodigality (nequitia) of the man who holds such a person close to 
him”, drawing explicit attention to Timarchides’ undue position (locus) in Verres’ entourage 
(exponam vobis breviter quid hominis sit, ut et istius nequitiam qui illum secum habuerit, eo praesertim 
numero ac loco). Similarly, a trusted agent and manager of Verres’ dirty work (C. Claudius), is called 
prope conlega Timarchidi. The same man would later even be audacious enough not to call himself the 
colleague of Timarchides, but of Verres himself: “[Claudius] qui se non Timarchidi sed ipsius Verris 
conlegam et socium esse dicebat” (Ver. 2.2.108). Trapp (2003), 316 shows how the descriptions of 
Timarchides serve not only to incriminate the freedman, but also to extrapolate the image of 
corruption to all of Verres’ staff members. Moreover, Timarchides’ “naive pretentiousness” 
paradoxically transfers the blame from himself to the man “who allowed such misgovernment to 
flourish”. By means of comparison, see Cels (1972) for Cicero’s treatment of slaves throughout the 
Verrines. 
24 Trapp (2003), 315. 
25 Elsewhere, Cicero similarly describes even a scriba of Verres in a not all too flattering way as an 
apparitor parva mercede populi conductus (Ver. 2.3.182). In Ver. 2.3.171 Timarchides is oddly described 
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implies, not at all that prestigious to proclaim in such a fashion at the beginning of a 
letter. But the fact that Timarchides did so nonetheless, cleverly foreshadows the 
subsequent account of the man’s twisted character. Every line in the letter, no matter 
how harmless, is similarly reinterpreted to serve Cicero’s primary purpose. When 
Timarchides, for example, requests Apronius to diligently protect the reputation of his 
patron Verres (fac diligentiam adhibeas, quod ad praetoris existimationem attine), Cicero does 
not consider this an act of loyalty or even sound advice. Instead, he draws on his 
previous characterisation of Apronius as a corrupt official, and bitterly argues that 
Verres’ reputation was in safe hands indeed, if he could rely on the care and influence of 
an Apronius (bono praesidio munitur existimatio tua, siquidem in Aproni constituitur diligentia 
atque auctoritate). When Timarchides follows up this request by a compliment to 
Apronius, Cicero again does not consider this an appropriate adherence to epistolary 
etiquette, but instead focusses on Timarchides’ character. “You are virtuous and 
eloquent”, Timarchides wrote (habes virtutem, eloquentiam). “What a splendid appraisal”, 
Cicero comments, “especially coming from Timarchides! Who could not consider 
Apronius a pleasing person if he comes so highly recommended by Timarchides?” (quam 
copiose laudatur Apronius a Timarchide, quam magnifice! cui ego ilium non putem placere 
oportere qui tanto opere Timarchidi probatus sit?). Via an obvious yet witty circular 
argument, the wicked character of both men, a priori taken for granted after having 
been consistently rebuked in previous parts of the speech, is thus used to reframe every 
single phrase of the letter, and to serve Cicero’s specific agenda. 
When stripped from Cicero’s biased notes and disparaging commentaries, the letter (or 
at least the passages that the orator deemed useful to quote) can be roughly 
reconstructed: 
Timarchides Verris accensus salutem dicit. Fac diligentiam adhibeas, quod ad 
praetoris existimationem attine. Habes virtutem, eloquentiam. Habes sumptum 
unde facias. Scribas, apparitores recentis arripe. Cum L. Volteio, qui plurimum 
potest, caede, concide. Volo, mi frater, fraterculo tuo credas. In cohorte carus 
haberere. Quod cuique opus est, oppone. Te postulante omnes vincere solent. Scis 
Metellum sapientem esse. Si Volteium habebis, omnia ludibundus conficies. 
Inculcatum est Metello et Volteio te aratores evertis. Obtuderunt eius auris te 
socium praetoris fuisse. Fac sciat improbitatem aratorum; ipsi sudabunt, si di 
volunt. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
as the scriba via whom Verres embezzled money from the Silician cities, but in 2.2.170 he is explicitly 
distinguished from an unnamed scriba of Verres (“aut scribae istius aut Timarchidi”). For scribae, see 
Badian (1989); Damon (1992), esp. p. 230. For the apparitores in general, see Purcell (1983). 
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Timarchides, orderly of Verres, sends his greetings. Take great care of the 
reputation of the praetor [= Verres].  You are virtuous and eloquent. You have the 
means to do so. Assail the new clerks and servants; L. Volteius can get a lot of 
things done: kill and strike down! I want you, my brother, to trust your own dear 
brother. You would be very popular among the staff-members. Give everyone 
what he needs. Everyone you back up usually gets what he desires. You know that 
Metellus is a clever one. If you manage to override Volteius, you will be able to 
accomplish anything without any trouble. Someone has convinced Metellus and 
Volteius that it was you who ruined the farmers. They continuously assaulted his 
ears with the claim that you were the praetor’s associate. Make sure you convince 
him of the depravity of the farmers: if the gods favour us, then they will be 
punished instead of us. 
 
We can only estimate the precise extent to which Cicero’s selection and omission of 
passages has altered the tone, spirit, or even content of the letter, especially because the 
speech in which it occurs was not actually delivered in front of an audience that could 
challenge it. But at the very least, he assures us that the letter was really written in 
Timarchides’ own hand (Timarchidi manu scripta)26. Unless we assume that it was 
Timarchides’ habit to write very concise and telegram-styled letters, if follows that 
Cicero moulded the letter into a collection of carefully selected phrases27. Moreover, the 
suspiciously succinct sentences may also have served a para-textual purpose, in that 
they clearly contrast with Cicero’s own elaborated and well-crafted sentences, thus at  
the same time “reflecting” Timarchides’ limited literary capacities28. In fact, the writing 
style thus attributed to Timarchides renders all the more pertinent Cicero’s sarcastic 
remark (mentioned above) about the freedman considering himself an authority on 
eloquence.  
What seems to be a collection of calculatingly chosen quotes is only made 
comprehensible by Cicero’s comments that knit all of them together. Indeed, the 
context of, and the causality in, the resulting “letter” is established only through these 
tendentious commentaries, and should therefore be approached very critically. 
Sometimes, Cicero will even insinuate things that are not borne out of the “letter” at all. 
When he quotes Timarchides’ advise to Apronius to oblige everyone (quod cuique opus 
 
                                                     
26 Butler (2002), 132 note 70 argued that Cicero was thereby not only confirming the authenticity of 
the letter, but also suggesting that Timarchides’ “own position [was] too low to enable him to 
dictate his letters to a secretary”. This is perhaps going too far in ascribing to Cicero the role of 
malevolent editor. 
27 Pace Ramsey (2010), 158 who suggests that the letter was quoted “from beginning to end”. 
28 On average, Cicero’s commentaries are almost three times longer than the phrases quoted from 
Timarchides’ letter (15 words/phrase versus 5,5 words/phrase). 
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est, oppone), it is Cicero – not the freedman – who suggests that this refers to large scale 
bribery practices. Indeed, the orator even has to add a sentence of his own – 
meaningfully starting with ait – to explain what Timarchides allegedly meant by this 
phrase (ait omnia pecunia effici posse: dare, profundere oportere, si velis vincere). A rendering 
of the whole passage in which it occurred would more likely have elucidated the 
phrase’s true meaning, but it is a distinct possibility that Cicero thought the “true” 
meaning to be much more “clearly” conveyed in his own words… Moreover, Cicero 
casually mentions that he does not consider it shocking that Timarchides should say all 
of these things to Apronius (what else would these degenerate souls have to talk about), 
but he is offended primarily by the fact that Timarchides gives the same wicked advice 
to his patron (non hoc mihi tam molestum est Apronio suadere Timarchidem, quam quod hoc 
idem patrono suo praecipit). Cicero conveniently invokes the person of Verres in a context 
of corruption, and states as a proven fact that Timarchides encouraged his patron’s 
depravity. Both claims, however, are Cicero’s, and have no footing whatsoever in the 
quoted passages of Timarchides’ letter. 
Both the selective quotation, and the setting in which Cicero frames Timarchides – as 
well as the freedman’s “attested” interaction with Apronius, and his presumed (yet 
entirely ungrounded) criminal relation to Verres – seem to have inalterably tarnished 
the content and tone this letter would have originally had if it was quoted completely 
and uninterruptedly. In fact, a look at the mere vocabulary Cicero uses to describe 
Timarchides throughout his commentary on the letter sections is indicative (and this is 
not even accounting for the many implicit sneers)29. He is, for example, twice referred 
to as a fugitivus. In yet another instance, Cicero rhetorically asks his audience “what 
immorality (impudentia) do you think he would have shown in a position of power 
(dominatio), when even while fleeing (in fuga) he is so depraved (tam improbus)?”30. 
Fugitivus is a term any Roman listener or reader would have associated with a 
disobedient slave, but it is unlikely that Timarchides had in fact abandoned his patron. 
Instead, Cicero’s primary intention is – again – to depict Verres as removed from his 
 
                                                     
29 A sneer that in itself contains no derogative terms or expressions is as likely (and perhaps even 
more so) to hit its mark. E.g. “Commendat Apronio Verrem, et hortatur ut inimicis eius resistat. 
Bono praesidio munitur existimatio tua, siquidem in Aproni constituitur diligentia atque 
auctoritate”. Cicero again uses his previous portrayal of Apronius to sarcastically attribute to him 
virtues that in itself are commendable (diligentia and auctoritas), but that in the case of Apronius 
receive a bitter connotation, since the tax collector uses them to the detriment of the Silician 
farmers. 
30 Cic. Ver. 2.3.155: “qua impudentia putatis eum in dominatione fuisse qui in fuga tam improbus 
sit?”. 
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position of power, and already on the run from an imminent prosecution31.  It would be 
challenging to find a word that contrasts more with the lowest kind of slave (fugitivus) 
than dominatio. More than anything, the association is an implicit accusation directed 
against the person who allowed such conflicting and norm-reversing situations to 
persist. In a previous speech, Cicero had similarly called Timarchides a fugitivus, only to 
shockingly follow up this portrayal by a description of how the freedman had reigned 
over every Sicilian city for three years (sed Timarchidem fugitivum omnibus oppidis per 
triennium scitote regnasse and in Timarchidi potestate sociorum populi Romani antiquissimorum 
atque amicissimorum liberos, matres familias, bona fortunasque omnis fuisse)32. By this one 
phrase, then, Cicero wittily begrimes both Timarchides and Verres at the same time.  
References to Timarchides’ inherently twisted character (e.g. nequitia (2), improbitas 
(2), or improbus), as well as to the concrete manifestations of this wickedness (e.g. furtum 
or malitia) are spread out all over Cicero’s commentary on the letter. Like dominatio, all 
of these vices boiled down to the undue influence Timarchides was able (read: allowed 
by Verres) to exert, and the extreme degree of insolence (audacia) the freedman thereby 
showed33. Making sure not to let slip any opportunity to disparage Timarchides, Cicero 
naturally invoked his sordid greed (lucrum, pecunia)34, and his blatant disrespect for 
honourable individuals like L. Caecilius Metellus, successor of Verres as governor of 
Sicily, and as such obviously outranking the freedman both in formal position and 
prestige (hoc vero ferri iam non potest, inrideri viri optimi, L. Metelli, ingenium et contemni ac 
despici a fugitivo Timarchide). 
Nonetheless, despite the very tendentious rendering of the letter, a close reading of its 
quoted shreds is very interesting. Especially the sneer to Timarchides’ “bragging” about 
being an accensus is telling in the light of our earlier observation that in network 
embedded contexts, this function could be invoked – just like freed status – as an 
indication of the trustworthiness of a dependant and of the correctness of the 
information he delivers (e.g. the case of Pausanias discussed in Chapter 4). In fact, Cicero 
himself regularly uses both terms (accensus and libertus) to accentuate the close 
connection between Timarchides and his patron Verres – the main target of his 
 
                                                     
31 The entire passage is part of Cicero’s second oratio against Verres, which was never actually 
delivered, since the disgraced governor had already decided to go into exile after having undergone 
the first one. Cf. Trapp (2003), 316. 
32 Cic. Ver. 2.2.136. 
33 These very same vices are, among many others, attributed to both Verres and Timarchides at the 
same time in Ver. 2.2.134: nequitia (3); audacter; impudenter; … 
34 The theme of the greedy freedman occurs throughout the many descriptions of Timarchides in 
the Verrines. E.g. 2.2.133, where he is associated with avarice (cupiditas), bribes (pretia), money 
(pecunia, twice) and presented as actively and shamefully plundering people (“improbe praedatus 
esset”) by his own labour (labor) and troubles (molestia). 
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speeches. For example, when he first introduces the freedman (earlier in the second 
book of the second plea), Cicero calls him the libertus et accensus who is Verres’ most 
trusted agent and manager in all his affairs (rerum huiusce modi omnium transactor et 
administer)35. Similarly, it is not just Timarchides who elsewhere subtly advises his patron 
on delicate matters, but accensus Timarchides36. Cicero’s very discussion of the notorious 
letter is introduced by Venio nunc ad epistulam Timarchidi, liberti istius et accensi37. In all 
these cases, Cicero used the identity dimensions of Timarchides that would most clearly 
link his depravity to his patron(’s). As argued in Chapters 4 and 5, both Cicero and his 
audience (or correspondents) were very sensitive to these cues. Towards the end of his 
discussion of Timarchides’ letter, Cicero even climactically slips in libertus (once) and 
libertus et accensus tuus (twice). These occur in the commentary on Timarchides’ mention 
(or, in Cicero’s reading: “warning”) that some people have linked Apronius to Verres 
(obtuderunt eius auris te socium praetoris fuisse). Cicero takes this phrase to mean that 
Timarchides was afraid of exposure, and presents it as proof of the accusations against 
Verres, since “clearly” his own freedman was at the time aware of his patron’s mischiefs 
(concedesne non hoc crimen nos in te confingere, sed iam pridem ad crimen aliquam defensionem 
libertum quaerere?). If, of all people, his own libertus was looking to safeguard himself 
from potential future charges, then “surely” it is proved that Verres was and is guilty 
(videsne hoc quam clarum sit et fuerit). With a rhetorical crescendo, Cicero continues: 
“your own freedman and orderly (libertus et accensus tuus), your and your children’s 
close assistant (tibi ac liberis tuis omnibus in rebus coniunctus ac proximus), writes Apronius 
that everybody has informed Metellus that you [Verres] were Apronius’ partner in the 
tax-levy (in decumis socium)”. Once more, this rendering of the, in essence much more 
neutral (or at any rate more neutrally worded) phrase in the original letter, again uses 
libertus and accensus to accentuate Timarchides’ central role in his patron’s trust 
network – even extending to the care over his children. Timarchides’ “confession” thus 
incriminating Verres by implication, was a very well-crafted rhetorical strategy of 
Cicero that relied heavily on highlighting the close connection between both men. The 
use of network embedded terminology was the orator’s most obvious way to achieve 
this38. 
 
                                                     
35 Cic. Ver. 2.2.69. 
36 Cic. Ver. 2.2.74. 
37 Cic. Ver. 2.3.154. 
38 Cicero ends the letter by gratuitously and unwarrantedly extrapolating that what he has “proved” 
for Timarchides to the entire entourage of Verres (neque ego huius fugitivi, iudices, vobis epistulam 
recitassem, nisi ut ex ea totius familiae praecepta et instituta et disciplinam cognosceretis). Earlier, 
Timarchides was already exaggeratedly called the columen familiae vestrae (Ver. 2.3.176). 
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In conclusion, Cicero clearly relies on the sensitivities of his readers to endow his 
interpretation of the letter with more credibility than an objective reading would have 
likely warranted. At the same time, however, it is beyond doubt that Timarchides’ 
reason for describing himself as an accensus at the very beginning of the letter, was 
inspired by very similar concerns. He too would have known that this title would create 
a “horizon of expectation” and an atmosphere of trustworthiness, thus increasing the 
chances of his letter – and the advice it contained – to be more positively received by 
Apronius. Rather than an inappropriate accentuation of this formal function as a source 
of unwarranted pride – as Cicero would have it – Timarchides knew very well the 
implications of this exordium. Cicero thus on the one hand uses network embedded 
strategies – expected to be picked up by his readers, as they were by his correspondents 
– to inextricably associate Timarchides with Verres, but he ridicules and twists 
Timarchides’ attempt at doing the exact same thing. If anything, then, this letter – 
regardless of the ways in which it was remodelled and interpreted by Cicero – indicates 
that at least one freedman used the rhetorical strategies of network embeddedness to 
his own advantage, i.e. by presenting himself as a crucial node of his patron’s trust 
network. Little did he know how badly the attempt would backfire after its tendentious 
re-contextualisation by Cicero. 
As announced earlier, the second part of this chapter focusses in more detail on the role 
and representation of freedmen in the works of Tacitus and Suetonius (conveniently 
referred to as “historians”). Throughout, we draw particular attention to the 
determining impact of the “detached” nature of these representations (and compare it , 
when relevant, with the network embedded correspondences). The main objective of 
this relatively extensive section is to reevaluate the value of these sources for our 
understanding of freedman socialisation by uncovering the functionality of libertinitas in 
these (and similarly detached) sources. 
6.2 The Roman historians 
Tacitus’ and Suetonius’ historical works are fervently cited in any study on Roman 
freedmen. However, most of these studies isolate single passages, and focus on the 
factual information they contain in order to support particular identity dimensions of 
freedmen (their influence under the Principate, the legal measures taken against them, 
their role in the famous conspiracies under the first emperors, etc). No attempt has ever 
been made to structurally (“holistically”) assess the way in which these writers 
discursively featured “the freedman” in their narrative, thereby underestimating the 
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importance of this para-textual aspect of freedmen anecdotes. The basis of the following 
discussion is an exhaustive prosopographical database of all freedmen occurring in 
these works (Appendices 5 and 6). The methodology is therefore the same as that of the 
previous chapters (although this time typical “detached” sources are considered). It 
again allows the transcending of individual passages where Tacitus or Suetonius 
mention freedmen, and enables us to focus on global strategies of representation. The 
contrast between these and Cicero’s (as network embedded letter writer) will prove 
particularly useful in assessing the respective opinions on and features of the “literary” 
freedman. As such, the following discussion will be an account of representation rather 
than historical factuality, thereby clearly taking for granted the notion that the one 
cannot be coherently understood without a clear understanding of the other.  
The most important reason why the historians were singled out as point of 
comparison, is that they – contrary to, for example, satirists or poets – set out to depict 
the events of their recent past in a more or less truthful way. Certainly, there is no 
scholar today who believes that Tacitus’ famous claim in the first section of his Annals 
(tradere … sine ira et studio) actually reflects his true modus operandi. The notion that he 
was overestimating his own ability (or desire) to neutrally describe recent history wie es 
eigentlich gewesen ist, is a well-known caveat heeded by all scholars engaging with his 
works. But it is precisely this claim of objectivity that makes his works – and the 
writings of other historians like Livy or Dio – so particularly interesting for our purpose. 
Satire, in other words, was meant to exaggerate. As a consequence, the extent to which a 
reader would have recognised claims and depictions as truthful is very hard to establish 
from a modern perspective. Histories, on the other hand, although certainly no less 
influenced by biases related to intended readership or the worldview of their author, at 
least disguised the ways in which they presented their version of events. This could 
typically be done intentionally (omission or changing of facts) or unintentionally 
(biased and subjective renderings of facts). We will, by drawing attention to discourse 
and vocabulary, focus in particular on the latter. Indeed, it are precisely such patterns of 
concealment (and their deviation from or congruence with patterns in embedded 
sources) that truly reveal the attitudes, sentiments, and predilections of the author.  
This section therefore mainly compares the works of Suetonius and Tacitus in order to 
trace these strategies, but it also focusses on the common inter-textual themes they both 
shared. Understanding the way in which such themes were appropriated and turned 
into true literary topoi is vital for the deconstruction of “detached” sources in general 
terms. Indeed, over time, inter-textual relations may become a compelling window 
through which reality was perceived, (re)consolidated, and represented in other literary 
works or even genres, growing as these did to fit the mask the shared topoi and inter-
textual relations initially created. In short, by approaching the references to freedmen 
as performative “action statements” rather than as intentional distortions of reality by 
the historians, the gap that any literary narrative creates between the embedded origin 
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of an anecdote on the one hand, and the detached (or “plotted”) representation of it 
within said narrative on the other, can be bridged39.  
6.2.1 Moral decay and decline of freedom as meta-narratives 
Tacitus regularly – and notoriously – uses the influence and power of (imperial) 
freedmen to accentuate the moral decay and the waning of freedom under the 
Principate. For the entrenched elites of Rome, libertas had always been inseparably 
connected to oligarchic rule, which ensured the predominance of the “best” elements in 
society40. Both monarchy and (radical) equality would fundamentally undermine this 
freedom; the former by subjugating the highest classes to but one man, and  the latter 
by diminishing aristocratic power through political participation from below. Ironically, 
under the emperors, imperial freedmen combined both dreaded alternatives to elite 
exclusivity. As trusted staff members of a princeps, they would not only represent, but 
also steer – in the senatorial minds at least – the (“bad”) emperors’ decisions, by abusing 
the lack of determination these leaders typically suffered from – again, according to 
senatorial consensus. Conversely, the democratic threat of freedmen had existed for a 
while in the Republic, the recurrent debates on the distribution of freedmen in the 
tribes and their resulting voting rights being the most obvious examples41.  
Whereas patrician rule had ensured a continuous safeguarding of the status quo, an 
emperor looking for allies against the senate naturally turned to (his) freedmen as 
confidential collaborators. As the radical perpetuation of a process that had gradually 
increased the social and political emancipation of the lower classes in Rome throughout 
the previous centuries, the emperors claimed and monopolised the right to elevate 
individuals to status positions that would normally be strictly off limits. If this was not 
already clear in the case of imperial freedmen, grants of the golden ring or admission of 
sons of freedmen to the senate were prerogatives of the emperor that equally tarnished 
the discrimina ordinum. It took the emancipation of the lower orders – of which freedmen 
were the most conspicuous, controversial, and threatening  component – to its extreme, 
 
                                                     
39 Cf. Richlin (1984), 67 who does something very similar – though less explicitly – when she rejects a 
common sense reading of satirical representations as “exaggerated but basically realistic versions of 
their prototypes”. 
40 For Tacitus’ conception of libertas in particular, see Hammond (1963); Wirszubski (1968), 160-7; 
Ducos (1977); Vielberg (1987), 150–68; Morford (1991). For the importance attached to the notion of 
libertas from the perspective of late Republican patricians, see Arena (2006).  
41 For (the evolution of) the distribution of freedmen in the tribes, see especially Taylor (1960), esp. 
p. 132-49; Treggiari (1969a), 37-52; Fabre (1981), 135-8; Millar (1995); Arena (2006); Mouritsen (2011), 
76-9. 
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posing an unprecedented menace to the exclusivity of birth as the most important 
status determinant. 
Because of the emperor’s far-reaching prerogatives, even informal and ad hoc 
decisions could potentially uproot individual private patronage relations. For example, 
when Nero wanted to get rid of his rival Lucius Antistius Vetus – the former consul – he 
gratefully used the latter’s corrupt freedman Fortunatus to stage the accusation. Vetus 
would have stood his ground, Tacitus implies, if not for the realisation that through 
Nero’s intervention, he would have had to meet his freedman in court as an equal. Not 
able to stomach this prospect, he voluntarily forfeited his defence and left for the 
countryside (quod ubi cognitum reo, seque et libertum pari sorte componi, Formianos in agros 
digreditur)42. All the more despicable was such deracination of a patron-freedman 
relation when it was a consequence not of a decision of the emperor, but of one of his 
freedmen – in itself already exemplifying the reversal of traditional hierarchies. Dio, for 
example, notes how Claudius’ freedmen engaged slaves and freedmen as informers 
against their own masters and patrons43. As such, the monarchic system of government 
was not only dreaded for the top-down subjugation of traditional elites it imposed, but 
it also became inextricably linked with the scandalous intrusion of “undeserving” 
elements in influential  positions of power – that is, from the elite writers’ point of view. 
Although these and similar privileges would remain out of reach for the absolute 
majority of Roman freedmen, the fact that some were thus promoted or unduly 
advantaged was considered not only a sign of the decaying morals and traditions under 
the Principate, but also a slippery slope for further degeneration. Hence the strong 
prejudices and attacks against the class of freedmen in general – not as actual usurpers 
or upstarts per se, but as a collective body of potential threats to the discrimina ordinum. 
Tacitus famously wrote that “the lack of status of freedmen is evidence of freedom” 
(impares libertini libertatis argumentum sunt), and described the unusual command of 
Nero’s freedman Polyclitus in Britain as doomed from the start, because to the natives of 
the island, “the power of freedmen was yet unknown, since freedom still flourished 
among them” ([hostes] apud quos flagrante etiam tum libertate nondum cognita libertinorum 
potentia erat)44. In both cases, freedom is contrasted to undue influence of freedmen. In 
these and similar one-liners, the historian interestingly makes use of libertini, and not, 
for example, liberti Caesaris. Although the lamentations clearly pertain primarily to the 
power of imperial freedmen, Tacitus’ generalisation of freed influence to encompass the 
 
                                                     
42 Tac. Ann. 16.10. 
43 Dio 60.15.5: “Τῆς γὰρ ἀφορμῆς ταύτης ἥ τε Μεσσαλῖνα καὶ ὁ Νάρκισσος, ὅσοι τε συνεξελεύθεροι 
αὐτοῦ, λαβόμενοι οὐδὲν ὅ τι τῶν δεινοτάτων οὐκ ἐποίησαν. Τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς δούλοις τοῖς τε 
ἀπελευθέροις μηνυταῖς κατὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν αὐτῶν ἐχρῶντο”. 
44 Tac. Germ. 25.2; Ann. 14.39.2. 
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entire ordo libertinorum, exaggeratingly dramatizes the decay of traditional social 
hierarchies, and implies a further spread downwards of the power of imperial freedmen.  
A logical corollary of the decline of freedom, was the conception of the new system of 
government as one that enslaved all to the emperor. As mentioned earlier, the 
metaphor of slavery applied to all who settled in this role of subordination45. In fact, the 
very opening lines of the Annals famously situate the entire work in a process of 
transition from freedom to servile adulation46. Servility was no longer a trait inherent 
solely in the lowest stratum of society, but structurally ingrained in its most prominent 
members as well. This is not to say that there were no glimpses of the old freedom left. 
His own father-in-law, naturally, was still able to obtain glory (laus) by modifying his 
behaviour to fit the context of his times, and even freedmen could still provide 
examples of bygone virtue. Even Domitian, for example, still had optimi liberti who 
showed great love (amor) and loyalty (fides) towards their patron47. In more general 
terms too, Rome – especially under the “good” emperors – was still able to “produce 
much in the sphere of true nobility and the arts which posterity may well imitate”48. 
Nor did Tacitus fail to see the shortcomings of a Republican system of government (nec 
omnia apud priores meliora). He does not shy away from accentuating the destructive 
feuds of Republican magnates (certamina potentium), the greed of public officials (avaritia 
magistratuum), and the legal system that was fundamentally distorted by force, 
favouritism, and money ([leges] quae vi, ambitu, postremo pecunia turbabanur)49. He even 
occasionally refers to the fickle nature of a system characterised by the alternation of 
plebeian and patrician dominance50. But although a concentration of power in one man 
would lead to a more firm and resolute government, the loss of freedom that it entailed 
was hardly worth it, as hindsight had taught – at least, again, from a top elite’s 
 
                                                     
45 For Tacitus’ conception of servility of freeborn persons in the Principate, see Vielberg (1987), 80-
128. 
46 Tac. Ann. 1: “libertatem et consulatum L. Brutus instituit … donec gliscente adulatione 
deterrerentur”; 2: “ferocissimi per acies aut proscriptione cecidissent, ceteri nobilum, quanto quis 
servitio promptior, opibus et honoribus extollerentur ac novis ex rebus aucti, tuta et praesentia 
quam vetera et periculosa mallent”. 
47 Tac. Agr. 42.5: “Sciant (…) posse etiam sub malis principibus magnos viros esse, obsequiumque ac 
modestiam, si industria ac vigor adsint, eo laudis excedere”; Tac. Agr. 41.4: “quibus sermonibus satis 
constat Domitiani quoque aures verberatas, dum optimus quisque libertorum amore et fide, pessimi 
malignitate et livore pronum deterioribus principem extimulabant”. For Tacitus appreciating 
positive traits of the lower orders, see Syme (1958), 532-3; Kajanto (1969), 58. 
48 Tac. Ann. 3.55: “nostra quoque aetas multa laudis et artium imitanda posteris tulit”. 
49 Tac. Ann. 1.2.  
50 E.g. Ann. 4.33: “Igitur ut olim plebe valida, vel cum patres pollerent, noscenda vulgi natura et 
quibus modis temperanter haberetur, senatusque et optimatium ingenia qui maxime perdidicerant, 
callidi temporum et sapientes credebantur”. 
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perspective. Or as one Tacitean scholar put it: “[I]f the Republic lost true equality early, 
it still had freedom at its end”51. 
6.2.2 Freedmen in the works of Tacitus and Suetonius 
6.2.2.1 The works of Tacitus and Suetonius 
Suetonius and Tacitus, contemporaries and acquaintances of Pliny the Younger52, wrote 
their main historical works roughly around the same time. Tacitus’ Historiae – treating 
the period from 69 to 96 CE – appeared somewhere in between 104 and 109 CE. His 
Annales – describing the reigns of the earlier emperors, thus ranging from 14 to 68 CE – 
were published shortly after 116 CE. Suetonius’ De vita Caesarum was dedicated to the 
praetorian prefect Septicius Clarus, who held this command between 119 and 122, thus 
providing a rough date for its publication53. Both Suetonius and Tacitus had access to 
several historical sources that are not preserved. With Pliny’s help, Suetonius was able 
to obtain the prominent positions of a studiis and a bibliothecis under Trajan. Further 
patronage from Septicius Clarus elevated him to one of the most influential posts 
available: the personal secretary in charge of the imperial correspondence (ab epistulis) 
under Hadrian54. If the Historia Augusta is any reliable indication, Suetonius fell from 
grace somewhere around the year 122 CE55. It is not known to what extent he had access 
to archival sources before or after this moment, but references to Augustus’ private 
correspondence and Tiberius’ autobiography suggest that he used at least these 
documents56. 
Tacitus, on the other hand, is very likely to have had continuous access to the records 
of the senate57. However, the value of this source of information is – from a modern 
perspective at least – somewhat diminished by the historian’s consistently respected 
 
                                                     
51 Griffin (2009), 173. 
52 As a somewhat older and higher ranking aristocrat – Pliny was a senator, Suetonius only a knight – 
Pliny provided his client with legal (Ep. 1.18) and private (Ep. 1.24; 10.94-5) advice, and secured for 
him a military tribunate (Ep. 3.8). They were close also intellectually, at least a few times exchanging 
thoughts and advice on literary matters (Ep. 5.10; 9.34). Cf. Bradley (1998), 3. For Pliny’s 
correspondence with and references to his friend Tacitus, see Ep. 1.6; 1.20; 2.1.6; 2.11.2; 4.15; 6.9; 
6.16; 6.20; 7.20; 8.7; 9.10; 9.14. 
53For a general introduction to these works, see the overviews in Bradley (1998); Edwards (2008), vii-
xxx; Syme (1958). 
54 Bradley (1998), 4-5. 
55 SHA, Hadr. 11.3. 
56 This does not, of course, prove that Suetonius had access to restricted archives, since these works 
are likely to have been published for a wider audience. See e.g. Aug. 51.3; Tib. 61. 
57 Syme (1984); (1988); Woodman (2004), xv-xix. 
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meta-narrative of “moral decay under the emperors”, which fundamentally coloured 
the interpretation and rendering of these records. Although Suetonius lacked similar 
access (especially after his ousting from the imperial court), and although his accounts 
often smack of juicy gossip rather than “objective” facts – if any such notion concerned 
him to begin with –, the Lives are less distorted by a Tacitean desire to present history as 
a structural opposition between idealised and archetypical good (“Republican”, 
freedom-loving) and bad (“Imperial”, slavishly obedient) forces58.  
Discussing the many similarities and contrasts between both authors and their works 
greatly exceeds the scope of our current intent. Their works are considered here to be 
broadly similar in the sense that they are “detached” from any network embeddedness 
(as defined in Chapter 4), and in that they contrast in this regard with the 
correspondences of Cicero and Fronto (and to a considerable degree also that of Pliny). 
Because they were written during the first two decades of the second century, it is 
important also to note the historical implications of the time-lapse that separates 
Cicero’s letters on the one hand, and Suetonius’ and Tacitus’ historical works on the 
other. Significant developments and changes had occurred as a consequence of the rise 
of Empire, with regard to both the legal status of freedmen (e.g. the introduction of 
Iunian Latinitas), and the role of ex-slaves in elite literature (cf. supra). Without ignoring 
this diachronic aspect of the comparison, the following discussions will focus on 
discursive representation and detailed case-studies, in the same way as was done for the 
Roman correspondences in the previous chapters. Before starting out this qualitative 
analysis, a brief look at the numbers and relative spread of ex-slaves seems advised. The 
next section will therefore in more detail expand on the impression offered in Chapter 
3. 
6.2.2.2 The freedmen: Suetonius 
Individual freedmen 
Of the 84 references to individual freedmen mentioned in Suetonius, 58 are to freedmen 
of an emperor59. In addition, 13 passages concern freedmen belonging to an emperor’s 
relative (e.g. Augustus’ daughter Iulia, Nero’s aunt Domitia, Caligula’s sister and Nero’s 
 
                                                     
58 Caligula desiring to appoint his horse consul (Cal. 55.3), or Nero singing while watching Rome burn 
(Nero 38.2) are among the more extreme examples.  
59 This number includes the three references to freedmen of Pompey, who was not, strictly speaking, 
an emperor – though the same could be argued for Caesar. His exceptional position as the first consul 
sine collega in 52 BCE, however, justifies his inclusion in this group. Either way, the number would 
not be dramatically altered by a stricter definition of “emperor” (81% instead of 84%). 
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mother Agrippina, etc.)60 The large majority of freedmen (84%) is thus connected to the 
imperial household in a broad sense. The 13 remaining attestations are of private 
freedmen. Of these, 8 lack any reference to a patron. Throughout the entire Lives, then, 
Suetonius describes only 5 non-imperial freedmen in relation to their patron.   
Of the 71 freedmen belonging to the imperial household, 33 feature in a negative 
context. 8 are described positively, 21 “neutrally”, and 9 received the categorisation 
“nuanced” as defined in Chapter 3. Of the 13 private freedmen, 3 are evaluated 
positively, 2 are referred to in a negative context, 5 in a neutral one, and the context of 3 
passages is ambiguous. All these numbers (with further distinction between “truly 
imperial” and “imperial by association” for the imperial freedmen, and between 
“related to a patron” and “not related to a patron” for the private freedmen) are given 
in a more accessible format in Table 11. For the data underlying these numbers, see 
Appendix 5. 
 
Table 11 Individual freedmen in Suetonius’ De vita Caesarum 
Imperial freedmen Private freedmen 
71 13 
Emperor (personal) Emperor (relatives) Mention patron No mention patron 
58 13 5 8 
Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua 
6 29 17 6 2 4 4 3 2 0 2 1 1 2 3 2 
 
The first and most significant observation is the highly biased attention paid to imperial 
freedmen. A comparison with Cicero’s correspondence seems futile, since the discourse 
on imperial freedmen was of course – like the group itself – entirely absent. However, it 
can be argued that the Republican freedmen who occur in Cicero’s letters are in many 
ways the precursors of their later imperial counterparts. It has been rightly argued that 
the households of Republican governors and other office holders  provided a template 
for the imperial familia. The latter was not a structure created ex nihilo, but rather a 
continuation of forms and practices that were deeply ingrained in the Republican 
system of government, and that centred around the use of a magistrate’s own personnel 
– often slaves and freedmen – in compensating for the lack of a formal state 
 
                                                     
60 Technically, Pallas (like his brother Felix) is not Claudius’ own freedman, but a freedman of the 
emperor’s mother Antonia. For all practical means and purposes, however, both Claudius himself 
and the Roman historians considered the brothers as freedmen of the emperor. For this reason, we 
count them as such here. 
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bureaucracy61. Surely, Republican magistrates were formally supported by state salaried 
officials (apparitores)62. As indicated in Chapter 4, however, private couriers and 
messengers necessarily complemented the official viatores in facilitating not only public, 
but also private communications between office holders.  
In Cicero’s correspondence alone, we encounter his scriba quaestorius M. Tullius, his 
accensus Pausanias, Gabinius’ accensus Antiochus, etc63. M. Tullius and Pausanias are 
explicitly connected to Cicero’s governorship in Cilicia, and Antiochus – as his name 
suggests – likely assisted his patron in the administration of Syria (making him the 
scapegoat for his patron’s crimes there)64. Antonius Hybrida could claim that Cicero had 
sent a freedman to help the governor collect taxes65. Likewise, it is surely no 
coincidence that Q. Cicero freed his confidential slave Statius while he was propraetor in 
Asia. Besides having the authority – as a magistrate – to perform and validate the 
manumission, the value of Statius as an administrative assistant could not have been 
exploited optimally should he have remained a slave. This (not necessarily exclusively) 
pragmatic motive for the manumission, as well as Statius’ influence over his patron, but 
especially the fact that both were clear for anyone to see, were the main reasons for 
Cicero’s feeling molestissimus after the news reached his ears66. Not only Quintus himself, 
but Statius too, should be aware of, and respect, the unwritten rules of behaviour, which 
had more to do with a respecting of hierarchies in general than with the legal status of 
magisterial assistants in particular. Even Tiro himself, for example, would warn his 
patron for addressing him in too familiar terms, which drew too much attention to his 
private influence67.   
None of these passages suggest that the employment of freedmen by Republican 
magistrates was considered anything else than common practice. The only condition 
was that the trust relation between patron and freedman translated itself in a restrained 
and controlled fashion to the public sphere. We already noted how accensi would ideally 
 
                                                     
61 McDermott (1972), 262; Millar (1977), 59-61; Rilinger (1997); Mouritsen (2011), 93.  
62 For the social status, functions, and evolution of the apparitores as staff-members of magistrates, 
see the detailed account of Jones (1949) and the critical complements in Purcell (1983). More general 
overviews are offered by Treggiari (1969a), 153-9 and Wiseman (1971), 70-7. 
63 Fam. 3.7.4,5 (Pausanias); Att. 4.18.4 (Antiochus). For M. Tullius, see Chapter 3. 
64 See above and Chapter 4. 
65 Att. 1.12.2. 
66 Att. 2.18.4; 2.19.1; 6.2.1,2. For the expectation that magisterial assistants operated on the 
background, see Chapter 4. 
67 Cicero had headed a letter, with Tullius Tironi. Although he did so frequently, Tiro felt that the 
context and intended readership of this letter warranted certain restraint, Fam. 16.18.1. For the use 
of Tullius Tironi suo, see for example Fam. 16.2-4. In Fam. 16.5, the formula is strongly enhanced by 
replacing suo with humanissimo et optimo. 
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work behind closed doors and at any rate keep silence during public appearances68. 
Similarly, it was socially accepted for magistrates to have freedmen as friends (amici), as 
long as such relation was not publicised beyond a very small circle of intimates. Indeed, 
throughout Cicero’s correspondence, freedmen were called amici only in letters of 
recommendation (where genre requirements allowed for such digressions) or in letters 
written by or to intimate friends or family69. 
The change of scenery caused by the transition from Republic to Principate, led to 
the establishment of a single powerful household70. Of course, magistrates were still 
appointed, and they too continued to make use of their own freedmen during their 
tenures as, for example, proconsuls and legati Augusti. However, the fact that there now 
existed an overarching centre of power – with its leader commanding a proverbial army 
of slaves and freedmen – reduced the importance and independence of these 
magistrates, who had only one man to thank for their appointment. Moreover, the 
emperor would even assign his own freedmen to assist (and keep an eye on) 
magistrates. When the imperial freedman Amazonicus and his brothers erected a 
tombstone for their deceased father Laeona, they proudly described him as a verna and 
dispensator who “assisted with the greatest care the praetor responsible for matters 
related to guardianship, for as long as he lived”. Much like Lentulus’ Pausanias, who 
served as an accensus under various successive proconsuls of Cilicia (cf. Chapter 4), 
Laeona permanently (in diem quoad vixit) held the function of dispensator. Because the 
praetor would be a different man every year, the continuity Laeona provided not only 
ensured stability over the course of successive tenures, but it also enforced the 
emperor’s hold on these and similar administrative posts71.  
 
                                                     
68 Cf. Chapter 4. 
69 Recommendations: Fam. 13.16.2 (Apollonius); 13.23.1 (Anchialus, indirectly); 13.46 (Zoilus). To or 
by close intimates: Fam. 16.16.1 (Tiro, by Q. Cicero); Att. 5.9.1 (Eutychides, to Atticus); 7.18.3; 10.16.1 
(Dionysius, to Atticus). See also Chapter 7. 
70 Cf. Sailor (2008), 64 note 35. 
71 CIL 10, 6093: “Laeonae / vern(ae) disp(ensatori) qui / vixit ann(os) LXVI / et est conversatus / 
summa sollicitudine / in diem quoad vixit / circa tutelam prae/tori Amazonicus / Augg(ustorum) 
lib(ertus) procurat(or) / [p]atri piissimo cum / [fr]atribus suis b(ene) m(erenti) f(ecerunt)”. Laeona’s 
function has been variously interpreted. Some scholars considered him the dispensator of an imperial 
property (praetorium), e.g. Wiedemann (1996), 287. Arnaldi et al. (2013), 69-70 thought that the lack 
of further specification of Amazonicus’ procuratorship indicates that he was in charge over the 
same praetorium as his father. However, procurator and dispensator were occupational titles often left 
unspecified by imperial slaves and freedmen (e.g. CIL 3, 2082; AE 1999, 287). Moreover, praetori is 
much more likely to be a dative of praetor than a (wrongly spelled) genitive of praetorium. Indeed, 
Augg. lib indicates a dating after the co-emperorship of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, and we 
know that the former had instituted a praetorship explicitly intended to deal with matters related 
to tutela (SHA Marc. Aur. 10: “praetorem tutelarem primus fecit”). 
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When a firm control over his personnel, and a manifest respect for hierarchies were 
already among the most valued features of a Republican magistrate, they became the 
criterion par excellence to evaluate or judge an emperor by. The extent, independence, 
and resulting influence of the familia Caesaris, would soon crystallise in a discourse, 
entailing a recurrent set of topoi and stereotypes, that defined and idealised a “good” 
emperor as a ruler who exercised firm control over his freedmen – the fewer the 
better72 – but a “bad one” as a weak and indulgent servus libertorum73. This structural 
discourse differed from similar Republican concerns in that it featured imperial 
freedmen almost exclusively as representations and embodiments of the character and 
policy of an emperor, typically leaning to the pejorative extreme of the scale “good” - 
“bad”. The difference between (the treatment of) freedmen in Cicero’s correspondence, 
and those figuring in the historians’ works is therefore twofold.  
Firstly, the ratio of “private” to “magistrate-assistant” (i.e. the later imperial 
freedman) is reversed in the former corpus when compared to the historiographies. 
Surely, several of Cicero’s correspondents were magistrates – this function often being 
one of the main reasons for writing them in the first place, especially in the case of 
recommendations. But besides the freedmen mentioned as assistants, messengers, or 
confidential agents in these contexts, a variety of ex-slaves are referred to in situations 
or functions that were entirely unrelated to the exercise of public office. Individuals like 
the architect Chrysippus, the teacher Dionysius, the sculptor Evander, the organiser of a 
feast Eutychides, the many librarii, and the accountants of personal finances, are almost 
entirely lacking in the “detached” discourse of the historians.  
Secondly, the ex-slaves that could cautiously be considered the precursors of the later 
imperial freedmen differ significantly from the latter in terms of their overall 
descriptions and evaluations, but especially in the way the discourse on them served the 
purpose not of critiquing society at large (i.e. the Principate’s system of government), 
but rather a single transgressive governor in particular. The condemnation of the 
influence and undue power of imperial freedmen was a direct attack against the 
emperor himself, but only insofar as the denunciation of the ruler served to discredit 
the monarchic system of government in general terms, a purpose that was lacking 
entirely in the denunciation of Republican freedmen like Antiochus or Statius. 
Besides the difference in numbers between imperial freedmen and private freedmen in 
Suetonius’ Lives, their evaluation is similarly interesting. Whereas the negative 
evaluation of imperial freedmen (46%) clearly trumps a positive one (11%), the trend is 
 
                                                     
72 Tiberius received praise even from Tacitus for having but a small number of slaves and freedmen, 
Ann. 4.6: “Rari per Italiam Caesaris agri, modesta servitia, intra paucos libertos domus”. 
73 Plin. Pan. 88.1. 
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reversed in the case of private freedmen (15% and 23% respectively)74. Without stressing 
the point too hard – the limited amount of attestations preclude any solid conclusions 
without further qualitative analysis – it may be significant that when a private 
freedman is mentioned in relation to a patron, this happens in a positive or at least 
neutral context, but never in a negative one. This trend is reminiscent of the 
observation that in Cicero’s letters, the explicit connection to a patron was a positive 
trait for couriers and messengers, and it may even indicate that concerns or accustomed 
habits related to “network embeddedness” – which the historians were undoubtedly 
familiar with in their private lives – also penetrated their public, detached discourse (cf. 
infra). 
Specific and general plurals 
All Suetonius’ references to a specific plural (as defined in Chapter 3) – 18 in total – are 
to freedmen of the imperial household75. The general plurals have, by definition, no 
individual patron, as they are references to the “class” or group of freedmen in  general. 
It is telling, however, that all nine references to a general plural occur in a passage that 
treats an emperor’s personal interaction with freedmen or his legislative attention to 
this “class”. The mentions of libertini in Augustus’ Life refer to the exceptional allowance 
of freedmen in the armed forces, to the emperor’s famous manumission laws, or to his 
upholding of traditional status boundaries in the theatre76. Similarly, the references to 
libertini in the discussion of the emperors Claudius, Nero, and Domitius also explicitly 
describe freedmen as targets of imperial legislation77.   
 
Table 12 Specific and general plurals in Suetonius’ De vita Caesarum 
Specific plural (SP) General plural (GP) 
18 (all imperial) 9 (close connection to emperor) 
Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua 
1 11 5 1 0 4 3 2 
 
The close connection between the plural references to freedmen and the emperor 
highlights the almost metaphorical function of freedmen in Suetonius’ work. Whereas 
 
                                                     
74 The latter group consists only of 13 attestations. A quantitative representation like this therefore 
merely allows us to compare trends, rather than to state absolute conclusions. 
75 Except for the freedmen of the condemned sisters of Caligula (Cal. 39.1), all of these belonged to an 
emperor personally. 
76 Aug. 16.1; 25.2, 40.3-4; 42.2; 44.1. 
77 Claud. 25.1; Nero 32.2; Dom. 7.2. 
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the narrative would on occasion include anecdotes about individual freedmen of private 
citizens, freedmen as a group were consistently presented as relating to, and 
representing, the imperial household or policy. Their evaluation in these contexts is 
again predominantly negative. The only “positive” passage refers to some fidissimi liberti 
Nero sent out to prepare a fleet in order to facilitate his escape from an imminent army 
insurgence78. Significantly, their positive evaluation derives from them faithfully 
executing their patron’s orders, and as such disconnects this evaluation from the 
context in which imperial freedmen were usually featured (i.e. in positions of influence 
and power with direct bearing on the administration of the state).  
This impression begs the question whether the negative evaluation of groups (or the 
“class”) of freedmen is not a consequence of their continuously stressed relation to the 
emperor (and their function as template for the latter’s evaluation), rather than of an 
ingrained belief of their moral inferiority. This was already suggested by the overview of 
individual freedmen, who received a predominantly negative evaluation when linked to 
the emperor, but who featured much more positively in the (limited amount of) 
attestations that linked them to a private patron. This point will be taken up in more 
detail below. 
6.2.2.3 The freedmen: Tacitus 
Individual freedmen 
Tables 13 and 14 present the spread of attestations of individual freedmen in Tacitus’ 
Historiae and Annales in the same way Table 11 did for Suetonius’ Vitae. For the data 
underlying these numbers, see Appendix 6. 
 
Table 13 Individual freedmen in Tacitus’ Annales 
Imperial freedmen Private freedmen 
67 15 
Emperor (personal) Emperor (relatives) Mention patron No mention patron 
53 14 10 5 
Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua 
0 37 5 11 1 9 2 2 2 5 2 1 1 4 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
78 Nero 47.1. 
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Table 14 Individual freedmen in Tacitus’ Historiae 
Imperial freedmen Private freedmen 
27 2 
Emperor (personal) Emperor (relatives) Mention patron No mention patron 
2779 0 2 0 
Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua 
2 20 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
The spread of imperial and private freedmen is uncannily similar to that in Suetonius’ 
work. Again, the former outnumber the latter at a ratio of 4-5 to 1 in the Annals, but in 
the Histories, the ratio increases to 13-14 to 1 (due to the almost complete neglect of 
private freedmen). The most significant nuance between the two authors is the 
qualitative evaluation of the freedmen mentioned. The distribution of pejoratively and 
positively described imperial freedmen in Suetonius (46% and 11% respectively) is even 
more polarised in the Annals (69% and 1%) and in the Histories (74% and 7%). 
Interestingly, Tacitus’ references to private freedmen this time follow this trend instead 
of reversing it. Even though the contrast here is somewhat softened when compared to 
the imperial freedmen, 60% of the attestations of private freedmen in the Annals are still 
negatively contextualised, and only 20% positively80. Like in the work of Suetonius, the 
context of a private patronage relationship traditionally provides the locus for more 
positive references to freedmen, but even this context does not escape manifest skewing 
by the meta-narrative of moral decay, which features much more prominently in 
Tacitus than in Suetonius (even to the point of obliterating the difference between 
patron-related mentions and non-patron-related mentions). This is again a point that 
will be taken up in detail below. 
Specific and general plurals 
Tables 15 and 16 present the spread of attestations of groups of freedmen in Tacitus’ 
Historiae and Annales in the same way Table 12 did for Suetonius’ Vitae.  
 
 
 
                                                     
79 This number includes a reference to the freedman of a foreign king (Hist. 3.47-8). It excludes, 
however, the references to an unnamed freedman of Domitian (Hist. 3.74), who appears in a context 
before the rise to power of his patron, and who is therefore completely detached from the discourse 
on “imperial freedmen”. 
80 Any quantitative rendering of the situation in the Histories (containing merely two mentions of a 
“private” freedman) is pointless. For what it is worth, however, the trend similarly continues, as the 
only private freedman who receives an explicit evaluation, is described in negative terms. 
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Table 15 Specific and general plurals in Tacitus’ Annales 
Specific plural (SP) General plural (GP) 
22 ------------------------------------------------------ 
Imperial Private ------------------------------------------------------ 
1481 8 6 
Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua 
1 6 4 3 1 3 3 1 0 5 0 1 
 
 
Table 16 Specific and general plurals in Tacitus’ Historiae 
Specific plural (SP) General plural (GP) 
12 ------------------------------------------------------ 
Imperial Private ------------------------------------------------------ 
9 3 3 
Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua Pos Neg Neu Nua 
0 5 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 
 
The mentions of groups of freedmen are similarly close in number to those in Suetonius 
(both corpora – or what is left of them – being of a roughly comparable size). Contrary 
to Suetonius, some specific plurals refer to private freedmen in both the Annals and the 
Histories, and most of the general plurals are not directly connected to the emperor. 
Nonetheless, nearly all of the SP and GP figure, much like the mentions of imperial 
freedmen, in a predominantly negative context. It could be argued, however, that this 
overall negative image is a consequence of Tacitus’ agenda of presenting the Principate 
in as dire and pessimistic terms as possible, and of his resulting negative tone in general. 
In a sense then, the negative representation of freedmen – even individual and non-
imperial ones – similarly derives from the emperor and the moral decay he personifies 
(cf. infra). 
Besides Tacitus’ typical meta-narrative as a distorting factor throughout his writings 
(not only the Annals or the Histories, but also the Agricola and the Germania), his social 
and legal status should also be taken into account. Contrary to Suetonius, Tacitus was a 
high-ranking Roman senator82. As a member of the highest echelon of elite society, he 
 
                                                     
81 This number again includes the reference to the liberti regii of Ptolemy, whose function as king was 
obviously similar to that of an emperor, at least in terms of the indulgence towards his freedmen in 
the eyes of Tacitus (Ann. 4.23). 
82 He held the praetorship in 88 CE, the consulship roughly 10 years later, and the proconsulship of 
Asia in 112-113 CE (Ann. 11.11; Plin. Ep. 2.1.6). Suetonius, on the other hand, declined a military 
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belonged to the select group of aristocrats who were the most prominent target of the 
many Augustan laws aimed at firmly distinguishing the different ordines, and at 
safeguarding the gradus dignitatis. Rather than a novel invention of the early emperors, 
these measures were, as emanations of the self-imposed and eagerly consolidated 
discourse of distinction, confirmations of a well-established social practice that 
condemned relations and interactions between senators and the lower classes. Chapter 
2 accentuated the fact that it was the sharply delineated body of senators rather than 
these lower classes (which were at any rate too broadly defined and conflated to allow 
for efficient legislation, including as they did actors, prostitutes, freedpersons, etc.) that 
were targeted by this strand of legislation. Although both the equestrian and the 
senatorial order contained members of widely diverging rank – a senator of lower 
standing could be conceived of as closer to a high-ranking knight than to a superior 
senator –, this difference between Tacitus (as a high-ranking senator) and Suetonius (as 
an unaspiring knight) can partially explain the different nuances in both authors’ 
works. However, it was especially Tacitus’ meta-narrative of moral decay that typically 
framed freedmen in much more pejorative terms. Before proceeding, this point is 
illustrated in further detail in the next paragraphs, by a comparative case-study of both 
writers’ treatment of two historical events: the disaster of Fidena and the murder of 
Agrippina. 
6.2.3 Tacitus versus Suetonius 
6.2.3.1 The disaster of Fidena: the genus libertinum responsible for the death of 
thousands? 
In 27 CE an enormous disaster took place, the magnitude of which apparently prompted 
both Suetonius and Tacitus to dedicate an entire section to it in their historical works83. 
In the Sabine town of Fidena, the collapse of a theatre had caused the death of an 
extremely large amount of spectators. Suetonius speaks of more than 20.000 dead, 
whereas Tacitus more than doubles this number – although his figure of 50.000 also 
included those who were merely debilitati. The number is likely to be exaggerated, but 
the recently lifted ban on gladiatorial performances had certainly caused a flocking 
together (adfluxere) of a great mass of people prone to this kind of amusement (avidi 
talium). Tacitus presents the most dramatic picture. He begins his account of the malum 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
tribunate obtained for him by his patron Pliny the Younger, and focussed more on his forensic and 
literary endeavours than on obtaining public office (Oth. 10.1; Plin. Ep. 3.8). 
83 Tac. Ann. 4.62-3; Suet. Tib. 40. 
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inprovisum with the vivid description that everything happened so fast that no one truly 
realised what was happening until the damage was already done (eius initium simul et 
finis exstitit). He describes in horrific detail the gravity of the catastrophe, with a 
visualisation of the collapse, the suffering of those who had not been immediately killed, 
and their hastily arriving loved ones who at the sight of mutilated bodies and no longer 
recognisable faces underwent a different though similar kind of agony.  
Before even specifying the nature of the disaster, Tacitus draws attention to the man 
responsible for it: “a certain Atilius of the freedman class” (Atilius quidam libertini 
generis). The man had allegedly neglected to lay proper foundations and had only 
superficially constructed the upper wooden structure. By describing Atilius as belonging 
to the genus libertinus, instead of simply calling him a libert(in)us, Tacitus at least 
rhetorically shifts blame from the individual Atilius to the entire “class” (genus) to 
which he belonged. It is therefore not surprising that the reasons Tacitus gives for this 
neglect markedly coincide with elite stereotypes against the lower classes. Indeed, 
Atilius was not only to blame for this neglect, but was even more to be despised for his 
motives for hastily building the theatre, which are thus discursively linked to the 
resulting disaster. Atilius, Tacitus presents as a certainty, had not built the structure as 
an act of evergetism, but only wanted to earn a quick and easy fortune (ut qui non 
abundantia pecuniae nec municipali ambitione, sed in sordidam mercedem id negotium 
quasivisset). When stripped from the ascribed motives and the strongly condemning 
discourse, the bare facts that remain are that an overcrowded theatre had collapsed, 
that a freedman had been responsible for its construction, and that the disaster claimed 
the lives of a large amount of people.  Anything beyond these restored “action 
statements” is colouring by Tacitus, which is highly likely to have differed from Atilius’ 
unrecorded version of the story.  
In this regard, the anecdote is very similar to a large scale accident near Lake Fucinus 
in 52 CE. Claudius’ freedman Narcissus had been responsible for a large drainage project: 
the tunnelling of the Monte Salviano, situated between the lake and the nearby river 
Liris. When the gates were opened – in order to lower the water level of the lake – the 
burst of water swept away nearby constructions and frightened the large audience 
which had just before enjoyed a naval battle on the lake (no casualties are reported). 
The emperor was understandably distressed by the disturbance of his show. His wife 
Agrippina took advantage of the disaster by accusing (incusare) Narcissus – her long 
standing rival for influence over Claudius. As the minister operis, she argued, Narcissus 
was entirely responsible for the incuria operis. Narcissus, moreover, had not built a feeble 
construction out of ignorance, but rather to embezzle some of the funds reserved for it: 
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it was his cupido and his desire for praeda that had caused the accident84. Although the 
motivations ascribed to Narcissus are uncoincidentally the same as those of Atilius, 
Tacitus implies that the accusation was ungrounded and merely invented to besmirch 
Narcissus’ reputation with the emperor (Agrippina trepidatione principis usa). 
Interestingly, moreover, (Tacitus’) Agrippina does not explicitly invoke any inherent or 
essential baseness of the freedman (like Atilius’ genus) as the cause for his vices, but 
attributes them to individual character flaws. 
The uproar in the aftermath of the disaster in Fidena was so strong that the senate 
felt compelled to enact legislation to prevent anything of the kind from happening 
again. Tacitus provides a detailed account of the resulting senatus consultum: henceforth, 
no one with a fortune less than HS 400.000 was allowed to organise a gladiatorial show, 
and amphitheatres had to be inspected before opening85. He ends the account with a 
mention of Atilius’ punishment, as he was driven in exile. The bar of HS 400.000 is 
probably not coincidentally identical to the census requirement for knights. By 
symbolically insinuating the equestrian status of future organisers of shows, the senate 
may have followed Tacitus’ interpretation that Atilius’ low status was somehow 
responsible for his greed. Freedmen could not under normal circumstances obtain 
equestrian status, and the choice of HS 400.000 instead of any other number, was likely 
inspired by the desire to accentuate this unbridgeable gap, as if the census requirement 
also endowed a possessor with the moral dignity and correct motivations required to 
organise theatrical shows. Of course, the measure did not actually prevent people below 
the rank of knight from organising shows. The bar was a financial one, not a status-
related one, and certainly did not target people libertini generis as a rule. Again stripped 
to its bare “action statements”, the senate’s reaction was primarily intended to prevent 
the organising of shows by people who were considered irresponsible or unable to do so, 
that is, “poor” people looking for quick and easy ways to enrich themselves. The 
assumption that this was also Atilius’ motive again derives from Tacitus’ rendering of 
the story, although a similar opinion may have played a part in the senate’s  decree. In 
any case, the senate’s reaction clearly made no reference to Atilius’ legal status – Tacitus 
surely would not have neglected to mention any. It merely made sure that only 
“respectable” individuals, of whom it could be safely assumed that their actions were 
intent on gaining prestige rather than money, and who were in that sense to be 
distinguished from poor and sordid people in general, were allowed to organise 
 
                                                     
84 Tac. Ann. 12.57: “Simul Agrippina trepidatione principis usa ministrum operis Narcissum incusat 
cupidinis ac praedarum”. 
85 Tac. Ann. 4.63: “cautumque in posterum senatus consulto ne quis gladiatorium munus ederet cui 
minor quadringentorum milium res neve amphitheatrum imponeretur nisi solo firmitatis 
spectatae”. 
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gladiatorial shows. As such, the measure was a result of the intertwinement of two 
closely related issues that continuously featured in the elite’s discourse of distinction, 
namely a rooted prejudice against lucrative labour, and the moral notions attached to 
wealth and status boundaries. 
Suetonius’ account of the story differs markedly from Tacitus’. A first clear difference is 
the length of the passage dedicated to the affair, which is roughly 9 times shorter than 
Tacitus’. Suetonius does similarly refer to the collapse of the theatre as a clades, provides 
the name of the city, and gives a rough estimate of victims, but the similarities with 
Tacitus’ account do not extend beyond such basic information necessary to merely 
contextualise the event.  Remarkably lacking – besides a horrific description of 
destruction, mutilated bodies, and mourning – is a reference to Atilius and his freed 
status, or to the subsequent senatus consultum. These omissions point to a significant 
difference in editorial choices between the two authors. Suetonius, of course, was 
restrained from expanding too much on the event, since he was writing the Life of 
Tiberius, and was therefore interested primarily in the emperor’s reaction to the 
catastrophe.  Whereas such genre-related concerns may at least partially explain why 
Tacitus devoted much more attention to these details, it seems rash to attribute to them 
every difference between the writers. Indeed, taking into account Tacitus’ meta-
narrative of moral decay and pessimistic prospects for the future in general, the explicit 
descriptions of horror and despair become almost logical. A much stronger focus on 
Atilius, his status, and the reaction of the senate stemmed from a more pertinent 
concern for the collapse of status boundaries under the Principate, and for the 
increasingly manifest danger of the ability of wealth to mediate and compensate for a 
lack of birth. It is meaningful that the senators – to which Tacitus in his own time 
belonged – rather than Tiberius are discursively credited with the initiative of taking 
action against the greedy, sordid poor. Both Tacitus’ agenda as a historian, as well as his 
belonging to the “true protectors” of the gradus dignitatis and the discrimina ordinum, go 
a long way in explaining the differences between his and Suetonius’ account of Atilius’ 
role in the disaster of Fidena. 
6.2.3.2 The murder of Agrippina: the ingenium libertinum responsible for the 
death of an empress-mother? 
The treatment of Anicetus in both writers’ works is similarly illuminating. That this 
freedman was living proof for the expression nomen est omen (Ανικητος being Greek for 
“invincible”) is clear from his remarkably resilient career. He occupied positions such as 
tutor of the young Nero, prefect of the Misenian fleet, specialised “hitman” responsible 
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for the deaths of both Nero’s mother Agrippina and (indirectly) his wife Octavia, and 
finally wealthy exile in Sardinia. He features prominently in Tacitus’ account in all these 
capacities, but only once – and only in passing – in Suetonius’86. 
Suetonius is thus remarkably less descriptive when it comes to Anicetus’ role in 
imperial intrigues. First and foremost, he entirely omits the freedman’s role in 
Agrippina’s assassination. In Suetonius’ history, it was Nero himself who – after the 
previous attempts on his mother’s life had failed miserably – came up with the plan of 
sabotaging Agrippina’s ship, the name of Anicetus being omitted entirely87. In Tacitus’ 
account, on the contrary, the idea is very explicitly attributed to Anicetus. He thereby 
provided a solution for the emperor, who had consistently failed in his attempts to kill 
his mother. The freedman is given very explicit (discursive) agency by Tacitus: 
“Anicetus came up with a witty idea” (obtulit ingenium Anicetus libertus), “he taught the 
emperor the possibility of a collapsible ship” (ergo navem posse componi docet), and “his 
ingenuity was pleasing” (placuit sollertia).Tacitus even has the freedman explain his plan 
in direct speech88.  
Similarly, after it became clear that Agrippina was not killed in the naval “accident”, 
it was Anicetus himself who again eagerly asked to be put in charge of a follow-up plan 
(qui nihil cunctatus poscit summam sceleris). Once more, Tacitus presents the emperor as 
merely nodding to, and agreeing with his freedman, this time even explicitly 
accentuating that it was Anicetus’ agency that gave Nero an empire (ad eam vocem Nero 
illo sibi die dari imperium actoremque tanti muneris libertum profitetur)89. The next section 
features Anicetus as an active participant in Agrippina’s murder, surrounding her villa 
(Anicetus villam statione circumdat), dragging of her slaves (obvios servorum abripit), and 
eventually standing by watching how she was clubbed to death90. Anicetus’ role is not 
only accentuated by the many verbs of which he is the only subject, but also by the fact 
that Agrippa addresses him personally in her last moments (respicit Anicetum … ac, si ad 
 
                                                     
86 Tac. Ann. 14.3; 14.7-8; 14.62; Suet. Nero 35.2. Woods (2006) suggests that the Anicetus of Tac. Hist. 
3.47-8 (the commander of a Pontic fleet who turned into a “barbarian pirate”) should be identified 
with Agrippina’s assassin (the praefectus of the Misenian fleet), but that the Anicetus who was Nero’s 
tutor and who “confessed” to an adulterous relation with Octavia (so Nero could dismiss her, Ann. 
14.62) is another individual altogether. However, not only is the existence of two Aniceti with 
similar occupations (fleet commander and “pirate”) not at all problematic, but of the barbarian 
“pirate” is said that he was praepotens in the court of his patron Polemo II (the king of Pontus) before 
the Roman conquest reduced the kingdom to a province; a description that hardly seems to apply to 
Anicetus-the-assassin. 
87 Suet. Nero 34.2. 
88 Tac. Ann. 14.3-4. Cf. supra. 
89 Tac. Ann. 14.7. 
90 Tac. Ann. 14.8. 
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visendum venisset, refotam nuntiaret, sin facinus patraturus, nihil se de filio credere; non 
imperatum parricidium)91. 
Anicetus’ perfidious dedication was remembered a few years later when Nero, 
inflamed by a love for Poppaea Sabina, wanted to get rid of his wife Octavia. Nero 
intended to incriminate her in an adulterous relation and was looking for someone who 
would be readily believed as being capable of committing such a heinous crime. 
Anicetus, as perpetrator of the earlier matricide (maternae nexis patrator), had initially 
been rewarded by Nero, but soon became a cause of distress, since he constantly 
reminded the emperor of his own crimes (malorum facinorum ministri quasi exprobrantes 
aspiciuntur). Besides Anicetus as an irritating personification of the emperor’s own 
wickedness, the freedman’s proven efficacy (operae priores), as well as the added bonus 
that he (and by association also Octavia) could be accused of treason (crimen rerum 
novarum) in addition to mere adultery, constituted – according to Tacitus – the three 
main reasons for Nero’s choice of Anicetus92. The emperor reminded the freedman of 
how he had single-handedly rescued him once before from his mother (solum 
incolumitati principis adversus insidiantem matrem subvenisse), and how the removal of 
Octavia would prove to be an even greater help (locum haud minoris gratiae instare, si 
coniugem infensam depelleret). He threatened him with execution should he refuse, but 
promised him secret rewards (occulta sed magna praemia) in addition to a pleasant place 
of retirement (secessus amoenos). In this instance, it is explicitly the emperor who is 
depicted as the prime instigator of the intrigue, and as covering up his tracks 
afterwards, by publicly “punishing” (“exiling”) the adulterer. 
This is indeed also the impression Suetonius provides. His account of Nero’s entrapment 
of Octavia is the only passage in which Anicetus is mentioned, but the historian merely 
describes him as the paedagogus Nero appointed to make the false confession (Anicetum 
paedagogum suum indicem subiecerit, qui fingeret et dolo stupratam a se fateretur)93. Suetonius 
is again much more sparse with details, omitting Anicetus’ freed status, his past 
transgressions, the emperor’s motivations for turning to him (again), his rewards and 
“exile” to Sardinia, etc. He does, nonetheless, find common ground with Tacitus in that 
it was the emperor who took the initiative for Octavia’s framing.  
Thus, Suetonius does not insinuate that Anicetus was chosen for his inherent 
wickedness (or even for his past crimes), implying that the only reason for Nero’s choice 
was that he was a reliable paedagogus, who merely executed the orders given by his 
 
                                                     
91 Dio 62.13.5 provides a very similar account of Agrippina’s “last words”, even accentuating their 
addressee by explicitly including his name: “’παῖε’, ἔφη, ‘ταύτην, Ἀνίκητε, παῖε, ὅτι Νέρωνα ἔτεκεν’”. 
92 Tac. Ann. 14.63: Nero later promulgated an edict saying that Octavia had seduced Anicetus to gain 
influence over his Misenian fleet. 
93 Suet. 35.3 
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master. Tacitus, on the other hand, typically complements the emperor’s agency with 
that of Anicetus himself. Indeed, after having been given the order, the freedman – 
“with inbred perversity and an ease communicated by former crimes” (insita vaecordia et 
facilitate priorum flagitiorum) – enthusiastically exaggerated and confessed more than he 
was ordered to (plura etiam quam iussum erat fingit fateturque). The description adds 
nothing to the story, except for the fact that it highlights in a typical Tacitean fashion 
the freedman’s individual wickedness. This difference between the two authors is most 
clear when we look at the semantic scope of the respective descriptions of Anicetus. 
Suetonius, as mentioned, only connects to the individual his function as paedagogus, 
whereas Tacitus repeats his (semi-)formal positions of power (e.g. as the commander of 
the Misenian fleet and personal go-to hitman of the emperor). Moreover, the specific 
vocabulary used by Suetonius to describe the freedman and his actions is limited to 
terms relating to the invented confession of adultery (index, fingere, dolus). In Tacitus’ 
account, however, a lexical analysis not only highlights Anicetus’ inherent wickedness 
(scelus (3), odium (2), crimen, facinus, flagitium), but also his own initiative (ingenium, 
sollertia) and malevolent agency in all kinds of matters (auctor muneris, percussor, minister 
malorum facinorum, patrator maternae necis). 
Once again, then, Suetonius is primarily interested in the emperor’s actions, paying 
only minimal attention to the role of imperial freedmen in court intrigues, and when 
they do appear in the narrative, no need is felt to stress their freed status – their 
closeness to the emperor in general terms (e.g. as paedagogus) being the only trait worth 
mentioning. Tacitus, on the other hand, not only draws explicit attention to Anicetus’ 
freed status, but actively portrays him as the mastermind behind many of these 
intrigues, and even as initiating or single-handedly executing some of them. Tacitus’ 
preoccupation with presenting the imperial court (read: the Principate) as an 
infestation of depravity, as well as with the important role of freedmen as its instigators 
and enforcers, colours his descriptions of freedmen in a much more pervasive way than 
is the case in Suetonius’ version of events. 
Finally, to focus all attention on Anicetus’ explicit agency in designing the plot against 
Agrippina, Tacitus significantly omits any reference to Nero’s other influential 
preceptor: Seneca. Seneca appears only briefly as doubtfully contemplating what to do 
after Aggripina had survived the initial shipwreck94. Tacitus even suggests that he may 
not have been aware of any plot against Agrippina at all until that moment (nisi quid 
Burrus et Seneca; quos statim acciverat, incertum experiens an et ante gnaros). Seneca’s 
subsequent advise to Nero is anything but resolute (post Seneca hactenus promptius, ut 
respiceret Burrum ac sciscitaretur, an militi imperanda caedes esset). In Dio’s account, on the 
 
                                                     
94 Tac. Ann. 14.7.3. 
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contrary, Seneca features prominently as an accomplice throughout the anecdote of the 
collapsing ship. In fact, Dio explicitly states that it was Seneca, together with Nero and 
his mistress Sabina, who – on visiting a spectacular naval show in the theatre – came up 
with the original idea themselves, omitting any reference to Anicetus95. Dio does 
mention the freedman in the following passage, but he is there introduced only after 
the plan had been concocted and the ship built. It was to him Nero, on the destined 
night, entrusted his mother to ensure her “safe” return home (παρέδωκεν αὐτὴν Ἀνικήτῳ 
ἀπελευθέρῳ ὡς καὶ κομιοῦντι οἴκαδε ἐπὶ τοῦ πλοίου οὗ κατεσκευάκει). Although he is thus 
implicitly connected to the plot, Dio greatly downplays his role (at least if we take 
Tacitus as a yardstick), and he certainly does not present the entire scheme as springing 
from Anicetus’ ingenium or sollertia. This is not to say that the Greek historian is more 
positively inclined towards the individual, as he too – like Tacitus – describes Anicetus 
as ultimately leading the band of assassins that would dismiss Agrippina for good96.  
A comparison of the historions does indicate, however, that Tacitus as a rule 
accentuated the agency and the depravity of freedmen, holding them accountable for 
some of the most shocking events of their time. A less biased narrator may have omitted 
an evaluative remark about Atilius’ or Anicetus’ character and motives. Indeed, both 
anecdotes could be interpreted – when stripped from the historians’ emplotment – as 
telling the stories of an entrepreneurial freedman, engaging his economic capital to the 
benefit of his community (and his own symbolic capital), and of a trusted paedagogus 
following up on his patron’s instructions. The recontextualisation of their actions (and 
the subsequent condemnation) by later generations of historians was, however, greatly 
inclined towards a negative presentation. This begs the question whether a “good” 
freedman could exist at all in Tacitus’ or Suetonius’ (discursive) universe. 
6.2.4 Always the “bad” freedman: the contradictory nature of a 
freedman’s obligations 
It clearly did not really matter what an individual freedman did or did not do, when the 
author relating his story already has his mind made up about the “moral” of the story, 
or about the “meta-narrative” to which the anecdote should contribute. Even with the 
sneers to imperial freedmen taken out of the equation, any assertive, proactive, and 
somehow “independent” freedman was likely to be presented as shamefully ignorant of, 
or even willingly transgressing the pattern of expectation laid out for him by (elite) 
society. After the future emperor Vitellius had heavily indebted himself to various 
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creditors, for example, he had to resort to rather dubious means to pay them off. He 
once even brought an action for damages against a freedman who had allegedly kicked 
him. Suetonius, who mentions the anecdote, clearly implies that this reason was 
invented by Vitellius (quasi calce ab eo percussus), but does not necessarily condemn the 
prosecution altogether. After all, the freedman had been inappropriately persistent in 
demanding the settlement of his debt with Vitellius (cum libertino cuidam acerbius debitum 
reposcenti iniuriarum formulam intendisset)97. The depravity of Vitellius’ act derived not 
from the punishment of the freedman an sich, but from the fact that Vitellius made him 
pay disproportionally for the minor insult (nec aliter quam extortis quinquaginta sestertiis 
remisisset). Although a sole focus on the false accusation would have accentuated 
Vitellius’ character, Suetonius does not let the opportunity slip to draw attention to the 
“inappropriate assertiveness” of the freedman, whose desire for coin typically made 
him forget social hierarchy and status boundaries in the interaction with men far above 
his own station. 
Contrarily, a failure to fully seize the opportunities that came with manumission, was 
considered a consequence of laziness or even inherent worthlessness, which could be 
rhetorically connected even to freedpersons’ offspring. Dio thus describes Vedius Pollio 
as a man who “has done nothing worthy of remembrance” and who “has performed no 
noteworthy deeds”, connecting this failure – perhaps explicitly if we read a causal 
connotation in γάρ – to his being the offspring of freed parents 
(ἐξ ἀπελευθέρων ἐγεγόνει), an origin that apparently could not even be compensated by 
his elevation to equestrian status98. The only reason for mentioning him, Dio remarks, 
was his extreme wealth and his cruelty towards his slaves. His freed father Vedius Rufus 
seems to have done much better for himself, if we are to take Horace’s word for it. Not 
only did he possess, cultivate, and profit from his extensive landed property (“a 
thousand Falernian acres”), he moreover obtained the gold ring and the privileges of 
equestrian status that accompanied it, eventually even rising to the post of tribunus 
militum99. Significantly, both Rufus’ overt success (i.e. “usurpation”) and his son’s 
alleged lazy inactivity were equally condemned – by Horace and Dio respectively –, with 
both vices being in no unclear terms associated with their servile descent. It is hard to 
imagine a course of action that would have completely agreed with the strong 
 
                                                     
97 Suet. Vit. 7.2. 
98 Dio 54.23.1: “κἀν τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἔτει Οὐήδιος Πωλίων ἀπέθανεν, ἀνὴρ ἄλλως μὲν οὐδὲν μνήμης 
ἄξιον παρασχόμενος (καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀπελευθέρων ἐγεγόνει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἐξητάζετο καὶ λαμπρὸν 
οὐδὲν εἰργάσατὀ), ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ τῷ πλούτῳ τῇ τε ὠμότητι ὀνομαστότατος γενόμενος, ὥστε καὶ ἐς 
ἱστορίας λόγον ἐσελθεῖν”. 
99 Hor. Ep. 4. For Rufus as Pollio’s father, see Kirbihler (2007). 
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moralising expectations of these elite writers, and that would not have given cause to 
disparaging statements like these.  
As a libertus, a freedman was supposed to behave subserviently and reverentially 
toward his patron, the various manifestations of which were usually conveniently 
captured by the term obsequium. As a formally freed libertinus, however, he was at the 
same time expected to have internalised Roman virtues and to behave according to the 
respectability and duties of a citizen. These ideals would occasionally conflict with one 
another. Suetonius, for example, mentions a patron killing his freedman for refusing to 
drink as lavishly as he had asked him to100. With his refusal, the freedman was almost 
paradoxically meeting the demands of frugality expected from a virtuous citizen, but at 
the same time ignoring his patron’s wishes. The anecdote starts off a series of cases that 
accentuate the wickedness of Nero’s father Domitius (the patron), and is included 
precisely to draw attention to the “genetic roots” of Nero’s own depravity. Importantly, 
although the freedman had disobeyed his patron, it was the latter who incurred infamy 
as a result of his cruel reaction. Suetonius clearly accounted for the freedman’s right to 
refuse dishonourable requests, even if it meant disobedience to a patron. In this case, 
the respectability any citizen was entitled to according to the public transcript of 
equality, trumped patronal arbitrariness. Suetonius thereby adhered to a principle that 
was well established in Roman law as well. Indeed, patrons were legally prohibited from 
imposing operae if these happened to be incongruent with, or harmful to, a freedman’s 
way of life (institutum vitae), and the law automatically annulled the operae of a 
freedwoman who had been elevated to a rank (dignitas) that would render the execution 
of such operae improper or degrading (inconveniens)101. 
Similarly, a few decades earlier, Phoebe – a freedwoman of Augustus’ daughter Iulia – 
had been praised by that emperor for opting for the only righteous way out of the 
dilemma that was forced upon her by the immoral conduct of her patroness. Because 
she would neither (or no longer102) violate her respectability by participating in Iulia’s 
depravities, nor blatantly abscond her patroness, her choice for suicide was considered 
highly commendable, prompting Augustus to exclaim that he would rather have had 
 
                                                     
100 Suet. Nero 5.1. 
101 Dig. 38.1.17: “Nec audiendus est patronus, si poscit operas, quas vel aetas recusat vel infirmitas 
corporis non patiatur vel quibus institutum vel propositum vitae minuitur”; 38.1.34: “sed si liberta, 
quae operas promisit, ad eam dignitatem perveniat, ut inconveniens sit praestare patrono operas, 
ipso iure hae intercident”. Perry (2014) stresses this respectability throughout his work (e.g. 93, 
133). 
102 She was already una ex consciis liberta of Iulia’s (Suet. Aug. 65.2), thus perhaps having been 
involved in previous misconduct. Be that as it may, her suicide still shines as an example of moral 
virtue, the freedwoman not being able to live with herself under these circumstances. 
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Phoebe as a daughter than Iulia103. Ironically, these freedpersons feature as exceptional 
examples of virtue and responsibility in a context where moral debauchery ruled 
supreme, but all of them paid the price for their correct behaviour.   
Honourable behaviour within the private relationship with a patron provided for the 
historians the only viable alternative to the practice of presenting freedmen as wicked 
individuals. These positive attestations thereby reflect much more strongly the network 
embedded context in which the actions of these freedmen were fundamentally rooted. 
As such, this praiseworthy behaviour is particularly reminiscent of the overall 
appreciation of freedmen in, for example, Cicero’s letters. Because tracing network 
embeddedness in the detached discourse of the historians will be the aim of a next 
section, we will limit ourselves here to a couple of examples illuminating how the 
usually a priori “bad” freedman could be described positively as a consequence of the 
individual loyalty to his patron. 
Especially when his patron had committed a crime, a freedman who was aware of the 
mischief found himself in a precarious position; torn between remaining silent to 
protect his patron, or coming forward as a witness. The freedman Titus Vinius 
Philopoemen, for example, hid his patron, and thereby saved his life, since he had been 
added to the list of proscribed men. That such reverence was particularly appreciated, is 
clear from Augustus not only granting Philopoemen amnesty, but even rewarding him 
with equestrian rank104. Likewise, an unnamed freedman of the plebeian tribune 
Octavius Sagitta confessed to a capital crime that was actually his patron’s105. Although 
the freedman thus obfuscated the truth of the affair and obstructed justice, even Tacitus 
had to admit that he was impressed by the magnitudo exempli, praising the freedman’s 
loyalty toward his patron.  
An emperor of whom one would perhaps expect it the least – given his reputation 
among later historians – even went so far as to encourage noble action by rewarding 
similar exemplary behaviour (bona exempla). Indeed, Caligula abundantly rewarded a 
freedwoman (mulier libertina) for having kept silence – even under the most cruel 
torture – about the (unspecified) crime of her patron (scelus patroni)106. Legally, of 
course, a freedperson could not be forced to give evidence against his or her patron107. 
The only exceptions concerned schemes endangering the state. It is significant that the 
first manumission procedure that conferred citizenship on freed slaves (manumission 
 
                                                     
103 Suet. Aug. 65.2: “(…) maluisse se ait Phoebes patrem fuisse”. 
104 Suet. Aug. 27.2. 
105 Tac. Ann. 13.44. 
106 Suet. Cal. 16.4. 
107 Dig. 2.4.4.1; 2.4.12,13; 22.5.4. Cf. Fabre (1981), 219-21. 
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vindicta) allegedly derived its name from a slave (Vindicius) who had been given his 
freedom in return for the betrayal of his master’s conspiracy against the vulnerable new 
Republic108.  
In Tacitus’ universe, however, even these freedmen would be fiercely condemned. This 
condemnation ultimately derived from the historian’s conviction that any conspiracy 
against an emperor was either beneficial to all, or at least not worth betraying your 
patron for. In 65 CE, the famous Pisonian conspiracy against Nero’s life was carefully, 
though not very efficiently, planned. Most of the conspirators we are told the names of, 
were senators and knights, but a plot of this magnitude could hardly be kept secret from 
outsiders109. Nonetheless, Tacitus narrates, it was not betrayed until the day before the 
actual assassination was planned, despite “the many ranks, classes, ages and sexes, rich 
and poor people that were involved”. Typically, he implies that the betrayal originated 
from one of the conspirators’ freedmen (Flavius Scaevinus’ Milichus). The blatant 
hostility with which Tacitus describes Milichus’ decision to lay bare the plot – he 
includes vile descriptions of his very nature, which Tacitus held responsible for the lack 
of loyalty (fides) – contrasts sharply with the general appreciation for Vindicius’ very 
similar actions. Of course, Vindicius was saving the Republic, Milichus merely a 
depraved emperor.  
Tacitus immediately invokes Milichus’ servilis animus and typically presents his 
interpretation of the freedman’s actions as the one and only true account of his 
motivations. It was – in a remarkable though entirely expected parallel to Atilius’ 
reasons for constructing an unstable theatre – not a feeling of civic responsibility that 
inspired Milichus to warn Nero, but a realisation of the rewards of treason (praemia 
perfidiae) and the unbounded wealth and power (inmensa pecunia et potentia) that would 
befall him if he did110. Supposedly, all of this made him forget instantly the safety of his 
patron and the memory of the freedom he had received (cessit fas et salus patroni et 
acceptae libertatis memoria). Of course, Tacitus stresses, he was supported in this 
depravity by his wife, whose feminine and base advice (consilium muliebre ac deterius) 
 
                                                     
108 Liv. 2.4-5. Cf. Plut. Publ. 7.5. Cf. Kleijwegt (2009), who situates Livy’s anecdote in the broader 
Augustan program of restoring Rome to its bygone moral standards. An alternative tradition 
ascribes the enfranchisement of freedmen to Servius Tullius (Dion. Halic. 4.24.3-4). For our purposes, 
it matters little to what degree the anecdote actually reflected reality. Semi-literal interpretations 
are likely too naive (e.g. Schumacher (1982), 46ff). The story behind it – a slave rightfully obtaining 
freedom and citizenship after having saved the Republic by laying down information against his 
patron – was in any case considered both plausible and agreeable in Livy’s time. 
109 Tac. 15.49-50; Dio 62.24. The nearly successful assassination attempt has been the subject of 
extensive modern enquiry, e.g. Schumacher (1982), 148-9; Griffin (1984), 166-70; Rudich (1993), 87-
122; Rutledge (2001), 166-70. 
110 Tac. Ann. 15.54. 
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added the extra motivation of fear, since a discovery of the plot by any other means 
than his own betrayal would undoubtedly result in Milichus’ destruction (as he would be 
considered an accomplice)111. Indeed, so she warned her husband, there were plenty of 
other slaves and freedmen who were potentially contemplating the exact same course 
of action (multosque adstitisse libertos ac servos, qui eadem viderint). The talks between 
Milichus and his wife are set in a private context, and it is highly doubtful that Tacitus is 
relating actual facts, and not merely adding details to enhance the emplotment of his 
narrative. By having the wife point out the many potential proditores in Scaevinus’ 
household, the historian cleverly insinuates that any household could – if the 
opportunity arose – turn itself against its pater familias.  
Although it is very “Tacitean” to thus invoke the decay of morality and private 
relations of fides and obsequium, the notion of slaves and freedmen always being at least 
potentially harmful to their master or patron was deeply ingrained in the elite’s minds. 
A popular proverbium, which stated that one has as many enemies as one has slaves (quot 
servi tot hostes), remained in vogue for many centuries, and Cicero tried to move his 
audience by claiming that every significant family counted among its members at least 
some wicked slaves or freedmen (tamen in tanta felicitate nemo potest esse in magna familia, 
qui neminem neque servum neque libertum improbum habeat)112. Moreover, the extreme 
provisions of the senatus consultum Silanianum of 10 CE enabled the torture and execution 
of all the servile dependents of a murdered master, likewise reflecting the belief that 
every one of them at least potentially cherished a latent hatred for his condition and for 
the person immediately responsible for it113. However, these beliefs stemmed 
predominantly from the realisation that the forced suppression of liberty in their 
dependents could lead to almost no other outcome than a constant tension between 
master and dependent. When quoting the above mentioned proverbium, for example, 
Seneca meaningfully adds that “we do not a priori have these enemies (i.e. slaves), but 
we make them for ourselves” (non habemus illos hostes sed facimus) by our cruel (crudelis) 
and inhuman (inhumanus) behaviour, since we treat them not as men (homines) but as 
beasts of burden (iumenta)114.  
 
                                                     
111 Fear, rather than sincere support, is also what motivated (according to Tacitus) the monetary 
support of libertini for the emperor Vitellius in 69 CE (Tac. Hist. 3.58). Here too, metus serves to 
preclude the attribution of this support to any honourable consideration. 
112 Sen. Ep. 47.5; Macr. Sat. 1.11.13; Cic. Rosc. Am. 22. For the “mutual hostility of master and slave”, 
see Hopkins (1978), 120ff. 
113 Tac. Ann. 13.32; 14.44. Cf. Barrow (1928), 56; Buckland (1970), 95-7.   
114 Sen. Ep. 47.5. Seneca’s claims are heavily influenced by his stoic conviction that slaves are 
fundamentally equal to free men – at least in a philosophical sense (Ben. 3.28.1). But the idea that 
slaves are entitled to at least some kind of human treatment is amply attested in all literary genres 
(e.g. Cic. Off. 1.41; Juv. Sat. 14.16-7). Cf. Den Boer (1979), 89-92; Mourtisen (2011), 14ff (including 
references). 
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Regardless, Milichus’ motives – Tacitus makes sure to accentuate – derived not at all 
from such maltreatment by his patron. As a valued confidant of his patron, his position 
within the household was arguably a very comfortable one (this is at least, again, the 
background Tacitus pictures). No natural dissatisfaction with his condition, but mere 
greed and prodigality moved the freedman to betray the man who had granted him 
everything. As a result of Milichus’ betrayal, Scaevinus was summoned to Nero’s court. 
There, he vigorously defended himself, giving plausible explanations for his 
“suspicious” behaviour, and ultimately turning his entire defence into an ad hominem 
argument against his freedman. It was the deceit of this freedman (fraus liberti) and his 
inherent criminal nature (intestabilis et consceleratus) that had inspired the accusation, 
the freedman conveniently acting as both informer (index) and witness (testis) of the 
case115. Despite his strong resistance, Scaevinus’ involvement was eventually unveiled 
through conflicting accounts of a fellow-conspirator, who was at the same time being 
interrogated. The plot was gradually dismantled, and Milichus richly rewarded for his 
contribution to the emperor’s safety, even receiving the title of Saviour (Conservator)116. 
For Tacitus, however, Milichus was the true villain of the entire affair, having shown 
remarkable contempt for his obligations in opting to save a depraved emperor at the 
expense of his patron. The freedman’s concrete actions – as presented by Tacitus – make 
his behaviour seem all the more wicked, since he does not merely inform the emperor of 
the conspiracy, but actively incriminates Scaevinus by explicitly demanding him to be 
summoned, by presenting material evidence, and by engaging in a personal duel of 
mutual accusations. When stripped from Tacitus’ rhetorical representations of the man 
and his motives, however, Milichus’ decisions may just as well have been inspired by 
concerns unrelated to such “servile inclinations”. Neither, it could be argued, was his 
wife wrong in instilling metus in her husband and thus encouraging the proditio. After 
all, it had only been a few years since the freedmen of the murdered Pedanius Secundus 
had but narrowly escaped exile for not having been able to inform their patron of the 
assassination117. The question of the accountability of freedmen for the murder of their 
patron (and in extenso for tacit complicity in an assassination attempt on the emperor) 
was greatly disputed at the time, and both Milichus and his wife had very good reasons 
 
                                                     
115 Tac. Ann. 15.55. 
116 Tac. Ann. 15.71. If the Augusti libertus Epaphroditus of AE 1915, 45 is to be identified with Nero’s a 
libellis of the same name who had allowed Milichus access to the emperor (in order to reveal the 
plot), he too was amply rewarded (receiving hastae purae and coronae aureae), cf. Constans (1914); Eck 
(1976). 
117 Tac. Ann. 14.45 
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to fear the consequences of the plot’s premature discovery118. Although some scholars 
blatantly reproduce the Tacitean interpretation of events in their account, a concern for 
his own (and his family’s) well-being may have been a much more profound motivation 
than a mere servile inclination toward immediate praemia119. By comparison, Suetonius 
and Dio entirely omit any reference to Milichus or to his part in the discovery of the 
Pisonian conspiracy. The Greek historian does make a reference to how faithless friends 
and house servants constituted a threat to men who blindly trusted them, but the 
passage describes the aftermath of the plot’s discovery. With Nero on his guard, any and 
every accusation – whether true or not – was considered a threat to the emperor; a 
loaded atmosphere dishonest dependents (ex-slaves are not singled out) would use to 
falsely enrich themselves120.  
In addition to Milichus, Tacitus prominently features another important agent in his 
account of the Pisonian conspiracy: Epicharis, unsurprisingly also a freedwoman. 
Besides Nero’s lover Acte, this Epicharis is the only female ex-slave in the Annals, and 
according to some scholars “one of the most fascinating characters” of the entire 
work121. While the conspirators are depicted as lingering irresolutely, “a certain 
Epicharis” (Epicharis quaedam) takes firm action. Contrary to Milichus, she supports the 
conspiracy, even trying to entice the powerful commander of the Misenian in the 
scheme. Her motives are unclear, but Tacitus makes sure we do not imagine any upright 
concern as prime mover, casually mentioning that she “had never previously shown 
interest in anything honourable (res honestae)”122. That this was not a sneer to her legal 
status per se, is clear from the fact that freeborn women too could be depicted in these 
exact same terms elsewhere123. In fact, when Tacitus first introduces Epicharis, he does 
not even describe her as a freedwoman. Neither do Dio – in his brief reference to the 
 
                                                     
118 It was not until Trajan’s reign that freedmen became officially liable under the Silanian decree 
mentioned earlier (Dig. 29.5.10.1), but as the case of Pedanius Secundus had illustrated, they were 
never truly out of harm’s way in these instances. Cf. Plin. Ep. 8.14.12-26. 
119 Cf. Rutledge (2001), 169 who rightly criticises Rudich (1993), 103. 
120 Dio 62.24.4: “Καὶ διὰ τοῦτ´ ἐς τὰ μάλιστα οἵ τε φίλοι οἱ πονηροὶ καὶ οἰκέται τινῶν ἤνθησαν· τοὺς 
μὲν γὰρ ἀλλοτρίους τούς τε ἐχθροὺς ὑποπτεύοντες ἐφυλάσσοντο, πρὸς δὲ δὴ τοὺς συνόντας καὶ 
ἄκοντες ἐγυμνοῦντο”. The circumstances facilitated rather than caused such ungrounded 
accusations. Even prior to the Pisonian conspiracy, imperial freedmen would incriminate either 
personal rivals or simply men whom the emperor wanted to get rid of. The freedman Graptus, for 
example – usu et senecta Tiberio abusque domum principum edoctus – invented a mendacium and 
successfully accused the innocent Faustus Cornelius Sulla of conspiring against the emperor (Tac. 
Ann. 13.47).  
121 For Epicharis, see Pagán (2000), 364-6; (2004), 78-83 (the quote is from p. 76); Späth (2012), 448-50 
(from a gender-specific perspective). 
122 Tac. Ann. 15.51. 
123 E.g. Tac. Ann. 11.37.4: “nihil honestum inerat” (about Messalina). 
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woman (Ἄξιον δὲ μνησθῆναι καὶ γυναικός τινος Ἐπιχάριτος)124 – or Suetonius (who does 
not mention her at all).  
Epicharis’ attempts at recruiting more conspirators eventually led to her capture and 
imprisonment. However, with actual evidence of her guilt lacking, she escaped worst 
punishmen – at least for the time being. It is noteworthy that there is no trace of 
Epicharis’ patron(ess) throughout Tacitus’ narrative (or any other historian’s for that 
matter). It is possible that s/he had died or relinquished immediate control over the 
freedwoman, as is perhaps suggested by her considerable freedom in moving around on 
her own, as well as by the fact that Tacitus does not present her later refusal to betray 
her fellow-conspirators as an act of loyalty to a patron(ess)125. 
Only in a later instance – when Nero summons Epicharis to question her again after 
Milichus had revealed the plot – is her legal status made clear. Despite being cruelly 
tortured, she refused to give information about her fellow-conspirators, thus famously 
evoking a rare remark of reluctant sympathy from Tacitus: “An emancipated slave and a 
woman, by shielding, under this dire coercion, men unconnected with her and all but 
unknown, she had set an example which shone the brighter at a time when persons 
freeborn and male, Roman knights and senators, untouched by the torture, were 
betraying each his nearest and his dearest”126. Tacitus seems torn between his initial 
depiction of Epicharis as the dishonourable, scheming woman on the one hand, and the 
usefulness of her exceptional virtuous taciturnity for once more drawing attention to 
the vicissitudes under the Principate on the other127. The power of the passage derives 
not only from morally elevating a freedwoman over knights and even senators, but also 
from the rare – and therefore all the more conspicuous – deviation Epicharis represents 
from the persistent, pejorative Tacitean image of people of her (legal) condition.  
Her gender served a very similar function, being accentuated much more often than 
her freed status. Whereas her sex (mulier, femina), as well as her muliebre corpus are 
mentioned on multiple occasions, she is described as a libertina only once – and even 
then in explicit conjunction with mulier128. In fact, another comparison with freeborn 
women indicates that similar behaviour by them was regarded as an equally admirable 
exemplum. A Ligurian woman (femina), for example, who refused to give up her son’s 
 
                                                     
124 Dio 62.27.3. 
125 E.g. Ann. 15.51: “(…) ac postremum lenitudinis eorum pertaesa et in Campania agens (…)” and the 
next note. 
126 Tac. Ann. 15.57: “(…) clariore exemplo libertina mulier in tanta necessitate alienos ac prope 
ignotos protegendo, cum ingenui et viri et equites Romani senatoresque intacti tormentis carissima 
suorum quisque pignorum proderent”. As Pagán (2000), 365 has noted, Epicharis’ steadfastness is 
reflected also in her final decision to kill herself, despite barely having any strength left to do so.  
127 Martin (1981), 183. 
128 Tac. Ann. 15.51 (mulier); 15.57 (libertina mulier; muliebre corpus, femina) 
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hiding place to Otho’s soldiers – fearing that they would enslave him as a war captive – 
endured gruesome terrors (per cruciatus interrogarent) and even paid for her silence with 
her own life129. Like the clarius exemplum of Epicharis, hers too was a praeclarum 
exemplum. The fact that such determination was shown by a woman evoked the praises of 
Tacitus in both cases, although Epicharis’ legal status allowed him to accentuate her 
unexpected virtue even further. 
Suetonius occasionally applies the same discursive strategy. When he presents an 
unnamed freedwoman (mulier libertina) as the recipient of an enormous reward by the 
emperor Caligula because she had kept silence about her patron’s crime under the most 
cruel torture (cf. supra), this is considered an unexpected though highly commendable 
example of virtue (Quoque magis nullius non boni exempli fautor videretur, mulieri libertinae 
octingenta donavit, quod excruciati gravissimis tormentis de scelere patroni reticuisset)130. By 
amply rewarding it, Caligula wanted to present himself as a fautor boni exempli, the 
implication being that it was rare (and therefore noteworthy) enough an occasion to 
serve as a locus for imperial self-aggrandising. Once again, the exemplary behaviour of a 
woman is invoked to highlight the character of another person or group of persons131. 
In both Epicharis’ and this unnamed mulier libertina’s case, freed status does not serve 
primarily to disparage these women themselves, but rather to draw attention to 
individuals or situations that are thereby placed at the centre of attention (Nero and the 
Principate’s moral decay, and Caligula’s vain attempts at self-promotion respectively). 
Moreover, both passages not only share the central theme (“the virtuous freedwoman”), 
but they also invoke the exact same pleonasm to do so: mulier libertina. The explicit – 
and strictly speaking unnecessary – inclusion of mulier once more indicates that not 
only (or primarily) legal status, but especially gender provided the anecdotes with their 
exemplary power.  
The same pattern is manifest in the works of other historians too. When Livy, for 
example, introduced Hispala Fecenia in his account of the Bacchanalia, he merely called 
her “a freedwoman well known around the Aventine” (Hispalam indidem ex Auentino 
libertinam, non ignotam viciniae)132. When he has this Hispala try to downplay her own 
significance as a witness in front of a consul, however, Livy draws explicit attention to 
her being but a woman, and to her testimony being not all that valuable as a 
consequence. The phrase by which this is done meaningfully starts out with mulier, but 
 
                                                     
129 Tac. Hist. 2.13. 
130 Suet. Cal. 16.4. 
131 Pagán (2004), 82 already observed that the examples of Epicharis and the unnamed Ligurian 
woman served to incriminate another party (i.e. weak aristocrats and Otho’s soldiers respectively). 
132 Liv. 39.12.1. 
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the focus on her gender is similarly enhanced by calling her not merely a libertina 
anymore, but a mulier libertina (i.e. libertina as an adjective rather than a noun)133. In 
both Suetonius’ and Livy’s accounts, the preference for accentuating gender rather than 
legal status is also confirmed by the fact that mulier typically precedes the adjective 
libertina. Contrastingly, in the majority of cases (throughout Latin literature) where 
libertinus/-a is used to further specify a noun, this word order is reversed, suggesting 
that its exceptional rendering in relation to these mulieres was deliberate134. Finally, it 
will come as no surprise that Tacitus – despite drawing ample attention to Epicharis’ 
femininity – still prioritises her status (libertina mulier instead of mulier libertina). That 
this is more than merely a stylistic difference between authors, is clear from the 
observation that on other occasions, where Tacitus does want to accentuate an identity 
dimension different than status, he does – like the other historians – change word 
order135. In other words, although Tacitus too recognises the value of Epicharis’ gender 
for his narrative, he – more than other historians – sticks to his habit of accentuating 
freed status as well. 
Although Epicharis was not torn between loyalty to a patron and civic responsibility 
to preserve the emperor’s safety, she was put in a similar situation when she was made 
to choose between her fellow-conspirators and the emperor. Unlike Milichus, who chose 
the latter over his patron, Epicharus decided to protect the conspirators. Both, however, 
were condemned; Epicharis was exposed to gruesome tortures, leaving violent suicide as 
her only remaining course of action, and Milichus may well have been rewarded in the 
short term, but his “servile nature” would remain forever tainted by the hostile 
senatorial tradition of which Tacitus was no doubt one of the most vigorous proponents. 
In a sense, then, it did not matter which course of action either Milichus or Epicharis 
took, since their decision would be disparaged either by senatorial or by imperial 
supporters, that is, as a betrayer of his patron or as an accomplice in a plot against “the 
state”. Milichus and Epicharis, in other words, would have been “bad freedpersons” 
either way. 
A similar paradox arose when a patron asked his freedman to assist him in his suicide. 
Once again, the general guideline for any freedman was to obey his patron’s wishes. 
 
                                                     
133 Liv. 39.13.2: “Mulier haud dubie, id quod erat, Aebutium indicem arcani rata esse, ad pedes 
Sulpiciae procidit, et eam primo orare coepit, ne mulieris libertinae cum amatore sermonem in rem 
non seriam modo sed capitalem etiam uerti uellet”. 
134 Examples are legion: Cic. Balb. 28 (Cn. Publicio Menandro, libertino homine); 56 (de libertino homine, 
Soterico Marcio); Sest. 97 (sunt etiam libertini optimates ); Catil. 3.15 (P. Umbrenum, libertinum hominem); 
Ver. 2.1.124 (libertinus homo sit heres); Hor. Sat. 1.6.6, 45-6 (libertino patre natum); Ep. 1.20.20 (libertino 
natum patre); … 
135 E.g. Ann. 15.72 (see also note 204 below). 
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Especially Velleius Paterculus’ History is filled with attestations of slaves and freedmen 
obeying their patrons’ last command136. There was, however, a thin line between being 
praised for assisting a patron this way, and being accused of murdering him. Thus 
Epaphroditus, who was suspected of having held the blade that killed Nero, was later 
executed by Domitian for his role in his patron’s demise. Domitian was well aware that 
Epaphroditus had acted bona fide and on Nero’s own orders, but he wanted to instil in his 
household the conviction that killing a patron was never justified, not even after an 
explicit command137. On the other hand, refusing to assist a patron in his suicide was 
considered an act of insubordination, but a slave who – knowing his master all too well – 
administered a non-lethal dose of poison, was later thanked for his assertiveness and 
given his freedom138. Contrarily, freedmen were obliged to help their patron when he 
was under attack (or at least cry out for help), but a freedman of Tiberius who witnessed 
Caligula strangling his patron, was crucified precisely for doing so139. Although obeying 
a patron was thus theoretically the right thing to do for a freedman, it was not 
necessarily the safest option, as this brief overview of conflicting expectations indicates. 
Once again, we are inclined to “understand” Milichus’ motives not as sprouting from his 
moral inferiority, but from his pragmatic inclination to self-preservation – although 
these two explanations may not have been as clearly distinct from one another for 
Tacitus as they are for a modern reader.  
Surely, the expectation of deference did not require as extreme a manifestation of 
self-sacrifice as that shown by Publius Catienus Philotimus, who – despite having 
inherited his ex-master’s entire estate – threw himself on his patron’s funerary pyre 
because he could not stand the loss. Nor was the manifest devotion of Agrippina’s 
freedman Mnester (who also ended his life after the death of his patroness) the standard 
to which freedpersons were held. Unsurprisingly, however, Tacitus implies that 
Mnester’s actions may have had more to do with his fear now that his protector had 
passed than with a true caritas in patronam140. In any case, these freedmen are only 
known to us because they were recorded by the ancient historians, who were attracted 
by these extraordinary actions, which were therefore deemed worthy of 
 
                                                     
136 E.g. 2.6.6; 2.69.2 (slaves); 2.70.2; 2.71.2 (freedmen). 
137 Dio 63.27.3; 63.29; 67.14. Suet. Nero 49.3; Dom. 14.4: “utque domesticis persuaderet, ne bono 
quidem exemplo audendam esse patroni necem, Epaphroditum a libellis capitali poena 
condemnavit, quod post destitutionem Nero in adipiscenda morte manu eius adiutus 
existimabatur”. 
138 Suet. Nero 2.3: “medicumque manumiserit, quod sibi prudens ac sciens minus noxium 
temperasset”. 
139 Suet. Cal. 12.2:”liberto, qui ob atrocitatem facinoris exclamaverat, confestim in crucem acto”. 
140 Plin. NH 7.122; Tac. Ann. 14.9. 
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commemoration. But more importantly, it was again the patronage relationship that 
provided the locus for honourable behaviour in freedmen. 
This observation indicates that traces of network embeddedness are still clearly 
discerneable in the detached works. However, Jean Andreau’s generalising adage that it 
was the libertus rather than the libertinus that worried the elites, is much less reflected in 
the histories than in, for example, Cicero’s letters141. Although we would certainly agree 
with Andreau’s general conclusion (cf. Chapter 2), the fact that the discourse of the 
detached sources focusses much more strongly on the libertinus as a constant threat to 
both elite and society at large, reminds us that these works greatly generalise concrete 
cases of usurpation or misdemeanour (usually by imperial freedmen). This consistent 
generalisation was a rhetorical strategy within the meta-narrative of moral decay, 
intended to readily provide the writer with a convenient shorthand set of stereotypes, 
that would immediately contextualise the passage in question within the framework of 
“usurpation from below” or “moral deprivation”. Indeed, as we have noted, especially 
Tacitus was very prone to use libertinitas in this manner (e.g. his representation of 
Atilius and Anicetus), although the notion could conversely be resorted to also to 
accentuate unusual and unexpected virtue (e.g. Epicharis). Whereas the previous 
sections painted a picture of this ambivalent function of freedmen in (mainly) Tacitus’ 
and Suetonius’ works, it is the dynamic interaction of detached and network embedded 
sources that will be further explored in the next sections, in order to elucidate the 
meta-narrative that was imposed on the representation of freedmen. Whereas a sole 
focus on isolated passages may yield specific information on certain historical themes, 
appreciating the way the meta-narrative in general moulded and reconfigured the 
original network embeddedness of each instance of freedman agency, goes a long way in 
better understanding  
6.3 Detached versus embedded sources 
6.3.1 Traces of network embeddedness in the historians’ public 
discourse 
Although Tacitus’ and Suetonius’ works are “detached” in the sense that they were not 
created in a communicative context that directly impacted their personal relations or 
 
                                                     
141 Andreau (1993), 196. 
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networks, traces of such context are still very much discernible. Several mentions of 
freedmen, for example, clearly reflect the existence of trust networks, even after they 
were re-contextualised by their framing in a meta-narrative. In these contexts, 
libertination – as noted in Chapters 4 and 5 – was not intended as a disparaging 
identification of an ex-slave, but rather as a strategy to accentuate social capital. The 
historians consistently took for granted their readers’ sensitivity towards cues related 
to this network embedded nature of the patron-freedman relationship, and occasionally 
used it to their advantage. The first subsection below will further elaborate on this point 
by showing how the intimacy of a private patronage relation was employed by 
Suetonius to create a framework in which agency could be more effectively praised or 
denounced. The second subsection will draw attention to those cases where (imperial) 
freedmen feature in a context very reminiscent of the freedmen in Cicero’s 
correspondence. These are consistently presented in a positive light, once again 
confirming that it was the meta-narrative of historical discourse, rather than an 
ingrained belief in libertine inferiority that lay at the heart of the generally 
condescending tone of the works of (in casu) Tacitus and Suetonius.  
6.3.1.1 Private relations and public appearance  
Imperial freedmen feature in Suetonius’ narrative only if they have a direct bearing on 
an emperor’s decisions or personal life. Especially in the early Lives, they are 
unambiguously considered yardsticks for the first rulers’ morals and firmness. When 
the objective is to present Caesar as a strict manager of his household (and in extenso of 
the state), for example, Suetonius narrates the story of how he had one of his favourite 
freedmen (liberti gratissimi) executed because he had committed adultery with the wife 
of a knight142. Caesar’s sternness is furthermore enhanced by the added statement that 
he had decided to do this without external pressure, as no formal complaint was made 
against the freedman. The culprit meaningfully remains unnamed, suggesting that his 
identity did not matter insofar as it did not contribute to his role in the exemplum. In 
fact, a focus on the individual may even draw attention away from the central point of 
the story: Caesar’s reaction to the affair. The mention of libertination in this case is thus 
meant primarily to accentuate the private bond between Caesar and his freedman, as 
well as Caesar’s sacrifice in willingly condemning one of his most trusted dependents to 
death. Although the adultery would have been considered aggravated because of the 
status difference between the freedman and the knight’s wife, the crime in itself is in no 
 
                                                     
142 Suet. Iul. 48. The anecdote follows a similar example of strictness on the part of Caesar as pater 
familias (he had his baker put in chains because he served him and his guests a different kind of 
bread). 
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way presented as related to an inherent mischievousness deriving from the 
perpetrator’s legal status. Both the offender and his crime merely provide a framework 
for the description of Caesar, since the voluntary decision to condemn to death even a 
beloved freedman would have struck – as Suetonius knew – a sensitive chord with his 
audience.  
Interestingly, the condemnation of one’s own freedman after a public offence is 
almost elevated to a topos when it recurs in other Lives. Augustus, for example, “merely” 
imprisons a slave who had insulted him (the offence not affecting anyone other than the 
emperor himself), but he ordered the suicide of – again – a favourite freedman (libertus 
acceptissimus), who had – again – committed adultery with a Roman matron143. Once 
more, by sacrificing even his closest freedman, the emperor is presented as a guardian 
of public morals in particular (both cases are not coincidentally sexual offences), and as 
respecting social hierarchies in general (showcasing that freedmen could not aspire 
undue influence under his reign). 
A similar sternness was – perhaps surprisingly – displayed by the emperor Domitian. 
Not only did he piously tear down the tomb of the son of one of his freedmen because 
the latter had appropriated building material designated for the temple of Jupiter 
Capitolinus, but he also ordered the bones and ashes of the deceased to be thrown in the 
sea144. Again, the implication is that any transgression – especially one that was 
potentially detrimental to the state’s divine protection – would be penalised by the 
emperor, even if this meant severely punishing his own freedmen. Once again, then, an 
imperial freedman features in a negative context, but once again the allusion serves to 
describe his patron, who voluntarily sacrifices, in a way, valuable social and economic 
capital to the benefit of the state (and, indirectly, of his own symbolic capital). None of 
these freedmen is named, nor does even one of them receive a disparaging 
characterisation from Suetonius. The passages are about the emperor, not about the 
freedmen. 
Conversely, when Suetonius’ narrative treats a “bad” emperor (or a “bad” period 
during the reign of an emperor), his wicked indulgence and despised morals are 
highlighted by invoking the depravity of his interaction with his freedmen – be it by 
drawing attention to the gravity of the wantonness exhibited, or by using particularly 
vile descriptions to do so (or both). Indeed, Suetonius’ depiction of a “weak” emperor’s 
reaction to transgressions similar to the ones outlined above is illuminating. In 24 CE, 
Urgulanilla (Claudius’ ex-wife of five months) gave birth to a daughter Claudia who – it 
was known or suspected at the time – was not Claudius’ but his freedman Boter’s 
 
                                                     
143 Suet. Aug. 67. The anecdote again features in a more extensive treatment of Augustus as patronus 
dominusque non minus severus quam facilis et clemens. Cf. the discussion of Thallus in Chapter 4. 
144 Suet. Dom. 8.5.  
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(libertus suus Boter)145. Although Claudius, confused as always146, initially reared Claudia 
as his own child, he soon cast her out of his house and disowned her. Any reader is left 
wondering how (and especially if) the actual adulterers were punished. Claudius, 
typically under the influence of his wives and freedmen – at least in the historians’ 
discourse147 – failed to show the firmness of a Caesar or Augustus, and the implication is 
that Boter got away even with adultery with Claudius’ own wife (Suetonius smoothly 
making sure to indicate that the adultery had taken place before Claudius and 
Urgulanilla divorced)148. By his indulgence, the emperor showed a manifest lack of 
control over both his wife and his freedman. Indeed, besides freedmen, the influence of 
women too could be conveniently invoked to accentuate the reversal of traditional 
order (i.e. by depicting the emperor as a subordinate to the kinds of people that were at 
least theoretically the farthest removed from formal power)149.  
Similarly, Nero’s submission to the freedwoman Acte was described in derogative 
terms, since the emperor added insult to injury by pretending to be formally married to 
her (Acten libertam paulum afuit quin iusto sibi matrimonio coniungeret)150. Whereas 
Suetonius draws attention primarily to the illicitness of the bond in general terms, 
Tacitus is typically more “detached” when he focusses mainly on Acte’s individual 
servility. He has Agrippina call her a liberta aemula, a nurus ancilla, and other similar 
insults (aliaque eundem). Tacitus himself repeatedly defines her as a muliercula or a paelex 
ancilla, and besides describing her relationship with Nero as a contubernium servile – 
thoroughly abiectum et sordidum – he contrasts it with the high descent (nobilitas) and 
 
                                                     
145 Suet. Claud. 27.1. 
146 This is, of course, the classical interpretation. Modern scholars generally believe that Claudius 
willingly allowed his freedmen to hold considerable power, e.g. Millar (1967), 15; (1992), 74-7; Levick 
(1990), 83. 
147 The negative image of Claudius extends well beyond Tacitus’ and Suetonius’ narratives, and is the 
near universal interpretation of the emperor’s personality and reign in Roman and Greek historical 
traditions. Cf. Syme (1958), 259-60, 436-7; Momigliano (1961), 77-9; Malloch (2009), 116ff (note 4 
containing many more references). Examples of this tradition are legion: Sen. Apoc. 6.2: “putares 
omnes illius esse libertos: adeo illum nemo curabat”; Suet. Claud. 25.5 (the Prinipate is reigned 
arbitrio non tam suo quam uxorum libertorumque); 29.1 (Claudius as addictus his [libertis] uxoribusque); 
Vit. 2.5 (idem). Cf. Dio 60.2.4: “Περιφανέστατα γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐδουλοκρατήθη τε ἅμα καὶ 
ἐγυναικοκρατήθη”; 60.14.1: “Αἴτιοι δὲ τούτου οἵ τε Καισάρειοι καὶ ἡ Μεσσαλῖνα ἐγένοντο”; 60.28.2: 
“Δουλεύοντα μέντοι αὐτὸν τῇ τε γυναικὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀπελευθέροις ὁρῶντες ἤσχαλλον”; 60.31.8: “Ὅτι 
οὕτω ταῖς γυναιξὶν ὁ Κλαύδιος ἐδεδούλωτο ὥστ'ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς γαμ βροὺς δι'αὐτὰς ἀποκτεῖναι”. 
Narcissus was perhaps the most detested of them all (Dio 60.33.6; Juv. 14.328-31; Sen. Apoc. 13.2; Tac. 
Ann. 11.37-8; 13.1; Suet. Claud. 28; 37.2). 
148 He mentions that Claudia was born five months after the divorce (ante quintum mensem divortii 
natam). Suet. Claud. 26.2 already identified Urgulanilla’s scandalous lewdness as the reason for the 
divorce (ob libidinum probra).  
149 For Tacitus’ analysis of female power in the Principate, see Marshall (1984-1986); Joshel (1997); 
Ginsburg (2006); Santoro L’Hoir (2006), Chapter 3 (p. 111-157) 
150 Suet. Nero 28.1. 
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proved honour (probitas) of Octavia whom Nero was about to divorce151. The contrast 
with the exalted Octavia, as well as terms like abiectum and sordidum are indications that 
Tacitus was presenting as great a gap as possible between aristocratic matrons and this 
liberta, in order to highlight Nero’s depravity in completely disregarding traditional 
concerns of status and standing. He behaves just like Martial who, though well aware of 
the importance of hierarchy in choosing a partner (i.e. of prioritising an ingenua over a 
libertina over a serva), would still prefer the latter if she happened to be more attractive 
than an ingenua or libertina152. The description of the relationship as a contubernium 
servile, however, should not necessarily be seen as a direct reference to Acte’s servile 
past . Indeed, of Nero’s freeborn lovers – and even his mother – it could be similarly said 
that they enslaved (καταδουλόω) the emperor by enticing him sexually153.  Nero not 
only failed to condemn inappropriate unions, but even encouraged them by establishing 
one himself. Of course, there was considered nothing wrong with an intimate bond 
between an emperor and his freedmen – Augustus rightly held many of them in high 
honour and close intimacy (multos libertorum in honore et usu maximo habuit)154 – and 
marriages between patrons and freedwomen were very common, if the epigraphic 
record is any indication. But like senators, Nero was supposed to uphold the rigid gradus 
dignitatis, which at least in theory prevented the lower classes from mingling with the 
top elite. 
Whereas the first two emperors would spontaneously punish their own close 
freedmen for usurping privileges above their station, a “bad” emperor like Claudius thus 
encouraged and even bestowed such privileges himself: the hasta pura to Posides, the 
command over a province and several cohorts to Felix, equestrian and praetorian 
insignia to Narcissus and Pallas, etc. He furthermore famously allowed his freedmen to 
amass great wealth by plunder, and his ab studiis to walk in between the consuls155. The 
ab studiis was – like the ab epistulis, the ab libellis, and the ab rationibus – a freedman 
whose function became increasingly associated with the power that was informally 
invested in them by the emperor. As noted earlier, Nero was thus able to eliminate his 
rival Torquatus Silanus on the grounds that he called his intimate freedmen ab epistulis, 
ab libellis, etc. Because Silanus belonged not only to the Junian gens, but was also a direct 
descendant of Augustus, the act of “usurping” the titles of the business of empire 
(nomina summae curae et meditamenta) could be invoked as a subversive and dangerous 
 
                                                     
151 Tac. Ann. 13.12-3; 13.46. 
152 Mart. 3.33: “Ingenuam malo, sed si tamen illa negetur, libertina mihi proxuma condicio est: 
extremo est ancilla loco: sed vincet utramque, si facie nobis haec erit ingenua”. 
153 Dio 62.11.3. 
154 Suet. Aug. 67.1. 
155 Suet. Claud. 28. 
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threat to the current emperor156. Once more, the private relationship between freedmen 
and their patron (and its extending into the realm of public affairs) served as a locus for 
accentuating the depravity of the emperor, without describing the freedmen 
themselves as inherently immoral (especially the intimi liberti of Torquatus were 
elevated, even by Tacitus, to innocent victims of a cruel regime, as they were executed 
in the wake of the charges against their patron). 
Finally, one of the few “good” imperial freedpersons during Claudius’ reign was the 
unnamed liberta et ornatrix of the emperor’s mother, whom Claudius praised for always 
having regarded him as her patron. It is no coincidence that the freedwoman’s 
commendable behaviour pertained to her private (network embedded) relation with 
Claudius. In its entirety, however, the passage serves to illustrate that the pious conduct 
was very exceptional. Indeed, Suetonius has Claudius exclaim that he appreciated the 
freedwoman’s devotion even more fervently because there were many in his household 
who did not consider him their patron157. The anecdote, though at first sight a rare 
exception to Claudius’ subordination to his dependents – thus serves to ridicule the 
emperor by having him rejoice about the fact that at least one of his freedpersons (and 
she is not even really his) was loyal and reverential towards him, accentuating his 
complete lack of control in all the other cases. 
6.3.1.2 Imperial freedmen as non-usurping domestic assistants 
Besides serving as exempla to highlight an emperor’s character, imperial freedmen also 
occur in contexts that are reminiscent of ex-slaves’ roles and functions in the 
household, as continuously evoked in “embedded” sources. The opinion of a certain 
freedman Iulius Marathus on Augustus’ looks is cited by Suetonius, who accentuates the 
authority of the statement by referring to the freedman’s role as the emperor’s 
confidential assistant (a memoria)158. It is possible – and at the very least implied by 
Suetonius – that Marathus’ flattering account of Augustus (he overestimated the 
emperor’s stature) was due to the freedman’s reverentia towards his patron. Likewise, 
Augustus used one of his freedmen as a stooge during a public auction. Having mutilated 
his sons in order to prevent them from having to serve in the military, a knight was 
convicted by the emperor and sold at the auction. However, when Augustus noticed that 
some publicani showed interest in the sale, and fearing that the knight would thereby be 
 
                                                     
156 Tac. Ann. 15.35. Nero disposed of Torquatus’ nephew Lucius Silanus in the exact same way (Ann. 
16.8). Tacitus had already insinuated that the charge against Torquatus was ungrounded, but called 
the accusation in Lucius’ case simply insania et falsa. 
157 Suet. Claud. 40.2: “Haec, inquit, matris meae liberta et ornatrix fuit, sed me patronum semper 
existimavit; hoc ideo dixi, quod quidam sunt adhuc in domo mea, qui me patronum non putant”. 
158 Suet. Aug. 79.2. 
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humiliated too severely, Augustus intervened and adjudged him to one of his freedmen 
instead (liberto suo addixit), thus ensuring that the knight would retain a de facto 
liberty159. Once again, the emperor relies on his personal trust networks, in a way very 
familiar to Cicero’s management of his household. Cicero too, for example, made use of 
Philotimus to secretly buy the exiled Milo’s estate when it was publicly auctioned160.  
Many other freedmen of the first emperors similarly feature in a personal trust 
relation with their patron. As a parallel to Cicero’s relying on the house of one of 
Lepidus’ freedmen to have a place to sleep while travelling, Augustus too regularly took 
recourse to his freedmen’s domains when he visited the suburbs (huc transibat aut in 
alicuius libertorum suburbanum)161.  Likewise, both Augustus and Tiberius were assisted in 
the writing of their testament by loyal freedmen: the former by liberti Polybius et Hilarion, 
the latter by an unnamed libertus162. On Augustus’ passing, Tiberius even had the 
emperor’s will read out loud by a freedman (recitavit per libertum) in front of the senate. 
This choice is all the more significant, since of the signers of the testamentum, only those 
of senatorial status were admitted to the senate house in order to confirm its 
authenticity (the rest of them had to do so outside)163. The contrast between the freed 
reader and the senatorial audience and witnesses could hardly be greater, and suggests 
that Tiberius had knowingly and willingly selected the freedman for the job. Although 
his patron is not mentioned explicitly, it is more than likely that he had belonged to 
Augustus, and that he had been chosen to read the will precisely because of this 
connection. The use of a trusted freedman, it was expected, carried extra weight, due to 
the “corporate authority”164 he added to the testament. Just like Cicero’s use of Atticus’ 
freedmen when sending official reports to Rome – endowing these documents with 
some of their patron’s symbolic capital – so the presentation of a freedman of Augustus 
would endow the will with the deceased emperor’s authority. It is again noteworthy in 
this regard, that the freedman remains anonymous, the connection to his patron being 
the primary focus of the narrative.  
 
                                                     
159 Suet. Aug. 24.1. 
160 Cic. Fam. 8.3.2; Att. 5.8.2-3; 6.4.3; 6.5.1-2; 6.7.1; 6.9.2; 7.1.1,9. 
161 Cic. Fam. 7.18.3; Suet. Aug. 72.2. 
162 Suet. Aug. 101.1; Tib. 76. The subsequent description of Tiberius’ relying on people of the lowest 
condition (humilissimi) to sign his will, undoubtedly stems from a hostile tradition instigated by 
Caligula who wanted to declare void the provisions contained in it. Cf. Dio 59.1.2. 
163 Suet. Tib. 23: “Inlatum deinde Augusti testamentum, non admissis signatoribus nisi senatorii 
ordinis, ceteris extra curiam signa agnoscentibus, recitavit per libertum”. 
164 Gurd (2007). Cf. the discussion in Chapter 4. 
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Finally, Agrippina’s libertus intimissimus Agermus was relied upon to deliver a delicate 
message to Nero during the final standoff between the emperor and his mother165. After 
the attempt on Agrippina’s life had failed (cf. supra), the empress-mother suspected her 
son of foul play, but thought it better to feign ignorance. She therefore appointed 
Agermus as courier to deliver to her son (misitque libertum Agermum)166 the message that 
she had survived “the accident”, pretending not to realise Nero’s involvement in the 
attempt. Agermus, apparently unaware of the danger of his delicate mission, joyfully 
reported the news to Nero (cum gaudio nuntiantem)167, who saw right through 
Agrippina’s deceit and had nuntius Agermus168 arrested on the charge of trying to 
assassinate the emperor169. Agermus’ somewhat naïve happiness, as well as his wrongful 
condemnation and Tacitus’ explicit mention that his guilt was absolutely 
inconceivable170, are clearly meant to evoke sympathy for the freedman, who was after 
all merely executing his patroness’ orders. Indeed, the repeated use of libertination and 
even nuntius, is reminiscent to Cicero’s habit of accentuating the freedman’s 
embeddednes in his patron’s trust network. 
Even the much more negatively presented reigns of the later emperors (from Caligula 
onwards) contain similar attestations of loyal freedmen. Nero’s freedman Phaon (Phaon 
libertus) offered his suburban villa to his patron when the latter was fleeing for his life. 
He also vainly tried to persuade him to hide underground, and used his own network of 
couriers to provide Nero with the latest information of the insurgence against him171. 
Similarly, on learning that imperial envy had given rise to an assassination plot against 
Rubellius Plautus – in Asia at the time –, one of his loyal freedmen set out immediately 
to warn his patron, surpassing the appointed executioner in both zeal and speed172. The 
assumed bond of trust between a freedman and his patron is also clear from the fact 
that the ex-praetor Minucius Thermus was executed after an unnamed freedman of his 
 
                                                     
165 Tac. Ann. 14.10. Dio does neither mention Agermus’ name nor his status (Dio 62.13.4). He merely 
notes that Agrippina informed (εὐαγγελίζομαι) Nero of her survival, and that the emperor in 
response incriminated the messenger (Ἀκούσας δὲ ταῦθ´ ὁ Νέρων οὐκ ἐκαρτέρησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν 
πεμφθέντα ὡς ἐπὶ τῇ αὑτοῦ σφαγῇ ἥκοντα ἐκόλασε …), as reported more extensively in Tacitus (cf. 
infra). 
166 Tac. Ann. 14.6. 
167 Suet. Nero 34.3. 
168 Tac. Ann. 14.7. 
169 Nero dropped a blade at the freedman’s feet during his audience with the emperor, thus 
achieving in a very underhand and perverse way what the freedman Anicetus had recently done 
through immediate and decisive action. Cf. Morris (1969), 101. 
170 Tac. Ann. 14.11: “quod fortuitum fuisse, quis adeo hebes inveniretur, ut crederet? Aut a muliere 
naufraga missum cum telo unum, qui cohortes et classes imperatoris perfringeret?”. 
171 Suet. Nero 48.1,3; 49.2. 
172 Tac. Ann. 14.58. Plautus, however, ignored the advice thus brought to him by his freedman – 
Tacitus provides a couple of plausible reasons why – and was executed anyway. 
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had brought charges against Nero’s favourite Tigellinus173. We are not told explicitly 
whether the accusation was actually ordered or inspired by Thermus himself, but 
Tacitus – calling the patron’s death inmerita – typically presents the case as if the latter 
had fallen victim to the actions of his freedman. Even if he had not directly ordered the 
accusation, the imperial court clearly deemed Thermus’ relation to his freedman a 
justified ground for prosecution.   
The close bond between freedman and patron – attested so vividly in embedded 
sources – is reflected also in the historians’ stories about freedmen honouring their 
patron even after the latter had died. For example, one of Otho’s freedmen, conveying 
his patron’s last wishes to the senate, silenced suspicious members of that body with an 
account of his patron’s nobility, courage, and virtue during his last moments174. Even 
more dramatic are the anecdotes relating the aftermath of Galba’s assassination. As an 
admirable act of reverence, an unnamed libertus of Patrobius Neronianus (himself a 
freedman of Nero) bought the severed head of the gruesomely treated Galba – at the 
considerable price of one hundred aurei –, only to throw it away at the spot where his 
patron had been executed by the emperor, thus posthumously avenging him175. 
However, as yet another act of devotion, a freed dispensator of Galba subsequently 
recovered it, reunited it with the rest of his patron’s body, and consigned all the 
remains to Galba’s private sepulchre176.  
6.3.1.3 Preliminary conclusion 
Although Tacitus and Suetonius did not produce their works in a network embedded 
context, their “histories”, as observed above, still occasionally reflect the embeddedness 
of freedmen in imperial and private trust networks. Both these freedmen’s functions (as 
couriers, confidential secretaries, agents, …) and their discursive rendering by the 
historians (a strong connection between the use of libertination and a context of 
trustworthiness) attest to this. Especially Suetonius reveals traces of libertination’s 
highly positive connotation known from Cicero’s letters (cf. Chapters 4 and 5). In 
Tacitus, this practice is discernible too, albeit much more obfuscated by the overlay of 
the more pervasive meta-narrative. Suetontius, for example, only once calls Narcissus a 
libertus, but the passage in which he does, meaningfully constitutes the only neutral (i.e. 
not pejorative) description of the freedman (fulfilling his domestic – “network 
 
                                                     
173 Tac. Ann. 16.20. 
174 Tac. Hist. 2.53. 
175 Suet. Galba 20.2; Tac. Hist. 1.49. Haynes (2003), 50 notes the irony in the connection thus made 
between Nero’s and Galba’s death. 
176 This Argivus is not explicitly identified as a freedman in Suetonius, but both Plutarch (Galba 28.3) 
and Tacitus (Hist. 1.49) describe him as such. 
  333 
embedded” – duty of bringing in a physician to examine Britannicus)177. Anicetus is 
similarly not called a libertus explicitly, because its positive connotations did not fit in 
the context in which he was mentioned. The same goes for the sexually transgressive 
Mnester, described by Suetonius merely as a pantomimus, but known to have been a 
freedman because Tacitus’ meta-narrative uses this status to rhetorically extrapolate his 
behaviour to that of the class of ex-slaves (cf. infra). Contrarily, the good Phaon, and 
Claudius’ only loyal freedwoman receive the epithet libertus/-a to accentuate their 
embeddedness in their patron’s trust network. Finally, the favourite freedmen executed 
as an example of imperial strictness were explicitly called liberti (and remained 
unnamed so as to draw attention to this libertination) in order to accentuate the 
sacrifice the emperor made by punishing them.  
Moreover, every single one of the imperial freedmen who were – rather 
exceptionally – depicted in a positive light, derives this positive description from his 
position within the private relation with his patron, the emperor178. Similarly, the rare 
positive mentions of private freedmen are related exclusively to their role as faithful 
subordinates in a patronage relation179. All of these freedmen show a remarkable 
reverence towards their patron, and are entirely disconnected from the dominant 
themes of the despised influence or of usurpation by freedmen in the public sphere. All 
differences between private freedmen and imperial freedmen thus vanish when they 
are mentioned in a private context: a good freedman was simply an ex-slave that aided 
his patron when necessary, without transgressing social boundaries. The narrative, in 
these cases, zooms in on this dimension of their persona, whereas negative mentions 
would typically focus on the propensity for usurpation and undue influence. Once again, 
then, these instances reveal the underlying embeddedness of the patronage-freedman 
relation, which a focus on the public appearances of (especially) imperial freedmen 
deliberately ignored – in function of the meta-narrative of moral decay and social 
transgression.  
The next section mainly consists of two cases studies, which will focus in more detail on 
the use of libertination, and more specifically on the deliberate choice of a writer to use 
either libertus (the freedman in relation to his patron) or libertinus (the freedman as 
member of the class of ex-slaves in society at large). It will adopt an explicitly 
 
                                                     
177 Suet. Tit. 2. 
178 Most of these attestations have already been included in the discussion above: Suet. Aug. 67.1; Cal. 
12.2; Claud. 40.2; Nero 47.1; 48.1,3; 49.3; Galba 20.2; Tac. Ann. 14.9; Hist. 1.49; 2.53. 
179 Idem: Suet. Aug. 27.2; Cal. 16.4; Tac. Ann. 13.44; 14.58. The only exceptions are Antonius Musa in 
Suet. Aug. 59 (although his service to Augustus was very similar to that of a loyal freedman to his 
patron, cf. Dio 53.30.3), and Epicharis (cf. supra). 
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comparative perspective, in order to accentuate the similarities and differences in these 
choices between network embedded and detached writers. 
6.4 Liberti versus libertini 
The  fact that attestations of libertus heavily outnumber those of libertinus in any literary 
corpus, reflects the centrality of the patronage relation in the discourse on freedmen. It 
is significant, however, that in the detached narrative of the historians, this contrast is 
slightly weakened when compared to the network embedded social practice of letter-
writing, where descriptions of a freedman or freedmen are almost exclusively framed in 
the context of a patronage relation. Indeed, neither Pliny nor Fronto refer to libertini in 
their letters, and even the much more extensive Ciceronian correspondence contains 
only two mentions.  
6.4.1 Libertini in Cicero’s correspondence 
In a letter from 50 BCE, Cicero used libertinus during one of his many praises of Atticus’ 
freedman Dionysius. After an enumeration of the man’s virtues, he decided to add an 
extra description rarely ever attributed to freedmen (vir bonus). He even explicitly 
stressed this transgressive praise by pointing out that he deemed Dionysius worthy of 
such appraisal, despite his being a libertinus (ac, ne libertinum laudare videar, plane virum 
bonum)180. Since this passage is treated in detail in the next chapter as a point of 
departure for the discussion of the “freedman discourse”, we will focus here only on the 
other reference to libertinus in Cicero’s correspondence. 
Interestingly, this occurs in a context that quite harshly evokes the reversal of social 
hierarchies – or at least the undesirability and potential threat of such a reversal. In the 
summer of 60 BCE, a motion of Cato that – if enacted – would allow for the prosecution 
of bribed jurors, caused a clash between the Senate and the order of knights. Cicero – 
ever intent on maintaining peace and concord – sided with the knights. Naturally, the 
fact that Atticus (a prominent knight himself) is the addressee of the letter, may explain 
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at least in part Cicero’s confession of having opposed the virtuous – though in his eyes 
unrealistic – proposal181.  
Despite his sympathy for the knights, however, Cicero was not entirely uncritical as 
to their reaction to the quarrel, which at least in some cases seems to have amounted to 
blackmail. Indeed, we are told that at least some publicani were starting to neglect their 
duties (quid impudentius publicanis renuntiantibus?)182. Cicero realised that concessions 
would have to be made in order to appease the knights, but the clash had clearly shaken 
his belief in an idealised cooperation between the orders. “Are we then to keep these 
fellows as mercenaries?”, he rhetorically asks, immediately answering his own question 
by defeatistically concluding that this may in fact be the only solution. The only 
alternative would be to rely on domestic dependents, but putting that much confidence 
in people of that station was unacceptable to Cicero: “Or should we take orders from our 
freedmen, even our slaves?” (an libertinis atque etiam servis serviamus).  
Obviously, and as noted earlier, Cicero had no problem whatsoever with freedmen in 
positions of trust and responsibility. What he did not particularly like the prospect of, 
however, was freedmen in a general sense – indeed, libertini – occupying such posts as a 
rule (much like equestrians quasi-monopolised the publicani contracts). The (Loeb) 
translation of libertinis atque etiam servis as “our freedmen, even our slaves” may 
therefore add a subtle layer of interpretation that does not per se reflect the spirit of 
Cicero’s statement. He did not mind his freedmen, Atticus’ freedmen, or the freedmen of 
any other responsible aristocrat occupying administrative, procuratorial, and financial 
functions (provided they respected the conventional decorum of not doing so too 
manifestly or “independently”). If he had meant to express such a sentiment, he would 
much more likely have resorted to a description of these dependents as liberti nostri, like 
he did on several other occasions. 
During his defence of Milo, for example, Cicero had complained that Clodius – 
running for praetor at the time – had planned the promulgation of a law that would 
 
                                                     
181 Cic. Att. 2.1.8: “equites curiae bellum – non mihi, nam ego dissensi”. Atticus was a knight by 
choice, since “upgrading” to senatorial status would prevent him from continuing his lucrative 
business. Berry (2003) suggests that equestrian support is likely to have been a crucial factor in 
Cicero’s succesful forensic career. 
182 Cf. also Cic. Mur. 62. See Liv. 39.44.8 for a similar disturbance with the publicani in 184 BCE, not 
coincidentally caused by Cato’s homonymous great-grandfather. Publicani fulfilled a variety of tasks, 
including the construction of public buildings, the supervision of state property, the collection of 
taxes, etc. (Polyb. 6.17.1-6; Dion. Halik. 6.17.2; Dig. 39.4.12.3). Although they are occasionally 
described as dutiful allies of the state in times of crisis (e.g. Val. Max. 5.6.8), they were often 
associated with fraud (fraudis), dishonest practices (malae artes) and greed (avaritia) in the later 
Republican period, e.g. Liv. 25.1.4; 25.3.8; 25.5.1; 45.18.4. For detailed studies on the publicani (and the 
later semi-formalised ordo publicanorum), see Badian (1972), Milazzo (1993); Malmendier (2002). 
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make Cicero and his audience subjects to their slaves (incidebantur iam domi leges, quae 
nos servis nostris addicerent)183. Referring to the same proposal, he dramatically exclaimed 
that such laws would turn their slaves into freedmen of Clodius (lege nova … servos nostros 
libertos suos effecisset)184. The use of liberti in this last passage is clearly rhetorical, 
conveniently drawing on the established categories of slaves and freedmen (and the 
transformation manumission implied), rather than constituting a representation of 
what would really happen should the laws be passed. Surely, no legal measure was being 
prepared that would turn private slaves into actual freedmen of Clodius. In this case, 
Cicero feared – and wanted to instil the same unease in his audience – that patrons 
would lose their private rights over their freedmen, since a novel distribution of 
freedmen over the thirty-five tribes – the likely content of Clodius’ leges novae – would 
endow the entire class with a much larger impact on the voting process, and 
consequently diminish that of their patrons (hence leges quae nos servis nostris addicerent). 
At the same time, these freedmen would have but one man to thank for this increased 
influence, which might in turn endanger patronal loyalty in favour of loyalty towards 
Clodius (hence servos nostros libertos suos efficisset). The use of liberti (and its connotation) 
rather than libertini was intended to upset Cicero’s audience by explicitly invoking the 
immediate consequences for private patronage relations, and the sudden surge in power 
Clodius would subsequently be able to benefit from. As such, the threatening danger of 
Clodius’ reforms was made felt much more profound than would have been the case if 
Cicero had merely talked about “classes” in more general terms. 
This is, however, precisely what he did in his letter to Atticus about the publicani. It is 
important to note, though, that Cicero is here not talking about freedmen merely taking 
up administrative functions or gaining increased – equal – voting rights. The verb of his 
second rhetorical question is very explicitly servire (libertinis serviamus), the semantic 
scope of which – despite the contextual similarity in meaning – must have struck a 
much more sensitive chord than addicere. The depravity attached to the notion of 
(servile) subservience to freedmen would transform into an outright literary topos under 
the empire (reaching its absolute culmination in the historical tradition on Claudius’ 
reign, cf. supra), but it was already a dreaded condition in the late Republic. 
Transformed into an ingrained and structural practice, the appointment of freedmen 
and slaves to positions of influence or formal power – originally detrimental only to an 
individual’s reputation – would be nothing short of disastrous. Cicero’s remark, in other 
words, expressed a pungent fear that would prove to be justified in the decades to come. 
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Moreover, the gravity and intended impact of an alternative expression like libertis 
serviamus would have been mediated by the positive connotation of an idealised patron-
freedman bond, and the ideology of cooperation and mutual support it was inseparably 
associated with. Atticus had his own favourite dependents, the daily intercourse with 
whom would not have been consistently framed in terms of discrepancies in legal 
status185. Submission to freedmen in a private sphere was – to a certain degree – 
acceptable. In fact, our understanding of Cicero’s interactions with his favourite 
freedman Tiro can in no insignificant way be improved by framing it as a praxis of 
submissive manipulation, as a short digression clarifies.  
Scholarship on Cicero’s relation with Tiro has been traditionally split between two 
hugely diverging opinions (cf. also Chapter 7). One of these, proposing a very literal 
reading of Cicero’s letters to his freedman, considers the relationship as entirely 
tensionless and wholly amiable186.  On the other hand, Cicero’s repeated exhortations 
for Tiro to join his patron again – after having to stay behind due to severe illnesses – 
have been interpreted as a form of (moral) blackmail187. The argument that features 
prominently in these and similar opinions centres around a letter written by Cicero on 
12 April 53 BCE, in which he wrote that if Tiro appeased his master’s troubled mind (i.e. 
by getting better), the latter would in turn “free” him from all his worries (liberare)188. 
Fabre even speaks of a double blackmail, suggesting that Tiro’s prolonged absences were 
deliberately organised by the freedman to exact this kind of concession189.  
As an intermediate, and more nuanced position in between these two interpretations, 
the framework of submissive manipulation goes a long way in elucidating the practices 
 
                                                     
185 E.g. Alexis – whether slave or freedman – who was an imago Tironis (Cic. Att. 12.10). Conversely, 
Tiro was Cicero’s Alexis (meus Alexis) in Att. 5.20.9. 
186 Thus Treggiari (1969a), 219: “the worst Cicero could be accused of was feather-bedding his 
freedman, and the worst fault of Tiro an excessive devotion to his patron’s family”; (1969b), 200: “In 
the short notes from Cicero to Tiro before the manumission, asking him to hurry up and get well so 
that his master may free him from all care, and in the warm congratulatory letter of Q. Cicero 
afterwards, wishing his brother happiness in the affection and accomplishments of his new 
freedman, who had been unworthy of the status of slave, we can see clearly the sincere sympathy 
which existed between Tiro and Cicero and even the rest of the family”. McDermott (1972), 263 
considered the correspondence between Cicero and Tiro as evidence for the “essential nobility” of 
the former’s character, and even saw Tiro’s “over-zealous work for his patron” as the main reason 
for his many illnesses (261). 
187 Smadja (1976), 102. 
188 Cic. Fam. 16.15.1: “Incredibili sum sollicitudine de tua valetudine; qua si me liberaris, ego te omni 
cura liberabo”. The remark is explicitly repeated five days later when Cicero states that his promise 
(of manumission) will be carried out at the agreed time: “Nostra ad diem dicta<m> fient (…)” (Fam. 
16.10.2).  
189 Fabre (1981), 245 note 306: “Il est possible cependant, qu’en 53, il y ait double chantage: à la 
guérison, de la part de Cicéron, à la liberté, de la part de Tiron”. 
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of social negotiation that underlie Cicero’s letters to Tiro. Gramling and Forsyth have 
elaborated the concept of submissive manipulation in a theoretical contribution that 
explores the ways in which stigma can be exploited190. They noted that “flattery and 
other forms of submissive manipulation are weapons” and that these “may be used to 
improve one’s standing in an exchange relationship. (…) individuals who have perfected 
submissive manipulation (…) may voluntarily acquire an inferior status in order to more 
effectively wield this weapon”.  
Applied to the relationship between Cicero and Tiro, the notion of submissive 
manipulation may partially explain Cicero’s aggrandising Tiro’s role in both his private 
and professional life. The famous enumeration of Tiro’s innumerabilia officia to his patron 
in all sorts of domains, Cicero’s claim that – without Tiro at his side – all his literary 
activity stagnated, or the explicit attempts by Cicero to minimise the distance in social 
status to Tiro (e.g. by addressing him in ways that purposely breached social 
hierarchies) are but the top of the iceberg191. Rather than a form of moral blackmail, 
however, Cicero’s and Tiro’s actions, behaviour, and discourse should be framed in an 
on-going process of social negotiation in which both Cicero and Tiro took part, and 
which characterises the interaction between unequal partners in general192. This is a 
well-known tenet of Social Exchange Theory, and contrasts with a more “dramaturgical 
approach” that typically focusses only or primarily on outward manifestations of 
interactions, rather than on personal motivations or the “subjective evaluation of 
outcomes in various situations”193. Blackmail suggests a perfidious intent and a rational 
or even conscious strategy. Seen as a dialectic process of social negotiation, however, 
Tiro’s and Cicero’s actions, discourse, and behaviour reflect both men’s attempts at 
optimising the outcomes of their exchanges. In any case, the practice of submissive 
manipulation indicates that it was not uncommon – in a private context – to diminish 
the social distance between patron and freedman.  
Using libertis servire in his letter about the publicani, then, may not have seemed to 
Cicero the most efficient way to paint the picture of freedmen gaining control over their 
patrons. Libertinis servire, on the other hand, implied a general reversal of hierarchies 
and a fundamental defilement of the discrimina ordinum. It meant that Atticus, Cicero, 
 
                                                     
190 Gramling & Forsyth (1987), esp. 409-410. The study is a modern sociological one, disconnected 
from ancient history (let alone the relation between Cicero and Tiro). 
191 Cic. Fam. 16.4.3: “Innumerabilia tua sunt in me officia, domestica, forensia, urbana, provincialia, 
in re privata, in publica, in studiis, in litteris nostris (…)”; Fam. 16.10.2: “Litterulae meae sive nostrae 
tui desiderio oblanguerunt (...). ei [Pomponio] cupienti audire nostra dixi sine te omnia mea muta 
esse”; 16.18 (Tiro complains about too familiar an address by Cicero). 
192 See Fleischmann (2005), 62ff for an interesting comparison with New World slavery. 
193 For these and similar critiques on the “dramaturgical approach” by social exchange theorists, see 
Singelmann (1972); Gramling & Forsyth (1987), 402-3 (including references). 
  339 
and their peers would be subjected not only to their liberti, but also to the class of 
libertini, i.e. including liberti alieni whose influence over aristocrats other than their own 
patron could not be justified by the closed and idealised context of a patronage relation.  
Finally, the letter about the publicani meaningfully makes a distinction between 
freedmen and slaves. Although manifest subordination to freedmen was considered 
detestable, it is significant that such domination was somehow considered still not quite 
as bad (or at least “differently” bad) as subjugation to slaves. In the phrase an libertinis 
atque etiam servis serviamus, “atque etiam” not only explicitly separates both groups, but 
it also insinuates that being supressed by slaves was worse still than slaving under 
freedmen. The distinction is of course mainly a rhetorical one, as both situations would 
be equally condemned in the strongest of terms. Moreover, the primary target of the 
expression are the libertini, not the servi. Whereas it would be a big – and rather 
unimaginable – leap indeed to one day wake up in a Rome where slaves were given a 
quasi-monopoly on farming taxes, the prospect of freedmen rising to such levels of 
public responsibility was much less utopian. By including servi, Cicero cranks up the 
drama of the passage by insinuating that structurally allowing freedmen to these 
positions was a slippery slope to be avoided: “if we allow freedmen to surpass us, how 
long before our slaves would begin to do so too?”.  
Like Suetonius and Tacitus would do much more consistently some 150 years later, 
Cicero used the class of freedmen to address the thorny issue of potential power 
usurpation or even reversal. It is the only instance where this theme is taken up in a 
letter, and it is certainly no coincidence that it is in such a context that the very rare 
libertini is used. The anecdote shows that fondness, affection, and trust in private 
patronage relations was not incompatible with a much more hostile discourse when 
status boundaries were under threat, and it begs the (unfortunately insoluble) question 
what the private correspondence of a Tacitus or Suetonius would have looked like. In 
any case, Cicero’s rhetorical rant was a warning to the elite, not a condemnation of 
freedmen. The historians typically elaborated on this theme, but firmly rooted it in their 
meta-narrative of moral decay and individual depravity. Whereas Cicero thought it 
sufficient merely to present potential libertine influence as a slippery slope to servile 
subjugation, the historians considered this process completed in their time, barely 
(discursively) distinguishing between slaves and freedmen at all in terms of immorality 
and corruption. 
6.4.2 Libertini in Tacitus’ and Suetonius’ works 
Although their combined works are of a similar order of magnitude as Cicero’s entire 
correspondence, the historical accounts of Tacitus and Suetonius feature many more 
references to libertini: 14 in the Vitae, 9 in the Annals, but only 2 in the Histories. We 
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suggested earlier that this structural distinction is a corollary of the non-embeddedness 
of these works, and more specifically of the generalising meta-narrative imposed on the 
historians’ version of events. A closer look at the contexts in which the references to 
libertini appeared, confirms this suggestion.  
Certainly, in some cases, the narrative simply required a description of a single 
freedman as a libertinus, since his occurrence was entirely disconnected from the 
relation to his patron. In an attempt to damage the young Caesar’s reputation, a rumour 
was spread during his first campaign in Asia (81 BCE). While on a mission to procure a 
fleet, he had allegedly lingered so long at the court of Nicomedes of Bithynia that he was 
suspected of having prostituted himself to the king194. The rumour gained credibility 
when Caesar – after the completion of his mission – immediately returned to 
Nicomedes. Caesar himself had apparently provided an “excuse” for this second visit to 
Bithynia: he had had to collect a debt for a freed client of his (quem rumorem auxit intra 
paucos rursus dies repetita Bithynia per causam exigendae pecuniae, quae deberetur cuidam 
libertino clienti suo). The use of libertinus may simply be due to the fact that it was not his 
own freedman’s business Caesar was taking care of195. But a reasonable question to ask, 
is why Suetonius felt the need to explicitly include the legal status of Caesar’s client in 
the first place. The anecdote would have coped just fine with a mere cliens suus in giving 
Caesar his reason to travel to Bithynia again. One possible explanation is that Suetonius, 
through a more detailed description, tried to endow his gossip with extra authority. It 
could also simply have been the common way to refer to clients. Indeed, throughout the 
Vitae, mentions of clients are usually accompanied by a further specification. When 
Suetonius mentions elsewhere that the young Caesar was devoted to his clientes, the 
example he gives describes the client (a certain Masintha) as a nobilis iuvenis196. When 
Tiberius requested citizenship for one of his dependents, the latter is described as his 
cliens Graecus197. And when Augustus defended one of his clients (a certain Scutarius), 
Suetonius makes sure to describe him as having been an evocatus suus198. In all these 
cases the additional description is placed after the introduction of the dependent as a 
client, thus retaining a strong focus on cliens as primary salient identity dimension of 
the individual. In Caesar’s case, however, Suetonius’ discursive rendering of the passage 
puts greater emphasis on libertino than on client suo, a deviation from the normal 
practice too conspicuous to ignore.  
 
                                                     
194 Suet. Iul. 2. 
195 This is of course confirmed by this libertinus also being Caesar’s cliens. 
196 Suet. Iul. 71: “Studium et fides erga clientis ne iuveni quidem defuerunt. Masintham nobilem 
iuvenem, cum adversus Hiempsalem regem tam enixe defendisset (…)”. 
197 Suet. Aug. 40.3: “Tiberio pro cliente Graeco petenti rescripsit”. 
198 Suet. Aug. 56.4: “Affuit et clientibus, sicut Scutario cuidam evocato quondam suo, qui 
postulabatur iniuriarum”. 
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In an attempt to cast doubt on Caesar’s true motivations, Suetonius insinuated that 
going through all these trouble only to fulfil obligations to a client – a freedman, of all 
people – is rather implausible. The likelihood of the rumour therefore derived not only 
from Caesar returning to Nicomedes’ court when he did not need to anymore, but 
especially from doing so under a somewhat obscure pretext. It would have been a 
different story entirely, if the man Caesar went out of his way for to please, had been a 
freeborn client (ingenuus), or even his own freedman (libertus). The use of libertinus – and 
its prominent place in the client’s identification – serves to discursively cast a shadow 
over Caesar’s motives by implying that this elaborate deference towards a mere libertus 
alienus was suspicious.  
This is not the only instance where this strategy is applied. When evaluating 
Claudius’ legalisation of incestuous marriages – the emperor had to do so in order to 
marry his brother’s daughter – Suetonius spoke to the feelings of aversion he expected 
from his readers, when he remarked that only two men actually made use of this new 
possibility. Things quae ad id tempus incesta habebantur, Suetonius argued, would not 
suddenly be socially accepted after forced legalisation. “None were found to follow 
[Claudius’] example save a freedman and a primipilus (non repertis qui sequerentur 
exemplum, except libertino quodam et altero primipilari)199. It is almost predictable that 
Suetonius should give the example of a libertinus to further accentuate the depravity of 
such incestuous unions, but the juxtaposition to a chief centurion precludes a 
conclusion that the mention of a libertinus was included solely or primarily to 
rhetorically endow Claudius’ decision with an aura of wickedness. Since Claudius 
personally attended both marriages – typically attracted by such displays of immorality, 
the narrative implies – the parties involved would surely have been the subjects of 
widespread gossip and notoriety. It therefore comes as a surprise that Suetonius does 
not include the men’s names (just like he had omitted the name of Caesar’s libertinus 
cliens). In both instances, the mention of a proper name would have added more detail, 
and thus more credibility, to Suetonius’ stories, but an overriding concern prompted 
their omission nonetheless. What we are left with to conclude then, is that credibility 
was less of a concern to the historian than drawing attention to the individuals’ legal 
status200. The implication is that men of all station are corrupted under Claudius (who is 
the main subject of the anecdote, just like Caesar was in the previous one); freedmen, of 
course, in the first place – literally and figuratively – but even responsible commanders. 
In a sense, the anecdote represents the general theme of Suetonius’ narrative of 
 
                                                     
199 Suet. Claud. 26.3. 
200 Although primipilus does not carry the same weight as libertinus or ingenuus in determining legal 
status, the necessity of free birth to serve in the legions – and certainly to become a chief centurion 
– would be known to Suetonius’ readers.  
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Claudius’ Life: moral decay has its roots in the emperor’s depravity, but subsequently 
spreads out even to what is supposed to be the respectable stratum of society. The 
position of the libertinus after Claudius and before the centurion presents him (and by 
libertinus, the entire ordo is implied) as the facilitating channel through which this 
happened. As such, the anecdote also discursively brings home Suetonius’ message. 
A connection to a libertinus – as opposed to a libertus – casted, no matter how far-fetched, 
a shadow over one’s reputation – at least in the discourse of the historians, which 
structurally presented (mainly through generalisation of individual cases of usurpation 
and alleged depravity)  the class of freedmen as a marker of moral decay throughout its 
narrative (cf. supra). This could happen indirectly (like in the case of Caesar’s client, 
where the status is merely meant to cast doubt over the reason for Caesar’s efforts) or 
directly (like in the case where a freedman was the first to follow the immoral exemplum 
of Claudius). The effect was naturally enhanced, if the freedman was biologically related 
to the person under attack. Especially emperors and other leading figures were the 
targets par excellence of this “guilty by association” type of slander. We noted earlier how 
Mark Antony was disparaged by Cicero for having children by the daughter of a 
freedman201. The same Mark Antony in turn resorted to similar accusations during his 
attempts to tarnish Octavian’s reputation. The latter’s grandfather, he habitually 
exclaimed, was only a freedman and a rope-maker; his grandfather but a money-
changer (M. Antonius libertinum ei proavum exprobrat, restionem e pago Thurino, avum 
argentarium)202. Very similarly, in his critical evaluation of the contradicting accounts of 
the emperor Vitellius’ origins, Suetonius gives as evidence for the view that his origo was 
nova et obscura atque etiam sordida, the claim of many that the founder of the family was a 
freedman, a cobbler, and his son even an informer, who married the daughter of a baker 
(contra plures auctorem generis libertinum prodiderunt, Cassius Severus nec minus alii eundem 
et sutorem veteramentarium, cuius filius sectionibus et cognituris uberius compendium nanctus, 
ex muliere vulgari, Antiochi cuiusdam furnariam exercentis filia, equitem R. genuerit)203.  
Tacitus likewise describes Nymphidius Sabinus – Tigellinus’ colleague as praetorian 
prefect under Nero – as the “son of a freedwoman who had prostituted her handsome 
person among the slaves and freedmen of emperors” (igitur matre libertina ortus quae 
corpus decorum inter servos libertosque principum vulgaverat)204. It is significant that the 
 
                                                     
201 Cic. Att. 16.11.1; Phil. 2.3. Cf. notes 62-3 in Chapter 4. 
202 Suet. Aug. 2.3. Unsurprisingly, Octavian’s own version of his family tree paints an entirely 
different picture (ipse Augustus nihil amplius quam equestri familia ortum se scribit vetere ac locuplete, et in 
qua primus senator pater suus fuerit). 
203 Suet. Vit. 2.1. 
204 Tac. Ann. 15.72. 
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historian gives pride of place to Sabinus’ mother, rather than his father205. Moreover, 
the explicit mention of mater seems redundant when libertina ortus would have already 
conveyed the exact same meaning. By again using a pleonasm, Tacitus subtly 
accentuated the bond of blood between Sabinus and the libertina (cf. supra). The 
confession of Tacitus that the woman was actually rather beautiful, makes her 
behaviour – i.e. wasting this beauty by vulgare her corpus decorum to mere slaves and 
freedmen – all the more shameful, and presents it as a clear sign of her moral 
wantonness. Libertinitas would naturally add more colour (and from Tacitus’ perspective 
perhaps even some explanatory power) to this behaviour, although the historian may 
have been labelling her as a freedwoman not because she was one herself, but because 
she had a freed father206. Be that as it may, the duly stressed maternal bond with 
Sabinus served to foreshadow and explain the latter’s own depravity, which is “clearly” 
genetically transferred onto him.  
In all these cases too, freed status is not invoked to insult the freedmen in particular, 
but rather to damage their descendants’ reputations as lacking an extensive family tree.  
Importantly, this descent is consistently juxtaposed to menial occupations, indecent 
marriages, or other immoral behaviour unrelated to these persons’ legal status (e.g. 
acting as an informer). These additional identity dimensions all share with a lower legal 
status their instrumentality for an elite historian’s discourse of distinction. When 
Antony tried to disparage the maternal ancestors of Octavian as well, he invoked the 
African birth of his great- grandfather, and his professions of perfumer and baker. 
Others referenced – in even more hostile terms – his grandfather’s hands, which were 
“stained with filthy lucre” (manibus collybo decoloratis)207. This side of the family had no 
immediate freed ancestors, but the ideological prejudices against foreigners, manual 
labour, and menial pursuit of profit provided alternatives arguably at least as 
 
                                                     
205 Tacitus afterwards notes that Sabinus himself spread the rumour that he was the biological son of 
Caligula. Although he makes no claims of veracity for this rumour, the historian also does not deny 
it (an adulterous relationship between an emperor and a freedwoman would fit very well into his 
meta-narrative of moral decay under the principes). Plutarch, on the other hand, explicitly refutes 
Sabinus’ claim, and instead mentions a gladiator named Martianus as his father (Galb. 9.1-2). 
206 Plutarch (Galb. 9.1) does not describe the mother as a freedwoman as explicitly, but instead as a 
“woman of comely appearance, and a daughter of the imperial freedman Callistus and a menial 
sempstress” (Ἐγνώκει γὰρ ὁ Γάϊος, ὡς ἔοικε, τὴν τεκοῦσαν αὐτὸν ἔτι μειράκιον ὢν οὐκ ἀειδῆ τὴν ὄψιν 
οὖσαν, ἐκ δ’ ἀκεστρίας ἐπιμισθίου Καλλίστῳ, Καίσαρος ἀπελευθέρῳ, γεγενημένην). If we are to believe 
this account, Tacitus may have been unjustly describing Sabinus’ mother as a freedwoman. All that 
mattered for Tacitus, was that she was at least connected to libertinitas through her freed father 
Callistus. 
207 Suet. Aug. 4.2: “Verum idem Antonius, despiciens etiam maternam Augusti originem, proavum 
eius Afri generis fuisse et modo unguentariam tabernam modo pistrinum Ariciae exercuisse obicit. 
(…) hanc [maternam farinam] finxit manibus collybo decoloratis Nerulonensis mensarius”. 
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disparaging, but at any rate achieving the very same purpose as allusions to servile 
descent would.   
If status at birth was something no one could control, public or exaggerated connections 
with freedpersons other than your own (i.e. libertini instead of liberti) were all the more 
despised if they were established voluntarily. The emperor Vitellius’ father initially 
received praise from Suetonius for having been an honest and active man (vir innocens ac 
industrius), but had undermined his own reputation by too close an association with a 
freedwoman (libertina)208. In fact, he fell madly in love with this woman (an amor 
perinfamis), and worshipped her to the point of believing that her spittle had healing 
powers. Since she was not a freedwoman of his own (liberta), this was a particularly 
transgressive violation of status boundaries. But the vilest aspect of the relationship 
pertained to Lucius not even trying to conceal his surrender to this woman’s charms, 
but instead publicly showcasing it (ne clam quidem aut raro, sed cotidie ac palam). Once 
more, the freed mistress is not herself a target of vituperation, but rather serves as a 
means to disparage associated nobles. The same goes for Otho’s avances towards a 
libertina aulica gratiosa in order to obtain Nero’s sympathy and friendship209. Especially 
her advanced age and her almost being decrepit (anus ac paene decrepita) is what makes 
the affair particularly shameful for the future emperor, but the fact that – in thus 
abasing himself – he also neglects traditional status boundaries, adds even more colour 
to the scandal. 
Contrarily, the strict maintenance of status boundaries was under other 
circumstances a tool to positively depict someone. Since (rich and influential) freedmen 
were the most visible and threatening component of aspiring middling groups – though 
greatly magnified and overrepresented in elite literature – they provided a suitable 
metaphor for a self-identification as stern and noble. A correct treatment of one’s own 
liberti was obviously a key pillar of this discourse, but especially leading figures would 
extrapolate this self-image as an attitude towards the whole class of libertini, i.e. much 
like the historians used such generalisation to cast the entire class of freedmen in the 
position of “the other”, against whom self-profiling (and -aggrandising) could be most 
successfully achieved. 
Obsession with social distinction and exclusivity was a concern all the more 
outspoken in the highest echelons of the elites. As noted before, for example, the 
Augustan marriage laws prohibited only senators from marrying freedmen, not knights, 
decurions, etc. According to this “logic”, an emperor should ideally be even more strict 
in maintaining social hierarchies, and all the more reluctant to publicly associate with 
 
                                                     
208 Suet. Vit. 2.4. 
209 Suet. Otho 2.2. 
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freedmen in any way. On dinner parties, Augustus would always pay close attention to 
the rank and personality of his guests (convivabatur … non sine magno ordinum hominumque 
dilectu). As the only example of this attention to status, Suetonius famously quotes 
Valerius Messala, who wrote that the emperor never invited a freedman to his table 
(neminem umquam libertinorum adhibitatem). It is very meaningful that the only exception 
he made was for Menas, who had betrayed his own patron (Augustus’ enemy Sextus 
Pompey). But even in this case (sed), Augustus had felt it necessary to first bestow on 
Menas fictional freeborn status (asserto in ingenuitatem)210. In comparison, when Pliny 
talked about his equal treatment of freedmen on his dinner parties, he consistently used 
liberti rather than libertini to refer to them211. For Pliny, the anecdote was about the 
correct behaviour of a host towards his and his guests’ freedmen in a private (“network 
embedded”) sphere. For Suetonius, the story was about a “good” emperor who rigidly 
respected social hierarchy, and who thereby served as a model for how society as a 
whole should be structured. 
To round up this chapter, we will highlight some of the points made in this secion via a 
final case study (the expulsion of “libertine” Jews from Rome), which serves as a parallel 
to the discussion of Cicero’s exceptional use of libertini in his letter to Atticus.  
6.4.2.1 4000 libertini generis 
Tacitus writes that during Tiberius’ reign (19 CE), a senatus consultum was passed, 
decreeing that 4000 people libertini generis, who were tainted (infecta) with the Egyptian 
and Jewish superstition – as he calls it – and who were of military age, had been sent to 
Sardinia to suppress brigandage there212. Tacitus’ expression libertini generis has given 
rise to considerable debate. Merrill, in a thorough discussion of the entire anecdote, 
suggested that it was a synonym not of “libertini” but of “libertini and their offspring”. 
The interpretation was accepted by a few later scholars, but no unanimity exists as to 
the true meaning of the expression. A recurring argument is that if libertini generis were 
solely ex-slaves, the amount of 4000 freed Jews would be suspiciously large213. Radin, 
however, already argued that these 4000 need not have been “Jews by birth”, but could 
also have included proselytes of the “Egyptian and Jewish rites”, a suggestion all the 
more likely if we take the Jews’ extraordinary succes in converting the city’s population 
 
                                                     
210 Suet. Aug. 74.  
211 Plin. Ep. 2.6.2. 
212 Tac. Ann. 2.85: “Actum et de sacris Aegyptiis Iudaicisque pellendis factumque patrum consultum 
ut quattuor milia libertini generis ea superstitione infecta quis idonea aetas in insulam Sardiniam 
veherentur, coercendis illic latrociniis (…)”. 
213 Merrill (1919), esp. 366f; followed by, for example, Levinskaya (2004), 109 note 14. 
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as the primary reason for their expulsion214. An identification as merely “descendants of 
freedmen” – influenced by Suetonius’ isolated claim that by libertini sons of slaves were 
once meant – is certainly flawed215. Based on an analysis of the occurrences of the very 
same expression (both in Tacitus and in other Latin writers), it seems very plausible that 
Tacitus meant people of freed condition only216. 
In any case, Tacitus contrasts these 4000 libertini generis who were sent to Sardinia, 
with an unspecified group of ceteri, who apparently received a more lenient punishment 
for their superstitious adherence – being merely ordered to leave Italy if they did not 
renounce their unholy rites (ceteri cederent Italia nisi certam ante diem profanes ritus 
excuissent)217. It is tempting to see the discrimination in punishment as a result of the 
ceteri not being libertini generis, but the other historians clearly imply that the ceteri (or 
reliqui) were simply those “Jews” who were not able to serve as soldiers. Suetonius, for 
example, contrasts the Jews of military age sent to Sardinia with the less harshly 
punished “others of that same race or of similar beliefs”218. 
In addition, Tacitus presents his own interpretation of the decree as truthful, when 
he claims that the senators were motivated by a contemptuous belief that, even if all 
4000 were to succumb to the pestilent climate of Sardinia, it would only be a cheap loss 
(vile damnum)219. It would be an almost ludicrous stretch of the imagination to believe 
that a senatorial decree invoked the freed status of trespassers (in addition to their 
“wicked beliefs”) to soften the blow of their potential demise. This would amount to a 
gross violation of the respectability first- (and especially second-) generation citizens 
were at least in principle entitled to, and would be unprecedented in its blatant and 
formal discrimination against a class that was supposed to add lustre to Rome by 
increasing her citizen body220. It therefore seems likely that vile damnum was either a 
purely Tacitean description, or a reference merely to the religious beliefs of the 4000 
(though Tacitus also rhetorically connects it to their libertinitas). 
 
                                                     
214 For this alternative view (that considers libertini generis as referring solely to ex-slaves 
themselves), see Radin (1915), 307-8; Williams (1989), 770ff. 
215 Suet. Claud. 24. The most recent edition of the LCL translation of the Annals (going back to John 
Jackson’s translation of 1931)  wrongfully interprets the passage in this way.  
216 Cf. already Radin (1915), 308, who claimed that “the phrase is not used in Latin of those who were 
of servile origin, but solely of those who were themselves emancipated slaves”. 
217 All non-Tacitean versions of the event agree that the expulsion was much more likely from Rome, 
and not from the whole of Italy, cf. infra. 
218 Suet. Tib. 36.  
219 Tac. Ann. 2.85: “(…) et, si ob gravitatem caeli interissent, vile damnum”. Suet. Tib. 36 similarly 
describes the not so attractive destination of the military aged Jews (Iudaeorum iuventutem per 
speciem sacramenti in provincias gravioris caeli distribuit), but does not go so far as to describe the 
measure as almost intended to condemn them to death. 
220 Plin. Ep. 7.32; IG 9, 517. 
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If the sheer number of historians who mention the expulsion of these “superstitious 
Jews” is any indication, the event was clearly considered noteworthy. Suetonius and 
Seneca the Younger refer – like Tacitus – to the exiles as tainted by a superstition221. 
Josephus and Dio more explicitly frame the decision in a general wave of expulsion of 
Jews from the city of Rome222. However, none of these writers makes any reference to 
the legal status of these 4000 men. The omission of legal status in all other historical 
traditions is undoubtedly significant, especially when we take into account that Tacitus 
regularly uses a reference to freed status as a tool to pejoratively present persons and 
events223. Although Tacitus invokes the authority of the senatus consultum when he 
describes the 4000 as libertini generis224, it would appear that the primary reason for him 
to mention their status is to present them as the utmost depraved individuals. It is 
probably too harsh a judgment to conclude that Tacitus made up the description 
deceitfully, but it certainly is plausible that he wanted to metaphorically attribute to the 
“infected Jews” the wickedness of ex-slaves his readers would be (and would become 
increasingly) accustomed to. In any case, all other authors agree that the fundamental 
reason for the expulsion of the Jews was their belief – or superstitio. That the 4000 were 
singled out to suppress brigandage in Sardinia was due only to their suitable age, their 
legal status being of no significance to any other author besides Tacitus.  
6.5 Conclusion 
“Everything that can be used to tell a lie”. For Umberto Eco, this is the most basic 
definition of semiotics (and thus of language, narration, and discourse)225. Surely, 
 
                                                     
221 Suet. Tib. 36: “Externas caerimonias, Argyptios Iudaicosque ritus compescuit, coactis qui 
superstitione ea tenebantur religiosas vestes cum instrumento omni comburere”; Sen. Ep. 108.22: 
“alienigenatum sacra movebantur et inter argumenta superstitionis ponebatur quorundam 
animalium abstinentia”. 
222 Jos. Ant. 18.3.5: “καὶ ὁ Τιβέριος, ἀποσημαίνει γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν φίλος ὢν Σατορνῖνος τῆς Φουλβίας 
ἀνὴρ ἐπισκήψει τῆς γυναικός, κελεύει πᾶν τὸ Ἰουδαϊκὸν τῆς  Ῥώμης ἀπελθεῖν. οἱ δὲ ὕπατοι 
τετρακισχιλίους ἀνθρώπους ἐξ αὐτῶν στρατολογήσαντες ἔπεμψαν εἰς Σαρδὼ τὴν νῆσον. πλείστους δὲ 
ἐκόλασαν μὴ θέλοντας στρατεύεσθαι διὰ φυλακὴν τῶν πατρίων νόμων”; Dio 57.18.5a: “Τῶν τε 
Ἰουδαίων πολλῶν ἐς τὴν Ῥώμην συνελθόντων καὶ συχνοὺς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐς τὰ σφέτερα ἔθη 
μεθιστάντων, τοὺς πλείονας εξήλασεν”. 
223 Cf. note 206 above. 
224 Tacitus’ discursive rendering explicitly attributed the selection of people libertini generis to the 
patrum consultum (factumque patrum consultum ut quattuor milia libertini generis … veherentur). 
225 Eco (1976), 7. 
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Tacitus’ and Suetonius’ works were no “lies” in any literal sense of the word, but they 
were biased and compelling representations of reality nonetheless. They typically 
present stereotypes and ideological beliefs as “natural”, and thereby create a meta-
narrative with its own independent logic, that is both predetermined and detached from 
any empirical basis. 
Being ingratus, sceleratus, or unduly powerful were personal traits of individual 
(imperial) freedmen, rather than features of the class of libertini as a whole. However, by 
rhetorically attributing these defects to a servilis animus, or a libertinum genus, the 
historians – especially Tacitus – ensure that the danger emanating from these 
individuals is presented not only as merely threatening the exclusivity of the top elite, 
but also as menacing the “natural” order of society at large. When the historians talk 
about libertini, they do not so much talk about individual freedmen in embedded 
contexts, but about a contextualised representation of an abstract category that suited 
both their attempts at distinction, and their meta-narrative of moral decay. 
Moreover, when derogating freedmen, Tacitus shares with Cicero the strategy of 
blaming inherent traits rather than structural inequality. The concrete acts and 
behaviour of freedmen are (rhetorically) attributed to a lack of social or even cognitive 
skills, instead of acknowledging the possibility that unjust treatment or an oppressing 
imposition of patronal demands were the cause of these tensions. The motives for 
misbehaviour were a priori attributed to the perpetrator, because other explanations 
did not fit the taken for granted (elite) notion that a freedman should at all times oblige 
his patron. This is the case for Milichus – whose betrayal was framed exclusively as a 
personal defect rather than as a reasonable concern for his own well-being – but also, 
for example, for Atticus’ Dionysius – whose fall-out with Cicero was not merely due to 
the man’s incapacity to reciprocate or to show gratitude (as Cicero would frame it), but 
rather to Cicero’s too excessively demanding his services226. The conclusion of a modern 
study on (contemporary) criminals can be transposed, mutatis mutandis, to this ancient 
reality: “By employing a language of individual pathology, offenders’ failure to conform 
is presented as a reflection o[f] their inadequacies rather than those of the social 
system” (i.c. the patronage relation)227. Whereas in Cicero’s case, these rants were 
primarily caused by an emotional reaction (e.g. Dionysius’ or Chrysippus’ 
 
                                                     
226 Cf. Treggiari (1969b), 201: “Dionysius was in the awkward position of having to maintain cordial 
relations with Cicero and Atticus simultaneously while his private affairs also demanded his 
attention. He was guilty merely of not putting Cicero’s interests before his own in time of civil war”. 
Cicero seems to have been much more considerate with regard to Tiro’s personal business, e.g. Fam. 
16.23.2: “nec tamen te avoco a syngrapha”. 
227 Mayr (2008c), 52-3. 
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condemnation228), for Tacitus, they were part of a much more deliberate strategy to 
protect the existing social hierarchy (i.e. by criminalising its adversaries or the people 
that undermined it).  
Recognising the independent agency of freedpersons, and adhering to the public 
transcript that prescribed ex-slaves’ equality as free men (and citizens) was – as noted 
in the theoretical framework – advantageous also for the elites. In case of individual 
transgression by a freedman, this agency and freedom could be invoked to ascribe to the 
trespasser all responsibility for the “crime”, and to justify the “righteous” indignation of 
the patron in question. Cicero does this in isolated, concrete, and very rare instances in 
his letters, but Tacitus considers all freedmen as inherently incapable of keeping up 
their end of the bargain in the social contract that was the public transcript of equality. 
It is but a small step from there to try and deny freedmen principle equality altogether, 
as at least a group of senators had in fact tried to do229. Unconditionally assisting your 
patron or living a virtuous life may well have been idealistic expectations for ex-slaves, 
but “detached” historical sources betray very little interest in discriminating between 
virtuous and non-virtuous freedmen, except when it concerned particularly extreme 
manifestations of either side of the spectrum. 
The narratives of freed authors did not fundamentally differ from those of freeborn 
writers with respect to their treatment of slavery, slaves, and freedmen. The fact that 
freedmen apparently did not write autobiographies or similar accounts of their past – in 
strong contrast with their 19th century US counterparts – does not reflect a sense of 
shame or a desire to conceal this past (cf. Chapter 2). In fact, the narratives of American 
freedmen are permeated by cues to personal degradation and perpetual stigmatisation. 
These biographies served primarily to “write off” this sense of inferiority, even though 
they became a much more pragmatic tool of abolitionists in their attempts to overthrow 
the institution of slavery altogether230. In the Roman world, this urge was felt much less 
strongly, since the public transcript of equality – nonexistent in 19th century America 
(due to primarily racial discrimination) – allowed for the development of an identity in 
which dimensions other than legal status mediated an individual’s sense of self (cf. 
Chapter 8). This is perhaps most clear in those cases where the Roman historians 
pretend to have a freedman talk for himself, but where this “direct speech” can be easily 
unmasked as framed in, and serving, an elite discourse on the dreaded influence and 
usurpation of ex-slaves.  
 
                                                     
228 Att. 7.7.1; 7.18.3; 8.4.1-2; 8.10; 9.12.2; 9.15.5 (Dionysius); Att. 7.2.8 (Chrysippus). 
229 Tac. Ann. 13.26-7. 
230 Aje (2013). 
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Claudius’ freedman Mnester, for instance, is said to have ripped of his clothes and to 
have presented the imprints of the lash in front of the emperor, during a final attempt 
to save his own life after his complicity in adulterous affairs had been laid bare231. 
Taking recourse to such visible attestations of previous subjugation is dramatic, and 
typically Tacitean in that it features a freedman whose servile past is quite literally 
inescapable. Moreover, by not giving any background to Mnester’s plea for mercy, 
Tacitus presents it as a desperate attempt of Mnester’s to use his influence over the 
emperor, whereas the accounts of other historians clearly show that the freedman’s 
arguments were not only truthful, but reasonable as well. Indeed, after Mnester had 
piously rejected Messalina’s avances, the empress asked her husband to put him at her 
disposal, not revealing to Claudius her true intentions. Mnester, now compelled to give 
way to Messalina’s demands, was thus forced to commit adultery. When he was 
subsequently interrogated, he invoked the emperor’s order in his dramatic plea. In 
Tacitus’ account, this comes across as a pathetic attempt at self-preservation, but when 
the anecdote is told in full – in Dio’s history, for example – Mnester’s attitude is more 
than reasonable232. Once again, a freedman is used to ridicule the imperial court, and to 
present it as infested by influential (ex-)slaves (Claudius had to be persuaded to not give 
in to Mnester’s plea for mercy). Although freedpersons did at times invoke their servile 
past in their epitaphs (cf. Chapter 8), Mnester’s way of doing this greatly differs from 
these instances, and is clearly shaped by the ideological beliefs of the narrator, who saw 
legal status as Mnester’s primary identity dimension.  
In short, this chapter centred more around the representation and narrative function of 
freedmen in the works of Tacitus and Suetonius, than on these freedmen themselves – 
whose historicity can but very rarely be untangled from the literary stereotype to which 
they were usually reduced. A comparison with Cicero’s letters reveals both certain 
similarities, but also great differences in the role and representation of freedmen in the 
respective corpora (cf. Chapters 3, 4, and 5). In the historians’ narratives, any freedman 
was – if not a libertus Caesaris himself – at the very least a closely associated derivative, 
who differed from the former category only in the more limited opportunities he was 
given to exhibit the depravity supposedly inherent in all members of his class.  
In almost all cases where a freedperson could, quite exceptionally, prove his worth 
and value, it was the patronage relationship that provided the framework; a clear 
reflection of the network embedded contexts of freedmen’s agency – of which the 
historians also were well aware. However, we should be careful not to interpret this as a 
reflection of a reality where ex-slaves could obtain virtue only through reverent 
 
                                                     
231 Tac. Ann. 11.36. 
232 Dio 60.22.3-5. 
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subservience and loyalty to a patron, or as an indication that the discourse on freedmen 
served to thus distinguish between freeborn and freed individuals. When certain 
scholars nonetheless make these or similar assertions, the arguments usually betray too 
great (and often exclusive) a focus on “detached” sources, instead of accounting for the 
valuable role embeddedness in a patronage relation could play in publicising social 
capital (cf. Chapters 4 and 5). They appropriate the ancient elite’s structural discourse of 
distinction, and disregard or undervalue a crucial secundum comparationis (the elite’s 
attitude towards the non-elites in general). The next chapter elaborates on these and 
similar themes by focussing in more detail on the notion of a “typical” discourse or 
vocabulary for freedmen.  
  353 
Chapter 7 A status-specific discourse on 
freedmen? 
7.1 Elite discourse and freedmen virtues 
Throughout the vast scholarly tradition on Roman slavery, the vocabulary associated 
with slaves, and the discursive practices elite writers invoked when writing about them, 
have been the subject of many studies. This strand of research has increased 
exponentially since the 1980’s, and continues to do so today. For example, Sereni paid 
considerable attention to slaves in his very broad study on the vocabulary used to 
discursively render relations of dependence in the ancient world, even though this 
(ideologically inspired) work is greatly superseded by Hoben’s rigorous enquiry into the 
terminology of slave relations1. More specific studies like those of Brockmeyer or Gibbs 
& Feldman have focussed on the different Greek words denoting (or related to) slaves, as 
well as on their spread and occurrence throughout the writings of Homer and Josephus 
respectively, in order to reveal not only the authors’ conception of slavery, but also 
their motives for accentuating (or omitting) specific aspects of the institution of 
slavery2. Freedmen have only very recently been drawn into this current, but promising 
steps have been taken by, for example, Mouritsen, MacLean, and Perry, with Boyce’s 
work on the language of the freedmen at Trimalchio’s dinner table in Petronius’ 
Satyricon constituting a most intriguing precursor3.  
One particularly persistent corollary of the macula servitutis framework is the 
automatic assumption that the Roman elite’s discourse on freedmen was unique in that 
 
                                                     
1 Hoben (1978); Sereni (1976), esp. 16ff. Cf. already Vendryes (1935), who focussed more specifically 
on the Roman world.  
2 Brockmeyer (1979); Gibbs & Feldman (1986). For further references, see Gibbs & Feldman (1986), 
282-3 note 3, 291 note 13. 
3 Mouritsen (2011), e.g. 58-64; Maclean (2012), passim; Perry (2014), e.g. 147; Boyce (1991). 
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it served to stress and consolidate this inherent inferiority. Indeed, ever since Foucault’s 
theories on the dialectic relation between language and power became widespread 
among social historians, a specific elite discourse and vocabulary on freedmen has often 
been taken for granted. Mouritsen, for example, claims that the Romans compensated 
for the lack of formal control over their ex-slaves by “conditioning freedmen and 
inculcating a distinct set of values”, and he postulates the existence of a “specific set of 
virtues” and “specific libertine qualities”4. The only sceptical voice in this debate has 
been that of Jürgen Blänsdorf, although he did not go any further than merely observing 
that in Cicero’s letters of recommendation, the so-called specific libertine virtues were 
also attributed to Cicero’s freeborn clients and friends5. The relative vagueness of 
Blänsdorf’s critique – Mouritsen’s claim nor its rebuttal being the central theme of his 
contribution – allowed Mouritsen to parry it with an equally indecisive response (in a 
footnote) ten years later6. 
Even more recently, Rose MacLean’s doctoral dissertation at Princeton University 
addressed the issue of a freedman vocabulary and discourse. The central idea of this 
thesis is that  
“during the early Empire, when elite values were being reconfigured to 
accommodate the rise of monarchy, freed slaves offered constructive models of 
behavior even as they were subject to intense social prejudice” and that “the 
virtues of deference and industry were adapted from freed culture by members of 
the imperial elite as they renegotiated traditional concepts of honor and glory”7.  
 
MacLean centres on these two virtues – obsequium and industria – in a very literal sense, 
and sees their combination as a clear indicator of a servile identity. In her argument’s 
summary, for example, she states that “[f]or the highest echelons of Roman society, the 
most effective path to glory now lay in the same combination of activity and obedience, 
 
                                                     
4 Mouritsen (2011), 58; 61; 64. 
5 Blänsdorf (2001), 452: “Die Bewertungen, die Cicero solchen Freigelassenen zuteil werden ließ, 
umfassen fast den gesamten Kanon römischer Wertbegriffe, und die Empfehlungsbriefe für 
Freigelassene (…) unterscheiden sich in diesem Punkt nur unwesentlich von solchen, die Cicero für 
seine jungen Freunde verfasste (…)”. 
6 Mouritsen (2011), 62 note 143: “it is important to look at the overall pattern and combinations as 
well as individual instances”. Moreover, the reference to Fabre (1981), 229 does not truly support 
Mouritsen’s response to Blänsdorf, since Fabre’s discussion merely includes several examples of 
freedmen being called fidelis, probatus, or officiosus. It too, ignores the fact that these terms were used 
to describe freeborn friends’ loyalty (cf. infra). 
7 MacLean (2012), iii. 
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industria and obsequium, that had been pursued by slaves and freed slaves for centuries”8. 
MacLean has read both Mouritsen (on whose similar claims her own work elaborates9) 
and Blänsdorf, but explicitly agrees with the former10. However, whereas Mouritsen 
does not quite confront Blänsdorf’s critique, she dedicates a paragraph to refute the 
assertion that there was no specific set of virtues (and corresponding vocabulary) for 
freedmen. Her first point, however, is a mere reiteration – albeit somewhat more 
elaborated – of Mouritsen’s brief argument: the vocabulary and virtues of fides, industria, 
modestia etc. were used to praise both ingenui and liberti, but in the latter case “these 
qualities were (…) embedded in the institution of slavery in ways that made them 
qualitatively different” because the relation between freedman and patron was 
involuntarily entered into11. Not only is the separation of “voluntary” (freeborn) and 
“involuntary” (libertine) forms of patronage too rigid a representation of ancient 
reality12, but the argument as a whole is predetermined: the freedman’s situation as a 
socially inferior individual is supported by the connotation of a specific set of virtues 
and ditto vocabulary; a connotation which only comes into existence when these 
qualities are attributed to a freedman because he is tainted by his servile past, i.e. because 
he is a socially inferior individual.  
Additionally, MacLean draws on Saller’s observation that the Romans often avoided 
the vocabulary of patronage (cliens, patronus, …), preferring euphemisms such as 
amicus13. She then argues that “the language of friendship with which the Romans 
sought to downplay the discrepancies in status between patron and freeborn clients had 
no correlate in the discourse of slavery”14. Leaving aside for the moment the 
indisputable fact that freedmen were sometimes called amici to this effect (cf. infra), this 
claim would in itself only prove that some terms or expressions (e.g. amicus, bonus vir, 
etc.) were reserved for freeborn persons and rarely, if ever, attributed to freedmen; not 
that a specific set of virtues or qualities existed for the latter category of people. 
Mouritsen too conflates these two observations, namely that because the freeborn elites 
had monopolistic access to a specific “path to glory” (i.e. through valour, independent 
action, the cursus honorum, etc.), freedmen therefore must have had an alternative path to 
 
                                                     
8 Maclean (2012), 30. 
9 E.g. Mouritsen (2011), 148 (“[the elites] elevate trust, reliability, and hard work as particular 
libertine qualities”; 152 (“the creation of a distinct social role for freedmen, which stressed their 
twin duty of obedience and industry”). 
10 Maclean (2012), 32. 
11 Maclean (2012), 35. 
12 Wallace-Hadrill (1989a), 8; Saller (1989), 55-9; Drummond (1989), 109. In addition, this distinction 
focusses too one-sidedly on the genesis of the patronage relationship (rather than, for example, its 
functioning or discursive representation) as the most determining factor of evaluation. 
13 Saller (1982), 11-15; Saller (1989), 56; Wallace-Hadrill (1989a), 4. 
14 Maclean (2012), 35. 
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realise “their potential for virtue”15. This duality is as structuralistic as it is 
functionalistic, and therefore a reflection of Mouritsen’s attempt at synthesis rather 
than of Roman reality.  
Surely, and as Mouritsen and MacLean amply demonstrate, other paths to glory were 
available for both categories of people alike, such as familial pride, evergetism, etc. (cf. 
infra). Modestia, obsequium, industria, etc. are singled out as specific libertine qualities, 
but this is overlooking the fact that all of these were virtues appreciated in the freeborn 
(elites) as well. In short, being excluded from one “path” is something different entirely 
than being forced into an opposing one with the purpose of stratification or even 
stigmatisation. There were, on the contrary, many “paths” freedmen shared with 
freeborn (like familial life, professional prowess, or indeed the combination of deference 
and industry), that did not “contrast with”, but rather existed alongside the “path” 
available only to (elite) ingenui. This point will be elaborated upon throughout this 
chapter and the next. 
Returning to MacLean’s statement that there was never any effort to “downplay the 
discrepancies in status” between freeborn patrons and freedmen by employing the 
language of friendship, we can simply refer to some passages in Cicero’s correspondence 
that indicate otherwise. It is of course true that the concept of amicitia implied a certain 
principled equality, and that a patron-freedman relationship was therefore less likely to 
be linked to amicitia than to more pragmatic and concrete denominations like 
necessitudo16. However, on three occasions in Cicero’s letters of recommendation alone 
already, does the term refer to the relation between a freeborn aristocrat and a libertus 
(alienus)17. It are naturally in part the requirements of the genre that incite Cicero to use 
the language of friendship in these cases, but elsewhere too, he explicitly considers 
freedmen his “friends”. As noted before, Cicero was very grateful to Atticus’ freedman 
Eutychides, who had supported him in times of need, and whose manumission he had 
subsequently helped to procure18. No wonder that Cicero would continue to refer to the 
man as a true friend for years to come (meus amicus Eutychides)19. Likewise, when he fled 
Rome, Cicero had high expectations of Atticus’ freedman Dionysius, because it is 
 
                                                     
15 Mouritsen (2011), 64. 
16 E.g. Dig. 3.5.30(31)pr, where a libertus is explicitly distinguished from his patron’s amici (liberto vel 
amico mandavit pecuniam accipere mutuam). The only exception in Cicero’s correspondence to the rule 
that a freedman could not be labelled the “friend” of his own patron is, quite unsurprisingly, Tiro in 
Cic. Fam. 16.16.1 (ac nobis amicum quam servum esse maluisti), cf. infra. 
17 Cic. Fam. 13.16 (amicitia between Cicero and Crassus’ freedman Apollonius); 23 (amicitia between 
Servius Sulpicius Rufus and L. Cossinius’ freedman Anchialus); 46 (amicitia between Cicero and L. 
Nostius’ freedman Zoilus). 
18 Cic. Att. 4.15.1; 16.9. 
19 Cic. Att. 5.9.1. 
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precisely in those situations that “friends” should be there for each other (omnino quid 
ille facere debuerit in nostra illa fuga, quid docto homine et amico dignum fuerit, cum praesertim 
rogatus esset, scio)20. Moreover, a few months later, when his relationship with Dionysius 
had deteriorated even further, Cicero told Atticus that he was greatly hurt by the 
freedman’s indirect insults, but that he hoped that Dionysius would at least respect 
Atticus’ friendship (velim ut tibi amicus sit)21. Finally, Cicero’s brother Quintus was most 
delighted, knowing that after Tiro’s manumission, the family’s favourite was now a 
friend (amicus) rather than a slave, thereby explicitly avoiding the word libertus to 
describe Tiro’s new condition (ac nobis amicum quam servum esse maluisti)22.  
It could be argued that other means as well were employed to downplay status 
discrepancies, or to at least avoid drawing too much attention to the hierarchy between 
patron and freedman. For example, the use of standardised phrases like si me diligis (“if 
you care for me”) when asking for a favour may have concealed that a patron was in fact 
invoking his freedman’s moral obligation to show deference and respect without 
explicitly demanding it. In a letter to Tiro written on 7 November 50 BCE, for example, 
Cicero directly links this expression to the following up of an order, i.e. for Tiro to 
inform him regularly about his health (et facies, si me diligis, ut cottidie sit Acastus in 
portu)23. In fact, Cicero used the very same phrase repeatedly to give the often implied 
“obligation” of getting better extra weight24. Not only diligere, but amare as well was 
used to morally incite Tiro to fulfil Cicero’s wishes. Only one day prior to the sending of 
the letter just quoted, Cicero wrote another one to his ill freedman, stressing that “if 
you love us all, and especially me, your schoolmaster, get back your strength” (tu si nos 
omnis amas et praecipue me, magistrum tuum, confirma te)25. Both amare and diligere suggest 
some kind of intimacy, but also serve to sugarcoat the obligation they are linked with26.  
However, it should be stressed that expressions like si me diligis and si me amas were 
not used by Cicero only to spur Tiro (or any other freedman for that matter) to 
undertake certain actions. We find the same means of incitement in some of Cicero’s 
letters to his peers, his clients and even his family27. Its recurrent appearance thus 
suggests that it was often no more than a figure of speech28. Indeed, not only Cicero but 
 
                                                     
20 Cic. Att. 7.18.3. 
21 Cic. Att. 10.16.1. 
22 Cic. Fam. 16.16.1. 
23 Cic. Fam. 16.5.2. 
24 E.g. Fam. 16.13; 14.2. 
25 Fam. 16.3.1. Cf. 16.1.2; 20. 
26 Clavel-Lévêque (1976), 253; Fabre (1981), 243-5. 
27 E.g. Cic. Fam. 3.9.2 (to Ap. Pulcher); 13.62 (to P. Silius); Fam. 7.21 (to Trebatius); Fam. 14.2.3 (to his 
family). 
28 Cf. Hall (2009), 132-3. 
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also his correspondents use the same phrase in their letters. When Cassius was begging 
Cicero for information about public affairs in January 45 BCE, for example, he wrote: “If 
you care for me, tell me what is going on” (quid fiat, si me diligis, rescribe)29. The 
expression could even be adopted by social inferiors to allude to the obligations a 
patron had towards his client. This is confirmed by a letter to Tiro in November 50 BCE, 
in which Tiro’s regard for Cicero is linked to Cicero’s regard for Tiro (quantum me diligis 
tantum fac ut valeas, vel quantum te a me scis diligi)30. The passage clearly points out the 
mutual responsibilities and duties patron and freedman had to uphold (employing a 
vocabulary of mutual affection rather than patronage). All of this, it should be noted, 
holds true also for the relationship between patrons and freeborn clients, who too were 
expected to respect each other’s position, rights, and responsibilities31. At any rate, this 
short digression indicates that the avoidance of the explicit language of patronage is not 
unique for the relations between patrons and (freeborn) clients, but is attested for 
patronage relations between patron and libertus as well. Both of MacLean’s arguments in 
favour of a specific freedman vocabulary – i.e. that virtues which were attributed to 
both ingenui and liberti alike got an extra layer of meaning in the latter case, and that 
there was no attempt to downplay status discrepancies between patron and freedman – 
cannot be upheld, and it seems that Blänsdorf’s critique still stands. 
This has far-reaching implications for her thesis since the central argument goes that 
such a “libertine” discourse was appropriated by the Empire’s elites to adapt to the new 
monocratic system of rule in which obsequium and industria were the only paths left to 
pursue, even for these elites. It is a matter of fact that the combination of these virtues 
is prominently present in imperial elite literature, which MacLean’s thorough analysis 
of (for example) Tacitus’ use of the terms shows32. However, a predominant focus on 
Tacitus’ works may, as suggested earlier, not give us a reliable impression of the way in 
which (the combination of) these qualities dominated the discourse on the elite’s newly 
adapted virtues. His meta-narrative of moral decay and servile subservience, for 
example, prompts him – more than any other Latin author (Tertullian notwithstanding) 
– to take recourse to terms like obsequium33.  
But even when accounting for this potentially biased nature of Tacitus’ works, 
MacLean’s observations clearly indicate that this discourse gained in importance under 
the Empire. It is, however, another point entirely to argue that these expressions were 
loaned from a supposed discourse on the specific virtues of freedmen, especially 
 
                                                     
29 Cic. Fam. 15.19.4. 
30 Cic. Fam. 16.2. 
31 Saller (1989), passim (e.g. 51ff). 
32 E.g. MacLean (2012), 23, 30, 60. 
33 Cf. Fredouille (1984), 142. 
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because MacLean does not include any analysis of the use of obsequium or industria in the 
Republic. In fact, throughout Republican literature, obsequium is not once mentioned to 
describe the behaviour of a freedman towards his patron. In this period, the word 
usually meant political loyalty, which it still did for the elites during the Principate34. 
Conversely, the combination of respect and industry was already a means of 
recommending freeborn friends during the Republic35. In 54 BCE, for example, Trebatius 
Testa was lauded for his pudor and labor36. A year later, Cicero would assure Curio that he 
had “firmly concentrated all his efforts, all his time, care, diligence, and thought, his 
whole mind in short, on winning the consulship for Milo”, once more connecting loyalty 
to concrete acts of industry (ego omnia mea studia, omnem operam, curam, industriam, 
cogitationem, mentem denique omnem in Milonis consulatu fixi)37. Even in his speeches, he did 
not refrain from praising his clients (or himself) by referencing their/his studium or 
diligentia and the resulting industria, labor, and operae38. Surely, loyalty and industry were 
expected and praised in freedmen in the Republic as well. The claim that slaves and 
freedmen had pursued these very qualities for centuries is thus not wrong, but arguing 
that these words therefore had a servile or libertine ring to them is stretching the 
argument.  
Without stressing the point too hard, it could be argued that the emergence of 
obsequium and industria as a dyad of qualities was a result precisely of the instalment of 
monocratic rule and of its consequences pertaining to the pursuit of honour and offices, 
without it having had a structural antecedent in the Republic, let alone as part of a 
“freedman vocabulary”39. This is not to say that both qualities could not be combined 
(by freeborn and freed alike) in less explicit (i.e. non verbatim) ways. Indeed, after 
having been lauded for his devotion to the res publica, Marcus Porcius Cato was 
 
                                                     
34 Perry (2014), 206 note 15, drawing on Treggiari (1969a), 73. In Fam. 3.5.5, for example, Cicero 
regrets that Scaevola had been “unable” to comply with Ap. Pulcher’s wishes (ac sane vellem potuisset 
obsequi voluntati tuae). Cf. Fam. 10.11.3; 10.15.1 (Plancus promises Lepidus omnia obsequia); Att. 7.1.2 
(Cicero showed Caesar and Pompey omnum obsequium). In Att. 8.4.1 the obsequium of Cicero for a 
freedman (Atticus’ Dionysius) is exceptionally stressed (cf. infra). 
35 Cf. Hellegouarc’h (1963), 178, who considers industria as “un terme désignant la situation de 
l’homme politique”. 
36 Cic. Fam. 7.7.2. 
37 Cic. Fam. 2.6.3. 
38 E.g. Cic. Sext. Rosc. 10 (hoc onus si vos aliqua ex parte adlevabitis, feram ut potero studio et industria, 
iudices); 16 (eam partem causamque opera, studio, auctoritate defendit); Cluent. 199 (horum omnium 
studium, curam, diligentiam, meumque una laborem, qui totam hanc causam vetere instituto solus peroravi, 
vestramque simul, iudices, aequitatem et mansuetudinem una mater oppugnat). For the appreciation of 
(the combination of) these virtues in freeborn clients or peers, see Hellegouarc’h (1963), 174-6. 
39 Syme (1939), 440ff; Roller (2001), 6-9. 
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described by Nepos as a man of extraordinary activity (industria)40. Likewise, when 
praising Atticus’ loyalty to his friends, a link is explicitly made with the concrete actions 
(labor atque industria) he undertook to protect these friends41. Moreover, in order to 
make up for his shameful behaviour, Nepos’ Themistocles decides to devote himself 
entirely to public affairs (totum se dedidit rei publicae), to diligently serve (diligentius 
serviens) both his friends and his own reputation, and to do all this with the utmost 
effort (summa industria)42. In Plautus’ Bacchides, the paedagogus Lydus praises a young 
man for following his father’s ways and obeying his commands (opsequens oboediensque 
est mori atque imperiis patris)43. This loyalty is very directly linked to actual industry since 
his going to sea, his looking after the family assets, and his guarding of the house are all 
mentioned as examples of this obsequium. Moreover, already in the Republic, obsequium 
could carry a pejorative connotation similar to the one Tacitus would consistently stress 
during his narrative about the Principate. In Terence’s Andria, for example, the 
freedman Sosia praises the obsequium of his patron’s (freeborn) son. The tone of the 
passage is cynical, since obsequium is explicitly contrasted with veritas as a means to 
curry favour (obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit)44. In the preceding lines, however, the 
patron had already proudly mentioned the obsequium of his son without this negative 
connotation, and referenced concrete favours that accompanied such loyalty45.  
So although obsequium and industria rarely occur verbatim in tandem in Republican 
sources, there are several cases where the same meaning is conveyed. There is no 
evidence whatsoever to suggest that it was a specific libertine combination of virtues. 
We believe that much of the confusion stems from MacLean’s explicitly synchronic 
approach to the matter46. Especially when one tries to argue in favour of an evolution in 
the use of specific linguistic habits (as is the case here), an exclusive focus on the 
sources of the Principate without any attention to the secundum comparationis (i.c. the 
Republican attestations of the expressions) seems rather rash. The consecutive 
 
                                                     
40 Nep. Cat. 3.1. 
41 Nep. Att. 12.3. 
42 Nep. Them. 1.3. 
43 Plaut. Bac. 457-9. 
44 Ter. Andr. 64-8. 
45 Further examples of the value Republican authors attached to the notions of obsequium and 
industria in praising freeborn (elite) individuals include Nep. Dion 6.5: Dion did not try to lessen his 
unpopularity by showing respectful reverence to his subjects (lenire obsequio) as he should have 
done; Ag. 3.2-3: Agesilaus – as military commander – and his soldiers show great industry (summa 
industria; egregia industria) in preparing for war against Tissaphernes; Eum. 1.5; 2.3: the scriba of 
Philippus of Macedon is of proven fidelity and ability (fide et industria cognita; fides et industria magna); 
Att. 13.4: to acquire property by labour rather than by money (potius industria quam pretio) is a noble 
thing to do; Ter. Heaut. 1040: a son’s primary duties are to obey his father and to preserve what he 
has earnt by hard toil (patri quo modo obsequare et ut serves quod labore invenerit); etc. 
46 MacLean (2012), 17 note 67. 
  361 
deduction of causal (or at least chronological) links therefore remains necessarily 
speculative and, in this case, demonstrably flawed.  
7.2 A “libertine” path to glory? 
One of MacLean’s arguments to corroborate the assertion that “freed slaves in particular 
combined the [servile] virtues of deference and vocational skill to mold their eternal 
personae”, focusses on inscriptions that explicitly proclaim the wish to commemorate 
and eternalise the deceased’s reputation. Because we will take up this topic in further 
detail in the next chapter, we will here only briefly consider her arguments insofar as 
they pertain to the notion of a specific set of virtues for ex-slaves. MacLean collected 
Italian inscriptions that referenced the deceased’s fama, and plotted out per status 
group (ingenui; ingenuae; servi; libertini) the qualities and virtues that constituted this 
reputation (military/civic; pietas; conjugal; other domestic; deference; vocational). 
Whereas a marriage relation was equally salient in fama-formation for freeborn and 
freed individuals, MacLean observed that military and civic achievements were 
accentuated by ingenui (8) more often than by freedmen (2). Deference or professional 
pride is not attested in conjunction with the fama of freeborn persons, but 3 and 5 
inscriptions respectively accentuate these virtues in relation to freedmen47. Although 
she admits that the sample is far too limited to draw statistical conclusions, she invokes 
the results as an argument that freedmen obtained glory and reputation differently 
than ingenui. 
First and foremost, it should be clear that the methodology is biased. It is well-known 
that (non-imperial) freedmen did not commemorate military or civic achievements 
(they were either formally or de facto prohibited from obtaining them), and that 
professional or familial pride was the most obvious go-to alternative48. By tacitly 
assuming that the existence of a distinct “path” to fama is proved by the observation 
that freedmen primarily commemorate these two identity dimensions, this existence is 
rhetorically presented as following naturally and necessarily from the analysis. 
However, the validity of the premise is never adequately questioned. For one, the 
distinction between freeborn and freed is reduced to a distinction between elite and 
 
                                                     
47 MacLean (2012), 45-6. 
48 At least for the salience of professional identity, MacLean’s results are a clear reflection of Joshel’s 
(1992). 
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freed. The examples of “freeborn fama” MacLean discusses are those of Publius Scipio, 
the equestrian M. Ulpius Maximus, and the local benefactor M. Sentius Redemptus49. 
Even if we ignore the possibility – like MacLean conveniently does – that Maximus was 
in fact an imperial freedman who had obtained equestrian status (as his name perhaps 
suggests, but certainly does not prove in itself), nor his nor Scipio’s case constitutes a 
representation of the average ingenuus. Redemptus would qualify much more readily, 
but it is no coincidence that precisely his “civic path” to fama (local evergetism) is 
attested for freedmen as well50. The claim that Redemptus’ path to fama “stands in 
direct contrast to the tendency among freedmen to publicize their dependent 
relationships and [their] specific occupations” therefore blatantly effaces important 
nuances. In other words, when not merely considering elite political or religious 
participation, the paths of freedmen and (lower, or even average) ingenui diverge much 
less meaningfully (if at all) than MacLean’s framing suggests. Freeborn members of the 
plebs media, for example, are entirely omitted from the analysis. Because they too were 
de facto excluded from municipal office (lacking both economic and symbolic capital), it 
is hard to imagine a way for them to obtain fama, unless they drew from the very same 
identity dimensions freedmen tended to accentuate (cf. Chapter 8). 
Moreover, the discussion in no way proves the argument that a combination of 
deference and industry (“the skillful integration of both of these elements”) was a 
typically “libertine” way of displaying virtue, since no inscription actually combines both 
virtues. Furthermore, any chronological evolution is once again ignored, entirely 
precluding the conclusion MacLean nonetheless draws from it, viz. that such a 
combination was a strategy adopted by the elite during the Principate. In fact, when she 
tries to establish the distinction between freed and freeborn in terms of fama 
construction, she draws as fervently from imperial as from republican epitaphs. Finally, 
MacLean at first reluctantly admits that freedmen shared these fama-constructing 
strategies with women, but later distinguishes between elites and women on the one 
hand, and slaves and freedmen on the other, again disregarding the justified nuance she 
had accentuated earlier51.  
In short, MacLean’s epigraphic analysis – as well as the main argument of her thesis – 
rightly sets out to reassess the deeply rooted conception of ex-slaves as passive 
subordinates in Roman society, by arguing that they provided a template for the elites 
in imperial times. It seems, however, that the attempt at reconsideration is too radical, 
and as flawed (in opposite direction) as the notion it contests. It moreover 
 
                                                     
49 CIL 6, 1288; 2160; 10, 5349. 
50 MacLean (2012), 46, 217f. The two attestations in MacLean’s sample of freedmen accentuating 
their fama like this, remain unmentioned. 
51 MacLean (2012), 48-51. 
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problematically implies, that before any elite appropriation of this discourse took place 
during the Principate, obsequious behaviour and industry were virtues exclusively 
praised in people of servile descent. Surely, any study aspiring to reveal the positive 
role, agency, and impact of freedmen on Roman society should be welcomed as a 
valuable counterweight to a tradition that still looms large in scholarly discourse52. But 
we should be watchful not to replace one biased orthodoxy with another. A brief 
revaluation of MacLean’s argument – and it should be stressed that this constitutes but a 
fraction of her thesis – will reveal these caveats, which we will subsequently integrate in 
our own analysis of carmina epigraphica in Chapter 8.  
Take the verse epitaph of a flute-player from Venafrum, for example53: 
Sacred to the spirits of the departed. Hold on a moment, traveller, as you hastily 
walk by. Receive these words of mine as petitioning you from beyond the grave, 
because you too must expect a day like this to come. I am called Iustus, not after 
my father, but after my mother. I lived, born from a father who was poor in terms 
of wealth, but rich in terms of reputation. I called to arms Mars’ sword-fighters, 
exhorting them with my signals, and indicating the rhythm by alternatively 
sounding my flute songs. I lived for 21 years, 11 months, and 29 days. I, Iustus, 
perished by a cruel death. His parents [made this monument] for their 
incomparable son. 
 
D(is) M(anibus) s(acrum) / substa praecor paulum festina(n)s ire viator / et m{a}ea 
post {h}obitum rogantis concipe verba / tale(m) c<u=O>(m) speres et ipse venire 
di{a}e(m) / Iustus ego non paterno se<d=T> materno nomine dictus / paupere 
patre quidem se<d=T> fam(a)e divite vixi / tibicinis cantu modulans alterna 
vocando / martios ancentu stimulans gladiantes in arma vocavi / qui vixi annis 
XXI m(ensibus) XI d(iebus) XXVIIII / Iustus ego morte acerba peri / parentes filio 
incomparabili. (Venafrum) 
 
MacLean discusses this inscription when arguing in favour of a “unique” libertine path 
to glory, and presents it as evidence for the “different” fama construction of ex-slaves54. 
However, there is no evidence at all for attributing freed status to Iustus. Put differently, 
a predetermined focus on identity dimensions assumed to be typically libertine, not 
only leads to circular reasoning, but also ignores manifest cues that indicate the exact 
opposite to be true. The argument rests on the assumption that the description of 
 
                                                     
52 This is the main goal also of Bell & Ramsby (2012). 
53 CLE 1319 (= CIL 10, 4915) 
54 MacLean (2012), 53-4. 
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Iustus’ father as pauper is a euphemising reference to the latter’s servile status, but this 
too is a very tentative point of departure, since the majority of carmina that mention 
paupertas explicitly refer to a lack of financial resources, rather than to freed status per 
se.  
It is not the Roman freedman Heliades’ freed status, for instance, that prevented him 
from making the monument for his deceased wife entirely in gold55. Nor was Quintus 
Egnatius Blandus from Brescia referring to his servile past when he deplored that he 
could only bestow very small gifts (parvola dona) on his deceased spouse56. Moreover, 
Gaius Gargilius Haemon was explicitly talking about his modest peculium when he 
contrasted his paupertas with his elevated character, and Ninnia Primilla explicitly had 
her parents’ census in mind when calling them “poor”57. None of these persons felt any 
shame in referencing their modest means (or that of their parents). In fact, most of 
them used it as a springboard to draw attention to admirable virtues, by implying that 
even such a considerable restraint did not taint their good morals. The same holds true, 
however, for freeborn individuals, who accentuated their paupertas at least as frequently 
as freedmen (and for the exact same reason). Lucius Trebius Ruso (Luci filius), for 
example, gives pride of place to the most severe poverty (summa pauperies) he had 
managed to overcome as a soldier in the fleet58. In short, the legal status of Iustus’ father 
can therefore not be deduced merely from his paupertas. 
There is, however, a much more compelling argument MacLean does not take into 
account, and which relates to the remarkable stress put on the origin of Iustus’ name 
(ego non patrio, set materno nomine dictus). There is no way of knowing for sure whether it 
was his cognomen or his nomen Iustus had inherited from his mother. The practice of 
giving a second son a cognomen as a tribute to his mother is a well-attested 
phenomenon. The first son of Titus Flavius Sabinus and Vespasia Polla, for example, was 
named Titus Flavius Sabinus after his father, but their second son Titus Flavius 
Vespasianus – the future emperor – after his mother. But it seems highly unlikely that 
this is what happened in Iustus’ case as well. Indeed, there was no reason to manifestly 
stress the reception of a maternal name, if the inclusion of this cognomen in itself 
 
                                                     
55 CLE 1086 (= CIL 6, 19175): “si tantum mihi fortuna largita [fuisset quantum in te pietas] / coguit et 
officia aureum hoc to[tum fecissem nunc monumentum] / de mea pauper<i=T>e feci ut [potui]”. Cf. 
also CLE 204 (= CIL 6, 15225): “si pro virtute et animo / fortunam habuissem magnificum 
mon<u=I>men/tum hic aedificassem tibi”; 1038 (= CIL 6, 14404): “terra levi tumulo levior ne degravet 
ossa / pau(pe)ris inpositum sustinet arte super”. 
56 CLE 1042 (= CIL 5, 4593): “Pro paupertate haec summo tibi / tempore coniunx ut potui / meritis 
parvola dona dedi”. 
57 CLE 134 (= CIL 6, 8012): “peculio pauper animo divitissimus”; CLE 1125 (= 9, 3358): “li/bertinis ego 
nata parentibus ambis / pauperibus censu moribus ingenuis”. 
58 CLE 372 (= CIL 5, 938). 
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already honoured the mother. Much more meaningful (and worthy of mention) would 
be the deviation from standard naming practices that prescribed that sons received the 
nomen of their father (if he was married formally with the child’s mother). 
Moreover, if it was indeed his cognomen that was meant here, the complete omission 
of the mother’s actual name seems odd, especially in light of the unusual stress that is 
put on the symbolical act. Perhaps the most significant indication that Iustus’ nomen was 
meant, is the simple fact that the carmen explicitly uses “nomen” instead of “cognomen” 
to convey the message. Other dedicators who drew attention to naming practices or 
nomenclature, used the term “cognomen” when indeed a cognomen was meant. An 
unnamed girl of Osor in Dalmatia was, for example, considered lucky (felix) because her 
father had given her a cognomen on her birth (cognomen pater huic fuerat natale daturus), a 
detail clearly included to highlight her freeborn status rather than eternalising her 
name (which is not included)59. 
In fact, both of Iustus’ parents remain unknown, since they did not deem it important 
to include their own names in the epitaph for their son. This too suggests that the 
information conveyed by the monument pertains first and foremost to Iustus himself, 
not his parents. Why so extensively stress that you did not receive your nomen from 
your father if this was not meant to implicitly highlight the reason for this deviation 
from normal naming practice? Indeed, the answer would logically be that his father was 
either a slave and had no nomen to transmit in the first place, or that he was not 
formally married to Iustus’ mother. By mentioning that he derived his nomen from his 
mother instead, it would have been clear to any reader that Iustus was born free (since 
his own mother was at least a libertina). This would correspond well with the suspicion 
that the passage was included to tell us something about the only named person of the 
epitaph, rather than about his unnamed parents who were attributed no noteworthy 
agency outside the erection of the monument. Therefore, the point is that in light of his 
mother’s free status, the legal status of Iustus’ father is irrelevant in determining Iustus’. 
This reading of the epitaph renders difficult to maintain MacLean’s assumption that 
Iustus was a freedman himself. It also explains the urgency felt by the parents to include 
a highly exceptional detail like the transmission of the maternal nomen. Finally, the last 
verse of the epitaph starts with Iustus ego and contains a pun on the literal meaning of 
the name. Death was acerba indeed if it took away prematurely someone who was as 
“righteous” (iustus) as Iustus. By comparison, the verse elucidating the origin of Iustus’ 
nomen similarly (and conspicuously) starts out with Iustus ego. Here too, then, a parallel 
pun can be discerned: it was only “just” that Iustus received the maternal nomen, 
 
                                                     
59 CLE 1160 (= CIL 3, 3146). Her legal status was already implied in the first line of the epitaph: “Felix 
haec visa est nascendi lege puella”. 
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because it was the right thing to do for any child born from a slave father and a free 
mother. 
The hypothesis of a “different” kind of fama construction for freedmen starts to waver 
once we do not a priori assume – as, indeed, we should not – that individuals who 
commemorate their success in trade or any other “non-elite” virtue must be d’office ex-
slaves. MacLean observes the “significance of service and labor” and of “the willingness 
to combine acts of deference with assertions of personal agency” in these individuals’ 
“cultural milieu”, but too quickly makes generalising claims when she calls this 
significance “unique” for freedmen60. 
Another example is her interpretation of the epitaph of Titus Aelius Faustus, who 
died at the age of 28, after having been made responsible by Marcus Aurelius and 
Commodus for the distribution of “oily liquids” (pinguis liquor) among the people61. 
MacLean interprets Faustus’ gratitude for this appointment as deference towards the 
emperors and – when considered in tandem with his active role in the oil distribution – 
as an “undeniable product of servitude”. The argumentation covers the next two pages 
of the chapter, and confidently concludes that this example of “integration of obedience 
and economic activity” supports the general assertion that Faustus’ rarissima fama was 
typically libertine62. However, it is not at all borne out of the inscription that Faustus 
was in fact an imperial freedman. Certainly, “Faustus” is a name known to have been 
given to slaves (and thus carried by freedmen), but like other “servile” names, the 
onomastic argument is in itself all but sufficient evidence for freed status, since 
“servile” names like Felix, Fortunatus, Primus, and indeed Faustus, were extremely 
popular names for (first generation) freeborn children too63. Furthermore, Faustus was 
appointed to his function during the joint rule of the emperors mentioned (simul 
induperantes), which extended from 177 to 180 CE. His name (Titus Aelius), however, 
indicates that, if he was in fact an ex-slave, he was freed not by Marcus Aurelius or 
Commodus, but by the previous emperor (Antoninus Pius). If we conservatively assume 
that Faustus was 25 years old in 177 CE (the earliest possible date for his appointment), 
then even if he was freed during the last year of Pius’ reign (which is, again, a very 
 
                                                     
60 MacLean (2012), 54. 
61 CLE 1814 (= CIL 6, 34001): “Moribus hic simplex situs / est Titus Aelius Faustus / annis in lucem 
duode/triginta moratus / cui dederant pinguem / populis praebere liquorem / Antoninus item 
Commodus / simul induperantes / rara viro vita et species / rarissima fama / [i]nvida sed rapuit 
semper / Fortuna probatos / ut signum i<n=M>venias quod / erat dum vita maneret / selige 
litterulas primas / e versibus octo”. The first letter of every second verse forms an acrostic, spelling 
out the latinised Greek equivalent of “Faustus” (prosperous, fortunate): “Macarius” (Μακάριος). 
62 MacLean (2012), 54-6. 
63 Kajanto (1965), 29-30; Duff (1958), 57-8; Tran (2006), 115; Mouritsen (2005), 41 note 17; (2011), 286-
9; Liu (2009), 174 (including further references). 
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conservative assumption), he would only have been 9 years old at manumission. It 
therefore seems much more likely that Faustus was the son of one of Pius’ freedmen64. 
Finally, another procurator ad oleum and contemporary of Faustus was of equestrian 
status65. Technically, Faustus, if a freedman, could obtain such extraordinary distinction 
through the ius anulorum aureorum, but it again seems more likely that the honour was 
given to the freeborn son of a freedman (especially given his relatively young age).  
Whereas Faustus’ status may still be open for debate on some points, the tentative 
identification of, for example, the Ostian Marcus Quintilius as a “prominent libertus” is 
entirely speculative, and based solely on his functions as sevir Augustalis and 
quinquennalis perpetuus of the colleges of Tiber ferries (corpus lenunculariorum traiectus 
Luculli) and caulkers (corpus stuppatorum). The same goes for Claudius Diadumenus 
whom MacLean herself describes as “almost certainly a member – or at least descended 
from a member – of the imperial family”, but who is treated as an ex-slave throughout 
the discussion66. Whereas she reads the combination of simplicitas, trustworthiness, 
concern for reputation, and professional activity as a typically “libertine” 
intertwinement of virtues, it seems much more advised indeed, to accept the arguments 
of Paul Veyne or Nicolas Tran, who both consider these “thèmes courants dans les 
carmina epigraphica des hommes de métier” and, as such, characteristic of the “plèbe 
moyenne” in general67. 
Consider, finally, the metric epitaph of the Tarraconese coppersmith (aerarius) Aper, 
erected by his devastated father68. His youth, we are told, was praiseworthy (cuius fuit 
probate iu(v)entus), and his poverty had not prevented him from always being devoted to 
his friends (pauper vixisti fuisti pronus amicis). The explicit mention of his occupation, his 
poverty, but also his pleasantness and devotion would be considered typical tell-tale 
signs of Aper’s status as a freedman if we follow MacLean’s reasoning. Nowhere, 
however, is this made explicit, nor is there any patronal presence in the inscriptions 
 
                                                     
64 Several scholars have taken this position, e.g. Alföldy (2005), 49. 
65 CIL 14, 20: Caius Pomponius Turpilianus was the equestrian procurator ad oleum in Galbae horreis, cf. 
Pavis d’Esurac (1976), 191; Tran (2008), 304. 
66 MacLean (2012), 57-9. 
67 Veyne (2000), 1187-1194; Tran (2006), 97-102 (the quote is from p. 99). 
68 AE 1962, 189: “Conditus his tumulis iuvenis iacet / hic Aper aerarius ille / cuius viventis fuit 
probata iu(v)entus / pauper vixisti fuisti pronus amicis / annis vixis{is}ti XXX duo menses et d(ies) 
VIII / o dolor o lacrim(a)e ubi te dum qu(a)era(m) ego nate / has tibi fundo miser lacrimas pater 
orfanus ecce / effugit et lumen labuntur membra dolore / hoc melius fu<isse=ERA>t ut funus hoc 
mihi parares / inferi si qua sap<iu=E>n miserum me abducite patrem / iam carui lucem qui te amisi 
ego nate / si qui pergis iter viator transis aut p<au=O>llo resistes / et relegis titulum sulcato 
marmore ferro / quod ego feci pater pio mi dulcissimo nato / hoc bene habet titulus tumulo manent 
ossa qu[ieta] / semper in perpetuo vale mi ka[ri]ssime na[te]”. The carmen is not included in 
Bücheler (1982) [1895-1930], but was published in Cugusi (2007), 58. 
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(the main focus being solely on Aper’s father and his grief). Although Aper may in fact 
have been an ex-slave, it is difficult to imagine any other virtues or qualities he could 
have stressed if he had been a freeborn pauper who similarly lacked the social, economic, 
and symbolic capital to invest in a public career.  
Indeed, an unnamed farmer from Mactar, finally, started out his extensive epitaph 
with the words: “I was born in a poor home and from a poor father” (fui / paupere 
progenitus lare sum parvoq(ue) parente)69. His poverty is immediately explained in more 
detail: “my father had neither property nor house” (cuius nec census neque domus fuerat). 
Born under these circumstances, he had no other choice than to work hard and without 
pause (ruri mea vixi colendo / nec ruri pausa nec mihi semper erat). Clearly, this industry did 
not go unnoticed, since he was promoted to leader (ductor) of a group of harvesters after 
twelve years of toiling. Eleven years of successfully leading his band – and in the 
meantime maintaining a frugal lifestyle – eventually resulted in our man being able to 
procure a house for himself, and to become a true pater familias (hic labor et vita parvo 
con(ten)ta valere / et dominum fecere domus et villa paratast / et nullis opibus indiget ipsa 
domus). Surely, the extraordinarily strong focus on his manual labour, his frugal 
lifestyle, and his resulting sense of achievement signals a path to fama MacLean would 
likely have labelled as “libertine”. In fact, if the inscription had ended here, he may well 
have been identified as belonging to the group of libertini proudly exclaiming 
professional prowess and familial achievement. But before concluding his epitaph with 
once more highlighting his honesty and faithfulness, this successful farmer reveals that 
he had eventually obtained public office as decurion and censor of Mactar, despite his 
precarious youth (et nostra vita fructus percepit honorum / inter conscriptos scribtus et ipse fui 
/ ordinis in templo delectus ab ordine sedi / et de rusticulo censor et ipse fui). Unmistakably a 
sign of his free birth, this ascension once more warns us against drawing premature 
conclusions based solely on commemorative themes like industry and zeal, which were 
in both epigraphic and literary sources appreciated also in ingenui70. 
 
                                                     
69 CLE 1238 (= CIL 8, 11824). 
70 E.g. Tac. Ann. 4.1 (about Sejanus): “palam compositus pudor, intus summa apiscendi libido, eiusque 
causa modo largitio et luxus, saepius industria ac vigilantia, haud minus noxiae, quotiens parando 
regno finguntur”, implying that industria and vigilantia – if honestly applied – were praiseworthy 
qualities. Idem for Fronto Amic. 1.6 (addressed to the commander Avidius Cassius, and dealing about 
the tribune Junius Maximus): “ita de laboribus et consiliis tuis et industria et vigilantia praedicator 
ubique frequentissimus extitit”. See also below. 
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7.3 Freedmen’s virtues in epistolary literature 
The analysis of this chapter takes two intriguing passages from Cicero’s correspondence 
as basic points of departure to quite extensively reassess the notion of a typical “set of 
virtues” or a “specific discourse” for freedmen. The first one constitutes a bridge with 
the previous chapter, since it contains the only example of direct speech of a freedman 
in Cicero’s correspondence71: Tiro’s expression valetudini fideliter inserviendo. The second 
– Cicero’s elaborate description of Atticus’ freedman Dionysius in Att. 7.4.1 – is one of 
the most frequently cited passages in defence of the argument that there existed a 
“fairly well established format for the praise of freedmen”, and will therefore be treated 
in greater detail. 
7.3.1 Valetudini fideliter inserviendo 
One of the most captivating examples of a freedman’s own voice recorded in a private 
context is Tiro’s expression that he “faithfully took care of his health” (valetudini fideliter 
inserviendo)72. These are the only three words of which we know for a fact that the 
famous freedman wrote them verbatim, since Cicero not only cites them, but also rather 
extensively comments on them in a response letter. Tiro was in Rome at the time, taking 
care of his patron’s business, while the latter sojourned in Tusculum. From there he 
wrote: 
Video quid agas; tuas quoque epistulas vis referri in volumina. Sed heus tu, qui 
κανὼν esse meorum scriptorum soles, unde illud tam ἄκυρoν 'valetudini fideliter 
inserviendo’? Unde in istum locum ‘fideliter’ venit? Cui verbo domicilium est 
proprium in officio, migrationes in alienum multae. 
 
I see what you are doing! You want your letters too put into rolls. But just a 
moment, you yardstick of my literary style, where did you come by so bizarre a 
phrase as ‘faithfully studying my health’? What is ‘faithfully’ doing in such a 
context? The home territory of the word is the performance of a duty, but it 
makes many excursions into other fields. 
 
                                                     
71 Only one other instance features a freedman’s direct speech, but the passage is corrupted and 
unclear. It concerns Gabinius Antiochus’ mysterious outcry after hearing of his conviction in the 
wake of his patron’s acquittal, Cic. Att. 4.18.4 (itaque dixit statim † res p. lege maiestatis ουσοιμρισαμαφιηι 
†). Cf. the references to this passage in Chapters 4 and 6. 
72 Cic. Fam. 16.17.1. 
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Apparently, Tiro had fallen ill once again. His recurrent non-activity due to sickness is 
one of the most often noted peculiarities of book 16 of the ad Familiares. He is reported ill 
no less than five times between 53 and 44 BCE. A first time in Tusculum in 53, while 
Cicero was staying in Cumae; a second time during the return journey from Cilicia in 50, 
when Cicero was forced to leave Tiro behind in Issus; a third time – after a brief 
recovery – in October 50, when Tiro stayed behind for over half a year in Patrae; and 
two more times between 46 and 4473. The sincere worries Cicero felt during these 
periods are clearly reflected in the frequency with which he wrote to Tiro. For example, 
the first time Tiro fell ill in 53 BCE, Cicero wrote him at least four times in eight days (on 
10, 11, 12, and 17 April)74. All of these letters betray true sorrow on the part of Cicero, as 
is clearly indicated by their vocabulary: summa cura, nox plena timoris ac miseriae, angor, 
sollicitudo, etc. Similarly, Cicero sent Tiro almost daily letters in November 50 BCE (e.g. 
the third, fifth, sixth and seventh). Not only the words but also the fact that he wrote up 
to three letters a day express the same agitated and anxious state of mind75. 
The seemingly many instances in which Tiro fell ill are not necessarily noteworthy 
per se. The opposite is true, however, for the fact that so many letters mention this 
theme, and that these are moreover exceptionally stressed by their placement at the 
very beginning of book 16 in the original (i.e. non-chronologically ordered) edition of 
the correspondence. Especially the physical absence of Tiro during all this time, and the 
loss of his administrative and literary abilities seem to have greatly troubled Cicero. He 
even refers to this quite frankly in 53 BCE: “You [Tiro] must get ready to restore your 
services to my Muses” (tu Musis nostris para ut operas reddas)76. Even in the most anxious 
letters, Cicero does not forget to include this kind of encouragement. In 50 BCE for 
example, he wrote that having his freedman at his side again was his most important 
wish, and that Tiro should thus take care of himself above all else77. He thereby implied 
that taking care of his health was the best and fastest way for Tiro to get back to his 
patron. Two days later, he urged him to get well as soon as possible, because seeing each 
other again would be the greatest pleasure for both patron and freedman78. 
These (and many more) attestations clearly indicate that Tiro’s health was a true 
concern of Cicero’s, but they do not ipso facto explain this concern. Indeed, it has been 
argued extensively that the reason for Cicero’s desire to have Tiro back at his side as 
soon as possible, was not merely the freedman’s agreeable character. The argument 
 
                                                     
73 For a more detailed chronology, see McDermott (1972), 260-1. 
74 See Cic. Fam. 16.13; 14; 15 and 10 respectively (the order of the references is based on D. R. 
Shackleton Bailey’s chronological arrangement of the letters in the Loeb editions). 
75 Cic. Fam. 16.1-6. 
76 Cic. Fam. 16.10.2. 
77 Cic. Fam. 16.1.2. 
78 Cic. Fam. 16.2. 
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goes that 1) Cicero’s pragmatic wish to once more make use of Tiro’s manifold qualities 
was at least as vehemently stressed on every occasion, and that 2) Cicero uses his 
position as a patron to impose recovery as an obligatory service Tiro owed as a 
freedman79. In another letter, for example, Cicero stated that by looking after his health, 
Tiro would fulfil his patron’s strongest desire (maxime obtemperaris voluntati meae)80.The 
general tone of the letters may indeed be very intimate and cordial, but an analysis of 
the specific terminology, it is argued, shows the implied obligation imposed on Tiro (e.g. 
obtemperare). This led Fabre, for example, to conclude that “Cicéron [donne] ainsi un 
caractère d’obligation à la guérison d’une maladie qui le prive des services de son 
dépendant”81. However, the exact same expression (and many similar ones, in fact) is 
used extensively throughout the correspondence in contexts that did not imply (freed) 
subservience or (patronal) superiority. Thus Cicero wrote to T. Titius that in 
recommending C. Avianius Flaccus, he was deferring to the desire of this client of his 
(qua re velim mihi ignoscas si illius voluntati obtemperans minus videbor meminisse constantiae 
tuae)82. Similarly, L. Lucceius – an ex-praetor of lesser rank than Cicero – on giving 
cautious advice to Cicero, hoped that the latter would comply with it (in altera [res] mihi 
velim, si potes, obtemperes)83. In manifestly expressing their obeisance to the counsel or 
desires of socially inferior individuals, Cicero and his peers applied the strategy of 
submissive manipulation (cf. supra). As Hall has convincingly shown, the resulting 
discourse was a “polite fiction” meant “to reduce social embarrassment and tension”84.  
However, it was, mutatis mutandis, not considered inappropriate or disrespectful for 
high-ranking individuals to use the verb obtemperare when asking their freeborn clients 
or friends to adhere to their instructions or advice, nor was it shameful for the latter to 
conform to their patron’s or friend’s desires. As an argument during his request to 
recommend him to the governor of Achaea, Manius Curius, for example, assured Cicero 
that a promotion in that province would allow him to more efficiently obey Cicero’s 
instructions (Sulpici successori nos de meliore nota commenda, quo facilius tuis praeceptis 
obtemperare)85. All of the above indicates that, when Cicero asked Tiro to “comply with 
his desire”, this should not per se be considered evidence for any presumed intention to 
remind his freedman of his social inferiority and his obligations towards his patron. 
Rather, it was an expression ingrained in epistolary discourse, meant to cautiously 
 
                                                     
79 See especially Smadja (1976), 95ff; Clavel-Levêque (1976), esp. 250-5; Daubigney (1976), 23; Fabre 
(1981), 244ff. 
80 Cic. Fam. 16.1.2-3. 
81 Fabre (1981), 247. 
82 Cic. Fam. 13.75.1. 
83 Cic. Fam. 5.14.3. Further examples include Fam. 9.14.1; 9.25.1; 12.12.1; etc. 
84 Hall (2009), 78ff. 
85 Cic. Fam. 7.29.1. 
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request the addressee to take au sérieux and respect one’s symbolic capital, thereby 
implicitly or explicitly invoking the reciprocal gratitude the addressee would receive in 
return. 
Nonetheless, the vocabulary Cicero (and his brother) used to address and refer to Tiro, 
continues to be described as a “language of dependence, hierarchy and servitude” in 
modern studies86. Especially Beard makes much of the “paradox … that Cicero and his 
family love their (ex-)slave in the language of slavery itself”87. She draws attention to 
Quintus’ use of the heavily laden verb “to scourge” (verberare), when he playfully scorns 
Tiro for not having written recently: “I have scourged you tacitly in my mind because a 
second package of letters has arrived without any from you”88. Beard justly notices, 
however, that the very next letter in the collection (even before the correspondence 
was rearranged chronologically by modern editors) featured the same Quintus 
exclaiming that Tiro had given him a flogging in return (mirificam mi verberationem 
cessationis epistula dedisti)89. Not only the flogging, but also the reason for it (both men’s 
laziness, cessatio) was the same in both cases. It will remain forever unclear whether 
Tiro had actually used these very words in his own letter, but it is equally possible that 
Quintus merely found it funny to reverse social roles himself. Indeed, and as Beard fails 
to notice, it is perhaps no coincidence that Quintus wrote the letter during Saturnalia, 
which naturally provided a very fitting context for self-degrading jokes like this. What 
the anecdotes in any case do tell us, is that Tiro would magnanimously receive such 
puns (and perhaps even respond to them in kind). It seems very far-fetched to consider 
these two letters as support for the claim that Tiro was continuously and deliberately 
framed in a context of subordination.  
Turning to the many letters Cicero wrote to the ill Tiro, Beard continues that the 
word servire was often used to express the expectation that Tiro should get better. She 
makes (without explicitly stating so) the same argument as Smadja, Fabre, et al. when 
she claims that this verb was used to insinuate that recovery was a duty owed by 
someone who had been a servus. “Serve your body well” (corpori servi) and “I rather want 
you to serve your health” (malo te valetudini tuae servire) are but a few of the many 
instances where Cicero used this particular expression90. However, a narrow focus on 
book 16 of the correspondence prompts Beard (like Smadja and Fabre) to over-interpret 
 
                                                     
86 Beard (2002), 136. But see also the earlier studies of the French scholars mentioned in note 79 
above. 
87 Beard (2002), 136ff. 
88 Cic. Fam. 16.26: “Verberavi te cogitationis tacito dumtaxat convicio quod fasciculus alter ad me 
iam sine tuis litteris perlatus est”.  
89 Cic. Fam. 16.27.1. 
90 Cic. Fam. 16.4.4; 16.22.1. 
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these passages. “Serving your health” was a phrase that occurs elsewhere in Cicero’s 
correspondence, without any reference to servility or subservience. Even to his own 
family, Cicero writes: “serve your health well” (servi valetudini)91. Or to Mescinius Rufus: 
“I hope you will continue to care for me, and pay proper regard to your health and 
peace of mind” (me velim, ut facis, diligas valetudinique tuae et tranquillitati animi servias)92. 
Similarly, not only health, but also honour, a wish, or a country could be “served”, and 
by very noble men at that. To Sulpicius Rufus, Appius Pulcher, and Dolabella, Cicero 
wrote respectively: “I will serve his [Caesar’s] desire” (illius voluntati serviam), “I served 
your honour” (inserviebam honori tuo), and “so that you serve your standing and glory” 
(ut dignitati et gloriae servias)93. Only when the dative belonging to “servire” is an actual 
person (and not merely his health, honour, or reputation), is the connotation of slavery 
and subservience apparently implied. “We are all his [Caesar’s] slaves” (nos enim illi 
servimus), Cicero complains to Papirius Paetus in September 46 BCE94. And when 
derogating Antony, he told Cassius that “we are all slaves to a fellow slave” (conservo 
servimus), indicating that the dominus Caesar may well have been killed, but that the 
situation had not improved subsequently95. Contrariwise, when asking Tiro to look after 
his health, Cicero did never structurally or consistently apply “the language of slavery”. 
Verbs like consulere or conferre were used instead on at least as many occasions96. 
Servire in the sense of “servile obedience” occurs only once in relation to Tiro. In yet 
another exhortation to get better, Cicero wrote to his freedman that “in serving me, you 
have not yet served your health enough” (dum mihi deserves, servisti non satis [valetudini 
tuae])97. Servisti in this instance is, as shown above, a very standard way of formulating a 
desire to get (or remain) well. Deserves, however, has mihi as explicit dative and would as 
such undoubtedly have been understood as a reference to Tiro’s position in relation to 
his patron – again, of course, as a witty wordplay made in good spirits. Like Quintus’ 
verberare, then, this particular instance is a clear joke on Cicero’s part and at Tiro’s 
expense, but neither of these observations warrants the conclusion that “the language 
of servitude is found, more or less stridently, throughout the book” or that “the 
language of subordination” (…) stalks every letter of Ad. Fam. 1698. 
 
                                                     
91 Cic. Fam. 14.2.3. 
92 Cic. Fam. 5.21.5. 
93 Cic. Fam. 4.4.4; 3.13.1; 9.14.6. Cf. 4.5.6 (to Sulpicius Rufus): “huic rei nobis serviendum sit” 
(referring to service to Rome); 5.16.5: “constantiae serviendum”; etc. 
94 Cic. Fam. 9.17.3. 
95 Cic. Fam. 12.3.2. 
96 E.g. Cic. Fam. 16.4.3: “cum valetudini tuae diligentissime consulueris”; 16.4.4: “quantam 
diligentiam in valitudinem tuam contuleris, tanti me fieri a te iudicabo”; etc. 
97 Cic. Fam. 16.18.1 
98 Beard (2002), 137-8. 
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When discussing the letter Quintus wrote to his brother immediately after Tiro’s 
manumission, Beard furthermore supports her argument by claiming that even this 
occasion provoked “the very language of obligations that defines the relationship 
between master and slaves”99. Especially Quintus’ mention of the pleasure (voluptas) 
Cicero would derive from his new freedman, as well as the fact that Tiro’s qualities are 
referred to as advantages (commoda) are given much weight in her analysis. Although 
she does not say so explicitly, this argument again draws heavily on the suggestions 
made by the French scholars in the 1970’s, who interpreted the relation between Cicero 
and Tiro in terms of blackmail and hypocrisy100. When we again expand the scope to 
include the other books of the correspondence, however, it becomes clear in a heartbeat 
that – like servire – neither the voluptas Tiro gives his  patron, nor his commoda should be 
interpreted as intended references to the freedman-patron relationship or to Tiro’s 
subordinate role within it. Indeed, Cicero could be equally gratified (mirificamque cepi 
voluptatem) by Appius Pulcher’s diligence (diligentia)101, and he derived great pleasure 
(magna voluptas) from perceiving the sound sense (prudentia) and loyalty (fides) of T. 
Munatius because of this man’s good will (benevolentia) and devotion (diligentia) to 
Plancus102. Moreover, when Trebatius – who was plenus offici towards Cicero – was 
severely ill, the latter empathically asked himself whether this friendship brought him 
vexation or pleasure (voluptas)103. He even assured Cornificius that taking care of the 
business of some viri boni et honesti, would result in great pleasure (magna voluptas), since 
the subsequent attentions (observantia) of these men would be highly beneficial104. And 
finally, Cicero gains not only pleasure (voluptas) from Trebatius’ companionship 
(consuetudo), but also advantages (utilitas) from his advice (consilium) and services 
 
                                                     
99 Beard (2002), 133 (about Fam. 16.16). 
100 Cf. note 79 above. See also Patterson (1982), 12 in more general terms: “while a kind of love may 
sometimes have triumphed over this most perverse form of interaction [between master and slave], 
intimacy was usually calculating and sadomasochistic”. 
101 Cic. Fam. 3.11.4: “mirificamque cepi voluptatem ex hac tua diligentia”. 
102 Cic. Fam. 10.12.5: “atque in his curis quas contuli ad dignitatem tuam cepi magnam voluptatem 
quod bene cognitam mihi T. Munati prudentiam et fidem magis etiam perspexi in eius incredibili 
erga te benevolentia et diligentia”. 
103 Cic. Fam. 11.27.1: “nondum satis constitui molestiaene plus an voluptatis attulerit mihi Trebatius 
noster, homo cum plenus offici tum utriusque nostrum amantissimus”. 
104 Cic. Fam. 12.26.2: “magnam ex eorum splendore et observantia capies voluptatem”. Other 
examples include: Fam. 2.10.2: Cassius, by his military successes, gave Cicero great voluptas (quod 
mihi magnae voluptati fuit); 5.7.1: Pompey gave Cicero great voluptas by kindly forwarding good news 
(cepi … incredibilem voluptatem); and 3.2.2: Appius Pulcher derives perpetua voluptas from Cicero’s 
gratitude (si rationibus meis provisum a te esse intellexero, magnam te ex eo et perpetuam voluptatem esse 
capturum). 
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(operae)105. In fact, both observations made Cicero conclude that it would be a commodum 
for him to have Trebatius at his side (ego, si mei commodi rationem ducerem, te mecum esse 
maxime vellem). In Tiro’s case, Q. Cicero could have mentioned the freedman’s utilitas to 
his patron, but instead, he focussed solely on the much more affectionate voluptas. On 
other occasions, the Cicerones clearly valued (and referenced) both aspects even in 
their friends. When Cicero recommends Varro to Brutus, for example, he promised that 
the commendatus would be a great pleasure (voluptas) and expediency (usus) to him106. 
The context implies that there was a considerable status differential between both 
individuals, since Varro was serving as quaestor under Brutus in Gallia Cisalpina. At the 
same time, however, this anecdote confirms that this vocabulary was not part of a 
derogatory discourse of subservience (let alone reserved for patron-freedman 
relationships), but a genuine (or genuinely pretended) expression of appreciation and 
joy. 
In parallel, Cicero described his connection to the influential Appius Pulcher as a 
commodum; he did not refrain from telling C. Antonius that he had done his very best to 
advance not only his honour (honor) and prestige (dignitas), but also his interests 
(commoda); and he assured Crassus that he seized every opportunity to promote his 
friend’s interests (commoda) in addition to his dignity (amplitudo) and desires 
(voluntas)107. Like being a pleasure to a peer or superior, contributing to such men’s 
interests was a respectable and praiseworthy endeavour. Only when we a priori accept 
the suggestion that Cicero structurally applied the “language of slavery” in his 
correspondence with Tiro, do these words obtain a pejorative connotation. But such 
reasoning is again predetermined, and moreover neglects the many identical or parallel 
expressions in the interactions between aristocratic peers. 
A final argument of virtually all the scholars who interpret the Cicerones’ language as a 
carefully crafted discourse of patronal dominance, is the use of officium to describe 
Tiro’s “obligation” to get well again108. “Of your countless services to me”, Cicero writes, 
“this [getting better and joining his patron] will be the one I shall most appreciate”109. 
This phrase almost becomes a topos throughout book 16, often recurring verbatim in 
 
                                                     
105 Cic. Fam. 7.17.2: “non enim mediocri adficiebar vel voluptate ex consuetudine nostra vel utilitate 
ex consilio atque opera tua”. 
106 Cic. Fam. 13.10.3: “sed tamen separatim promitto in meque recipio fore eum tibi et voluptati et 
usui”. 
107 Cic. Fam. 3.10.9: “quid commodis meis aptius, quam hominis nobilissimi atque honoratissimi 
coniunctio”; 5.5.2: “omnia enim a me in te profecta sunt quae ad tuum commodum, quae ad 
honorem, quae ad dignitatem pertinerent”; 5.8.5 “… si quid ipse intellegerem aut ad voluntatem aut 
ad commodum aut ad amplitudinem tuam pertinere, mea sponte id esse facturum”. 
108 Fabre (1981), 247; Beard (2002), 137-8. 
109 Cic. Fam. 16.1.3: “de tuis innumerabilibus in me officiis erit hoc gratissimum”. 
 376 
subsequent letters110. At first sight, then, Cicero does seem to impose on Tiro an 
obligation, implying that in order to be a good freedman and to become useful to his 
patron again, he needs to get well as soon as possible. However, as is well known, 
rendering officia was considered an essential part of any reciprocal relationship. It was 
naturally expected from individuals bound together by the ties of amicitia, which 
connected not only Cicero to Tiro111, but also elites to each other and to their clients. 
Officia were often exchanged between unequal partners, but there is no indication that 
in Tiro’s case this “status differential” referred specifically to his (previous) servility (let 
alone to any inherent inferiority of the freedman). The notion that recovery qua officium 
is part of a “language of slavery” is therefore not borne out of the letters themselves, 
but stems entirely from the tacit assumption by scholars like Smadja, Fabre, Beard, et al. 
that an accentuation of his patronal superiority (and Tiro’s servile dependence) was 
Cicero’s primary concern in choosing these and similar terms. This point will be taken 
up in further detail in the next section. 
In short, the use of voluptas to express his expected feelings on Tiro’s return, or the 
description of Tiro’s qualities as commoda were – just like the employment of servire to 
exhort diligence in getting better – not manifestations of a distinct “language of 
slavery”. In the few instances where this relation between freedman and patron is 
implied (e.g. Quintus’ verberare and Marcus’ deservire mihi), these descriptions are 
moreover clearly meant as humorous puns. It is in such a context that we should also 
situate the words of Tiro cited at the beginning of this section. After Tiro wrote that he 
would faithfully take care of his health (valetudini fideliter inserviendo), Cicero expresses 
his surprise at this phrase. As we noted earlier, the phrase valetudini servire was very 
common, and it are therefore not these terms Cicero finds fault with. Instead, he draws 
attention to the odd use of fideliter in this sentence: “Where did you come by so bizarre a 
phrase as ‘faithfully studying my health’? What is ‘faithfully’ doing in such a 
context?”112. Cicero, in other words, claims that fideliter is wrongly used by Tiro, because 
valetudini servire was not an officium. Indeed, if it was, then fideliter, as Cicero points out, 
would be an acceptable description (cui verbo domicilium est proprium in officio). In light of 
Cicero’s consistent descriptions of Tiro’s recovery as an expected officium, it seems 
untenable to argue that this passage should be taken au sérieux113.  
 
                                                     
110 E.g. Fam. 16.4.3: “omnia [innumerabilia officia] viceris si, ut spero, te validum videro”; 16.6.1: “ad 
tua innumerabilia in me officia adde hoc, quod mihi erit gratissimum omnium”. 
111 Cic. Fam. 16.16.1: “ac nobis amicum quam servum esse maluisti”. 
112 Cic. Fam. 16.17.1: “unde illud tam ἄκυρoν 'valetudini fideliter inserviendo’? Unde in istum locum 
‘fideliter’ venit?”. 
113 Morgan (2015), 446 thinks the phrase expresses Tiro’s concern for Cicero’s health, but this is an 
untenable position when considering the letter in the broader context of book 16. 
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Smadja thought that Cicero was truly shocked by the expression, because, from her 
point of view, Tiro thus linked his health to his position of dependence. Tiro thereby 
confirmed what Cicero had “subtly” implied for so long, namely that getting better was 
a moral obligation as a consequence of the fides Tiro owed his patron since his 
manumission in 53 BCE. Cicero is thus particularly upset because Tiro blatantly 
insinuated that his patron was interested in his health only or primarily because he 
missed his freedman’s services and utility. Cicero, still according to Smadja, was thus 
“unmasked” by Tiro, who knew very well the true intentions and feelings of his 
hypocrite patron, as well as the actual meaning of his health and recovery as metaphors 
for his loyalty. This passage has therefore been considered the clearest proof of the 
mutual “blackmail” between Cicero and Tiro114. Tiro on the one hand unmasks Cicero’s 
true intentions (to the latter’s embarrassment and shock), but on the other hand, Tiro’s 
long periods of illness and absence are better explained, the argument goes, if we 
assume (as the anecdote “proves”) that Tiro was aware of Cicero’s hypocrisy. These 
suggestions completely ignore the observations made above, i.e. that the language of 
Cicero’s letters to Tiro does not fundamentally differ from other letters, apart from 
some amiable jokes. The latter feature far too prominently in the analyses of the 
proponents of the “blackmail” thesis, who consistently fail to recognise their humorous 
undertone, and thereby incorrectly interpret them as genuine expressions of 
haughtiness and, consequently, hypocrisy. 
Cicero never shied away from a joke in his private correspondence115. In this 
particular case too, the first phrase of his “shocked” response to Tiro sets the tone for 
the rest of the passage. “I see what you are doing”, Cicero starts out, “you want your 
letters too put into rolls!”116. We do not know what Tiro had done, said, or written to 
trigger this “suspicion”: neither the letter chronologically preceding this one (16.22), 
nor the one originally intended by the initial editor to be read just before it (16.16) 
provides any clue. The tone, however, is unmistakeably amiable. “But hang on a 
minute!” (sed heus tu), Cicero continues, even addressing his freedman as “the yardstick 
of my writings” (κανὼν meorum scriptorum). Heus is used by Cicero predominantly in 
humorous contexts throughout the correspondence. For example, after already having 
made a joke in a letter to Trebatius (typically drawing on the latter’s expertise in legal 
matters), Cicero writes: “But hey you! What are you doing now? Is anything happening? 
I notice that you now crack jokes in your letters” (sed heus tu! Quid agis? Ecquid fit? Video 
 
                                                     
114 Smadja (1976), 102. Cf. Fabre (1981), 245 note 306. 
115 For humour and jokes in Cicero’s correspondence, see Kiser (1932); Haury (1955); but especially 
Hutchinson (1998), 172-99. 
116 Cic. Fam. 16.17.1: “video quid agas; tuas quoque epistulas vis referri in volumina”. 
 378 
enim te iam iocari per litteras)117. Cicero imitates the language Trebatius uses when making 
jokes, and apparently thought or knew that an expression like sed heus tu would be 
particularly recognisable in that context. Similarly, after starting out a letter to Fabius 
Gallus (making use of Greek terms to take home an initial joke’s punch line), Cicero 
humorously exclaims that he should stop joking about sensitive matters: “But hey you! 
Hands off the tablets! Here comes the master, sooner than expected” (sed heus  tu, 
manum de tabula! Magister adest citius quam putaramus)118. In fact, attestations of heus tu 
occur very often in juxtaposition with Greek terms, and this combination is usually 
intended to add to the humorous effect of the expression119. In this light, sed heus tu and 
the Greek terms Cicero used in his response to Tiro (κανὼν to describe Tiro and ἄκυρoν 
to describe the oddity of his expression), clearly reveal the cordial undertone of the 
passage.  
Another letter is similarly illuminating. When Cicero refers to Tiro’s imminent 
manumission in April 53 BCE, he writes: “My promise will be performed on the 
appointed day; I have taught you the derivation of faith” (nostra ad diem dicta<m> fient; 
docui enim te fides ἔτuμoν quod haberet)120. Cicero cleverly uses the homonymic relation 
between fient and fides to link both words together, thus assuring Tiro that he could rely 
on Cicero’s promise to manumit him. This letter precedes the valetudini fideliter 
inserviendo letter by nearly 7 years, and is thus entirely unrelated to it. However, the 
original editor of the Ciceronian correspondence (very likely Tiro himself) made sure to 
neutralise this temporal distance by deliberately positioning both documents very 
closely together (a meaningful positioning, completely obliterated by the modern 
chronological editions)121. Only four letters are situated in between them, all of these 
having Tiro’s (imminent) manumission as their main subject122. By the time a reader of 
the original collection came to the valetudini fideliter serviendo letter, then, he would 
vividly remember that Cicero and Tiro had already discussed the true meaning of fides. 
Given Tiro’s remarkable talents in the fields of literature and the liberal arts in general, 
 
                                                     
117 Cic. Fam. 7.11.1-2. 
118 Cic. Fam. 7.25.1. Cicero jokingly refers to Gallus’ fear that if they continued laughing with 
Tigellius, it might backfire on them (videris enim mihi vereri ne, si istum <ludibrio> habuerimus, 
rideamus γέλωτα σαρδάνιον). The Greek expression is a clear pun at the expense of Tigellius and his 
Sardinian origin. 
119 E.g. Att. 1.16.13; 6.1.13; 6.6.2; Fam. 7.25.1. 
120 Cic. Fam. 16.10.2. 
121 The unsurpassed merit of Beard (2002) is that she structurally and convincingly elucidates how 
the original editor of the correspondence had purposely arranged the letters, but how modern 
editors “corrected” the “flawed” chronological order, thus losing much of the correspondence’s 
literary value. She rightly deplores that most modern editions present the chronological order as 
the original one: “you would simply never know that any re-ordering had gone on” (p. 131 note 85). 
122 The original order of the letters was: 16.10 – 16.15 – 16.14 – 16.13 – 16.16. 
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no reader would have suspected Tiro to have forgotten or to have remained blatantly 
ignorant about the correct use (domicilium proprium) of the word. Moreover, in the letter 
originally following the valetudini fideliter inserviendo letter (although chronologically 
separated from each other by almost a year), Cicero is again engaged in a friendly 
discussion of terminology, this time relating to the correct form of address in semi-
public letters123. In other words, the original collocation of the letters (prioritising 
thematic coherence over chronology) highlights – together with the joking initial 
phrase of the valetudini fideliter inserviendo letter, the expression sed heus tu, and its 
combination with Greek terms – the humour of the interaction by presenting it as but 
one of the many witty wordplays the two friends and intellectuals taunted each other 
with124. 
In short, it appears that Tiro had answered a joke of his patron with a quip of his own, 
just like he would do later in 44 BCE when Quintus wrote that Tiro had scolded 
(verberare) him. By using fideliter in the context of “getting better”, he appropriated the 
language of Cicero’s isolated puns, which – as noted earlier – are not to be identified 
with a persistent “language of slavery”. Although Cicero clearly plays along (he rather 
tediously tries to top Tiro’s feigned ignorance), we cannot exclude (nor prove) the 
possibility that, in a way, Tiro himself suddenly drawing attention to the metaphorical 
equation of recovery and loyal service was an unexpected turn of events, even for 
Cicero. This is an interpretation of the passage in between the “blackmail”-thesis 
(“Cicero was sincerely shocked because he was unmasked by Tiro”) and a point of view 
that considers the entire anecdote merely as amiable bantering among intimate friends, 
although it necessarily remains as speculative as both of these. Without stressing the 
point too hard, then, Cicero may in fact have felt a slight unease when his freedman 
pointed out rather explicitly the jokes his patron habitually made at his expense; not 
because he suspected that Tiro would not understand them, but because he feared a 
third party might misunderstand them. Indeed, we know from other instances that 
concerns related to privacy loomed large in the minds of Roman letter writers, and that 
the potential leaking of sensitive information was a dreaded risk every one of them 
reluctantly had to take125. Although he undoubtedly trusted Tiro on the matter (in the 
secluded sphere of their personal correspondence), it may have worried Cicero that his 
freedman could make similar jokes in the company of other people. Indeed, the latter 
 
                                                     
123 Cic. Fam. 16.18.1: “Quid igitur? Non sic oportet? Equidem censeo sic, addendum etiam ‘suo’. Sed, si 
placet, invidia vitetur; quam quidem ego semper contempsi”. The following line of the letter 
contains a Greek term to refer to Tiro’s perspiration (tibi διαφόρησιν gaudeo profuisse). 
124 Cf. also Fabre (1981), 252 note 380: “l’utilisation du grec dans les lettres de Cicéron à Tiron traduit 
l’intimité intellectuelle dans laquelle les deux hommes vivaient”. 
125 E.g. Fam. 16.18.1 and the examples given in Chapter 4. 
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may have been less able (or inclined) to interpret them as the witty wordplays they 
were intended to be, and could instead consider them rather cruel exhortations, 
unbefitting for a good pater familias or patronus, and detrimental, moreover, to the public 
transcript of principled equality. In this sense, it is perhaps significant that Cicero seems 
to unilaterally and abruptly terminate the humorous exchange: “But more of this when 
we meet again in person” (sed haec coram).  
In any case, Tiro’s witty wordplay in itself – i.e. as situated in the private context of 
his relation with Cicero – was neither critised nor denounced by Cicero, though it would 
certainly not have been condoned in a public context. Rather than a contextual 
manifestation of any hypocrisy, blackmail, or “language of slavery”, it attests to the 
intellectual and emotional parity of two men, who had grown towards each other 
through years of close association. It is no doubt for this reason also, that the letter 
survived editorial selection. Read in the context of Cicero’s extended correspondence 
with Tiro, any reader would have been able to correctly interpret and evaluate it. Put 
differently, the entire anecdote attests to the pertinent and ad hoc concerns related to 
network embeddedness, and clearly illustrates the marked difference with public 
discourse on freedmen. 
7.3.2 Ne libertinum laudare videar  
In support of the claim that there existed a “specific set of virtues” for freedmen, 
another intriguing passage in Cicero’s letters is regularly quoted. After Atticus’ 
freedman Dionysius had spent a couple of months in Cicero’s household at the end of 50 
BCE, Cicero sent him back to his patron, enthusiastically providing him with a laudatory 
testimony to his qualities, recorded in Att. 7.4.1:  
Quem quidem cognovi cum doctum, quod mihi iam ante erat, notum tum 
sanctum, plenum offici, studiosum etiam meae laudis, frugi hominem ac, ne 
libertinum laudare videar, plane virum bonum. 
 
I have found him not only a good scholar, which I already knew, but upright, 
serviceable, zealous moreover for my good name, an honest fellow, and in case 
that sounds too much like commending a freedman, a really fine man. 
At first sight, Cicero contrasts an unconventional and social boundary crossing praise of 
Dionysius (bonus vir) with a series of qualities which he seems to have thought would be 
considered by his correspondent as merely the traditional praise of a freedman. Indeed, 
bonus vir was a description members of the elite almost exclusively reserved for 
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themselves126. Only on very exceptional and highly rhetorical occasions were freedmen 
described as such, like in the case of Publius Trebonius’ freedman, who was considered 
good (bonus) and honourable (honestus) because he alone had respected his patron’s 
testamentary provisions127. Whereas freedmen themselves assertively adopted this 
quality in their commemorative practices (cf. Chapter 8), its use by Cicero to describe 
Dionysius is clearly noteworthy. But even so, as we have accentuated earlier in this 
chapter, the observation that there existed a “path to glory” (with typical associated 
virtues) reserved for the elites, cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for the existence 
of a conflicting “path to glory” (and associated discourse) reserved for ex-slaves.  
Fabre, nonetheless, concluded from Att. 7.4.1 that “selon Cicéron, les qualités de 
l’affranchi seraient sauf exception, au-dessous de celles d’un ingénu (…). Il y aurait donc 
des qualificatifs propres à un affranchi et d’autres qu’on ne pourrait leur attribuer que 
par excès”128. Santoro L’Hoir similarly saw the opposition between the first five qualities 
and the exceptional description of vir bonus as an indication that the former were 
“conventional platitudes appropriate to freedmen”129. Mouritsen too, has taken this 
passage as evidence that a freedman vocabulary did in fact exist, assuming that 
officiosus, frugi and frugalitas, studium, litteratus (represented as doctus in the quote 
above), etc. were “common stereotypes used to praise freedmen”130. The evidence to 
support this claim is, however, extremely casuistic and circumstantial, consisting of an 
enumeration of isolated instances in which these words were used to praise freedmen. 
Bradley’s analysis of the negative slave stereotypes, or Fabre’s treatment of freedman 
values suffer from a similar methodological flaw131. Indeed, as recent developments in 
the theories of Critical Discourse Analysis have shown, one of the most profound 
critiques on its methodology is that almost anything can be proven by a selective use of 
the source material, and that it is often tempting to analyse this in function of a certain 
hypothesis132. It is of course impossible for large-scale syntheses like the ones just 
mentioned to exhaustively scrutinise a representative set of sources, or to compare the 
 
                                                     
126 Achard (1973); Seletsky (1976); Hellegouarc’h (1963), 485–93; Fabre (1981), 237-8; Santoro L’hoir 
(1992), 10-11, 65. 
127 Cic. Ver. 2.1.123-4. 
128 Fabre (1981), 233. The only reservation Fabre makes is that his conclusion derives solely from a 
Ciceronian letter (and not, for example, from a wider sample of sources). Although he thus questions 
its representative value, he does consider it a true conviction of Cicero’s, and even – in defiance of 
his previous caution – implicitly takes it to be representative of e.g. epigraphic sources as well. 
About the latter he states that they “font écho à ce que Cicéron et les auteurs liés aux milieux 
aristocratiques nous indiquent”. This point will be taken up extensively in Chapter 8.  
129 Santoro L’Hoir (1992), 17. 
130 Mouritsen (2011), 61-63 (the quote is from p. 61). 
131 Bradley (1987), 26-31; Fabre (1981), 229. 
132 E.g. Bastow (2008), 139 with references. 
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isolated virtues with instances in which they are mentioned in non-freedman contexts. 
But any conclusions or suggestions drawn from a sample that does not meet these 
requirements necessarily need further qualification.  
Moreover, Mouritsen links the passage in Att. 7.4.1 with another one that describes 
Cicero’s freedman Tiro in a similar vein. At the end of 50 BCE, Cicero wrote to Atticus 
that he had had to leave his beloved Tiro behind in Patrae due to, unsurprisingly, a 
severe illness. He used this opportunity (cuius quoniam mentio facta est) to accentuate 
Tiro’s many virtues: “he is an accomplished, conscientious young fellow as you know 
and, you are at liberty to add, an honest one” (adulescentem <doctum et diligentem>, ut 
nosti, et adde, si quid vis, probum)133. Mouritsen sees in the passage a similar attempt by 
Cicero to “move beyond mere conventions”, because it too contrasts a “fairly well 
established format for the praise of freedmen” with a more generous description 
(probum)134. However, as indicated by the rendering of the Latin (respected also in 
Mouritsen’s footnote to the passage), doctum et diligentem is a description unlikely to 
have featured in the original letter. Different manuscript traditions have restored this 
passage in various ways. Wesenberg’s 1880 edition of the letter, for example, first 
inserted doctum between adulescentem and ut nosti, whereas an earlier (and inferior) 
tradition had already read diligentem instead135. In his 1999 Loeb edition, Shackleton 
Bailey translated both of these options (“an accomplished, conscientious young 
fellow”)136, even though he had earlier questioned any addition whatsoever in a more 
detailed discussion of the passage137. He there argued that ut nosti need not have been 
accompanied by any modifying adjective, but is instead very likely to have referred 
immediately to adulescentem. Probum, therefore, was not used to rhetorically surpass any 
prior “typically libertine” virtues at all.  
In addition, the eloquent figure of style “and add, if you will” (here presented in the 
form of et adde, si quid vis) served in a very general manner to politely suggest a further 
enhancement of a previous description (i.c. adulescentem). It presents the additional 
description as optional, thereby both actively forcing the addressee or audience to 
participate in the narrative, but at the same time also cleverly presenting the initial 
description as weighty enough in its own right (i.e. whether or not the addition is 
accepted)138. As such, it is hardly atypical in either epistolography or rhetorical 
 
                                                     
133 Cic. Att. 7.2.3. 
134 Mouritsen (2011), 61. 
135 Wesenberg (1880), 224. 
136 Shackleton Bailey (1999), 185. 
137 Shackleton Bailey (1960), 30. 
138 Cf. Goodin (1980), 105 (from a theoretical and discourse analytical point of view): “an important 
aspect of appealing to audience prejudices is the orator’s claim to share their perspective . . . The 
‘language of participation’ in general (…) figures importantly in this process”. 
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speech139. Cicero was thus not trying to represent Tiro in a way that was somehow more 
exalting than “usual”, that is, when we assume the existence of a certain pattern of 
libertine praise. In fact, probus features prominently as a virtue for freedmen (but also 
freeborn) in the correspondences. For example, L. Nostius Zoilus – Cicero’s coheir to his 
patron’s estate – was described in a letter of recommendation to Appuleius as a homo 
probus, without there being any indication that this was an exceptional appraisal140. 
Similarly, when the imperial procurator Maximus returned to Roma after succesfully 
having ended his tenure as assistant procurator of Pontus and Bithynia, Pliny 
recommended him to Trajan as an “honest, hard-working, and conscientious fellow, as 
devoted to your interests, Sir, as he is a strict maintainer of discipline” (probum et 
industrium et diligentem ac sicut rei tuae amantissimum ita disciplinae tenacissimum 
expertus)141. In Pliny’s description, then, probus featured among other qualities that are 
very reminiscent of those Cicero used in his praise of Dionysius (e.g. rei tuae 
amantissimum as parallel to studiosum meae laudis; industrium et diligentem as parallel to 
plenum offici; expertus tenacissimum disciplinae as parallel to frugi hominem). And finally, 
Cicero would surely not have repeatedly reproached freedmen for being improbus if 
being probus was an exceptional virtue for these men to begin with142.  
In yet another parallel to the appraisal of Dionysius, moreover, Cicero recommends his 
(freeborn) friend L. Castronius Paetus to Brutus with the mention that he was “the 
leading man in Luca, honourable, serious, very serviceable, and a thoroughly good 
man”, adding that “he was also – if this is anything worthy of note – very rich” (L. 
Castronius Paetus, longe princeps municipi Lucensis, est honestus, gravis, plenus offici, bonus 
plane vir et cum virtutibus tum etiam fortuna, si quid hoc ad rem pertinent, ornatus)143. In this 
instance, five qualities are enhanced – “if you will” – by more worldly success, which, 
the tone implies, is useful but at any rate less important than the initial description. 
This initial description contained qualities that were typically reserved for the top elite, 
but meaningfully combined it with a virtue (being plenus offici) that was also ascribed to 
 
                                                     
139 E.g. Cic. Cluent. 89 (about the convicted judge Gaius Iulius, who had presided the corrupted trial 
of Oppianicus in 74 BCE): “Condemnatus est C. Iunius, qui ei quaestioni praefuerat. Adde etiam illud, 
si placet: tum est condemnatus cum esset iudex quaestionis”; Off. 1.150 (after categorising trades 
that provide sensual pleasures as sordid): “adde huc, si placet, unguentarios, saltatores, totumque 
ludum talarium”. 
140 Cic. Fam. 13.46. 
141 Plin. Ep. 10.85. 
142 E.g. Cic. Att. 7.2.8 (about an unnamed homo operarius): “sed tamen ne illo quidem quicquam 
improbius”; 9.15.5 (about Dionysius): “cum in me tam improbus fuit”. 
143 Cic. Fam. 13.13. 
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Dionysius and – indirectly (industrium et diligentem) – to Trajan’s Maximus144. Similarly, 
when Sallust described the young Marius, he focussed on the virtues that exceptionally 
allowed him (as a homo novus) to become consul. Not being able to invoke an illustrious 
family line (vetustatem familiae), he had to rely entirely on his diligence, honesty, and 
military skill, his abstinence from lust and riches, and his desire for glory (industria, 
probitas, militiae magna scientia, animus belli ingens domi modicus, libidinis et divitiarum victor, 
tantummodo gloriae avidus)145. Whereas military prowess was not a quality freedmen 
could boast of, it here appears again in tandem with “libertine” virtues like industria and 
probitas. Clearly – and as we will momentarily show in a more detailed and structured 
way – such virtues were at least as frequently applied in laudations for freeborn (elites) 
as for freedmen.  
However, the inclusion of the rare (at least in freedmen contexts) expression bonus vir 
deserves a moment’s consideration. It is important first and foremost, to point out that 
Cicero wrote this message while being fully aware that Dionysius would at some point 
read or hear its content. Only a few days after sending Att. 7.4.1 (no doubt using 
Dionysius as courier, as he was returning to Atticus anyway), Cicero wrote his friend 
another letter (Att. 7.7.1). Apparently, Atticus had already sent a reply letter in the 
meantime, which Cicero quotes at the start of 7.7.1. In it, however, Atticus had not 
passed on a thank you message from Dionysius, which Cicero clearly expected after his 
exuberant laudation on the freedman a few days earlier (… tot enim verba sunt de Dionysio 
in epistula tua; illud, putato, non adscribis, ‘et tibi gratias egit’)146. Cicero knew that Atticus 
would not forget to include such a note if Dionysius had actually asked him to (atqui 
certe ille agere debuit et, si esset factum, quae tua est humanitas, adscripsisses), and he 
therefore interpreted the omission as a clear sign of Dionysius’ rudeness. Because he 
could not simply revoke his earlier appraisal without seeming naïve or impulsive, Cicero 
thus repeats that he deemed the freedman a bonus vir, but coldly adds that he only 
thought so because Dionysius had given him “this insight into his character”, implying, 
of course, that Dionysius had showed himself quite the opposite of a vir bonus (mihi 
autem nulla de eo παλινῳδία datur propter superioris epistulae testimonium. sit igitur sane 
bonus vir; hoc enim ipsum bene fecit, quod mihi sui cognoscendi penitus etiam istam facultatem 
 
                                                     
144 Being the first citizen of a prominent Italian town was hardly something Cicero would say about a 
freedman. Bonus and honestus have already been shown to be typically “elite virtues”, but the same 
goes for gravitas, cf. Ferguson (1958), 176; Kaster (2010), 154. 
145 Sal. Jug. 63.2. 
146 Cic. Att. 7.7.1. 
  385 
dedit)147. Dionysius, in other words, had not reciprocated in kind to Cicero’s appraisal. 
The latter’s frustration, however, is only comprehensible if the laudatory statement was 
meant to be read to (but shamefully ignored by) the freedman as well.   
The underlying intention of indebting Dionysius (and the expectation of a return) 
may have prompted the extraordinary description of Dionysius as a bonus vir. Treggiari, 
however, approached the passage from yet another point of view – proposing that it 
expressed the idea that “one’s feelings about [freedmen] should not be too warm” – but 
arguing that it was not intended very seriously148. This interpretation still assumes a 
specific decorum for libertine praise (centred primarily around restraint), but leaves 
open the possibility that the recourse to an expression like vir bonus was a manifest 
(perhaps insincere) exaggeration. There are several indications that this may indeed be 
a correct reading of the passage. First and foremost, Atticus’ reply to the letter (quoted 
in 7.7.1) quite conspicuously appropriated Cicero’s exalting discourse, and even 
elaborated on it. Atticus not only used doctissimus and amantissimus (i.e. the superlatives 
of Cicero’s initial descriptions), but also described Dionysius as a vir optimus – again 
exceeding Cicero’s already energetic praise (vir bonus)149. Moreover, when referring to 
another letter of praise he had written to the freedman himself, Cicero dramatically 
invoked the immortal gods – something he did on many occasions to mock certain 
persons or events150 – to testify to its complimentary and affectionate nature (ad quem 
ego quas litteras, di immortales, miseram, quantum honoris significantis, quantum amoris). He 
even describes the reverence he had exhibited towards the freedman in the only 
passage in Latin literature ever to feature the obsequium of an aristocrat towards a 
freedman (cui qui noster honos, quod obsequium, quae etiam ad ceteros contempti cuiusdam 
hominis commendatio defuit)151. And finally, apart from one highly rhetorical mention of 
the danger of freedmen rising to a position of power over their patrons152, libertinus is a 
hapax legomenon in Cicero’s correspondence. It contrasts in this regard with, for 
example, Tacitus’ Annals or Suetonius’ Lives (9 and 17 mentions respectively, and both 
corpora being much smaller than Cicero’s correspondence). Chapters 3 and 6 noted that 
this variance is a reflection of the difference in network embeddedness between these 
detached sources and Cicero’s letters (Pliny’s and Fronto’s correspondence contain no 
 
                                                     
147 Note the repetition of bonus and bene, suggesting that the former description was only warranted 
because Dionysius had allowed Cicero to recognise his previous mistake of calling the freedman a 
bonus vir. 
148 Treggiari (1969b), 195 note 3. 
149 Santoro L’Hoir (1992), 17 fails to notice both this appropriation of Cicero’s terms by Atticus as well 
as the humorous statement the latter was thereby making. 
150 E.g. Fam. 2.13.3; Att. 1.16.1; 1.18.5; 14.9.1; 16.7.5. 
151 Cic. Att. 8.4.1. 
152 Cic. Att. 2.1.8: “an libertinis atque etiam servis serviamus?”. Cf. Chapter 6. 
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references at all). The mere fact that Cicero uses libertinus in this letter, then, highlights 
once more the very exceptional nature of the passage. Indeed, the qualities Dionysius 
had exhibited all derived from his personal relation to Cicero, which would have made 
the use of libertus much more logical (libertinus referring to a freedman’s standing in 
society at large). Therefore, the very exceptional use of libertinus (as well as the peculiar 
passage ne libertinum laudare videar as a whole) only makes sense when we accept that it 
derived from Cicero’s intent to contrast it with the subsequent vir bonus (rather than 
referring to the five preceding qualities), i.e. another quality that pertained to a 
person’s persona in public life. 
Be all of this as it may (and we will come back to this point later), any interpretation of 
the passage hinges entirely on the question whether Fabre and Mouritsen cum suis are 
to be followed in their assertion that it constitutes evidence for a “specific format” of 
“libertine praise”. To establish the veracity of this claim, a much wider lexical analysis is 
required than merely the invocation of isolated passages that use the terms or 
expressions in relation to freedmen. In the next section, therefore, an approach will be 
outlined to structurally analyse the specific attestations of these so-called “libertine 
qualities”. 
7.3.2.1 Methodological approaches 
From a theoretical point of view, there are two feasible ways to go about the analysis of 
– in this case – elite discourse on freedmen: a Corpus Linguistics approach and a Lexis 
Selection approach. We do not intend to expound either of them in full (theoretical) 
detail, but focus instead on their operationalization for the concrete purpose at hand. 
7.3.2.1.1 Corpus Linguistics 
This approach requires the cataloguing and analysing of all the words and expressions 
used to refer to freedmen in a methodologically delineated collection of texts. Corpus 
Linguistics has been rightly lauded by communication theorists for remedying some of 
the pitfalls of traditional Critical Discourse Analysis (especially its often subjective 
approach and lack of representative potential)153. It allows for a structural comparison 
of the vocabulary used for freedmen in different works, authors, genres, periods, etc. 
The Tables in Appendices 2-7 include a field “lexis” in which have been collected all 
nouns, adjectives, and relevant verbs related to freedmen in the respective literary and 
epigraphic corpora. This allows us in turn to establish a Table including all these 
descriptions, and the amount of times they occur per corpus (given in Appendix 8). We 
 
                                                     
153 Tyrwhitt-Drake (1999), 1082; Bastow (2008), 139-41. 
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will include in the brief discussion below: Cicero’s correspondence (Pliny’s and Fronto’s 
contain too few descriptions to meaningfully plot out in this manner); Tacitus’ and 
Suetonius’ “historical” works; and our selection of metric epitaphs (carmina latina 
epigraphica), which will be treated in further detail in Chapter 8. Needless to say, the 
analysis could be greatly expanded, but at least for the time being, we will limit 
ourselves to these four corpora. 
Processed visually, these Tables result in the following “word clouds”. The more 
frequently a word is attested, the larger it is rendered in the word cloud (for the 
underlying data, see Appendix 8). 
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Figure 1 Lexis counts of freedmen descriptions in four source corpora (Cicero’s Epistulae, 
Suetonius’ De vita Caesarum, Tacitus’ Annales and Historiae, and the metric 
epitaphs of freedpersons) 
 
These “clouds” contain all words that were used at least twice to describe freedmen 
with. All words are restored to the nominative (and adjectives to the masculine form). 
For the sake of clarity, derivatives of a word have been counted towards the total of the 
corresponding noun or adjective (e.g. fidelis and fidus to fides; officiosus to officium; gratia 
and gratiosa to gratus; etc.). It should also be noted that certain terms have been 
excluded because of their widespread occurrence. Indeed, including very universal 
verbs like diligere in Cicero’s count – a word he uses in basically every letter – or nouns 
and adjectives like castus, pietas, incomparabilis in the CLE count – also used very often 
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across status boundaries – would draw attention away from the more relevant (i.e. less 
standard) terms.  
Unsurprisingly, in both “network embedded” corpora (the correspondences and the 
carmina), fides and terms related to the patronage relation (patronus, officium, gratus, 
opera) feature most prominently. Next to these, the larger words are typically positive 
characterisations: humanus, benevolus, studiosus, probatus, amicitia, honestus, pudicus, 
bonus, laus, etc. Negative or hostile descriptions barely occur at all in the CLE collection – 
mainly due to the nature of the genre, cf. Chapter 8 – and only occasionally in Cicero’s 
correspondence (e.g. ingratus, culpa, furtum, sceleratus). Once again, however, these are 
terms very closely related to the private patronage relation, all of them deriving from 
personal disappointment in individual freedmen after concrete acts of ingratitude or 
betrayal (from an elite perspective). 
Even a superficial comparison of vocabulary already shows marked differences 
between these embedded sources and the “detached” discourse of the historians. In the 
latter works, negative descriptions feature far more prominently, and greatly 
outnumber positive ones: servilis, potentia, scelus, corruptus, metus, pernicies, poena, odium, 
flagitium, crimen, stuprum, malus, etc. This reversal is most clear in Tacitus’ case, where 
laudatory vocabulary is almost entirely lacking (rare exceptions are intimus, exemplum, 
and meritus). This trend would be even more manifest if we had included in the word 
cloud all verbs related to freedmen that occurred only once throughout his work154. 
These are remarkably often related to transgressive usurpation (adsumere, ducere, 
impellere, transgredi), moral wantonness (adulterare, delinquere, derogare, peccare, 
pervertere), or otherwise negatively connoted actions (adversari, degenerare, dissimulare, 
fingere, increpare, insultare, labefacere, obstrepere). 
Moreover, words that at first sight convey a positive meaning or connotation (and 
also occur as such in network embedded sources), get a rather (to very) negative 
undertone in the detached histories. Indeed, a simple word count does not account for 
the semantic scope or even plain denotation of a term in a specific context. Aequus and 
words (like par) similarly denoting “parity” or “equality”, for example, typically have a 
positive ring to the modern ear, but the historians consistently used them in a negative 
sense in relation to freedmen. When Tacitus writes about Claudius raising his own 
freedmen to an equality with himself and the law – thereby fundamentally tarnishing 
the gratus dignitatis and insulting the nobles who used to monopolise positions of power 
– this equality is manifestly condemned (cum Claudius libertos, quos rei familiari praefecerat 
 
                                                     
154 This was not done because it would greatly increase the magnitude of the visual representation at 
the cost of transparency. Of course, all the words that occur only once are nonetheless included in 
the lists in Appendix 8. 
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sibique et legibus adaequaverit)155. During the famous debate in Nero’s council about the 
measure to revoke the freedom of disobedient ex-slaves, one of the arguments in favour 
drew from the observation that freedmen were not even content anymore to be equal 
before the law with their patrons, but proceeded to mistreat them on several occasions 
(ut ne aequo quidem cum patronis iure agerent, patientiam eorum insultarent ac verberibus 
manus ultro intenderent)156. The legal equality – meaningfully accentuated by Tacitus – 
was in this instance unambiguously considered a slippery slope to further deterioration 
of entrenched status boundaries. Finally, when, as noted earlier, Nero had convinced a 
freedman of Lucius Antistius Vetus to incriminate his patron, the latter realised that he 
would have to face his own freedman in court “as an equal” – a thought he could not 
bear, and therefore immediately opting for voluntary exile (seque et libertum pari sorte 
componi)157. 
Other terms that generally occur in a positive context, likewise become highly 
pejorative in the detached discourse on freedmen. When arbitrium, consilium, studium, 
fautor, etc. occur in the correspondences, they usually depict freedmen as assisting, 
helping, and defending their patron158. When the same words are appropriated by 
Tacitus or Suetonius to describe (mainly imperial) freedmen, however, they almost as a 
rule occur in a negative context. The former thus described Pallas’ function as a 
rationibus under Claudius as allowing the freedman to exercise control over the 
monarchy (velut arbitrium regni agebat)159, and has Callistus think that power could be 
held by carefully giving advice (potentiam cautis quam acribus consiliis tutius haberi)160. 
Therefore, when Claudius calls his freedmen into council (consilium), the act is presented 
not as a cordial conversation between patron and freedman, but as the emperor once 
more yielding to his “advisers”161. 
Perhaps even more indicative for the determining influence of author, context, and 
genre on the semantic scope of a word, is the use of gratus/gratia. It has an almost 
exclusively positive connotation in Cicero’s correspondence. Most of the attestations 
there, occur in letters addressed to Tiro, in which Cicero expressed his appreciation for 
his freedman162. Other references include the traditionally expected gratitude of a 
 
                                                     
155 Tac. Ann. 12.60. 
156 Tac. Ann. 13.26. 
157 Tac. Ann. 16.10. 
158 E.g. Fam. 13.16.1-3; 16.1; 16.21.6; Plin. Ep. 10.5.1. 
159 Tac. Ann. 13.14. 
160 Tac. Ann. 11.29. 
161 Tac. Ann. 12.1. 
162 Cic. Fam. 16.1.3: “de tuis innumerabilibus in me officiis erit hoc gratissimum”; 16.6.2: “[officium] 
quod mihi erit gratissimum omnium”; 16.17.2: “Cuspio quod operam dedisti mihi gratum est”; 
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freedman as a consequence of Cicero’s recommendation, and Cicero’s gratitude towards 
a freedman (mentioned as the reason for a subsequent recommendation)163. Only once is 
gratiosus used to denote undue influence of freedmen. When Cicero warned his brother 
for the manifest influence of his freedman Statius, he told him that the sight of gratiosi 
liberti aut servi was detrimental to his reputation164. Uncoincidentally, it is precisely this 
use of gratiosus that permeates the historians’ discourse, who completely reverse the 
directional quality of gratia (i.e. owed to an influential freedman instead of by a reverent 
one). Whereas under the early “good” emperors Caesar, Augustus, and Tiberius, 
mentions of gratus – much like the epistolary ones – still exclusively denote a close and 
commendable relationship with a patron (a freedman shows the appropriate gratia)165, 
the implied “direction” of the relationship changes drastically from Caligula onwards. 
Instead of adjectives meant to accentuate an intimate patron-freedman relationship 
(gratus; gratissimus), they are now almost exclusively rendered as nouns meant to denote 
individual freedmen’s influence in absolute terms (gratia).  
In his younger years, for example, the future emperor Vitellius obtained the 
command of a legion through the gratia Narcissi166. Similarly, Galba allowed his freedmen 
to bestow as a favour (gratia) immunity from taxes or impunity for crimes167. Only on 
one occasion does gratus still feature as an adjective, viz. when an old freedwoman at the 
imperial court is said to be gratiosa (libertina aulica gratiosa)168. Significantly, the choice 
for libertina instead of liberta indicates that the gratia of the freedwoman is to be 
interpreted as disconnected from the relationship with her patron, and instead – again – 
as an absolute trait. It is precisely for this reason that the young and ambitious Otho 
pretended to love her, even though she was “old and almost decrepit” (anus ac paene 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
16.21.6: “tuum tamen studium et consilium gratum acceptumque est”; 16.22.2: “hoc gratius mihi 
facere nihil potes”. 
163 Cic. Fam. 13.27.2: “incredibilis mihi gratias per litteras egit” (about Hammonius); 13.60.1: “eum 
tibi ita commendo ut homines grati et memores bene meritos de se commendare debent” (about 
Trypho). 
164 Cic. Quint. Fratr. 1.2.3: “tamen species ipsa tam gratiosi liberti aut servi dignitatem habere nullam 
potest”. 
165 Suet. Iul. 27.1: “(…) libertos insuper servulosque cuiusque, prout domino patronove gratus qui 
esset”; 48: “libertum gratissimum ob adulteratam equitis Romani uxorem, quamvis nullo querente, 
capitali poena adfecerit”. 
166 Suet. Vesp. 4.1: “Claudio principe Narcissi gratia legatus legionis in Germaniam missus est”. 
167 Suet. Galba 15.2: “nihil non per comites atque libertos pretio addici aut donari gratia passus est, 
vectigalia, immunitates, poenas innocentium, impunitates noxiorum”. Cf. also Tac. Ann. 11.29: 
Pallas’ “flagrantissima eo in tempore gratia”; Hist. 1.13: “Potentia principatus divisa in Titum 
Vinium consulem Cornelium Laconem praetorii praefectum; nec minor gratia Icelo Galbae liberto”. 
The reference is followed by a description of the actual implications of this power after Icelus was 
granted the anulus aureus. 
168 Suet. Otho 2.2. 
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decrepita)169. Finally, epigraphic sources reveal how the positive epistolary use of 
gratus/gratia, and its predominantly pejorative use by the historians need not be 
mutually exclusive or considered as a rigid, binary distinction. Indeed, neither imperial 
freedmen themselves nor (at least local) elites considered libertine gratia a problematic 
issue. The imperial freedman C. Iulius Gelos, for example, was explicitly honoured by 
the city council of Veii for always having assisted the municipium by his advice and 
influence (consilio et gratia adiuverit)170.  
In short, a Corpus Linguistics approach may reveal certain trends, patterns and 
propensities of individual authors or corpora, but it does not account for semantic 
nuances, contextual usage, connotations, or even stylistic differences between 
individual authors. An additional caveat is that it usually does not proceed to compare 
the terms thus isolated with the attestations of these words in contexts where they are 
applied to people other than freedmen – a caveat often overlooked or disrespected in 
modern studies, as noted earlier. As such, a Corpus Linguistics approach has only 
limited value and cannot provide any conclusive evidence for (or counter-argument 
against) the existence of a specific “freedman discourse”. The method, therefore, can 
only be useful for our purposes when it is combined with another one that accounts for, 
and adequately compensates, these shortcomings. 
7.3.2.1.2 Lexis selection 
Another way to analyse the elite discourse on freedmen is to isolate a set of expressions 
and terms, and to compare the occurrence and semantic load of each of these when they 
are applied in freed and non-freed contexts respectively. Although greatly 
compensating for the above mentioned pitfalls inherent in the Corpus Linguistics 
method, this “Lexis Selection” approach has certain limitations of its own. The most 
significant one is that the initial selection of terms and expressions is unavoidably 
arbitrary. One first needs to define which terms and expressions are to be taken into 
consideration, but this very deliberation runs the risk of at least implicitly steering 
analysis towards desired (or expected) results. Ideally, then, both Corpus Linguistics and 
Lexis Selection need to be combined. It is at this point that Cicero’s elaborate appraisal 
of Dionysius provides a unique opportunity to do precisely this, as it already contains 
supposedly typical “libertine virtues” (that is, if we accept, for the moment, its 
 
                                                     
169 Seeking contact with imperial freedmen was a popular way of gaining influence with the 
emperor. E.g. Vit. 2.5 (Vitellius approaches Claudius by entreating the two “kinds” of people that 
had the greatest influence of the emperor: freedmen and women); Tac. Ann. 6.8 (Marcus Terentius 
admits that he had entreated Sejanus’ freedmen to get to the man himself (and thus Tiberius), and 
adds that this was common practice). 
170 CIL 11, 3805. 
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interpretation by Fabre and Mouritsen cum suis). Combining both methods – and thus 
greatly compensating for their respective shortcomings – the contextual application of 
the five qualities attributed to Dionysius must be analysed across a selection of literary 
corpora, in order to expose any status-related implications of connotations. The most 
obvious candidates for comparison are naturally the correspondences of Pliny and 
Fronto, but a limited focus on the network embedded epistolary genre risks ignoring 
meaningful patterns in “detached” works – to which Cicero may just as likely have been 
referring when commending Dionysius to Atticus.  
To allow for potential differences in usage (e.g. per author, style, or even genre), the 
following analysis thus used a cross-section of literary genres in order to obtain a 
relatively balanced representation of Latin literature. The corpora we selected for this 
purpose are the collection of Cicero’s speeches (as representation of the forensic genre); 
Juvenal’s Satires and Petronius’ Satyricon (satire); the works of Terence (comedy) and 
Horace (poetry); Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita (historiography); and Pliny’s eulogy of Trajan 
(panegyric). Evidently, the lexical search was expanded to also include words and 
phrases that expressed the same or similar intent and meaning as some of the allegedly 
“libertine” qualities, since some expressions rarely occur verbatim. Plenus offici, for 
example, features only in Cicero’s correspondence (and once in a speech), and – except 
for Dionysius’ appraisal – exclusively to describe freeborn individuals. Expressions like 
me perofficiose observare or in officio esse, however, convey a very similar meaning and are 
therefore considered as well171. The same observation applies to being studiosus laudis, 
which could be expressed in many different forms172; to doctus, which is very similar in 
meaning and connotation to eruditus and perhaps even to appraisals like facundus; etc. 
This approach is necessarily synchronic, although shifts in meaning or connotation 
of words over time will be highlighted when relevant. Moreover, evolutions like these 
were often counteracted by the Roman authors’ propensity to emulate – or at least 
inter-textually link their own works with – prior examples of literary style. Pliny, for 
one, never hid his admiration for the Ciceronian writing style, even though his polished 
correspondence is reminiscent more of Horace’s or Statius’ letters than of the relative 
spontaneity of Cicero’s173. Since we are – contrary to MacLean – not concerned with 
semantic evolutions, but rather – similar to scholars like Hellegouarc’h – with “la valeur 
essentielle de chaque terme, indépendamment des nuances particulières qu’il a pu 
 
                                                     
171 E.g. Cic. Fam. 9.20.3; 9.16.5. 
172 E.g. Cic. Fam. 1.4.3; 5.8.1; 6.8.3; 10.3.4. 
173 Radice (1969), xix; Levens, Fowler & Fowler (2003), 847. For explicit references to Cicero as literary 
example, see e.g. Plin. Ep. 1.2.4; 1.5.12-13; 9.2.1-4; Fronto Ad Ant. Imp. 2.4; 2.5. 
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acquérir au cours de son évolution historique”, we believe such synchronic approach to 
be the most suited for our current purpose174. 
7.3.2.2 Five libertine virtues?  
An exhaustive discussion of every case where any of the five “Dionysian” qualities was 
meaningfully employed to praise individuals, would be as cumbersome – and arguably 
futile – as a quantitative representation via a word cloud is inadequately nuanced. In 
fact, no scholar even remotely familiar with Roman literature would contest that being 
officiosus or studiosus were qualities valued also in freeborn clients or even social peers. 
This is a very obvious observation, and has already been noted by Blänsdorf175. But the 
mere fact that the same word is used to describe persons of different statuses or 
reputation does not necessarily mean that its content is at any rate the same, or that we 
should conclude purely on the basis of such a superficial impression that a quality could 
be used interchangeably without alteration or modification in meaning for both freed 
and freeborn individuals. Gender, for example, as has been unambiguously shown by 
Habinek, was an identity dimension that greatly impacted the precise meaning of 
descriptions of learnedness176. Similarly, being doctus could denote mere erudition, but 
it could also imply wisdom, shrewdness, or prudence177. In other words, the many layers 
of meaning of a word, the connotations it may gain when joined with another one, or 
the mere discursive context in which it occurs could explain why Cicero considered 
words like doctus or frugi traits par excellence to praise freedmen with on one occasion, 
while he did not seem to find fault in using them to describe his clients, magistrates and 
even his own son on others. Appendix 9 gives an overview of the attestations per status-
group (freeborn – freed – slave). It contains all references to the “libertine” virtues in 
the corpora under consideration here. The entries in this Appendix also include 
attestations of the terms where they are not featured as a personal characterisation. 
These are marked as “N/A” in the “status”-column , and are of no direct use for our 
current purpose.  
 
                                                     
174 Hellegouarc’h (1963), 3-4. 
175 Blänsdorf (2001), 452, noting that several words were used for both freed and freeborn, doctus 
being but one of them (prudens, probus, fortis, fidelis, curiosus, doctus, humanus, suavis, benevolus). 
176 Habinek (1998), 122-36. For example, the learnedness of the women in Terence’s comedies (Andr. 
274-5; Heaut. 361) has a strong moral undertone, and is explicitly linked to their purity (probe), 
chastity (pudice), and righteousness (bene). It serves to accentuate these women’s adherence to 
traditional female virtues, rather than to imply any literary education. As such, it contrasts to more 
superficial and generalising mentions (e.g. Eun. 791). For these typically feminine virtues, see Muth 
(2005), 263; Milnor (2008), 37; Feltovich (2015), 140. 
177 Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, V, 1, column 1751ff. 
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7.3.2.2.1 Denotation and quantitative spread 
Doctus 
Firstly, doctus has been meaningfully described as “a keyword of the Latin tradition”178. 
This phrase succinctly summarises the underlying preoccupations of the great majority 
of academic enquiry into the notion of “learnedness” in the ancient world, as it has been 
directed mainly at understanding the classical literary tradition. Andrew Feldherr, for 
example, analysed how “learnedness” functioned as a meta-narrative in the works of 
Catullus, and Jon Hall examined the ideal of the doctus orator in Cicero’s De Oratore179. 
Besides this strand of research, studies on “learnedness” in the Roman world have been 
undertaken with particular vigour by scholars interested in gender divisions. Sharon 
James, for instance, dedicated a monograph to the puella docta as a poetic stereotype in 
Roman elegy, whereas Emily Hemelrijk analysed the phenomenon of educated women 
(matronae doctae) in much broader terms180. Thomas Habinek, furthermore, paid 
attention to the way in which the epithet doctus/-a changed in meaning when attributed 
to women rather than men181. Studies on the semantic scope of the word doctus (and its 
derivatives) outside of these contexts are very rare – Alain Hus’ erudite exploration of 
“les mots de la famille de docere” undoubtedly being one of the more valuable ones182. 
However, none of these studies have structurally considered the (variation in) use of the 
term (and its derivatives) in light of the legal status of the persons to whom it was 
attributed.  
As is clear from the data in Appendix 9, learnedness is primarily attributed to 
freeborn individuals throughout our literary corpora (69%). Freedmen and slaves, on 
the contrary, are much less often described in these terms (8% and 4% respectively). The 
trend does not change drastically when we consider only the network embedded letter 
collections, where 76% of the mentions of doctus (and derivatives) is applied to ingenui, 
and 14% to freedmen (nowhere in the correspondences is a slave praised for his 
erudition). It should be noted, however, that all freedman attestations derive from 
Cicero’s correspondence, and that four out of five times, the quality is there attributed 
to our Dionysius183. The other freedman is Crassus’ Apollonius184. Both of these 
 
                                                     
178 Habinek (1998), 12. 
179 Feldherr (2007), passim (e.g. p. 93); Hall (1994). 
180 James (2003); Hemelrijk (1999). 
181 Habinek (1998), esp. Chapter 6 (p. 122-36). 
182 Hus (1965). Cf. also the etymological study by Hamp (1968). 
183 Att. 6.1.12; 7.4.1; 7.7.1; 7.18.3. 
184 Fam. 13.16.4. The description of Tiro as doctus (Att. 7.2.3) is, as mentioned earlier, modern 
conjecture. 
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appraisals therefore occur in rather exceptional contexts: that of Apollonius in a letter 
of recommendation to Caesar which has to convince the latter of the freedman’s ability 
to write his biography; and that of Dionysius, as noted earlier, in conjunction with other 
exceptional terms (sanctus, vir optimus, amicus, …) in the intimate correspondence 
between Cicero and Atticus. 
Moreover, in the detached sources, slaves and freedmen are almost exclusively 
described as doctus to ridicule them, or to indicate they were particularly adept in a 
specific (“sordid”) skill. It is certainly no coincidence that this happens most often in 
satire. Trimalchio, for example, famously orders the killing and cooking of a cock whose 
crowing had distressed him. This job was entrusted to Daedalus, the slave cook whom 
Trimalchio had praised earlier as a homo pretiosus, but whom Petronius now describes as 
a cocus doctissimus, referring to his extraordinary skills in preparing magnificent 
dishes185. The characterisation of a slave as doctissimus is already in itself very 
unconventional, but the rather base handiness that is here referred to clearly reveals 
Petronius’ characteristic sarcasm in its use186. The consistent use of doctus in private 
correspondence or speeches (where it is mainly reserved for the praiseworthy literary 
qualities of noble individuals) contrasts sharply with this description of the practical 
skill of a mere slave, who in no way deserved such appraisal. The freedman Enchion, on 
the other hand, is ridiculed for his inability to recognise the importance of true 
learning. When he boasts about his boy (cicaro meus) making good educational progress, 
Petronius makes sure that we do not take this claim too literally187. Indeed, Enchion had 
a habit of preferring teachers who were not truly docti, but instead merely inquiring (est 
et alter non quidem doctus, sed curiosus)188. The stinging humour of the passage derives 
from Enchio leaving the education of this cicaro up to a magister non quidem doctus, who 
would moreover make things up on the spot rather than drawing from a solid base of 
knowledge (qui plus docet quam scit). Enchion’s final claim that education is a treasure, 
and that culture never dies (litterae thesaurum est, et artificium nunquam moritur) therefore 
typically has a very cynical undertone. The implication is that this freedman – but in 
 
                                                     
185 Petr. Sat. 70.2 and 74.4-5 respectively. 
186 The scope of the current discussion does not allow for a digression into matters of authorship. For 
a convenient overview, see most recently Prag and Repath (2009), 5ff. 
187 Sat. 46.3-5. There is some debate about who is meant by cicaro, the arguments ranging from 
Echion’s son (thus Whittick (1957), 392-3; Witke (1989), 170; Best (1965), 74) to his slave (thus Booth 
(1979), 16ff). See for the most recent discussion Schmeling (2011), 193-5. 
188 Since the passage in between is corrupt, we do not know for sure who is meant by alter (another 
cicaro or another magister), although most scholars agree on the latter option. Best (1965) and 
Heseltine (1969) believed it to refer to another cicaro. But a convincing case has been made for alter 
referring to a second magister in Booth (1979). See also Whittick (1957) and Schmeling (2011), 194-5. 
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extenso all his fellows at the table – can never be doctus since they do not even know 
what it means to be learned. 
Indeed, a similar questionable use of doctus is found in three other instances, where it 
refers to a practical skill unmistakably linked to sexual activity. In one passage, 
Encolpius calls Ascyltos “more clever than any pimp” (ipsis lenonibus doctior)189. Although 
he figures prominently in the Satyricon, the status of Ascyltos remains obscure190. 
However, rather than any status-specific use of doctus, it is once again the devaluation of 
this weighty term, and the substitution of its meaning by slyness and cunningness, that 
is particularly striking. It is the same surprise effect Petronius achieves at the very end 
of the Satyricon, when he calls a son of the legacy-huntress Philomela doctissimus because 
he is clever enough to realise he can get his hands on Encolpius’ money if he agrees to 
intercourse with him191. Juxtaposing “learnedness” with a sordid desire for money 
through prostitution, Petronius again sarcastically distorts the true meaning of the 
quality, but once again, it is in no way related to a status-specific vocabulary (the son is 
ingenuus). Finally, when the ship-owner Lichas recognised Encolpius (despite him being 
disguised as Eumolpus’ slave), the “brilliant way” (docte) in which he had been able to do 
so pertained not to any clever deduction or inquiry, but rather to recognising, on touch, 
Encolpius’ genitals192. The inappropriate use of docte is furthermore accentuated by a 
direct comparison to the much more respectable motif of Odysseus’ anagnorisis193.  
In Juvenal’s Satires, too, we encounter a man who – prostituting his own wife while 
pretending not to be aware of the affair – is described as “an expert (doctus) at watching 
the ceiling, an expert (doctus), too, at snoring over his goblet with a wide-awake 
nose”194. An ironic use of doctus reminiscent of Petronius’ cocus doctissimus is moreover 
attested when Juvenal mentions a servant who “arranged the dishes expertly (docte)”195. 
Elsewhere, he meaningfully launches a stinging attack against those who think that only 
nobles can be doctus, while they are in fact quite the opposite (nobiles indocti), priding 
themselves only because of their resonating family name196. In his thirteenth Satire, he 
 
                                                     
189 Petr. Sat. 84.5. 
190 Andreau (2009), 117-8.  
191 Petr. Sat. 140.11. 
192 Petr. Sat. 105.9-11: “homo prudentissimus confusis omnibus corporis orisque lineamentis ad 
unicum fugitivi argumentum tam docte pervenerit” 
193 Cf. Schmeling (2011), 415. 
194 Juv. Sat. 1.56-57: “leno (…) doctus spectare lacunar, doctus et ad calicem vigilanti stertere naso”. 
195 Juv. Sat. 7.184-185: “(…) veniet qui fercula  docte conponit”.  
196 Juv. Sat. 8.47-52. See also Juv. Sat. 2.2-4 where hypocrites are likewise attacked for their actual 
unlearnedness: “(…) aliquid de moribus audent qui Curios simulant et Bacchanalia vivunt. Indocti 
primum (…)”. Although Greeks themselves escape this particular reproach, they are being 
condemned for their habit of meaningless flattering and for their praising of the illiterate speech of 
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debunks the opinions of the uneducated (indocti) as “the pleasures of a petty, weak, and 
tiny mind”197. In all these cases, being indoctus implies a moral inferiority as well as an 
intellectual one, since not being properly schooled results in inappropriate behaviour or 
opinions. In Juvenal too, then, this negative affirmation of the aristocratic ideal of being 
doctus exists next to more sarcastic instances in which the word is used to describe 
vulgar and base skills. The same can be said about the only time Horace uses 
learnedness in connection to someone who is not of free birth (cf. infra).  
The only positive use of doctus for a freedman in the detached sources occurs when it 
suits Juvenal’s argument to present a teacher as commendable for his learnedness (his 
status meaningfully not being mentioned explicitly). In the seventh Satire, after doing 
the same for historians, advocates and rhetores, Juvenal deplores that schoolteachers are 
not duly rewarded for their services: “When do Celadus and learned (doctus) Palaemon 
pocket the reward a schoolteacher deserves?”198. This is the only instance in our literary 
sample – apart from Cicero’s correspondence – where doctus actually refers to a 
freedman. Moreover, it seems to have had the same elevated meaning as when applied 
to freeborn persons (i.e. a true and commendable learnedness). Even though 
grammarians are seemingly forced to work under dire circumstances (no doubt an 
exaggerated representation of reality), the description is not designed to mock these 
teachers199. Instead, Juvenal denunciates the degenerated patronage-system of his time 
with an almost Tacitean pessimism200. As such, we have no reason to question the 
sincerity of Juvenal in describing Palaemon as doctus, although the rhetorical style and 
poignant message are no doubt partially responsible for resorting to this rather 
exceptional description. 
Apart from Cicero’s correspondence and satire, doctus and derivatives occur only in 
relation to ingenui (e.g. the other correspondences; Cicero’s speeches; Livy; Terence) or 
not at all (e.g. Pliny’s Panegyric; Fronto’s theoretical and historical works De Eloquentia, 
De Orationibus, Principia Historiae, and De Bello Parthico). In both Livy and Horace, however, 
it features prominently as a participle (edoctus) that requires further determination by 
referencing a particular skill or trade. As such, it does not denote or imply independent 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
their friends: Juv. Sat. 3.86-7: “Quid quod adulandi gens prudentissima laudat sermonem indocti, 
faciem deformis amici (…)”. 
197 Juv. Sat. 13.180-1: “’At vindicta bonum vita iucundius ipsa.’ Nempe hoc indocti (…)”; 13.189-91: 
“Quippe minuti semper et infirmi est animi exiguique voluptas ultio”. 
198 Juv. Sat. 7.215-6. For the famous freed grammarian Q. Remmius Palaemon, see Suet. Gram. 23.  
199 They have to “sit from midnight onwards in a place where no blacksmith would sit” and “breath 
the stink of as many lamps as there are boys” for a wage that is no more than that of a gladiator’s 
prize for one single victory (222-6; 242-3). 
200 For Satire 7 as an accusation of Domitian (and the emperors in general) being responsible for this 
degradation of patronage, see e.g. Helmbold & O’ Neil (1959). 
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erudition, literary aptitude, or overall intellectual quality, but rather a very specific 
proficiency that has been acquired through experience201. In satire, as we have seen, 
this could similarly lead to situations where a rather ridiculous skill or trait was 
juxtaposed to doctus (as a necessary clarification). Some poetic examples include a boy 
from an Arabian palace (“skilled in archery”), the average freeborn youngster in Rome 
(“better at playing games than at hunting or horse-riding”), the young girl Chia (“ adept 
in playing the harp”), or an unknown person – described as an ape by Horace (“capable 
only of imitating Catullus and Calvus”)202.  
This use of (e)doctus is thus hardly comparable with that of Cicero when he was 
praising Dionysius, and which besides intellectual quality also implied a cultural and 
perhaps even moral sensibility. This is not to say, however, that the latter use of 
learnedness is absent entirely in Horace203. It is, however, also used in a sarcastic – 
“satirical” – manner. When the notorious bore is chasing Horace along the Via Sacra, for 
example, he tries to get his idol’s attention by bluntly claiming that he is learned (noris 
nos inquit docti sumus)204. Although doctus here implies the typical independent 
cultivation, it becomes clear immediately that the bore’s conception of this quality is 
quite different than Horace’s, especially when the former claims that it pertains to his 
dancing and singing skills (quis membra movere mollius? Invideat quod et Hermogenes, ego 
canto). Neither does he seem to understand that true learnedness is more than simply 
writing a lot (nam quis me scribere pluris aut citius possit versus?)205. Although he may deem 
himself truly doctus, his own behaviour and his own self-aggrandising clearly undermine 
this statement. On another occasion, Horace describes Catius, probably an Epicurean 
philosopher, as learned (docte Cati). Since this satire is traditionally interpreted as a 
dismissal by Horace of any form of degenerated Epicureanism (here represented by a 
 
                                                     
201 E.g. skill in warfare (25.40.6) or piety towards the gods (29.18.6; 30.37.1). In several instances the 
word is used as a participle in a general sense of “having learned that” (9.40.4); “being informed 
that” (41.8.5); or “having been taught by experience that” (4.46.4; 6.32.7; 7.38.9; 21.34.2; 44.22.12). 
Only once is docti used as a general plural: “learned men” (26.22.14). None of these instances refers 
to doctus as an independent virtue of an identifiable individual. The same trends can be discerned in 
Tacitus’ historical works. E.g. (e)doctus as “having learned from experience/long use/age” (Hist. 1.9; 
2.90; Ann. 1.16; 4.50; 13.47); “being well trained in something” (Ann. 12.44); or doctissimi as a general 
plural: “learned men” (Ann. 6.28). 
202 See Od. 1.29.9: “puer (…) doctus sagittas tendere Sericas”; Od. 3.24.56: “ingenuus puer (…) ludere 
doctior”; Od. 4.13: “doctae psallere Chiae (…) excubat”; Sat. 1.10.19: “simius iste nil praeter Calvum et 
doctus cantare Catullum”. In the latter case, doctus is used somewhat ironically: even though “the 
ape” is skilled in reciting Catullus and Calvus, there derives no glory this imitation. Other examples 
include Od. 3.8.5 and 3.9.10. 
203 E.g. Sat. 1.5.3 (Graecorum longe doctissimus); 2.1.78 (docte Trebati); 2.4.3 (doctus Plato); Epist. 1.19.1 
(Maecenas docte); 2.1.56 (Pacuvius docti famam senis). See also Sat. 1.9.51 and 1.10.52. 
204 Sat. 1.9.7. 
205 Sat. 1.9.23-5. 
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gluttonous preoccupation with gastronomy personified by Catius), the description 
should be taken with a grain of salt206. Earlier, Catius had already described Plato as 
doctus and promised Horace that he too would become so if he followed his culinary 
advice207. By using doctus to refer to the proponent of the very habits and philosophy he 
condemns, Horace clearly ridicules Catius for thinking his “art” is in any way 
comparable to the true wisdom of Plato. 
Apart from one instance where Horace has a fictional slave trader praise his goods by 
calling one of them a sweet though not very artful singer (canet indoctum sed dulce)208, all 
of the attestations of learnedness pertain to ingenui. Not only does an analysis of the 
occurrence of doctus in Horace thus confirm the trend that freedmen were in general 
not described as such, the poet also repeatedly hints at the explicit link between high 
education and free birth. Towards the end of the Ars Poetica, for example, he states that 
whoever is unskilled (indoctus) in sports tends – and quite rightly so – not to expose 
himself to an audience, out of fear for mockery209. Shifting from such practical skills to 
literary learnedness, he continues with sneering sarcasm: “Yet he who does not know 
anything about verse still dares to write. Why not? He’s freeborn and free, he has the 
wealth of a knight, and he is lacking in any defect” (Qui nescit versus, tamen audet fingere. 
Quidni? Liber et ingenuus, praesertim census equestrem summam nummorum vitioque remotus 
ab omni)210. The phrase liber et ingenuus explicitly excludes freedmen from the picture. 
Despite his stinging attack on the haughtiness of ingenui (especially knights), Horace 
implies that literary quality is associated with the freeborn elite. Of course, it is not 
because you are a freeborn aristocrat that you are a priori doctus (even though many of 
them seemed to think so), but the conviction that their social status counts as proof for 
their literary abilities reveals the strong link between both. In this context, we should 
not overlook the fact that Horace himself was the son of a freedman. Although he was 
thus freeborn, such an attack against the privileged class may spring in part from his 
loathing of this false sense of superiority among the elites, reflecting his own well-
known pride in having risen from a humble background by hard work and literary 
merit211. 
 
                                                     
206 For this and a general discussion of this satire in this light, see Günther (2013), 140-4.  
207 Sat. 2.4.3 and 19 respectively. 
208 Epist. 2.2.7. Not only is the slave thus deprived from a characterisation as doctus in the 
independent, literary, and cultivated sense, but he is not even attributed basic proficiency in any 
particular skill. 
209 Ars 379-381: “Ludere qui nescit, campestribus abstinet armis indoctusque pilae discive trochive 
quiescit, ne spissae risum tollant impune coronae”. 
210 Ars. 382-384: “Qui nescit versus, tamen audet fingere. Quidni? Liber et ingenuus, praesertim 
census equestrem summam nummorum vitioque remotus ab omni”. 
211 Sat. 1.6.65-88; 1.10.31-49. 
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In short, doctus as a description of inherent cultivation and intellectual quality is – 
barring Juvenal’s exceptional and rhetorical reference to Palaemon – described to (two) 
freedmen only in Cicero’s correspondence, and there also in equally exceptional 
contexts. Slaves, moreover, are only described as such when the author intended to 
ridicule them, or draw attention to a specific (often “sordid”) trade or skill. Ranging 
from cooking skills, over an expertise in (homo)sexual practices, to an adeptness in 
ignoring or even exhibiting shameful behaviour, the semantic scope of doctus in satire is 
much broader than its rather homogeneous denotation of literary and cultural 
proficiency in other literary works, but this is a genre-related observation more than 
anything else. The general impression of this lexical analysis, then, is that doctus, its 
derivatives, but also certain synonyms like eruditus or facundus, were not typically 
libertine qualities – quite on the contrary212. Cicero – like Juvenal – used it to praise 
freedmen with precisely because it conveyed a sense of exaltedness by its common 
association with the erudition of ingenui. Indeed, in one of his speeches, Cicero considers 
the group of ingenious and learned men (ingeniosus et eruditus) as a distinct class (genus), 
which he unconditionally admired213. Similarly, Suetonius’ De grammaticis et rhetoribus 
contains many descriptions of freed teachers, but significantly, the only time doctus is 
used to describe one of them, is when it is attributed to the talented M. Antonius 
Gnipho, of whom Suetonius makes sure to mention that he had originally been freeborn 
(ingenuus sed expositus)214. The implication is that his learned ingenium magnum derives at 
least in part from this condition at birth. 
By way of preliminary conclusion, the use of doctus in elite literature can be 
interpreted as a strategy of distinction – perhaps even reflecting an aspect of the elite’s 
hidden transcript. Barring exceptional instances, it is preserved for this elite (or at least 
ingenui). By exclusively appropriating certain virtues, they can discursively claim 
distinctiveness or even superiority without openly stigmatising “others” (by, for 
example, ascribing to them a set of more derogatory terms, cf. infra). This observation is 
very much in line with our earlier suggestion, i.e. that a reserved elite “path to glory” 
does not in itself imply an alternative, opposing, and subordinate “path to glory” for 
 
                                                     
212 All attestations of eruditus in Cicero’s correspondence refer to ingenui (Fam. 13.3.1; 5.14.1; 13.16.4; 
13.61.1; Att. 14.20.3), or have a negative connotation, e.g. Att. 4.16.7 (barbarians are not eruditus); 
Quint. Fratr. 1.1.16 (Greeks are schooled in compliance). When compared to doctus, eruditus features 
much less prominently in all literary corpora. In the historians, it is similarly reserved for ingenui 
(Liv. 9.36), or used in the same way as edoctus (Liv. 42.52; Tac. Ann. 16.18). It does not feature in 
Terence’s comedies. 
213 Cic. Pis. 68. 
214 Gram. 7. For child exposure in ancient Rome in general, see Brunt (1971), 140-54; MacMullen 
(1974), 13-4, 92; Boswell (1984), esp. p. 14 note 6; Harris (1994); Harper (2011). Doctus and its 
derivatives are mentioned on other occasions in Suetonius’ work, but only in relation to 
generalising descriptions, not as an individual trait (Gram. 4; 11; 18; Rhet. 2). 
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lower classes. As a quality typically reserved for freeborn individuals, Cicero’s 
application of doctus to a freedman endows his appraisal with a very profound 
connotation. Its use in this context implied that he considered the man virtually equal – 
at least with respect to his intellectual qualities – to the freeborn. The description, in 
other words, momentarily erases the distinction between freed and freeborn so 
structurally respected throughout Latin literature. From this perspective, it cannot be 
maintained that Cicero’s claim ne libertinum laudare videar referred to the virtues 
mentioned prior to it, because the terms he used to describe Dionysius were not 
typically “libertine” at all (cf. also below). Once again, it seems that ne libertum laudare 
videar serves as an introduction to vir bonus, rather than as a reflection on the previous 
qualities. This is perhaps even clearer when considering the elite’s use of another 
quality Cicero recognised in Dionysius: sanctitas (sanctus). 
Sanctus 
Even more so than doctus, sanctus and its two corresponding nouns (sanctitas and 
sanctimonia)215 were qualities attributed almost exclusively to freeborn (elites). These 
terms covered both a religious and a moral load, although analytically distinguishing 
between the two is violating the Roman belief that they were inextricably linked to one 
another216. In public life, it was a key-virtue of public office-holders. Evidently, the 
“sanctity” of Vestal Virgins, or the legal sacrosanctitas of tribunes had divine and legal 
implications in addition to moral ones, but these need not concern us here217. In private 
life, the terms primarily served – often in tandem with qualities like castitas and pudicitia 
– to describe individual virtues such as piety, adherence to established norms and 
conventions, and overall respectability218. As such, it was valued in all kinds of people, 
including aristocrats, emperors, spouses, etc.219 In literary sources, however, it implied a 
gravity rarely associated with non-elites, as a broader lexical analysis unambiguously 
reveals.  
Indeed, the data in Appendix 9 show that throughout our sample, the description of a 
freedman as sanctus occurs only twice – both times in Cicero’s correspondence and in 
 
                                                     
215 The much weightier sanctitudo was used on occasion as well, although much less frequently. Cf. 
Gellius NA 17.2.19. 
216 For the intersection between morality and religion, and the particular relevance of the virtue 
sanctitas in this regard, see Mueller (2002), 148ff.  
217 Bauman (1992), 47. For Vestal Virgins, see e.g. Liv. 1.20.3; Hor. Od. 1.2.27; Cic. Dom. 136.9. For the 
sacrosanctitas of tribunes, see e.g. Liv. 2.33.1; 3.55.6; Cic. Sest. 79.3; Red. Sen. 7.6; Plin. Ep. 1.23.1. 
218 Langlands (2006), 30 (esp. note 6). 
219 E.g. Plin. Pan. 63.8 (the moderatio and sanctitas of Trajan made him oblige both god and man); 
Fronto, Ad Ant. Pium 8.1.1 (Pius as most sacred emperor); CIL 14, 2756 (a coniunx sanctissima); Juv. 
Sat. 7.209 (pious parents); Cic. Phil. 2.32.9 (Jupiter); … 
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relation to our Dionysius220. Prior to Att. 7.4.1, Cicero had called Dionysius sanctus once 
already. In a letter (Att. 6.1.12) to Atticus predating 7.4.1 by almost a year, Cicero had 
expressed his delight with Dionysius’ accomplishments as a teacher. Although he was 
certainly quite severe, Cicero – so he wrote – could think of no man more learned, more 
principled, or more loving towards Cicero and Atticus than Dionysius (homo nec doctior 
nec sanctior fieri potest nec tui meique amantior)221. As noted, the description of a freedman 
as doctus is noteworthy in itself, but the same goes – even more so – for the 
characterisation of sanctus. Moreover, in both cases, the two exceptional virtues are 
explicitly juxtaposed in the appraisal, clearly reflecting a deliberate choice on Cicero’s 
part. The only difference between the two passages, is that Cicero – in the earlier one – 
did not add a status-related remark parallel like ne libertinum laudare videar. This is, once 
again, an indication that this expression should be seen as referring to the 
“transgressive” use of vir bonus (attested only in 7.4.1), rather than to the five preceding 
descriptions.  
Neither the other letter writers, nor any other author, deemed sanctus (or a 
derivative) appropriate to praise a freedman (let alone a slave) with. All attestations, 
then, refer to ingenui. Most of these were not only freeborn but also top elite222, and its 
connotation of moral integrity made of sanctus a virtue particularly suited to praise 
emperors with223. The few attestations of sanctus in Fronto’s correspondence, for 
example, all refer to the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Antoninus Pius, and serve to 
accentuate their piety in both private (familial) and public (state) affairs. Horace even 
implies that sanctus was a quality expected to be inherently present in a vir bonus224. 
A notable trend in non-epistolary genres, however, is that sanctus is used much more 
often not as a personalised epithet, but rather as a description of an event, an abstract 
concept, a general plural, etc.225 Terence, for example, never used it to describe an 
individual person’s quality or character. Instead, it was employed once when referring 
 
                                                     
220 Att. 6.1.12; 7.4.1. 
221 Att. 6.1.12. 
222 E.g. Cic. Fam. 4.3.2 (Sulpicius Rufus); Quint. Fratr. 1.2.13 (Q. Cicero); Juv. Sat. 3.137-138 (Publius 
Cornelius Scipio Nasica); 4.77-9 (the prefect Pegasus); Plin. Pan. 70.4 (provincial officials); 83.5 (the 
empress Plotina); etc. 
223 Plin. Ep. 10.1.1; 10.3a.3; 10.83.1; 10.100.1; Pan. 1.3; 63.8 (Trajan); 10.4 (Nerva). For the different 
connotation of “imperial” sanctity, see Wardle (2000), 482; Taylor (1918), 160. 
224 Ep. 1.16.57-61: “Vir bonus, omne forum quem spectat et omne tribunal, quandocumque deos vel 
porco vel bove placat: 'Iane pater!' clare, clare cum dixit: 'Apollo!' labra movet, metuens audiri: 
'Pulchra Lauerna, da mihi fallere, da iusto sanctoque videri”. 
225 E.g. riches (Juv. Sat. 1.112); a home (14.68); Greeks (3.109); Egyptians (15.10); a revered parent 
(7.209); the diplomatic entourage of a governor (8.127); an outstanding honest man (13.64). 
Especially in Livy, it was used in many different contexts (relations, official office, the city of Rome, 
laws, Vestal Virgins, an alliance, sacred obligations, etc.). See, for example, Liv. 1.8.2; 2.55.8; 30.19.9; 
1.20.3; 2.33.1; 3.55.6; 28.17.6; 41.19.6; 1.28.9; 2.10.11; 29.18.3; 30.16.3; 40.9.7. 
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to the sanctity of a marriage ceremony, and another four times when a character is 
swearing a solemn oath226. Even though the agents in each of these cases are not 
directly described as sanctus – contrary to many persons in the epistolary genre – it is 
again significant that no slave or freedman is associated with the virtue in such a way. 
Petronius uses sanctus (as an individual trait) only to describe Encolpius. But this 
typically happens in a sexually-laden context where Ascyltos jokingly addresses his 
friend by frater sanctissime after he had caught him red-handed with another boy227. As 
noted in a similar vein for doctus, the solemn connotation of the description is thereby 
strongly contrasted to the base activities to which it refers. 
The only corpus that allows for some generalisation because of the relatively 
abundant mentions of sanctus in it, is the collection of Cicero’s speeches. The term (or 
derivatives) occur 157 times in 31 different orationes. Most of these do not refer to 
specific individuals, but rather to objects, abstract concepts or general plurals228 and 
some to gods and goddesses229. The remaining 41 attestations do refer to individuals of 
whom the status is known with relative certainty. It no longer comes as a surprise that 
all of these are freeborn: no slaves or freedmen are ever described as sanctus  in our 
sample230.  
In conclusion, sanctus  was, even more so than doctus, a quality exclusively ascribed to 
ingenui. Once again, then, this observation begs the question whether Cicero was 
actually opposing “libertine” virtues with the expression bonus vir in Att. 7.4.1. It 
becomes increasingly clear that this was explicitly not the case, and that the ne 
 
                                                     
226 Adelph. 899 (marriage ceremony); Hecyra 61; 268; 751; 771 (oath-swearing).  
227 Sat. 11.3. In Sat. 116.6 and 133.3 sanctus is not an individual trait. 
228 To give only a few examples: Quinct. 55.4; Planc. 80.8; Red. Pop. 18.8; Agr. I.9 (good men in 
general); S. Rosc. 112.7 (friendship and trust); Caec. 3.5; Ver. 2.5.184; 2.5.185 (sacred images); Ver. 
1.1.14; 2.1.54 (sanctuaries); Ver. 2.1.47; 2.4.94; 2.4.103; Har. 32.7; Sest. 83.14; Pis. 85.2; Mil. 66.11; 90.6 
(temples); Ver. 2.1.108; 2.2.123; Har. 32.3; Vat. 23.6; Balb. 19.11; Pis. 91.1; Phil. 11.27.6; Sest. 65.4 
(laws); Ver. 2.4.151; 2.5.36 (festivals); Man. 65.5 (a city); Flac. 15.10 (ancestors); Flac. 71.10 (the people 
of Apollonides); Dom. 109.1/5; Phil. 2.68.2; 2.69.4 (the house of a citizen); Dom. 136.9 (the Vestal 
priesthood); Sest. 55.8; 79.3; Red. Sen. 7.6 (magistrates); Balb. 32.10; 33.3-5 (treaties); Prov. 41.13; 
Balb. 52.4; Deiot. 10.8 (the Senate); Q. Rosc. 6.7; 43.14 (court acts and witnesses); Sest. 147.3; Lig. 21.8; 
Cat. I.29.5 (the res publica); Red. Sen. 34.13; Sest. 56.7; Mil. 87.4 (religious ceremonies and traditions); 
etc. 
229 Ver. 2.1.49 (Tenes); Ver. 2.5.186 (Mother of Ida); Mil. 85.11; Phil. 2.32.9 (Jupiter); Ver. 2.5.188; 
Scaur. 46.4/45a (the gods in general); Sest. 143.11 (Hercules). 
230 S. Rosc. 33.5 (Q. Scaevola); Q. Rosc. 15.2 (Q. Roscius); Q. Rosc. 44.6; Ver. 2.3.182; Cael. 52.8; 54.7 (the 
senators Manilius, Luscius and Lucceius); Ver. 2.4.83 (Scipio Africanus); Ver. 2.5.49; 2.5.49 (Verres, 
sarcastically); Cluent. 107.5 (Octavius Balbus); Cluent. 133.3 (Cluentius Habitus); Arch. 9.10 
(Metellus); Flac. 8.4 (Lucius Flaccus); Dom. 137.4 (the censor Caius Cassius); Balb. 9.15 (Pompey); Pis. 
28.5 (Piso Caenoninus); Planc. 27.5 (Aulus Torquatus); Planc. 32.8 (Cn. Plancius); Deiot. 20.6 (Caesar); 
Phil. 3.16.5 (Atia); Phil. 2.103.2 (M. Varro); Phil. 9.15.15 (Sulpicius Rufus); Phil. 13.42.6 (Dolabella); 
Phil. 2.60.2 (Cicero); ... 
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libertinum laudare videar phrase was either a joke in itself, or referred to the exclusivity 
of the subsequent vir bonus expression. However, it is possible still that Cicero intended 
to highlight the contrast between this exalted description and the other three qualities 
of Dionysius (frugi, studiosus, and officiosus), which were juxtaposed the closest to the 
phrase ne libertinum laudare videar.  
Frugi 
The indeclinable adjective frugi (“sparing”, “parsimonious”) and the associated terms 
frugalitas and frugalis were among the most encompassing qualities available to any 
Roman writer who intended to praise someone’s overall virtue231. It was – contrary to 
sanctus – a virtue particularly valued in private citizens rather than kings or emperors. 
In his defence of the Galatian king Deiotarus, for example, Cicero notes the man’s 
frugalitas, but immediately adds that it was not a word (!) particularly worth stressing 
(etsi hoc verbo scio laudari regem non solere), since Deiotarus was also fortis, iustus, severus, 
gravis, magnanimus, etc. “These are praises”, Cicero concludes, “that are suited for a king, 
whereas the former [frugality] is a virtue rather for a private individual” (hae sunt regiae 
laudes, illa privata est)232. After the rise of Empire, however, it was appropriate also to 
describe emperors as frugal individuals, although a desire to present them precisely as 
modest and unaspiring rulers was no doubt partially responsible for this evolution233.  
When looking for a good definition of the “temperate” man in his Tusculanae 
Disputationes, Cicero starts out by giving a few synonyms of temperantia: σωφροσύνην, 
moderatio, and modestia. He is, however, reluctant to put these on a par with frugalitas 
because for the Greeks, the corresponding χρήσιμος has the more confined meaning of 
mere usefulness (utilis) instead of the much richer (latius) load the Latin term covered. 
The discussion then proceeds to the various qualities frugalitas denoted – at least for 
Cicero and his contemporaries: abstinentia, innocentia, and some other virtues (reliquas 
virtutes). It is further onwards associated even with fortitudo, iustitia, and prudentia. 
Cicero’s conclusion, then, is that the unique property of frugalitas is “to govern and 
appease all tendencies to too eager a desire after anything, to restrain lust, and to 
preserve a decent steadiness in everything” (eius enim videtur esse proprium motus animi 
adpetentis regere et sedare semperque adversantem libidini moderatam in omni re servare 
constantiam)234. The same very general meaning – again incorporating the praiseworthy 
qualities of being moderatus, modestus, temperans, constans, and continens – is given in the 
 
                                                     
231 See especially Bonneville & Dardaine (1984), 218-9 (including many references) for “la 
signification du mot”.  
232 Cic. Deiot. 26. 
233 E.g. Plin. Pan. 3.4; 41.1; 49.5. Cf. Wallace-Hadrill (1981), 312, 316. 
234 Cic. Tusc. 3.16-7. 
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next book of the Disputationes, where attention is once again drawn to the practical use 
of these words (vocabula; nomen) to describe a virtuous person, implying that at least 
Cicero himself was very well aware of their connotation. The passage meaningfully 
concludes by confirming all that has been said earlier: “for if that word [frugi] did not 
include all virtues, it would never have been proverbial to say that a frugal man does 
everything rightly” (quodnisi eo nomine virtutes continerentur, numquam ita pervolgatum 
illud esset, ut iam proverbio locum optineret, 'hominem frugi omnia recte facere')235. 
Frugi, frugalis, and frugalitas are terms widely recognised by modern scholars who pay 
structural attention to discourse and vocabulary. Ernst Badian, for example, unmasked 
the inaugural speech of the tribunus plebis Marcus Duronius (96-97 BCE) as an ironical 
invention by Valerius Maximus by drawing attention to – among other things – the 
inappropriate use of the word frugi in it. He noted that its “entirely honourable 
connotations” and “favourable associations” are incongruous with the sordid point 
Duronius was trying to make (i.e. that sumptuary laws were an evil restraint (frenum) to 
freedom)236. Nicole Méthy analysed the ways in which Pliny the Younger and his 
contemporaries used frugalitas and (quasi-)synonyms like verecundia, parsimonia, or 
modestia to “faire du passé un idéal ou un modèle de perfection”237. Because of its very 
broad meaning – basically summarising someone’s innate virtue in general terms – frugi 
and its derivatives were – contrary to doctus and especially sanctus – attributed to slaves, 
freedmen, ingenui, elites, and even emperors alike throughout Latin literature238.  
The Table in Appendix 9 again enumerates the attestations of frugi and its derivatives 
in the respective literary corpora. The overall impression is that although ingenui are 
again the status-group most described in these terms (53%), the numbers of freedmen 
(15%) and slaves (22%) are considerably higher than was the case for doctus or sanctus. 
Perhaps even more important, these figures remain roughly the same when isolating 
either the epistolary corpora (50%, 20%, and 15% respectively) or the “detached” ones 
(55%, 13%, and 25% respectively). Moreover, some of the incerti should perhaps be 
counted as liberti. Assuming freed status for Pansa’s medicus Glyco is certainly not far-
fetched, but adhering to our strict criteria as explained in Chapter 3, we were reluctant 
 
                                                     
235 Cic. Tusc. 4.36. Attention had earlier been drawn to the laudatory cognomen “Frugi” noble 
individuals like Lucius Piso were able to obtain (quae nisi tanta esset, et si is angustiis, quibus plerique 
putant teneretur, numquam esset L. Pisonis cognomen tanto opere laudatum), cf. Tusc. 3.16; Bonneville & 
Dardaine (1984), 219-31. For Cicero’s predilection towards this name as a basis for puns and exempla, 
see Matthews (1973), 20-1. 
236 Badian (1969), 198-200 (the quotes are from p. 199); Val. Max. 2.9.5. 
237 Méthy (2010), 347ff (the quote is from p. 347). Cf. also Syme (1985), 332. 
238 The most obvious examples of frugi/frugalitas being attributed to an emperor are found in Pliny’s 
Panegyric (e.g. 3.4 (explicitly opposed to luxuria); 41.1; 49.5 (for Trajan); 51.1 (for Nerva). 
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to do so here239. It should also be noted that the proportional dominance of freeborn in 
this sample is at least in part due to the fact that this status-group is much more 
represented in the literary record. When looking at the epigraphic record, for example, 
the opposite trend can be discerned; again clearly reflecting demographic 
“representation” in this area240. 
Many scholars have explicitly associated the appraisal of being frugi with slaves and 
freedmen. Roberta Stewart, for example, noted that the description of a slave’s 
primordial virtue (i.e. his “skill of accommodation”) was referred to on multiple 
occasions in Plautian comedy by using this term, and that this was a very persistent 
feature of the genre in general241. Much more radical was Fabre’s discussion of the word, 
which adopted the entrenched view – going back to the early 19th century – that frugi 
was a quality normally attributed to slaves in general242. Fabre typically focussed on the 
use of frugi for slaves and freedmen in Cicero’s works243. He concluded that “il s’agit 
d’une qualité qui est aussi ‘servile’”, but this inference is based entirely on isolated 
passages, on – again – relatively ad hoc references to Roman comedy, and on a few 
examples of frugi liberti in Cicero’s speeches. The discussion thus completely ignores the 
parallel use of frugi (and associated nouns) in relation to ingenui. It provides good 
evidence for the (obvious) habit of praising slaves and freedmen in these terms, but it 
too quickly concludes from this biased focus of attention that this was due to these 
persons’ connection to their patron (and the duties expected from them as a 
consequence): “Appliqué à un homme, et singulièrement à un affranchi, frugi insiste à la 
fois sur l'honnêteté, la frugalité, mais aussi le fait que l'on peut en tirer quelque chose, 
en attendre notamment des services”244. Not only does this claim fly in the face of the 
general spirit of Cicero’s definition of the word in his Tusculanae Disputationes discussed 
above (and which Fabre conveniently ignores), but it is also incompatible with the 
impression provided by our Appendix 9, which clearly shows that the virtue was in fact 
recognised and openly appreciated in freeborn, freed, and slaves alike (cf. infra).  
 
                                                     
239 Brut. 1.6.2. He was certainly no slave, since Cicero referred to his marriage as a matrimonium. His 
profession and (single, Greek) name may also point to freed status, but are not enough to 
convincingly prove such an assertion. For the dominance of slaves, peregrini, and especially 
freedmen in the medical profession, see Scarborough (1970), 298-9 (including notes), and Nutton 
(1969), 96. 
240 Gregori (2014), 209-10. See also below. 
241 Stewart (2008), 89-91. 
242 E.g. Le Clerc (1821), 302: “Homo frugi, c’était la louange qu’on donnait ordinairement aux esclaves” 
(supported by one reference to Hor. Sat. 2.7.3). 
243 Fabre (1981), 236-7. 
244 Fabre (1981), 236. 
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Fabre’s discussion subsequently includes the realm of epigraphy. At this point, his 
analysis simply cannot be taken seriously anymore. The claim, for example, that “ce 
qualificatif [frugi] apparaît assez souvent, dans les sources épigraphiques, et la plupart 
du temps à propos d'affranchis ou de conjoints d'affranchis” is supported only by a 
footnote, revealing that out of eight (!) occasions when frugi is attested in CIL I², it is five 
times attributed to a freedperson245. Not only is the sample far too small, but even if we 
assume representative value, still almost half of the attestations are not “libertine”. 
Even a very superficial overview of the epigraphic record of the Italian peninsula 
indicates that the amount of freeborn individuals being praised for their frugalitas (or 
for being frugi) is considerable indeed246. In their much more rigorous analysis of the 
frequency and use of frugi in epigraphy, Bonneville & Dardaine already drew attention 
to Fabre’s problematic generalisation from “une série très incomplète”247. They 
observed that frugi is too rapidly considered a servile epithet, but do not entirely 
abandon Fabre’s claim that it was a virtue particularly valued in freedmen. Their 
sample, however, reveals that the quality was certainly not attributed to freedmen 
alone, but also – among others – to craftsmen and traders. Still reflecting the ingrained 
belief that frugi must have somehow carried a servile or libertine connotation, they 
tentatively argue that the occurrence of the word in epitaphs of non-freedmen is due to 
these person’s sociological proximity to the libertine clientele248. Because the qualities 
and virtues of freedmen in epigraphy will be treated in further detail in Chapter 8, we 
will continue to focus here on our analysis of “libertine virtues” in the literary record.  
Even Shackleton-Bailey thought that the adjective frugi had a libertine ring to it, and 
even went so far as to suggest that it could, as such, help in identifying the legal status 
of individuals. In his Onomasticon to Cicero’s speeches, for example, he considers the 
accensus P. Tettius’ description as a homo ordinis sui frugalissimus as an indication that the 
man was a freedman249. Although most accensi  were indeed freedmen of the magistrates 
they served (and the assumption is thus very likely not factually incorrect)250, the OCS 
uses the characterisation frugalissimus as an additional argument for this assertion, 
because the order of knights (let alone senators) was not regularly described with such 
 
                                                     
245 Fabre (1981), 237 note 198. 
246 E.g. CIL 5, 2501; 7446; CIL 6, 17108; 28422; 37806; CIL 9, 4298; CIL 10, 388; CIL 11, 6216; AE 1996, 432 
(all freeborn individuals who included filiation). 
247 Bonneville & Dardaine (1981), 231. 
248 Bonneville & Dardaine (1981), 240: “Frugi n'était donc pas une épithète strictement réservée aux 
affranchis, mais le pourcentage obtenu, pour les non-citoyens ou apparentés (84 %), probablement 
nettement supérieur à celui des affranchis dans l'ensemble de la société romaine, s'explique sans 
doute par une extension de la clientèle libertine à des catégories sociologiques proches — les 
commerçants”. 
249 Shackleton Bailey (1988), 92; Cic. Ver. 2.1.71. 
250 Shimada (1988), 423; Manzella (2000). 
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terms. However, knights and even senators were in fact attributed this quality, albeit 
individually251. Shackleton Bailey was therefore pointing out the improbability that the 
order of knights as a whole was being described as frugalissimus. But even so, Cicero’s 
reference could have referred to lots of ordines other than that of the libertini. Certainly, 
an ordo libertinorum had been discerned by the elites as early as the late Republic, 
although its allure and legal implications (if any) did not match those of the aristocratic 
ordines252. However, equally less formalised ordines are mentioned by Cicero throughout 
his works as well: the ordo scribarum, the ordo publicanorum, the ordo aratorum, the ordo 
pecuariorum, etc.253 In this sense, even an ordo mancipiorum could be conceived of, and 
the Roman Augustales were notoriously prone to describe themselves as belonging to a 
distinct ordo254. If, then, the quality of frugalitas indicates that the order of P. Tettius was 
not that of the knights, it does not follow per se that the ordo libertinorum was meant. In 
fact, in other works, Shackleton Bailey is much more reluctant to associate frugi with 
slaves or freedmen. In reaction to Constans’ claim that Fabius Luscus must have been a 
freedman because he was described as a homo frugi, he rightly noted that Cicero also 
attributed frugalitas to ingenui (and elites), that Fabius’ cognomen does not insinuate 
servile background, and that his identification as a freedman – merely based on his 
ascribed frugality – is consequently unwarranted255. 
Law texts perhaps provide the most compelling argument in favour of the 
assumption that frugi was a “servile” virtue. Interestingly, however, although the 
quality is six times attributed explicitly to slaves in the Digest – always with the same 
standardised phrase (bonae frugi servus)256, it never occurs as a characterisation of 
freedmen. Nor is it exclusively reserved for slaves. Indeed, the other five mentions of 
frugi in the Digest occur in a generalising context, which was supposed to apply to 
members of all status categories257.  
This is not to say that freedmen, and especially slaves, are not regularly associated with 
frugality in the literary record. When explaining in his De Oratore how to use jests that 
 
                                                     
251 See Appendix 9. 
252 E.g. Liv. 42.27; 43.12; Suet. Gram. 18; Cic. Ver. 2.1.124; Cat. 4.16; Phil. 2.3. Cf. Treggiari (1969a), 
162ff; Łoś (1995), 1012, 1026; Ryan (1998), 146-7. 
253 Cic. Ver. 2.2.17; 2.2.181; 3.183-84; Mur. 42; Planc. 23-24; Fam. 13.10.2; Off. 3.88;  Cf. Ryan (1998), 146-
7 (including more examples). For the refusal of the existence of a formal ordo accensorum in 
particular, see Cohen (1975), p. 272. 
254 E.g. Dig. 7.1.15.2; Mouritsen (2011), 257. 
255 Shackleton Bailey (1965), II, 190; Constans (1935), 123. 
256 For (bonae) frugi servus, see Dig. 9.2.23.5; 11.3.1.4; 11.3.9.1; 19.1.13.3; 21.1.19pr; 47.10.15.44. Dig. 
21.1.19pr is the only exception: “veluti si dixerit frugi probum dicto audientem” (about the 
information a slave trader was legally obliged to furnish). The expression is used to describe 
freeborn persons as well in literary sources, e.g. Cic. Att. 4.8a.2-3 
257 Dig. 2.15.8.11; 18.6.12; 24.3.22.8; 26.7.3.3; 31.77.30. 
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excite laughter, Cicero, for example, writes that “we may with the very same words 
commend a thrifty (frugi) servant, and jest upon one that is extravagant”258. Even 
though Cicero only used frugi in his letters to describe freeborn and freed individuals, it 
is noteworthy that he uses the image of a servus frugi in this “detached” treatise. Not 
only does this passage draw attention to the vital importance of context in evaluating a 
description, it also implies that a “thrifty servant” was a mental image Cicero’s audience 
would be familiar with. The same, moreover, could be argued for freedmen. Pliny, for 
one, assumed that feedmen should aspire to nothing more than a reputation for honesty 
and good character (probi et frugi existimentur)259. Although a limited focus on these and 
similar expression may lead to the conviction that frugi – and in extenso other virtues – 
were reserved or “typical” for slaves or freedmen260, a broader lexical analysis greatly 
nuances such conclusions. 
Indeed, our sample of diversified literary sources, clearly reveals that frugi was a 
quality at least as often attributed to ingenui as to freedmen, even if we compensate for 
the proportional dominance of the former category in these corpora. Moreover, when it 
is not used as a personalised epithet (but instead as descriptions of more abstract 
relations or concepts), it usually implies the tastes and modest characters of freeborn 
aristocrats261, even though such descriptions can also indirectly relate to slaves or, in 
more general terms, to “anyone”262. Finally, the impact of genre or personal style is 
important to take into account. Especially in Terence’s comedies, frugi occurs as a very 
trite and commonplace appraisal, almost entirely disconnected from any frugality in the 
literal sense of the word. In The Eunuch, for example, Chaerea is called frugi by his friend 
 
                                                     
258 Cic. Orat. 2.248: “velut eisdem verbis et laudare frugi servum possimus et, si est nequam, iocari”. 
The advice is put in practice by Juvenal (Sat. 4.23), though not in relation to a slave, when he mocks 
Domitian’s trustee Crispinus (as personification of the declining morals of his time). Juvenal 
compares him to the notorious  gourmet Apicius, whom he sarcastically calls a poor and frugal man 
(multa videmus quae miser et frugi non fecit Apicius). 
259 Pan. 88.2: “tu libertis tuis summum quidem honorem, sed tamquam libertis habes abundeque 
sufficere his credis, si probi et frugi existimentur”. 
260 E.g. Mouritsen (2011), 63. 
261 E.g. Plin. Ep. 1.14.4 (about Brixia, and thus Minicius Acilianus: “Brixia, ex illa nostra Italia quae 
multum adhuc verecundiae frugalitatis, atque etiam rusticitatis antiquae, retinet ac servat”); 1.22.5 
(the modest bedroom of Titus Aristo: “soleo ipsum cubiculum illius ipsumque lectum ut imaginem 
quondam priscae frugalitatis adspicere”); 2.17.4 (Pliny’s hall in his Laurentine villa is unpretentious 
but not without dignity: “atrium frugi, nec tamen sordidum”); 3.1.9 (Spurinna has an admirable 
lifestyle and his dinner habits are simple but well served: “cena non minus nitida quam frugi”). 
262 E.g. Plin. Ep. 1.21.2 (Pliny’s new slaves seem of good quality even though it remains to be seen if 
they are honest too (“superest ut frugi sint”); 3.19.7 (Pliny needs thrifty slaves to make his lands 
fertile again: “sunt ergo instruendi, eo pluris quod frugi, mancipiis”); 1.14.4 (2.17.26 (a village is 
praiseworthy when it can satisfy anyone’s modest needs: “frugi quidem homini sufficit etiam 
vicus”). 
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Antipho263. It is a very generic and colloquial appraisal (frugi’s), and is uttered after 
Chaerea had announced that dinner had been served. The Loeb translation of the phrase 
as “you’re a good man” therefore best captures the trivial nature of the expression. The 
same goes for the praise of the slave Syrus in The self-Tormentor – also casually called “a 
good man” (frugi’s) after having come up with a plan to help his master264 – and for the 
other two instances where slaves are associated with frugi265. Although the triviality of 
the phrase is in itself not a result of status-related concerns (Chaerea was freeborn), it is 
perhaps significant that all slaves associated with frugi are described in this superficial 
way. Two out of three freeborn individuals, however, are labelled frugi in a much more 
concrete manner resembling the use of the word in Att. 7.4.1 (i.e. explicitly referring to 
parsimony and economy)266.  
Interestingly, the only time a freedman is associated with frugality in Terence’s 
comedies, this is done in this way too. After Syrus had been freed, Demea (the man who 
had incited Syrus’ master to proceed with the manumission) tries to obtain further 
benefits for him. For example, he tried to have Syrus’ master give him some pocket 
money so he could truly enjoy his freedom. To justify this request, Demea ensures him 
that Syrus was a thrifty man (frugi homost)267. Although the Loeb edition again reads 
“good man”, we believe that this particular context (the explicit reference to money and 
the ability to use it responsibly) requires a more literal translation. This connotation of 
frugi thus differs from the one attributed to the slaves mentioned above (i.e. a trivial and 
general), and is very similar to the quality ascribed to two of the freeborn individuals 
(i.e. truly parsimonious). If there is any structural distinction in the application of frugi 
in Terence’s comedies at all (and the attestations are far too few to draw generalising 
conclusions), it is situated between slave and free, rather than between freed and 
freeborn. 
Unsurprisingly, satire reverts or at least downgrades the positive connotation of frugi 
on most occasions where it is attributed as a personal quality. To give only one 
example268, when Trimalchio proudly proclaims his own thrift as a slave, he points to 
 
                                                     
263 Eun. 608. 
264 Heaut. 597. 
265 Eun. 816; Adelph. 959. A similar practice (of servile frugalitas being a general description of their 
value, rather than an expression of their parsimony) can be discerned in other corpora as well. E.g. 
Hor. Sat. 2.7.3. 
266 Heaut. 580: “Hominis frugi et temperantis functu’s officium?” (the slave Syrus rhetorically asks 
this to the freeborn Clitipho; Heaut. 681: “Dedo patri me nunciam ut frugalior sim quam volt” (Clinia 
heeds his father’s advice to live more frugally). 
267 Adelph. 982.  
268 Other sarcastic uses of frugalitas include Sat. 84.5 (where Encolpius vainly claims to be frugal) and 
140.5 (where Eumolpus’ frugality is sexualised, and as such an ironic description). For a more 
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his availability to his dominus and domina – with a strong sexual implication, evidently – 
as the quality that constituted this thrift269. Furthermore, Trimalchio stops himself from 
saying more on the subject out of fear of appearing too boastful, while Petronius’ 
readers would know that the proper incentive for tacere should have been 
embarrassment. The reference to his frugality, in this regard, is typically ridiculous; not 
because such a quality was inappropriate for freedmen as such, but because of the 
context in which it appeared. 
Finally, Cicero’s speeches provide a useful reminder that the very content of a 
literary product may greatly determine the relative occurrence of descriptions like frugi 
(but also other qualities). Of the 17 attestations where frugi (or a derivative) directly 
attests to a personal virtue of an individual or group of persons, more than half (9) occur 
in the second act against Verres270. Whereas the first act served primarily to glorify and 
appeal to the senatorial jury, focussing mostly on the defence’s attempts to block the 
case on procedural grounds, the second speech was meant to irreparably damage 
Verres’ reputation by giving detailed descriptions of his crimes as governor in Sicily. 
These crimes were manifold, ranging from military scandals over extortion to the 
flogging and crucifying of Roman citizens without a trial. It are, in short, the extreme 
excesses and greed of Verres that are being denounced. It is thus not surprising that the 
attestations of frugalitas and frugalis are so numerous, since it was the virtue which was 
lacking the most in Verres, and which Cicero correspondingly wanted to accentuate in 
the defendants and their witnesses. The other 8 mentions of frugi occur in various other 
speeches, though no speech ever contains more than one271. The proportion freeborn – 
freed – slave in the corpus as a whole, moreover roughly reflects the general spread 
mentioned above, since frugi (or a derivative) is attributed to ingenui 11 times (65%), to 
freedpersons 2 times (12%), and to slaves 3 times (18%). 
In conclusion, frugi was – contrary to doctus and especially sanctus – a quality with which 
also slaves and freedmen were praised, even likely as often as ingenui, if we account for 
the relative occurrence of these status-groups throughout the literary corpora. In law 
texts and comedy, it was a virtue praised in slaves in particular (though never 
exclusively), and at least in comedy usually in a context that generalised its meaning 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
detailed discussion of frugi in these passages, see  Schmeling (2011), 358, 541; Gill (1973), 181 (incl. 
note 29). 
269 Sat. 75.10-1: “Sed, ut coeperam dicere, ad hanc me fortunam frugalitas mea perduxit (…) Tamen 
ad delicias [femina] ipsimi [domini] annos quattuordecim fui. Nec turpe est, quod dominus iubet. 
Ego tamen et ipsimae [dominae] satis faciebam. Scitis, quid dicam: taceo, quia non sum de 
gloriosus”. 
270 Ver. 2.1.71; 1.101; 1.135; 1.137; 2.110; 2.192; 3.182; 4.39; 5.20. 
271 Cic. Font. 40; Dom. 111; Sest. 21; Clu. 47; Planc. 62; Deiot. 26; Phil. 2.69; 8.32. 
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and effaced the literal sense of frugality or parsimony. As a quality that accentuated 
economy, and implied modesty and self-restraint, it was also attributed to freedmen in a 
way very similar – if not identical – to Cicero’s praise in Att. 7.4.1. It is thus safe to say 
that Cicero, when including this quality in his description of Dionysius, was drawing 
from a set of virtues that would have been considered by Atticus as appropriate in this 
context. However, its use was appropriate not because it was a typical “libertine” (or 
“servile”) virtue, but because it did not  (unlike sanctus, bonus vir, and to a lesser degree 
also unlike doctus) imply an exalted moral trait, which the freeborn elite structurally 
reserved for themselves as a tool in their efforts at distinction. Frugalitas was thus a 
quality praised in these very elites too, although the crucial question must be asked (as 
we will do momentarily) whether in these cases, an additional marker of exalted moral 
ingenuity was somehow required (i.e. to implicitly endow this frugalitas with a sense of 
nobility, which would then be absent in the cases where it was used for slaves or 
freedmen).  
Plenus offici and studiosus laudis 
As briefly noted earlier – and contrary to the more straightforward terms sanctus, frugi, 
and doctus –, the expressions plenus offici and studiosus laudis reflect sentiments that can 
be easily conveyed without any verbatim citation of these expressions. Not only can the 
grammatical function of the words be changed without the meaning being drastically 
altered272, but adjectives like officiosus or substantives like officium and studium can 
convey a very similar message. For example, the expression me perofficiose observant is 
arguably very close – if not identical – in meaning to plenus offici sunt273. Most of the 
time, moreover, these terms require a further determining description, which 
influences their exact meaning in each separate instance, and which greatly precludes 
putting all of them on a par. Studium, for example, can refer to (dedication to) literary 
studies, but it can also imply zealous devotion or support to any particular cause, 
endeavour, or person imaginable. Sometimes it denotes both, and sometimes a (wittily 
presented) condition in between274. Hellegouarc’h focussed on the political use of the 
term, implying an “activité déployée avec passion en faveur de quelqu’un ou quelque 
 
                                                     
272 E.g. Cic. Att. 7.18.1: “mulieres nostrae Formias venerunt tuaque erga se officia plena tui suavissimi 
studi ad me pertulerunt”. 
273 Cic. Fam. 9.20.3 
274 E.g. Pan. 95.1 (Pliny thanks senators for  appreciating his “professional services” (but implied is 
also his devotion in general terms) towards the allies): “in istis etiam officiis, quae studiis nostris 
circa tuendos socios iniunxeratis, cum fidei tum constantiae”; Hor. Ep. 1.3.6 (Horace mentions 
Augustus’ “learned staff” but studiosa may just as well denote – and both possibilities are not 
mutually exclusive – its general zeal in performing operae): “quid studiosa cohors operum struit”. 
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chose”275. He noted the relation with amor, but argued that since studium has a much less 
affective connotation, it is associated more closely to officium, since both these words 
imply the notion of (political) support. The difference in nuance between them is that 
studium has a more voluntary basis (it is a personal feeling of devotion deriving from 
true admiration or sympathy), whereas officium is embedded in a quasi-obligatory 
exchange relationship. Hellegouarc’h concluded: “le studium peut être la conséquence 
de l’officium et en être une forme en quelque sorte spontanée”276. The difference is very 
well expressed by Cicero in his defence of Sextus Roscius, where he states that he 
undertook the task not as a consequence of a personal inclination, but rather because he 
thought it was his duty (me non studio accusare, sed officio defendere)277.  
Officium, officiosus, and being plenus offici were thus typical expressions to convey a 
more formal reciprocal consciousness, and differ in this regard also from more 
voluntary benefactions278. As such, it was as relevant a trait to accentuate in freeborn 
(clients) and freedmen alike. It comes as no surprise that within the epistolary genre, for 
example, most of these attestations occur in letters of recommendation. It was 
quintessential in these contexts to indicate that the commendatus had a personality 
which guaranteed a reciprocal conscience, and which in turn ensured a repayment of 
the kindness.  
Because the meaning of any reference to studium, officium, or one of their many 
derived adjectives, adverbs, or more elaborate expressions, is highly contextual and as 
such different in almost every individual case, it is difficult (and arguably ill-advised) to 
exhaustively catalogue and process all of these passages in a way similar to that of the 
three much less polyvalent virtues discussed above. Indeed, should we include casual 
references to the studium of an individual, when Cicero instead presented Dionysius as 
much more inherently enthusiastic by using studiosus laudis meae (this studiousness 
thereby moreover contributing to Cicero’s honour in particular)? Should we likewise 
consider cases where any reciprocal dimension is lacking entirely (e.g. when someone is 
studiosus only to advance his own reputation)279? Moreover, laus is not very often the 
actual object of the zeal described280. Much more regularly, it is connected to salus, 
dignitas, or voluntas281. Especially salus and voluntas have a much less formal (political) 
connotation than laus and dignitas, and the question could be rightfully asked whether 
 
                                                     
275 Hellegouarc’h (1963), 174-5, with many examples from Cicero’s works. 
276 Hellegouarc’h (1963), 175. 
277 Cic. S. Rosc. 32.91. 
278 In Fam. 12.29.1, Cicero explicitly prefers merita (benefactions) over officia (acts of “friendship”). 
279 E.g. Mur. 55: about Murena’s eagerness for a new distinction (studium novae laudis [suae]); Font. 42: 
Fonteio excites others by his example to the pursuit of honour and virtue (studio laudis ac virtutis). 
280 Rare examples are Phil. 1.30; Font. 42; Mur. 55. 
281 Deiot. 1; Sest. 128, 130 (salus); Planc. 2; Dom. 142 (dignitas); Sul. 10 (voluntas) 
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these instances convey the same ardent message as the formulation in Att. 7.4.1. 
Furthermore, is a reference to fautores tuae laudis not the same as praising this group of 
people for being studiosus tuae laudis282? Is engaging one’s consilium, operae, labor, or 
diligentia to someone’s dignitas different from studiously advancing someone’s 
reputation283? And should we include also those instances where a very banal or even 
sordid zeal is meant (e.g. the love for profit, swimming, the games, breeding horses, 
cooking, …) rather than virtuous support embedded in a reciprocal relationship284? The 
very same goes for the plenus offici expression. Occurring only in Cicero’s 
correspondence (and once in a speech of his), is it comparable at all with an instance of 
someone performing a single isolated officium? The most important reservation in all of 
these cases, however, is related to the question of the relative impact of the terms and 
qualities used in conjunction with these words (e.g. the genitives associated with 
studiosus).  
In the correspondences, but also in many detached corpora, the primary meaning of 
studium is literal, i.e. denoting intellectual studies285. In Cicero’s speeches, this use 
occurs occasionally, but the figurative meaning (“zeal”, “loyalty”) features much more 
prominently in this corpus286. The following overview therefore takes these speeches as 
a point of departure before briefly touching on the other literary genres.  
Cicero standardly uses studium to denote the zeal of his opponents287, his own 
ardour288, or his client’s enthusiasm289. In some cases, the relative overrepresentation of 
attestations in a speech is due primarily to the content of the accusation that is made or 
refuted. The Pro Murena, for example, addresses election fraud, which obviously 
 
                                                     
282 Planc. 55. 
283 Cic. Fam. 10.1.3. Cf. also 2.6.3; 11.5.3; 11.6.1; 11.6a.2. 
284 E.g. Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.95 Fam. 7.10.2; 12.2.2; Cat. 3.10; Mur. 29; Deiot. 11; etc. For parallels in e.g. 
Terrence, see Andr. 56, 64 (cf. 822); Heaut. 23; Phor. 2, 18; Hec. 19, 23, 53, 595; or in Horace’s works, 
Odes 3.27.29; 4.12.25; Sat. 2.3.105; 2.5.80; Ep. 2.1.109. 
285 The attestations are far to numerous to list exhaustively. See e.g. Plin. Ep. 1.2.6; 1.3.3; 1.9.7; 1.10.1; 
1.13.1,5,6; 1.22.6,11; 2.2.2; 2.3.4; 2.8.1;  2.10.8; 2.17.25; 2.18.2; 3.1.9; 3.2.3; 3.3.3; 3.5.2,5,8,9,14,15,16,18,19; 
3.7.14; 3.9.8; 3.15.1; 3.18.5,11; 4.6.2; 4.8.5; 4.13.9,10; 4.16.1; 4.19.2; 4.24.4; 4.28.2; 5.6.46; 5.8.4/6; Fronto 
Ad M. Caes. 1.8.3; 3.12.1; 3.16.1; 4.2.1; 4.3.2-3,8; 4.5.2; 4.8; 5.29; etc. For parallels in Petronius’ 
Satyricon, see e.g. Sat. 4.2; 48.4; 85.3; 101.2; 116.6; or with Horace’s works, see e.g. Sat. 1.10.21; Ep. 
1.1.81; 1.2.36; 1.3.28; 1.18.39; 2.2.82; 2.2.104; Ars 409; or with Pliny’s Panegyric, see e.g. Pan. 46.5; 
47.1,3; 49.8. 
286 For the literal use in the speeches, see for example Mur. 61, 66, 75; Arch. 1-5, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19; 
Sest. 110; etc. 
287 Quinct. 2.7, 9; 14.47; Ver. 2.3.22, 75, 142; 2.4.1, 33, 126; 2.5.176; Mur. 9, 56. 
288 Sext. Rosc. 4.10; Caec. 40; Ver. 2.1.15; Leg. Agr. 2.2; Rab. Perd. 2; Cat. 4.23; Mur. 2, 6, 22; Sul. 10, 26; 
Flac. 52; Planc. 73. 
289 Sext. Rosc. 17.49 (3); Ver. 2.2.83, 117, 144; Flac. 105; Sest. 5, 7. 
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necessitates regular references to the political studium of voters, clients, friends, etc.290 
Besides these very standardised references, more concrete instances of studium occur as 
well throughout the speeches. The loyalty of an army could, for example, be expressed 
by this term. But even within this very confined category, it could be both a general 
sentiment (e.g. of patriotic Romans desiring to defend their homeland)291 or a very 
personal sense of loyalty to an individual commander292. The distinct order of knights 
could similarly be singled out as the subject (and object) of zealous behaviour293. The 
same goes for close friends, foreign nations, but also actors294. Only on one occasion, is 
the zeal of the body of freedmen singled out (studia hominum libertinorum)295. This 
happens in the fourth Catilinarian oration, and during a deliberate attempt to present 
all strata of society (except Catilina and his followers) as invested in their country and 
liberty. To achieve this polarisation, Cicero had earlier described the very similar zeal of 
the multitudo ingenuorum, a body in which he had explicitly included also its poorest 
members (tenuissimorum). It comes as no surprise that in this highly rhetorical context, 
freedmen (but also slaves) were subsequently treated in detail as well.  
This is, as noted, the only case where the (“public”, “political”) zeal of freedmen is 
accentuated. Usually, then, studium (or the adjective studiosus) was used to denote the 
fervour shown by or towards ingenui (especially viri boni et optimi). During his defence of 
Milo, for example, Cicero drew attention to the support he had from optimi viri, boni viri, 
and from the lumina florentissimis ordinibus, of whom he said that they were studiosi 
mei296. When it suited his argument, Cicero naturally invoked the zeal of all orders of 
society (like he had done most explicitly in the case of the studia hominum libertinorum 
mentioned above). For example, when he extolled Dolabella for his exemplary 
behaviour in the past, Cicero empathically exclaimed that all orders, and people of all 
origin and station zealously lauded and congratulated him (Cuius ordinis, cuius generis, 
cuius denique fortunae studia tum laudi et gratulationi tuae se non obtulerunt?)297. Likewise, 
when the people of Puteoli (as a whole) adopted Cassius and Brutus as their patrons, 
they did so magno studio, and Cicero was on many occasions proud to note that he had 
 
                                                     
290 E.g. Mur. 34, 42, 45, 46, … 
291 Phil. 7.13; 11.24. 
292 Phil. 5.43, 46. 
293 Planc. 58: about the oration of Lucius Cassius (digna Equitis Romani vel studio vel pudore); Rab. Post. 
43: a zealous knight is devoted to Caesar (equitem Romanum veterem amicum suum studiosum, amantem, 
observantem sui); Phil. 7.27 (studio equestris ordinis); Planc. 24 (ordo publicanorum). 
294 Sul. 73 (friends); Balb. 25 (foreign nations); Sest. 121; Rosc. Com. 10.29 (actors). 
295 Cat. 4.16. 
296 Mil. 22. Among the numerous other examples are Mil. 4 (ordines amplissimi); Cat. 1.21 (fortissimi); 
Sul. 4 (cives clarissimi et summi viri); Lig. 36 (studiosus et bonus vir); Red. Pop. 18; Sest. 35; Planc. 89; Phil. 
6.11; Mur. 90 (boni).   
297 Phil. 1.30. 
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been backed by the zeal and loyalty of “all people” (omnes societates; omnes ordines)298. 
Freedmen, of course, are implicitly included in these groups, but they are – apart from 
the one exceptional case – never isolated in this regard (unlike viri boni, equites, etc.). 
Being studiosus towards someone’s laus or dignitas was an expression with a very 
“public” and “political” connotation299, and was used consistently in a context of a 
reciprocal relation, as confirmed by the repeated juxtaposition of terms like gratia300. It 
is therefore significant, though not entirely unsurprising, that Cicero rarely describes 
freedmen in this way (neither in his correspondence nor in his speeches). In fact, when 
a freedman does occur in relation to this expression (which again happens in a delicate 
political context where his patron’s reputation is at stake), he was explicitly left out of 
the group of (freeborn) men that were described as such. Indeed, Quintus, Caecina, and 
Calvisius, for example, are described as studiosissimi tui in a letter to Furnius, whereas 
the latter’s freedman Dardanus, mentioned later in the phrase, clearly is not (haec eadem 
locutus sum domi meae adhibito Quinto, fratre meo, et Caecina et Calvisio, studiosissimis tui, cum 
Dardanus, libertus tuus, interesset)301. It is certainly no coincidence that the only freedman 
in Cicero’s correspondence – apart from Dionysius – who is praised for being studiosus 
(Crassi), is Apollonius; i.e. the same freedman who was – again, together with Dionysius – 
the only one exceptionally attributed the quality of learnedness (cf. supra)302. 
Of course, it could be argued that the studium of freedmen was of less interest for 
Cicero when extolling the supporters of his clients during his speeches, and that a 
choice to include only the backing of people of high social standing related to rhetorical 
pragmatism rather than to a literary habit of denying ex-slaves this virtue. This seems 
precisely to have been Cicero’s concern in the Pro Cluentio. When he announced that all 
people from Larinum had come to Rome to pledge their support (studium) to his client, 
he noted that only slaves and women were left in the city303. Obviously, we cannot take 
this claim literally (no Roman audience would have either), but Cicero is clearly 
insinuating that the lower classes also supported Cluentius. Throughout the following 
passages, however, Cicero only features high-status groups and individuals pledging 
their studium. Examples include the Larinian testimonial of support, drafted and 
 
                                                     
298 Phil. 2.107; Sest. 128, 130; Leg. Man. 14, 19, 61, 69; Leg. Agr. 2.4 (Quirites Romani); Mur. 23, 24; Red. 
Pop. 6; Pis. 57; Planc. 10; Phil. 1.36 (populus Romanus); Dom. 94; Vat. 10 (cives)  
299 Hellegouarc’h (1963), 174-6. 
300 E.g. Fam. 3.8.3; 3.10.3; 3.13.1; 4.13.7; 5.11.1; 6.4.5. Compare with Liv. 5.8.13. 
301 Fam. 10.25.3. 
302 Fam. 13.16.1. On only one occasion (Fam. 16.12.6) is the expression used to describe the zeal of an 
ingenuus towards a freedman (Tiro), though this is again very likely to be a wordplay by Cicero.  
303 Cic. Cluent. 195: “(…) omnes Larinates, qui valuerunt, venisse Romam, ut hunc studio 
frequentiaque sua quantum possent in tanto eius periculo sublevarent”. Perhaps, Cicero meant with 
qui valuerunt “those persons who matter” (i.e. important people), rather than “able-bodied men”. 
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presented in Rome by the decuriones of Larinum304; the zeal (studium, benevolentia, cura, 
…) of the neighbouring communities as expressed by deputies who were homines 
honestissimi, nobilissimi, equites, and homines summo splendore305; the labor and sollicitudo of 
all individual honourable men Cicero sums up306; etc. He ends this enumeration by 
mentioning the enthusiasm (studium), trouble (curam), and the pains (diligentiam) of all 
these people (i.e. the honourable representatives) and his own endeavours (laborem)307. 
Towards the end of the speech, he summarises: “give him [Cluentius] back to his friends 
(amicis), his neighbours (vicinis) and his associates (hospitibus), whose enthusiasm (studia) 
you behold”308. In short, Cicero clearly included only those people whose studium would 
have impressed a jury. In this case, not explicitly mentioning freedmen’s studium is 
likely to have been a consequence of this pragmatic preoccupation. 
When in Pliny’s letters someone’s zeal towards another person is meant – as was the 
case in Att. 7.4.1 – we notice again that it predominantly concerns freeborn 
individuals309. Only two freedmen are associated with studium (or derivatives). This 
happens in the passages that conveyed the literary proficiency of Pliny’s favourite 
Encolpius, and the care and services of a freed doctor310. Although especially the latter 
case is embedded in a reciprocal relationship (Pliny thanks the doctor by applying for 
his citizenship with Trajan), neither of the passages is comparable to Dionysius’ quality 
of being zealous with regard to Cicero’s honour. At best, Encolpius and the doctor 
(privately) contributed to Pliny’s literary activity and health, but they were in no way 
praised for advancing his (public) reputation or prestige. In Fronto’s correspondence, 
studium is only very exceptionally used as denoting personal zeal in a reciprocal 
relationship: the literal use (“literary studies”) unsurprisingly prevails. When the 
former is denoted, no freedmen are even remotely associated with the expression311.  
Terence’s comedies – even though featuring many slaves and freedmen – do not 
associate studiosus or studium to liberti. This is all the more interesting, if we note that a 
non-political studium (e.g. of a wife towards her husband or that of a mother towards 
 
                                                     
304 Cluent. 197. 
305 Cluent. 197-198. 
306 Cluent. 198. 
307 Cluent. 199. See also Planc. 22 for the habit of getting the most important individuals of the 
municipality to Rome to support the defendant. For the zeal of municipalities in general, see also 
Mil. 94; Phil. V.36(2); VII.23; VIII.4; XII.7/20. 
308 Cluent. 202. Cf. Planc. 30: “municipum, vicinorum, societatum studio”. No mention is made of 
freedmen of even his familia. 
309 E.g. Ep. 1.17.3; 2.9.3; 2.11.15; 2.18.4; 6.12.4; etc. 
310 Ep. 8.1.2: “ (…) si is, cui omnis ex studiis gratia, inhabilis studiis fuerit”; 10.5.1: “iatralipten (…) 
cuius sollicitudini et studio tuae tantum indulgentiae beneficio referre gratiam parem possum”. 
311 E.g. Ad M. Caes. 2.1: Fronto mentions his studium impensum et propensum towards Hadrian.  
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her child) is occasionally attributed to other people312. The only passage in Petronius’ 
cena Trimalchionis that does not mention studium or a derivative in the literal (literary) 
sense, is the one where Trimalchio exclaims his passion for coin (in argento plane 
studiosus sum)313. Petronius clearly alludes to the dreaded image of the abundantia 
pecuniae of freedmen314, and does so by manipulating a description that not only had a 
predominantly positive connotation315, but was moreover – as is becoming increasingly 
clear – reserved (at least in its “political” sense) to ingenui and elites. In the works of the 
other satirist – Juvenal –, studium and studiosus occur only with a literal meaning316. 
Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita does little more than confirming previous observations317. When 
studium and studiosus occur in a reciprocal relationship and as contributing to someone’s 
honour or reputation, it is attributed solely to ingenui or collectives318. In Horace’s 
works, studium is referred to twice within a reciprocal relationship, but it is again 
associated exclusively with ingenui. One of the passages, moreover, is related rather to 
mere literal (literary) studium319. The other one features Horace asking his friend Vinius 
to present one of his works to the emperor. He encourages him to do so subtly so as to 
not “offend in your zeal for me” because that would hurt rather than advance his case. 
Vinius should not look like an “over-eager servant”320. Significantly, studium and being 
studiosus were praiseworthy qualities, but could be detrimental when exaggerated. It 
required the mind and judgement of a morally sound individual to recognise the line in 
between these two forms of behaviour, and to not succumb to mere scandalous 
adulation. The passage, if anything, implies that the zeal of a respectable individual like 
Vinius was not only different but also more effective than such sordid adulation, which 
is almost literally associated with slavery (opera; minister). Nowhere does Horace clarify 
whether a freedman could exhibit the “proper” kind of studium (Petronius obviously 
implied that he could not, cf. supra), but the very fact that – like in all other corpora – 
 
                                                     
312 E.g. Heaut. 280; Eun. 116; Hec. 202. 
313 Sat. 52.1. 
314 Mrozek (1976a), 122-3. 
315 “Bad” studiousness occurred as well, but was rather exceptional. E.g. Cluent. 72 (natural faults are 
strengthened by studium); Cat. 1.26; 2.9; 3.10 (Catilina is accused of “studiously” pursuing a wicked 
way of life). Cf. Mur. 56; Sul. 70. 
316 Sat. 7.1; 7.17 (the only attestations).  
317 In many cases, studium or studiosus simply accentuate a neutral eagerness, enthusiasm or zeal (e.g. 
1.9.8; 14.8; 2.48.1; 3.19.2; 3.64.8; 5.52.10) – sometimes in relation to concrete things or occupations 
(e.g. spoils in 1.15.5; military action in 3.5.6; 30.11.8; 41.20.12; hunting in 5.6.3; 25.8.9; or reading in 
40.29.9) – or it can (literally) denote “studies” and “learning” (e.g. 1.18.3). 
318 E.g. 1.2.5; 4.25.14; 4.52.7; 26.48.6. 
319 Ep. 1.18.65: clients have to endorse their patron’s pursuits and studies (consentire suis studiis qui 
crediderit te fautor). 
320 Ep. 1.13.4: “ne studio nostri pecces odiumque libellis sedulus inportes opera vehemente minister”. 
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the quality is rarely associated with freedmen (or slaves) in a reciprocal context that 
would enhance a social superior’s reputation, is meaningful in its own right. 
Contrary to the notion studiosus meae laudis, the application of the expression plenus offici 
is somewhat more easily reviewed. However, the expression only occurs (verbatim) in 
Cicero’s correspondence (and in one speech). The quality of being officiosus, however, 
conveys a very similar meaning, and generally denotes a rather essential quality – again 
contrary to the very diversified attestations of studium or studiosus (+ genitive). When 
considered together (plenus offici + officiosus), this quality is – throughout Cicero’s 
correspondence – attributed to individual people of known status 20 times; 3 times to 
freedmen (including Att. 7.4.1), and 17 times to ingenui. The expression plenus offici itself 
is mentioned verbatim only 6 times, and – apart from Att. 7.4.1 – always in relation to 
ingenui321. The two other freedmen associated with the quality of being serviceable are 
C. Avianius Hammonius (in the letter recommending him to Sulpicius Rufus) and the 
infamous actress Volumnia Cytheris322. The latter, however, is accused of not having 
been serviceable enough (i.e. according to Cicero’s and Terentia’s standards). Evidently, 
a consideration of the instances where the noun officium was used, reveals that 
freedmen were in fact associated with the virtue much more frequently323. 
In Pliny’s letters, plenus offici does never occur verbatim, and even the adjective 
officiosus is mentioned only twice. One of the persons thus described is Pliny’s freedman 
Zosimus, who was besides officiosus also probus, litteratus and humanus324. The other is 
Gavius Bassus, a freeborn vir egregius whose reverence (reverentissime) was praised in 
addition to his services325. In Fronto’s correspondence, finally, the only instance of 
officiosus referring to an individual is attested in a letter of recommendation. Gavius 
Clarus is presented as a conscientious, reasonable, unassuming, generous, and unselfish 
man (nihil isto homine officiosius est, nihil modestius, nihil verecundius; liberalis etiam, si quis 
mihi credis, et in tanta tenuitate, quantum res patitur largus), whose simplicitas, castitas, 
 
                                                     
321 Fam. 3.1.2; 3.9.1: (two letters from) Ap. Claudius; 11.27.1: Trebatius Testa; 13.13.1: Castronius 
Paetus; Att. 6.1.1: (a letter from) Atticus. 
322 Fam. 13.21.2: “hominem pudentem et officiosum cognosces et dignum qui a te diligatur … officio 
et fide singulari … magna officia contulit mihi”; 14.16.1: “debuit in te officiosior esse quam fuit”. For 
Volumnia, see the early 5th century commentator Maurus Servius Honoratus in Serv. ad Buc. 10.1: 
“hic autem Gallus amavit Cytheridem meretricem, libertam Volumnii, quae, eo spreto, Antonium 
euntem ad Gallias est secuta”. Cf. Keith (2011), 38ff. 
323 Philotimus’ dealing with the sale of Milo’s property was an officium (Fam. 8.3.2); L. Livineius 
Trypho had rendered Cicero summa officia (Fam. 13.60.1); Tiro’s many officia are mentioned on a 
regular basis (e.g. Fam. 16.1.3; 16.4.3; 16.6.1; 16.25.1); Vettius Cyrus performs officia as an architect 
(Quint. Fratr. 2.2.2); etc. 
324 Ep. 5.19.3. 
325 Ep. 10.21.1. 
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veritas, and fides Romana were particularly worth stressing326. Moreover, earlier in the 
same letter, Gavius’ many officia as a senator towards another senator of higher age and 
rank had already been praised327. Gavius, in other words, was plenus offici towards his 
superiors in the same way a freedman was (or should be) in relation to his patron. In 
both instances it is the discrepancy in social rank rather than a specific legal status that 
is accentuated. As in Latin literature in general, officium usually implied a bond of 
reciprocity and duties between friends, clients and patrons, regardless of their legal 
status328. Both Pliny and Fronto, however, use it in their letters primarily to refer to a 
public duty329. Evidently, freedmen could not take up political functions. Their officia, as 
a consequence, consisted of duties within a reciprocal relation (e.g. with their patron). 
The fact that the former officia were unavailable to them, however, does not at all mean 
that the latter were qualitatively different from the private officia of ingenui, just like the 
exclusivity of expressions like bonus vir or qualities like sanctitas did not mean that 
shared virtues of freed and freeborn were inherently different because of the difference 
in legal status.  
Contrary to the epistolary genre, Terence’s comedies do not feature the qualities of 
being plenus offici or officiosus. Moreover, the noun officium never denotes public duties, 
but is used only to describe private relations. Very often, it lacks any reciprocal 
embeddedness, as it refers to the correct or expected behaviour of individuals (“it is the 
part of a gentleman, father,  adolescent, … to do this or that”)330. Interestingly, it is only 
once used in relation to a freedman; not to denote a general delineated behavioural 
framework, but rather to refer to a couple of very concrete and contextual instructions, 
which, moreover, could have been delegated to ingenui just as well331. On the contrary, 
officium is linked three times to slaves, when very status-specific tasks are meant. In The 
Self-Tormentor, for example, the senex Chremes ridicules another old man (Menedemus) 
for doing the tasks his many slaves were supposed to do (servos compluris; proinde quasi 
nemo siet, ita attente tute illorum officia fungere)332. Similarly, when Syrus (in The Brothers) 
tries to obtain his freedom, Demea praises his exceptional character by summing up his 
accomplishments, concluding that “these are the services of no ordinary person” (non 
 
                                                     
326 Ad Verum Imp. 2.7.6.  
327 Ad Verum Imp. 2.7.2. 
328 This aspect is of course omnipresent in the correspondences (e.g. Ep. 1.7.2; 1.13.6; 3.4.6; 5.3.1; 
5.16.3; 6.18.1; 6.26.2; 7.15.3; 7.31.7; 8.12.4; 8.18.7; 10.26.2; Ad Ant. Pium 4; Ad Amicos 1.6.1). 
329 E.g. Ep. 1.5.11; 1.10.9; 2.1.8; 3.1.12; 3.4.3; 3.5.8/9/18/19; 3.6.6; 3.18.1; 4.15.3; 4.17.6; 4.24.3; 5.14.2; 
6.15.3; 6.32.1; 7.15.1; 7.31.3; 10.3a.2; 10.8.3; 10.9.1; 10.67.; Ad M. Caes. 1.3.3; 3.13.1; Ad Amicos 2.4.1; 
2.11.2. Pliny himself clearly separated official from private duties in Ep. 3.5.19. For officia amicorum, 
see also Ep. 3.11.1. 
330 Andr. 236; 330; Adelphoe 464; Phor. 282; Heaut. 580. 
331 Andr. 168. 
332 Heaut. 65-6. 
 422 
mediocris hominis haec sunt officia)333. Ironically, the officia summed up are “buying food 
on credit, hiring girls, and arranging drinking parties in broad daylight” (opsonare cum 
fide, scortum adducere, apparare de die convivium); hardly very important or honourable 
tasks at all.  
In Petronius’ Satyricon too, the serviceability of slaves (usually expressed by officiosus) 
concerns tasks that are very manifestly “servile”, rather than embedded in an 
honourable exchange of services. A puer officiosus, for example, brings in a cool jar to 
soften Fortunata’s bruise, and an officiosus capsarius served as guardian of clothes in a 
bathhouse334. Other mentions are marked by the strong sarcastic undertones typical for 
the satiric genre in general, and for the omnipresent references to sexual activity in the 
Satyricon in particular335. Finally, the noun officium is, quite unsurprisingly, used 
throughout the Satyricon to denote the very concrete duties or tasks of slaves (e.g. 
reading out loud, warning guests for the doorstep, cleaning nails, satisfying a master 
sexually, etc.)336 In one case, an officium is even literally called servile337. Certainly, officia 
of freedmen and ingenui are referred to as well, but no qualitative distinction is made 
between them338. Both in Terence’s comedies and in Petronius’ Satyricon, then, there 
exist clear differences in application of the adjective officiosus or in the load the noun 
officium covered, but this distinction is – again – very clearly between slave and free, not 
between freed and freeborn. 
In Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita, attestations of officium are rarely used to characterise an 
individual. Very often a quite literal “duty” is meant (e.g. political or military)339. As 
such, they do not regularly evoke the “epistolary use” of accentuating the reciprocal 
bonds between two or more persons. And even when this is done, it concerns larger 
groups of people or more abstract entities, rather than specific individuals: the 
obligations to gods and men in a general sense, the loyalty of colonies, an army or allies, 
or the services of foreign cities to Rome340. This different application of officium and its 
derivatives in Livy, is underscored by the complete lack of attestations of officiosus, 
which was one of the most popular ways to describe serviceability in other texts. In 
 
                                                     
333 Adelphoe 966: “non mediocris hominis haec sunt officia”. As noted before, this was part of 
Demea’s plan to become popular among the lower classes and can thus not be seen as genuine or 
conventional behaviour. 
334 Sat. 74.12: 92.11. 
335 E.g. Sat. 105.9 (Lichas discovers Encolpius’ true identity by applying a manus officiosa to his 
genitals, cf. supra). 
336 E.g. Sat. 30.6; 31.5; 56.8; 74.7; 140.9. 
337 Sat. 26.10. 
338 E.g. Sat. 64.7 (Trimalchio); 101.10 (Lichas); 107.1 (Eumolpus); 114.1 (sailors). 
339 E.g. Liv. 1.35.4; 3.20.1; 4.40.6; 26.9.9 (political duties); 25.6.20; 34.39.9; 35.48.12; 37.31.7; 44.34.5 
(military duties).  
340 See for example 21.63.12; 25.6.19; 27.10.1; 28.24.2; 45.23.6; 31.11.14 ; 36.22.2 respectively. 
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Horace’s works, officium and all its derivatives are relatively rare, no doubt owing to the 
demands of genre. They refer mostly to a very specific profession (e.g. that of the 
famous lawyer Lucius Marcius Philippus, that of Horace, or that of a judge)341 or to daily 
business in general342, and again much less often to reciprocal bonds between two 
individuals. In fact, it is this very bond that is ridiculed in the satirical advice to get 
appointed as an heir in the will of some old and naive person. To achieve this, Horace 
tells us, one should studiously strive to gain the favour of the target (leniter in spem 
adrepe officiosus)343. The officiousness is not some praiseworthy characteristic, but a 
pragmatic means to obtain a goal. It is the only time the adjective refers to an individual 
in this corpus. In Juvenal’s Satires, officium occurs only once in the context of an explicit 
reciprocal relationship between two socially unequal persons. In this passage, Juvenal 
mocks the belief of certain patrons that to invite their clients to dinner is “payment in 
full for long-standing services” even though such a dinner does not cover these services 
at all344. Although clearly satirical, the passage shows that officia were a fundamental 
part of  the patronage system (between ingenui or between patron and freedman). 
Obviously, not only freedmen were expected to be pleni offici towards their patron. A 
look at Pliny’s Panegyric confirms the main trends of this discussion: there is no 
mention of the Ciceronian plenus offici expression, and the adjective officiosus is lacking 
entirely as well. When the substantive officium is mentioned, it typically refers to the 
tasks and obligations of the Emperor or the Senate345. 
In short, being plenus offici or officiosus were qualities respectable partners in a reciprocal 
relationship were expected to exhibit. As such, they were praised in both freedmen and 
ingenui alike. Slaves were ideally officiosus too, but their serviceability pertained to the 
realm of activities no other (free) man would care to engage in (unless his name was 
Trimalchio). Like we have observed for frugi, then, the differences in connotation when 
writing about officiousness were primarily between slave and free, not between freed 
and freeborn. The same cannot be said, however, about the expression studiosus meae 
laudis, which was reserved solely for ingenui. Surely, the adjective studiosus or the noun 
studium had many different connotations depending on the object of the zeal in 
question. It is precisely this object, however, that made of being studiosus meae laudis a 
 
                                                     
341 Ep. 1.7.47; Ars 306; 314. Cf. also the role of host in Sat. 2.6.109. 
342 E.g. Ep. 1.18.35; 2.2.68. 
343 Sat. 2.5.48. 
344 Sat. 5.13: “Primo fige loco, quod tu discumbere iussus mercedem solidam veterum capis 
officiorum. Fructus amicitiae magnae cibus: inputat hunc rex, et quamvis rarum tamen inputat”. 
Officium and its derivatives are used also to denote specific professions like that of lawyers or 
prophets, but also tasks and duties in general (e.g. Sat. 2.132-4; 7.107; 11.114; 3.126; 3.239). 
345 E.g. 91.1; 92.2. 
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quality rarely recognised or praised in freedmen. Evidently, freedmen could be zealous 
in a private relationship, but the “political” connotation of adding to someone’s honour, 
reputation or prestige in the public sphere (as Hellegouarc’h noted) made it a much less 
likely candidate for libertine appraisal.  
After having observed that none of the five qualities attributed to Dionysius in Att. 7.4.1 
was ever reserved for freedmen or had a “libertine” ring to it, there is only one way the 
claim made by Mouritsen or Fabre could be maintained, viz. that it was the combination 
of these virtues (indeed, a “set of virtues”346) which made Cicero worry about any 
libertine connotation his appraisal might evoke with Atticus (and which subsequently 
prompted the addition of the ne libertinum laudare videar phrase). However, a structural 
qualitative comparison of virtues associated with doctus, sanctus, frugi, officiosus, and 
studiosus meae laudis, precludes also this possibility, as we will briefly demonstrate in the 
following section, before highlighting the general conclusions of this overview. 
7.3.2.2.2 Associated qualities as distinguishing factor? 
It is one thing to note that the three qualities that were regularly attributed to 
freedmen (frugi, officiosus, and the non-political studiosus) occurred in the same 
(discursive) contexts, alongside the same juxtaposed terms, within the same reciprocal 
(patronage or amicitia) networks, and with similar or the same connotations as when 
used to describe freeborn clients or elites. But a very important point to consider is 
whether in the latter cases, the addition of a marker of ingenuity or moral superiority 
was somehow “required” or appropriate to endow these descriptions with a 
qualitatively different meaning (i.e. what Cicero seems to have done in the case of 
Dionysius, by adding bonus vir). 
At first sight, there indeed seems to exist some evidence for this practice. For 
example, when Cicero refers to M. Fabius Gallus, to P. Nigidius Figulus, or to C. Matius, 
he explicitly links their portrayal as homines doctissimi with a characterisation of these 
men as vir optimus, [homo] sanctissimus, and homo suavissimus respectively347. Apart from 
the abundant use of superlatives – an element of style more than anything else348 – it 
 
                                                     
346 Mouritsen (2011), 61: “Praise of freedmen generally invoked a specific set of virtues”. 
347 Fam. 2.14.1; 4.13.3; 7.15.2. Gallus is elsewhere described also by summum ingenium, summa doctrina, 
singularis modestia, summa probitas, summa humanitas et observantia (Fam. 2.14.1; 9.25.2; 15.14.1); 
Figulus by amicissimus et acerrimus civis, [vir] singularis bonus (Quint. Fratr. 1.2.16); Matius by homo 
temperatus et prudens; fides et humanitas (Fam. 7.15.2; 11.27.8; Att. 9.11.2). Cf. also Plin. Ep. 1.22.1; 
4.26.2. 
348 Cf. Shipley (1961), xvi and note 1 (about Velleius Paterculus, but also referring to Cicero’s works): 
“the superlative had already suffered so much rhetorical abuse that it had come to have little more 
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could be tentatively argued that these additions distinguish between a “libertine” and a 
“freeborn” use of doctus. By immediately adding a high moral principle to their 
learnedness, Cicero may have enhanced it, to justify its attribution to his aristocratic 
friends. The noble connotation of descriptions like vir optimus, and the exclusive 
application of sanctus to ingenui have been touched upon already, but suavis too, was 
similarly used by Cicero only to describe freeborn individuals, although the term did not 
carry the same solemn weight as sanctus349. Doctus, in these cases, may have been 
appropriate to describe freeborn peers with, due to the reference to their ingenuitas, 
implicit in other juxtaposed virtues. In the case of Aulus Caecina, Cicero even explicitly 
linked his learnedness to his high birth (quapropter primum fac animo forti atque magno sis 
– ita enim natus, ita educatus, ita doctus es, ita etiam cognitus, ut tibi id faciendum sit)350.  
However, other instances where Cicero describes aristocrats as learned are not 
similarly “differentiated”. When writing to Terentius Varro, he mentioned their mutual 
friend Caninius Gallus, whom he treated as an erudite man (homo doctus) and a good 
friend (amantissimus tui)351. In a letter to Q. Cornificius, Cicero playfully dismissed a 
difference of opinion in literary matters, by stating that disagreements between a man 
of learning (homo doctus) and a man who is not wholly unlearned (non indoctus) – 
meaning Cornificius and Cicero respectively – do not amount to much352. Elsewhere too, 
Cicero refers to his own learnedness (albeit in a modest way) or to that of his son353. In 
none of these cases is doctus “enhanced” by a direct link to other virtues. If the word (or 
its derivatives and synonyms like eruditus) had some kind of libertine connotation, and 
“needed” to be supplemented by other virtues to denote a more exalted kind of 
learnedness, appropriate for his peers, surely Cicero would have done so in a more 
consistent way. The fact that he did not, and that he, for example, could simply address 
C. Matius (whom he had called a homo suavissimus doctissimusque on another occasion) as 
homo doctissimus, clearly shows that there was no such strictly defined decorum in the 
application of this virtue354.  
Very similarly, Pliny’s long-time friend and Roman knight Voconius Romanus is 
addressed as vir doctissimus in a letter accompanying a draft of the Panegyric, and the 
senatorial scholar Herennius Severus is likewise referred to in a letter addressed to 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
value than a positive. (…) the choice between positive and superlative is frequently a mere matter of 
sonorousness and rhythm”. 
349 Medici, for example, could be described with it as well (e.g.Fam. 7.20.3; Att. 15.1.1). 
350 Fam. 6.5.4. The man is elsewhere connected to several “noble” virtues too, e.g. bonus civis, dignitas 
et virtus, eximium ingenium summaque virtus, summa probitas, [vir] bonus (Fam. 6.5.2-4; 6.9.1-2). 
351 Fam. 9.2.1. 
352 Fam. 12.17.2: “sic scilicet, ut doctum hominem a non indocto, paullulum dissidere”. 
353 Fam. 9.20.3; Att. 12.38a.1; 14.7.2. 
354 Fam. 11.27.8. 
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Pliny’s friend Vibius Severus355. Neither of these persons are attributed any other trait 
that accentuated their high social standing, although Pliny did do this on other 
occasions. When writing to the consular senator Maecilius Nepos, for example, he called 
him not only a vir doctissimus, but also the future governor of an important province, 
and described him as gravissimus, disertissimus356. Interestingly, in a letter to Titius 
Aristo, Pliny defends himself against critics who had reproached him for writing light 
and humorous verse, by reminding them that “serious scholars of blameless reputation” 
(doctissimi gravissimi sanctissimi homines) had done so as well in the past357. He refers to 
senators like Cicero, Hortensius, Brutus, Catullus, Varro, Seneca and even to some 
emperors. Stepping down on the social ladder, he even includes Virgil, Cornelius Nepos, 
Accius, and Ennius. “Although they were not senators”, Pliny conveniently reminded his 
critics, “moral integrity knows no class distinctions” (non quidem hi senatores, sed sanctitas 
morum non distat ordinibus)358. At first, then, the description of doctissimi gravissimi 
sanctissimi homines seems reserved for esteemed men of senatorial rank only. Because it 
suited his argument or because he honestly believed so, Pliny subsequently decided to 
add the names of famous writers of lower standing (Accius even being the son of a 
freedman). Significantly, the passage – rhetorical as it may be – links learnedness to 
moral integrity, but it also explicitly denies any connection between these two virtues 
on the one hand, and social status on the other. 
In Fronto’s correspondence, doctus is often directly linked to a (quasi-)synonym. In 
fact, the frequent juxtaposition of facundus (“eloquent”) is a literary fashion not attested 
in the other correspondences, and reminds us that vocabulary and style of epistolary 
writing could change over time359. The overall use of doctus, however, remains very 
much the same as before, although it is linked slightly less to other adjectives 
accentuating moral virtue (such as gravitas or sanctitas). When such links do occur, the 
focus is rather on purely scholarly qualities, literary cultivation and paideia, as is to be 
expected from a teacher of rhetoric at the Imperial court360. Besides such extended 
 
                                                     
355 Ep. 3.13.5 and 4.28.1 respectively. 
356 Ep. 4.26.2: “vir gravissimus doctissimus disertissimus, super haec occupatissimus, maximae 
provinciae praefuturus”. Cf. Ep. 1.22.1 (about Titius Aristo): “Nihil est enim illo gravius sanctius 
doctius”. 
357 Ep. 5.3.3. 
358 Ep. 5.3.6-7. 
359 M. Caesar, Iulius Aquilinus, Antoninus Aquila, and Sardius Lupus are all referred to as viri docti et 
facundi (Ad M. Caes. 1.7.3; Ad Amicos 1.4; 1.7; 1.10). 
360 Besides facundus, see also Fronto’s recommendation of Iulius Aquilinus which contains 
descriptions like elegans, eloquentia, eruditus, etc. (Ad Amicos 1.4). References to moral integrity keep 
occurring as well, e.g. the description of Volumnius Serenus as senex lenissimus mansuetissimus 
doctissimus piissimus (Ad Amicos 2.7.8). In a letter from M. Caesar to Fronto, doctus is only one of the 
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descriptions, doctus keeps occurring on its own, i.e. as a single trait without further 
immediate digressions361. Finally, docta is used only once to describe a woman, although 
the passage is not Fronto’s but a quote from Sallust’s De Catilinae coniuratione362. 
Sempronia, a beautiful woman of noble birth, is characterised as well-versed in Greek 
and Roman literature (litteris Graecis et Latinis docta) but also as voluptuous, promiscuous 
and not at all preoccupied with traditional feminine virtues. However, after a climactic 
description of her vices, Sallust finally repeats that despite all this, she was a woman “of 
no mean talents; she could compose verses, jests, and use language which was modest, 
or tender, or licentious; in a word, she possessed a high degree of wit and of charm”363. 
Clearly, Sempronia’s learnedness was not inhibited by her morally despicable 
behaviour. While Pliny had implied that status is irrelevant when assessing someone’s 
learnedness and integrity, Fronto – via Sallust – indicates that morality and behaviour 
are so as well. Both elites with a questionable reputation, and individuals from the 
“lower” orders could be doctus despite their respective shortcomings. 
Because in all three correspondences, doctus occurs both on its own, and as linked to 
other words that denote learnedness, personal affection or even noble qualities, it is 
clear that the addition of any of the latter qualifications was not essential when 
describing freeborn friends, clients, or peers. At least in epistolary writing, then, the 
word and its derivatives or synonyms clearly did not have any servile or libertine ring to 
it, that needed to be compensated by more elevated descriptions. These are 
observations that equally hold true for the attestations of the other virtues in both 
epistolary and detached sources as well. 
In the correspondences, sanctus and its derivatives, for example, usually occur in 
tandem with other typical elite virtues like prudentia, severitas, auctoritas, gravitas, or 
dignitas364, but also with frugalitas, patientia, abstinentia, and other much more generally 
applied qualities365. Interestingly, the immediate linking of doctus and sanctus – similar 
to what Cicero did when praising Dionysius – is attested in the correspondences as well, 
albeit solely to laud freeborn individuals366. The epistolary habit of using a series of 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
many words the emperor uses to empathically address his magister:  “disertissime, doctissime, mihi 
carissime, dulcissime, magister optatissime, desiderantissime” (Ad M. Caes. 1.6.7). 
361 E.g. Fronto’s description of Sardius Saturninus’ sons as iuvenes doctissimi (Ad Amicos I.9) or his 
recommendation of Faustinianus as doctus (Ad Amicos I.5). 
362 Ad M. Antoninum Imp. 3.1.10. 
363 Cat. 25: “Verum ingenium eius haud absurdum: posse versus facere, iocum movere, sermone uti 
vel modesto vel molli vel procaci; prorsus multae facetiae multusque lepos inerat”. 
364 Cic. Fam. 4.3.2 (prudentia, dignitas); Plin. Ep. 2.7.4 (virtus, honor); 4.3.1 (verecundia, venerabilis, 
severitas, gravitas); 4.17.4 (auctoritas, gravitas); 5.14.3 (bonus and sanctus); Fronto, Ad M. Caes. 2.16.2 
(iustus, gravis). 
365 Cic. Fam. 5.8.5 (diligentissime); Plin. Ep. 1.12.5 (abstinentia); 1.22.1 (frugalitas, patientia, …). 
366 Cic. Fam. 4.13.3; Plin. Ep. 1.22.1 and 5.3.3. 
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virtues rather than just one, is observable in the detached corpora as well. In Pliny’s 
Panegyric, for example, words that are likely to be used to describe freeborn (aristocrats) 
– gravitas, sanctitas, innocentia – are very common juxtapositions to sanctus, but more 
widespread ones – castus, moderatio, industria – occur as well367. The same holds true for 
Cicero’s speeches, etc.368 Sometimes two words of a different “category” (i.e. “elite” and 
“more general”) are added to sanctus or sanctitas, once more indicating that they did not 
have a compensating function369.  
Of course, sanctus – as we have seen – already in itself connoted moral superiority, 
just like doctus served not only to describe a superficial learnedness, but also a cultural 
and intellectual sensitivity. It is, then, not wholly unsurprising that these virtues were 
not accompanied by more exalted ones that made them “more suitable” for application 
to ingenui. In fact, they may have fulfilled this role themselves when they were 
attributed to the “more general” descriptions mentioned above (castus, industria, etc.). 
The true test for the assumption that some general virtues required additional markers 
of ingenuity in order to better suit a description of freeborn (elites), is thus a 
consideration of the words that were occasionally or even regularly ascribed to 
freedmen.  
Take, for instance, the expression plenus offici, the adjective officiosus, and the noun 
officium. In Cicero’s correspondence, Castronius Paetus’ virtues range from being plenus 
offici, diligent (diligentia) and a good friend (amicitia) to honestas, gravitas and being a 
bonus vir370. Especially these last two qualities were used exclusively to praise freeborn 
aristocrats with, and may as such indicate that characterisations like plenus offici and 
diligentia were ideally enhanced by additional markers of high status to compensate for 
any base connotations. Indeed, the adjective officiosus or the noun officium (but also frugi 
or qualities that conveyed a similar meaning) were often juxtaposed to elevated 
qualities like vir bonus/optimus or virtus371. Once again, however, they were not 
 
                                                     
367 Plin. Pan. 1.3 (castus); 3.5 (innocentia); 10.4 (optimus); 63.8 (moderatio); 70.4 (industria); 82.8 (gravitas, 
temperantia). 
368 “Elite” descriptions: Cic. Quinct. 55.4 (vir bonus); S. Rosc. 33.5 (ornatus); Ver. 2.3.185; Phil. 9.15.15 
(honestus); Cat. 1.9.4; Red. Pop. 18.10; Cael. 54.7; Balb. 12.1; Pis. 47.5; Planc. 27.5; Deiot. 10.8; 20.6 
(gravis); Flac. 8.4; Dom. 21.1 (fortis); Dom. 105.17; Balb. 9.15 (castus); Sest. 6.2; Rab. Post. 8.10 (severus); 
Phil. 3.16.5 (optimus); Ver. 2.3.182; Phil. 8.16.7 (innocens); Cael. 52.8; Phil. 2.103.2 (integer). “More 
general” descriptions: Quinct. 55.4; Ver. 2.5.49; Cluent. 91.4; 107.5; 133.3 (diligens); Ver. 2.4.83; Font. 
38.9 (temperans); Cluent. 107.5; Dom. 21.1 (prudens); Cluent. 133.3 (probus); Arch. 9.10; Balb. 50.9 
(modestus); Flac. 71.10 (frugalis); Balb. 9.15 (moderatus). 
369 E.g. Lucius Flacus who is not only sanctus and fortis, but also modestus, diligens, and temperans (Flac. 
8.4); Cato  who is besides sanctus and fortis also prudens (Dom. 21.1), and Clodius (albeit in a sarcastic 
passage) who is both sanctus and innocens, and temperans and modestus (Phil. 8.16.7). 
370 Fam. 13.13.1. 
371 Fam. 5.17.3 (sanctus); 11.22.2 (gratissimus; virtus; natus summo loco); 13.1.2 (vir bonus; suavis; 
officiosus); 13.13.1 (gravitas); 13.22.2 (bonus vir); 13.29.8 (gratissimus; optimus vir); 3.11.3; Att. 1.5.1 
 
  429 
accompanied by such exalted virtues on many other occasions372. In fact, the words 
associated most often with freeborn attestations of plenus offici (or officiosus and officium), 
were general virtues like humanitas, fides, diligentia, and frugalitas; i.e. appropriate also to 
praise freedmen with373. For example, the already mentioned letter to the emperor 
Verus, which praised Gavius Clarus’ many qualities, refers not only to his being 
officiosus, but also modestus, fidus, frugalis, simplex, etc. Similarly, combinations of the 
“libertine” qualities with other words that could imply “inferiority” or inequality occur 
in the same way for both freed and freeborn persons. The combination of frugi and 
modestus is a good example, attributed as it was to both freeborn, freedmen, and even 
slaves374.  
Perhaps the most interesting are the instances where freeborn individuals are 
described in almost exactly the same terms as Dionysius in Att. 7.4.1, without there 
being any indication that the lack of a more exalted virtue somehow diminished the 
value of this description. A particularly indicative case is that of Aulus Fufius, whom 
Cicero praises in a letter to Gaius Memmius. The man, Cicero writes, is one of his 
intimate friends, most attentive and attached to him, a good scholar, a very kind 
natured man, and most worthy of Fufius’ friendship (unum ex meis intimis 
observantissimum studiosissimumque nostri, eruditum hominem et summa humanitate tuaque 
amicitia dignissimum)375. A positive answer to the recommendation would moreover bind 
him to Memmius by the strongest ties of duty and respect (ipsum praeterea summo officio 
et summa observantia tibi in perpetuum devinxeris). The significant similarities with Cicero’s 
description of Dionysius in Att. 7.4.1 are clear immediately (summo officio – plenus offici; 
studiosissimus nostri – studiosus meae laudis; homo eruditus – homo doctus). Clearly, even in a 
formal letter of recommendation, this combination of descriptions was deemed 
appropriate for freeborn clients. Similarly, in the eponymous oratio in his defence, 
Fonteius is praised by Cicero as a frugal, moderate, and temperate man, full of modesty, 
sense of duty, and piety” (frugi igitur hominem, iudices, frugi, inquam, et in omnibus vitae 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(virtus). For frugi, see e.g. Cic. Brut. 1.8.2 (fortis vir); Plin. Ep. 2.6.6 (optimus); Fronto Ad Verum Imp. 
2.7.5 (parsimonia; frugalitas); Ad Antoninum Pium 3.2 (fortis; innocens). 
372 Fam. 1.1.2; 1.6.2; 2.18.1; 3.4.1 (studium); 1.8.1; 2.13.1 (prudentia); 1.8.1; 3.1.2; 3.9.1; 11.15.1; Quint. 
Fratr. 2.14.1 (diligentia); Fam. 3.1.2 (amor); 3.9.1 (humanitas); 3.11.3; 12.25a.2; Att. 9.7B.2 (fides); 3.11.3 
(benevolentia); 6.6.13; 6.14.1; 10.1.3 (opera/labor); 11.27.1 (amantissimus nostri); Att. 13.45.3 (diligens; 
studiosus). 
373 Cic. Fam. 13.23.2; Att. 5.20.8-9 (for freedmen); Fam. 1.8.1; 2.8.1; 3.11.3; 6.14.1; 11.15.1; 12.25a.2; Att. 
1.20.1; Quint. Fratr. 2.13.1; Fronto Ad Verum Imp. 2.7.5  (for ingenui). 
374 For ingenui: e.g. Cic. Att. 4.8a.2-3; 13.28.4; for freedmen: e.g. Fam. 13.70; for slaves: e.g. Plin. Ep. 
10.31.2-3. 
375 Fam. 13.3.1: “A. Fufium, unum ex meis intimis observantissimum studiosissimumque nostri, 
eruditum hominem et summa humanitate tuaque amicitia dignissimum (…); ipsum praeterea 
summo officio et summa observantia tibi in perpetuum devinxeris”.  
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partibus moderatum ac temperantem, plenum pudoris, plenum offici, plenum religionis 
videtis)376. Interestingly, the description reads as another clear parallel to Att. 7.4.1 (e.g. 
frugi (id.); plenus offici (id.); sanctus - plenus religionis).  
7.3.2.3 Preliminary conclusion  
An extensive lexical analysis unambiguously reveals that neither of the virtues ascribed 
to Dionysius in Att. 7.4.1 would have been recognised by Atticus as common “libertine” 
virtues. Not only were freedmen rarely (if ever) described by some of them, but all of 
these qualities – and their many possible combinations – were attributed to ingenui as 
well; sometimes almost in the exact same combination, and both with and without 
additional markers of ingenuity. 
Mouritsen, MacLean, and especially Fabre claimed that the same virtues would 
nonetheless have a different semantic scope, depending on the context in which they 
were (discursively) situated. Within the bounds of a patron-freedman relationship in 
particular, a shadow was allegedly cast over these qualities because this framework 
implied that the freedman in question only possessed them by the grace 
(acknowledgment) of his patron. The argument is very tentative and subjective, as it 
cannot be objectively proved or disproved. Moreover, the idea that virtues can only be 
“innate” or “optimal” when they originate from a person’s character without there 
being a “recipient” seems absurd, since – especially in epistolary sources – these virtues 
were nearly always presented as beneficial to (usually) the receiver or writer of the 
letter. As we have seen in the chapter on letters of recommendation (Chapter 5), 
moreover, the notion that embeddedness in a patronage relationship was somehow 
demeaning for the inferior party, or that virtuous descriptions received somewhat of a 
denigrating connotation as a result, is blatantly disregarding the performative function 
of such descriptions in the on-going process of social negotiation. In a similar vein, then, 
attributing frugality, zeal, or serviceability to a person was a strategy to increase his 
social capital (by accentuating his reciprocal consciousness), and was applied to 
freedmen as well as to ingenui. The latter, moreover, exhibited these qualities more 
often than not in relation to their own (pseudo-)patron or at least social superior. One of 
the clearest examples is the recommendation of the freed imperial procurator Maximus. 
For Mouritsen, his description as probus et industrius et diligens is evidence for his 
suggestion that freedmen were praised for a “different set of qualities”377. Surely, being 
 
                                                     
376 Font. 40. In the subsequent passage (41), Fonteius is explicitly described in highly exalting terms 
(hominem honestissimum, virum fortissimum, civem optimum), but this description is not meant to 
“compensate” for the previous one, which could clearly feature independently. 
377 Mouritsen (2011), 63. For Pliny’s passage, see Ep. 10.85.1: “probum et industrium et diligentem ac 
sicut rei tuae amantissimum ita disciplinae tenacissimum expertus”. 
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probus was a quality valued in freedmen (and slaves)378, but it was equally appreciated in 
freeborn individuals. Sometimes this happened by adding markers of ingenuity379, but 
this was certainly not always the case. In the letter following Maximus’ 
recommendation, for example, a prefect is recommended in exactly the same terms as 
Maximus (integer probus industrius), and without additional descriptions380. 
Returning to Att. 7.4.1, Cicero seems to have followed the advice he gave his readers in 
the De Oratore. There, he stated that laughter could be excited by a witty thought or by 
original use of language, but that the best jokes consist in combining both (haec igitur sit 
prima partitio, quod facete dicatur, id alias in re habere, alias in verbo facetias; maxime autem 
homines delectari, si quando risus coniuncte re verboque moveatur). He subsequently noted 
how any topic or description might evoke both amusement and serious thoughts. The 
difference on which this reaction depends is that “weightiness is applied to honourable 
subjects with gravity, quips to matters that are in some degree foul or grotesque” (sed 
hoc mementote, quoscumque locos attingam, unde ridicula ducantur, ex eisdem locis fere etiam 
gravis sententias posse duci: tantum interest, quod gravitas honestis in rebus severisque, iocus in 
turpiculis et quasi deformibus ponitur)381. By explicitly stating that his appraisal of 
Dionysius was transgressive (ne libertinum laudare videar), Cicero applied the latter 
rhetorical strategy, and he did so – as he recommended himself – through both the 
language used, and the idea behind it. Not only would the combination of the five 
virtues Cicero initially describes Dionysius with not be recognised as particularly 
“libertine”, but the inclusion of doctus, and especially sanctus and studiosus meae laudis 
would achieve quite the opposite. If Cicero’s description implied any status-related 
connotation at all, it was much more likely a “freeborn” than a “libertine” one. 
Consequently, the phrase ne libertinum laudare videar was intended not to introduce an 
antithesis (“libertine” virtues versus vir bonus), but to enhance the already deviating 
initial appraisal. The expression thus served to bring home the message already 
anticipated by the qualities listed prior to it. It shows that Cicero was aware of the 
boundaries he was crossing. It is certainly no coincidence that this occurred – like Tiro’s 
 
                                                     
378 E.g. Plin. Ep. 5.19.3 (Zosimus is a homo probus officiosus litteratus); 10.31-32.1 (servi poenae who had 
usurped the condition of servi publici had to be reduced to their original status: “in condicionem 
proborum ministrorum retrahuntur”). 
379 E.g. Plin. Ep. 2.9.3 (about Sextus Erucius, recommended by Pliny to Trajan): “Quae causa si studium 
meum non incitaret, adiutum tamen cuperem iuvenem probissimum gravissimum eruditissimum, 
omni denique laude dignissimum, et quidem cum tota domo”. 
380 Plin. Ep. 10.86a.1: “Gavium Bassum, domine, praefectum orae Ponticae integrum probum 
industrium atque inter ista reverentissimum mei expertus”. Other examples include Cic. Att.4.8a.2-
3; Att. 13.28.4; Quinct. 24.77; Plin. Ep. 2.18.2-3. 
381 Cic. De Orat. 2.248. The example that follows has already been quoted earlier (i.e. that the 
expression frugi servus might be both sincere and a quip towards an extravagant slave). 
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“blunt” expression valetudini fideliter inserviendo – in the network embedded 
correspondence. Cicero plays with the notion that certain qualities would normally not 
be ascribed to Dionysius (or a fellow freedman), but he both explicitly accentuates and 
breaches this – what could be called a – “hidden transcript”. Atticus understood the 
reference and recognised its (somewhat snobbish) allusion, as his response 
(appropriating and deliberately surpassing Cicero’s descriptions) clearly suggests. 
7.4 Conclusion: principled equality and distinction 
The ingrained assumption that freedmen’s public disabilities differed fundamentally 
from those of the urban poor; the belief that such public disabilities significantly 
affected the daily lives of these lower classes; or the conviction that the artistic tastes of 
freedmen essentially differed from those of both the elite and freeborn members of the 
plebs media, are but a few of the many aspects of freedman socialisation that have been 
the subject of scrutinous revision in recent years382. Sherwin-White already noted that 
freedmen “enjoyed a large measure of equality of private rights under the ius civile”, and 
Wiseman showed how such “discrepancy between the equality showed in private life 
(…) and political disadvantages” was a strategy of elite distinction not at all exclusively 
resorted to in relation to freedmen, but similarly applied to, for example, the Italian 
upper classes prior to the Social War383. Most recently, Borbonus has argued that the 
“contradictory experience” of manumitted slaves differed not fundamentally from that 
of “other nonelite Romans” or peregrini384. Despite these exponentially increasing 
attempts to break down modern analytical boundaries and distinctions between 
freedmen on the one hand, and freeborn members of the plebs media or even elites on 
the other, the notion of a distinct vocabulary or set of virtues to describe freedmen with 
has been consistently left unchallenged. Quite on the contrary, it very much remains an 
undisputed given in recent contributions, as our initial discussion of MacLean’s and 
Mouritsen’s recent works have shown.  
 
                                                     
382 Many scholars have drawn these conclusions independently and in widely diverging contexts, e.g. 
Weber (1988), 257; Shaw (2000), 389-90; Mouritsen (2011), 71-3, 79, 100, 296; Perry (2014), 130-4; 
Petersen (2006), e.g. 230; Gardner (1993), 154; Alföldy (1988), 144-5; Borbonus (2014), 118; Knapp 
(2011), 174. See also the Introduction and Chapter 2.  
383 Sherwin-White (1973), 326; Wiseman (1971), 63. 
384 Borbonus (2014), passim (e.g. p. 11-2, 144). 
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The reservation of a set of descriptions for ingenui (usually top elite) was a tool of 
these elites in their attempts at distinguishing themselves – in a truly “Bourdieusian” 
fashion – from “outsiders”, viz. by accentuating unique features of dignity unattainable 
(at least from their perspective) for the subelite classes385. It was an unspoken rule that 
expressions like vir bonus, or qualifications like gravis, honestus, or sanctus should be used 
only when praising intrinsic virtues of freeborn individuals of relatively elevated social 
status. It is, however, an unwarranted leap to deduce from this observation that another 
set of virtues therefore had to be reserved for freedmen, in order to further accentuate 
the exceptional and reserved nature of the “elite discourse”. As we have shown, this 
“elite discourse” could be used to enhance a different one, which was linked to “paths to 
glory” other than those available solely to the elite. However, this alternative discourse 
(and its associated virtues, which included reverence and industry) did not imply 
inherent “libertine” inferiority, as it applied equally to freedmen, lower class ingenui, 
and the elites alike.  
In fact, and almost paradoxically, MacLean’s study deserves ample credit for showing 
how freedmen and elite shared a path to glory and an associated discourse. 
Unfortunately, the chronological and causal evolution she prematurely discerns in, and 
imposes on, the sources, presents this path and discourse as originally having been 
typically “libertine”, and as only appropriated by the elite under external pressure (the 
domination of an emperor), but even then still retaining its connotation of inferiority. 
As we have indicated in this chapter, there was nothing “libertine” about accentuating 
upward reverence. Indeed, even ingenui who could resort to the exclusive “path” of 
ancestry or public office could just as easily stress their association to a patron386. Even 
law texts could accentuate the difference in authority, rank, and power between patrons 
and freeborn clients (e.g. clientes nostros intellegimus liberos esse, etiamsi neque auctoritate 
neque dignitate neque viri boni nobis praesunt)387. As noted in Chapter 5 (and as Chapter 8 
will reiterate), however, the connection to a (pseudo-)patron was a dimension that 
could be, and was, voluntarily invoked because besides publicising an inherent respect 
for status hierarchies, it also accentuated the client’s social capital, without infringing 
on his fundamental freedom and citizenship. Or as Wallace-Hadrill noted: “patrons and 
 
                                                     
385 Bourdieu (1979) famously observed how the dominant in society (whom he defined as those 
groups and individuals who possess large volumes of cultural and symbolic capital) impose their 
conception of “disctinction” between lower and higher classes, as well as the structural 
determinants that justify and consolidate this distinction (i.c. a specific set of elite qualities). 
386 AE 1915, 23 (L(ucius) Magnius Sa/turninus Se/dianus iuni/or patrono / amantissimo); AE 1934, 26 
(M(arcus) Aemilius / M(arci) f(ilius) Pap(iria) Felix / Iunior aedil(is) / q(uaestoriciae) p(otestatis) praef(ectus) 
i(ure) d(icundo) / patrono op/timo sua pe/cunia posu/it itemque de/dicavit); CIL 8, 20996 (M(arcus) Aurelius 
Saturninus veteranus ex dec(urione) alario patronis dignissimis); … Cf. Saller (1982), e.g. 194ff. 
387 Dig. 49.15.7.1. 
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clients were (mostly) fellow citizens, equal in theory before the law, and it is therefore a 
crucial feature of this particular structure of human inequality that it had to be 
compatible with the ideology of citizenship”388.  
But the higher up the social ladder, the more rigid the norms, ideology, and attempts 
at distinction played. This general Bourdieusian distinction process, however, was 
directed not against freedmen in particular – even though they often provided the most 
conspicuous representation –, but rather against “the other”, i.e. the “non-elite” (or 
more specifically, the “non-decuriones”, the “non-knights”, or the “non-senators”, 
depending on what (contextual) level the distinction was pursued). Attempts at 
distinction trickled down, with the result that the highest echelons would necessarily 
require stricter values and boundaries (a well-known preoccupation, more 
pragmatically reflected in the census requirements for each ordo). The notion of a 
recognisable “libertine” set of virtues or a “libertine” vocabulary is a consequence 
either of unwarrantedly separating and opposing the “two paths to glory” (esp. 
Mouritsen and MacLean), or of a circular reasoning that explains such discourse because 
it has to exist as a consequence of the freedman’s presumed innate stigma or his 
perpetual subservience in relation to his patron (esp. MacLean and Fabre). 
The public transcript of equality – based on the shared identity dimensions of 
freedom and citizenship389 – as well as the locus for social negotiation it provided, would 
not survive the driving of a wedge between the body of citizens as a whole. As noted in 
Chapter 1, this public transcript was beneficial to both non-elite and elite. It was a tool 
of the dominant to “normalise” fundamental inequalities by framing them in an 
acceptable “natural” order of things, but it also allowed freedmen to operate in an 
atmosphere of de facto equality, against which the elite could not protest without 
undermining the very transcript that consolidated their power in the first place. In this 
chapter, we focussed on discourse in the most literal sense, but it goes without saying 
that any “transcript” is made up, and in turn reinforced, by non-linguistic constituents 
as well. Indeed, the legal notion of inalienability of freedom, for example, precluded the 
reduction of informally freed slaves to mere “quasi-slaves”, no matter how assiduously 
some elite writers proclaimed that it should390. Even if an idealistic conception of the 
Roman citizen body was not the prime reason for elites to uphold this principled 
equality, surely the prospect of losing one of the most effective tools for keeping the 
 
                                                     
388 Wallace-Hadrill (1989a), 8. 
389 Cf. Lavan (2013), 96 (a good emperor makes no distinction within the citizen body); Mouritsen 
(2011), 30: “the Romans had traditionally enfranchised their freedmen, in principle making them 
equal to their masters”; 122: “their citizenship in principle was equal to that of freeborn”. 
390 Cic. Fam. 1.1.13; Tac. Ann. 13.27. For the inalienability of freedom, see Ramin & Veyne (1981); 
Mouritsen (2011), 10ff, 56. 
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slave population under control (the spes libertatis), or a fear that the penuria ingenuorum 
might spur ex-slaves to violent action, constituted compelling arguments391. A similar 
preoccupation with safeguarding the fundamental equality of citizens lay at the core of 
the consistent refusals to institutionalise the procedure of revocatio in servitutem, or to 
abolish the freedman’s right to vote (cf. Chapter 2). It has been duly noted, by way of 
comparison, that the institution of US slavery did not have its own form of public 
transcript of equality (largely due to racist considerations), and that this led not only to 
a system where repression was the most important tool to keep the slave population in 
line, but also to a situation where the happy few that did obtain their freedom became 
disillusioned and rebellious392. 
The existence of a public transcript of equality – of which discourse and vocabulary 
are thus but the most conspicuous manifestations – did not imply that the principal 
equality of free(d) citizens could not be contextually reconfigured to suit elite attempts 
at distinction, just like freedmen themselves would originally appropriate the “elite 
discourse” in their efforts of self-representation (cf. Chapter 8). A misrecognition of the  
counterintuitive symbiosis of “principled equality” and “distinction” lies at the core of 
recurrent modern misconceptions about freedman socialisation393. Indeed, a focus on 
detached sources (i.e. the large majority of Latin literature) leads to a disproportionate 
accentuation of the element of “distinction”, even though traces of “equality” are 
discernible already in its most radical expressions (Chapter 6). Certainly, there was 
disparagement, but besides being limited to the highest echelons of Roman society – 
which, as noted before, required a more strident discourse of exclusivity – the sneers to 
and condemnation of freedmen consistently stemmed from a meta-narrative that 
extrapolated individual cases of usurpation and elite fear to the entire “class” of ex-
slaves394.  
In all of these cases, fear stemmed primarily from the dreaded prospect of freedmen 
acquiring power or influence over their patron. Senators did not have to fear freedmen 
rising to their station, since both mos and lex clearly restricted access to this order395. 
The problem, however, was that some freedmen might gain influence through their 
 
                                                     
391 Tac. Ann. 13.26-7. 
392 E.g. Fleischmann (2005), passim (but already accentuated on p. 1). 
393 Roman law also recognised the coexistence of “superiority” and “shared freedom”. But it was a 
coexistence never exclusively related to freedpersons. For example, it was observed also as a trait in 
relations between people as a whole, e.g. Dig. 49.15.7.1: “hoc enim adicitur, ut intellegatur alterum 
populum superiorem esse, non ut intellegatur alterum non esse liberum”. A refreshing insight in the 
interaction between condescendence on the one hand, and citizen equality on the other, is one of 
the most interesting aspects of Perry’s recent volume on the Roman freedwoman (2014). 
394 For the elite “fear of freedmen”, see López Barja de Quiroga (2007). 
395 Łoś (1995), 1015. 
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patrons (i.e. by too close an association, very similar to the one Cicero condemned in his 
brother’s freedman Statius, or the one Tiro feared third parties might use against his 
patron)396. The consistent attacks against imperial freedmen (whose influence on 
malleable emperors was the most threatening of all), but also the recurrent discussions 
on the freedman’s vote, his inability to hold public office, etc. were manifestations of 
the same fear. We can once more cite Andreau on this matter: “it was the libertus that 
worried them, not the libertinus”397. Nonetheless, the detached sources would typically 
associate isolated and circumstantial anecdotes of (mostly imperial) freedmen’s 
depravity or usurpation, with the ordo libertinorum as a whole (as attested by the many 
occurrences of libertinus when compared to the network embedded sources). It was a 
rhetorical strategy to present an elite fear (of liberti) as a danger for society as a whole 
(order-reversing libertini), and as such much more profoundly threatening to the 
“natural” order. 
An intriguing, though necessarily elusive question is how the elites would have 
presented freeborn members of the plebs media if there had been as profound an 
attention to this “class” as to that of freedmen in their literary works. If the figure of the 
homo novus is any indication, very similar vituperations (focussing especially on a lack of 
illustrious ancestry) indicate that it would have been comparable to the attempts at 
distinction directed against freedmen398. It was precisely because the freedman 
(privately) and the new man (publically) were in a position to threaten patronal dignity 
or elite exclusivity – a position the members of the plebs media did not share – that they 
became the object of elite derision. Literature and law notoriously focus on social 
concerns and problematic aspects of society rather than on a proportional 
representation of that reality399. It has been argued that the mediocre freedperson was 
never a concern or an interest of elite writers, but rather a banality taken for granted 
and therefore not worth mentioning. A similar trend is discernible in the 
representations of women or poor clients – who were generally considered unworthy of 
attention400. Women, clients, and freedmen only come to the fore in exceptional 
contexts, i.e. when their normality is somehow breached and their actions worthy of 
note (either for the good or the bad). The works of Valerius Maximus (extolling slaves 
who exhibited extreme loyalty and virtue) and Tacitus (consistently condemning the 
 
                                                     
396 Cic. Fam. 16.18; Quint. Fratr. 1.2.1-3, 8; Att. 2.18.4; 2.19.1. 
397 Andreau (1993), 196. 
398 Wiseman (1971), passim (e.g. 2, 7, 59). 
399 Fitzgerald (2000), passim; Wiseman (1971), 53. For freedpersons in particular, see Perry (2014), 
146; Kleijwegt (2012), 117. 
400 Garnsey & Woolf (1989), e.g. p. 167. 
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class of libertini as the most profound sign of moral decay) are arguably the most 
illustrative examples of these trends401. 
When Tiro explored the boundaries of the public transcript of principled equality (by 
jokingly insinuating that his imposing patron saw his revalidation as an officium), or 
when Cicero did so (by drawing exceptional attention to the exclusivity of a description 
like bonus vir), the stinginess of these anecdotes derives from the involved individuals’ 
realisation that such breaches should not be revealed openly. A Tacitus, on the other 
hand, does nowhere conceal his contempt for (the class of) freedmen. The blatant 
difference reveals the distinction between network embedded communication (where 
principled equality was consistently respected), and detached meta-narration, which, 
on the contrary, typically focussed on the deterioration of the institution that made the 
public transcript acceptable for the elite (i.e. respect for, and adherence to social 
hierarchy by individual freedmen). Because the latter was alledgedly lacking – an 
essential though highly exaggerated and crystallised assumption resulting from the 
meta-narrative of moral decay –, detached authors did not feel the need to keep up their 
end of the bargain, justifying the general condemnation of an entire class that was 
considered a vital cause – if not the essential reason – for this decay. 
In conclusion, the assumption of a “libertine” set of virtues or discourse stems from a 
tacit appropriation and extrapolation of the elite’s detached meta-narrative, a 
methodological fallacy which Petersen has, in another context, famously called 
“Trimalchio vision”402. It typically isolates the freedman as a (literary) object of 
distinction, without accounting for the fact that he is thereby lifted – “detached” – from 
the network embedded context in which his actions and behaviour were essentially 
rooted. It is no coincidence at all that it are precisely the network embedded sources 
that reveal the greatest care in upholding the locus for social negotiation by adhering to 
the public transcript of equality. Besides the letter corpora, these sources also include 
epigraphic texts. It is to these that we will turn in the final chapter. 
 
                                                     
401 Val. Max. 6.8 (de fide servorum). For Tacitus’ evaluation of freedmen, see Appendix 6. 
402 Petersen (2006). 
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Chapter 8 Identity and stigmatisation: the 
freedman’s perspective 
This final chapter is conceived as a distinct part of the dissertation – in which new 
questions are raised and different topics treated –, but at the same time, it also serves as 
a kind of epilogue to previous discussions and arguments. It is in particular the shift of 
focus to epigraphic source material that provides the opportunity to construe this 
chapter along these lines. The source base of the analysis is a database of metric 
epitaphs (carmina epigraphica), which will be introduced in section 8.5 (and which is 
included in Appendix 7). After a general introduction to the presence of freedmen in the 
epigraphic realm (8.1), we briefly expound our own assumptions with regard to the 
representativity and value of these sources for the study of freedman socialisation, 
thereby firmly rooting the discussion in the theoretical framework of transcript theory 
(8.2). A third (methodological) section prior to the actual analysis of the database, treats 
the fundamental issue of “authorship” in epigraphy, and assesses the repercussions of 
the often indeterminable identity of the dedicators of epitaphs (8.3). Section 8.5 focusses 
on the salience (and combination) of the identity dimensions freedmen felt particularly 
worth stressing in their epitaphs. Specific attention will be paid (both comparatively 
and in its own right) to the use and function of libertination in these texts (8.5.2; parallel 
to Chapter 4), and to the instrumentality of dedication and subservience in freedman 
self-presentation (8.5.3; parallel to Chapter 5). Section 8.6 focusses in detail on the traces 
of a macula servitutis in these poems, and on the salience of a “servile” past in creating a 
“libertine” identity. Finally, the chapter reiterates the notion of a “freedman discourse”, 
this time obviously from a mainly non-elite perspective (8.7; parallel to Chapter 7). 
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8.1 Freedmen in epigraphy  
Saller and Shaw estimated that roughly three-quarters of all extant Latin inscriptions 
belong to the funerary realm1. For Rome alone, this number already amounts to more 
than 30.000. Enormous as it may seem at first sight – especially when compared with 
smaller towns or non-urban contexts – this corpus constitutes barely one per cent of all 
the burial monuments that once existed in the city2. Besides the delicate question of 
overall representation, socio-cultural biases in the remaining epitaphs preclude any 
conclusions about demographic proportions3. Even when leaving aside age and gender 
biases4, the epigraphic record also does not reflect the relative (or absolute) magnitude 
of any given social class. 
Be that as it may, the proportion of freedmen in funerary epigraphy is notoriously 
great. For Rome, Taylor estimated that freedmen outnumbered the freeborn by a ratio 
of – at the very least – three or four to one, although she rightly noted that the true 
proportions greatly depend on the unknown status of the many incerti, who comprised 
roughly two-thirds of all individuals. Moreover, any random sequence of inscriptions 
always contains at least twice as many freedmen as freeborn (and often many more than 
that)5. This estimate was confirmed by Nielsen, who analysed the inscriptions of the 
people of Rome who mentioned their status when dedicating an epitaph6. She found 
that 67% of them were freedpersons, 23% slaves, and only 10% freeborn, although these 
numbers again (necessarily) ignore the incerti. Huttunen’s elaborate database containing 
every fifth inscription of the sixth volume of the CIL, revealed a similar ratio (roughly 
6:1) of freedmen and freeborn7. Mouritsen’s analyses of samples from Ostia and Pompei 
show that 75% and 58% of the inscriptions respectively were made by or for ex-slaves8. 
Finally, Borbonus studied status mentions in columbarium epitaphs, and similarly 
concluded that 21% were freedpersons and only 2% freeborn, although there too 73% of 
the individuals mentioned were incerti9. Barring some exceptional municipal outliers, 
 
                                                     
1 Saller & Shaw (1984), 124. 
2 Bodel (2008), 179. 
3 E.g. Saller & Shaw (1984), 130; Hopkins (1987), 117; Shaw (1987), 33ff; and especially Parkin (1992), 
19. 
4 Hopkins (1983), 72; (1987), 114; King (2000), 123-9. 
5 Taylor (1961), 117-9. 
6 Nielsen (1997), 203-4. The numbers are roughly comparable to the proportion of dedicatees (62%, 
14%, and 24% respectively). 
7 Huttunen (1974), esp. 139. 
8 Mouritsen (2005), 38. Cf. already Heinzelmann (2000), 104. 
9 Borbonus (2014), 119-20, 211-2. Borbonus’ methodological approach, it should be noted, is 
exceptional in that it categorises as incerti all individuals who did not formally mention their status. 
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similar trends are found across the entire Italian peninsula, but are noticeably absent in 
the provinces10.  
The reasons for the freedman’s drive for commemoration have been variously 
explained, and it is now generally accepted that their predominance reflects socio-
cultural trends related to the “epigraphic habit” rather than demographic ones11. Their 
promotion to free (and often citizen) members of society, for example, was an 
achievement particularly worth stressing. Somewhat paradoxically, this argument has 
been put forward by the very same scholars who considered freedmen to be generally 
“ashamed” of their status12. Moreover, Joshel noted how professional pride was an 
identity dimension particularly worth mentioning for slaves and freedmen, who thus 
comprise the great majority of people commemorated in (or establishing) occupational 
epitaphs13. Other explanations focussed on freedmen’s heightened sense of awareness of 
what it meant to be able to have family connections, as this was arguably one of the 
prerogatives most desired by the unfree population. Thus Mouritsen rightly stressed 
that freedmen had unique and compelling reasons for commemoration in necropoleis, 
whereas municipal elites looked increasingly to the forum for the fulfilment of their 
existential needs14. He argued that the aspiring class of freedmen was undoubtedly 
inspired by the great Republican monuments of the nobles, but that this never 
amounted to blatant imitation. Nor should funerary habits only or primarily be 
interpreted as constituting a sphere of competition15. All of these possibilities have been 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Even freedmen who, for example, mention a patron or a collibertus are thus labeled incerti. It is 
meaningful that even then, the relative proportions are in line with the results of other studies. 
10 Kajanto (1968), esp. 523; D’Arms (1974), 112 note 71; George (2005), 58f. The image is confirmed 
also by a focus solely on “speaking stones” (i.e. carmina that address the reader personally). Carroll 
(2007-8), 45-6 thus showed that for Rome, 53% of individuals mentioned in these epitaphs were 
freedmen, 15% freeborn, and 13% slaves. In Italy as a whole, the relative preponderance of freedmen 
shrinks to 32% (35% for ingenui). It disappears entirely in the provinces, where freeborn individuals 
considerably outnumber freedpersons in these particular carmina. 
11 MacMullen (1982); Meyer (1990); Woolf (1996); Bodel (2001), 6-10. Mouritsen (2005) critiques the 
notion of a monolithic epigraphic habit, and argues in favour of a plethora of interacting epigraphic 
habits (62-3). 
12 E.g. Taylor (1961), 129-30; Carroll (2006), 247ff; and Chapter 2.  
13 Joshel (1992), esp. 184. Slaves featured most prominently – both as commemorator (31,8%) and 
deceased (32,4%) – but are closely followed by freedmen (26,9% and 31,7% respectively). Freeborn 
craftsmen pale by comparison (1,7% and 2,9%), and would still not exceed either slaves or freedmen 
even if we grant that all “uncertain freeborn” (24,4% and 19,5%) are in fact ingenui (although in 
reality at least a portion of these were ex-slaves). 
14 Mouritsen (2005), esp. 53ff. 
15 Mouritsen (2005), esp. 47-50. Cf. Borbonus (2014), 12. Neither Mouritsen nor Borbonus recognises a 
specifically “libertine” form of such original appropriation. Cf. Petersen (2006). Dexheimer (2000), 
passim (e.g. 82) similarly sees in elite attitudes and values clear models for imitation from below. 
Although the title of the contribution insinuates that these conclusions are applicable specifically to 
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given their due attention, most recently, by Borbonus, who claimed that columbarium 
graves above all constituted a non-competitive sphere of commemoration16. Whereas 
his results for columbaria are indisputable and highly valuable, the claim that these 
burials contrast significantly in this regard to the more publicly accessible (and visible) 
graves alongside the great entrance roads to cities, is still heavily indebted to the 
scholarly tradition that views funerary practices as a sphere of conspicuous 
competition. It does not stand the test of Mouritsen’s detailed scrutiny of the Pompeian 
and Ostian sites, and is incompatible with the observation that elites voluntarily 
withdrew from the sphere of public commemoration17. 
The nature of the commemorative genre is naturally predisposed towards positive 
descriptions. Individuals who did not entertain a good relationship during life are less 
likely to honour each other in death, and even if they did (e.g. as fulfilment of a formal 
testamentary obligation), the social convention and traditional rules of decorum would 
have euphemised or omitted any pejorative reference: de mortuis nihil nisi bene. In any 
case, the degree of sincerity of emotion and feelings attested in so many epitaphs is 
often impossible to gauge. Robert Knapp, for example, writing about the freedman-
patron relationship in particular, argued that despite sporadic cases of feigned 
adulation, the “frequency of positive remembrances must reflect good relations in many 
situations”18. Although this seems a very common sense assumption, he does not qualify 
this claim anywhere in his analysis. Much more compelling is King’s detailed analysis 
that shows that even the standardised expressions of grief and loss reveal true emotion 
on the part of the dedicators of funeral inscriptions. The debate is a very heated one, as 
emotion, psychology, and mentality are areas notoriously complicated by their 
subjectivity, and many a scholar of epigraphy is subsequently reluctant to engage in it. 
Although the past two decades have been marked by a crystallisation of this debate 
around the emotions expressed by parents of deceased children, the arguments can 
often be extrapolated – mutatis mutandis – to more generalised contexts19. The central 
problem in all of these discussions is that cases can be made in utramque partem, without 
cynical nor more optimistic historians being able to convincingly settle the matter. 
Already in 1983, Keith Hopkins, one of the first ancient historians to highly and 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
liberti, it also recognises similar patterns for e.g. slaves and veterans. Leppin (1996) shows how 
imperial freedmen originally appropriated elite values to create their own social identity. 
16 Borbonus (2014), passim (esp. 106ff).  
17 Among the many scholars who interpret funerary epigraphy in terms of imitation and 
competition are Woolf (1996); Dexheimer (2000); Carroll (2006), e.g. 16, 229. 
18 Knapp (2011), 184. 
19 E.g. Golden (1988), passim; Dixon (1992), 13; Nielsen (1997), 199f. King (2000), 119-21 provides a 
more detailed overview of the debate. 
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consistently value sociological models and insights in his analyses, deemed it self-
evident that he could not define the connection “between the experience of feelings and 
their expression”20.  
In the following two sections, we expound in more detail our approach to these and 
similar caveats related to the contentious issue of representative value of epigraphic 
sources, while focussing in particular on the ramifications for a study of freedman 
socialisation.  
8.2 Epigraphy as “transcript” 
8.2.1 Hidden and public transcript 
Even though epigraphic sources have been repeatedly hailed as giving voice to Rome’s 
lower classes – and as such contrast sharply with the literary sources –, they by no 
means represent the “hidden transcript” of these groups21. As noted in Chapter 1, 
expressions of displeasure or resistance to domination typically occur in “off-stage” 
contexts, where anonymity and disguise provide the necessary framework for 
concealment. If there is one thing the realm of funerary epigraphy was not, it was such 
an anonymous “off-stage” context, as these inscriptions were intended for conspicuous 
(self)representation. These texts were explicitly meant to be read by anyone who passed 
by, and did not, in general, hide the identity of dedicator and dedicatee – quite on the 
contrary. Even in the less ostentatious columbarium contexts, respecting the “public 
transcript” – shaped by and reproducing the norms and values of the slave-owning class 
– was a conditio sine qua non for being guaranteed a valued spot in these tombs. 
Subordinates were expected to extend their adherence to the public transcript after 
death, and an ingrained mechanism of “social control” ensured that an explicit 
deviation of these norms would not be tolerated. Even though this transcript 
acknowledged and respected freedmen’s fundamental liberty and equality as citizens, it 
also prescribed an adherence to traditional status hierarchies. In a sense then, when 
freedmen are “speaking” in their epitaphs, very similar biases occur as in the elite 
literary sources these epitaphs are so often contrasted with. The internalisation of the 
 
                                                     
20 Hopkins (1983), 204. 
21 Taylor (1961), 129-30; Saller & Shaw (1984), 145; Carroll (2006), passim (e.g. vii); Bruun (2015), 
605ff. 
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socio-cultural habitus of a Roman citizen, and the implied adherence to the public 
transcript of respect for social superiors were non-optional expectations for freedmen. 
8.2.2 The patronal prerogative of complaint 
For these reasons, it is no coincidence that there exist no examples of freedmen publicly 
condemning or derogating their patrons in their inscriptions, whereas strained 
relations were on occasion aired by these very patrons themselves (an exact mirror of 
the practice in literary sources). The latter was usually done by excluding freedmen 
from the tomb of a patron(ess) whom they had disrespected during their life. The 
imperial freedman Publius Aelius Melitimus, for instance, made a grave monument for 
all his male and female freedpersons, as well as for their descendants (libertis 
libertabusque meis posterisque eorum). Only one of these, his freedman Eutyches, was 
explicitly denied access22. Likewise, M. Aemilius Artema excluded his freedman Hermes 
from his family grave because of his “misdeeds” (delicta)23. We are not told what the 
precise nature of these misdeeds was, but similar inscriptions reveal some of the 
motivations that could move a patron to punish a freedman this way. The freedwoman 
Caecilia Secundina, for example, was excluded from her patron Felix’ tomb “because she 
had not shown the proper respect to him” (impia [fuit] adversus Caecilium Felicem 
patronum suum)24. Likewise, a certain Eutyches was excluded from the group of 
freedmen that was allowed access to their patron’s tomb, because of his “bad 
behaviour” (malae merito)25. An unnamed father concluded the emotional inscription in 
honour of his deceased daughter with the wish that his freedman Atimetus – whom he 
held responsible for this loss – would go and hang himself. Although he was even willing 
to provide the rope and nail himself, the inscription does not elaborate on Atimetus’ 
 
                                                     
22 CIL 6, 8857: “D(is) M(anibus) / P(ublius) Aelius Aug(usti) lib(ertus) Melitinus / invitator fecit sibi et 
Aeliae / Severae uxori karissimae / lib(ertis) libertab(us)q(ue) meis posteris/que eorum except<a=O> 
Euty/che lib(erto) meo cuius neque cor/pus neque ossa in hoc mon<u=I>mento / inferri volo”. 
23 CIL 6, 11027: “M(arcus) Aemilius Artema / fecit / M(arco) Licinio Successo fratri / bene merenti et 
/ Caeciliae Modestae coniugi / suae et sibi et suis libertis / libertabusq(ue) posterisq(ue) eorum / 
excepto Hermete lib(erto) quem veto / propter delicta sua aditum ambitum ne / ullum accessum 
habeat in hoc monumentum”. 
24 CIL 6, 13732: “C(aius) Caecilius Felix / et C(aius) Caecilius Urbicus / locum ita uti est 
concamaratum / parietibus et pila comprehensis longum / p(edes) VI latum p(edes) VII s(emis) 
consecrarunt sibi et / C(aio) Caecilio Rufino et C(aio) Caecilio Materno et / libertis libertabusque 
posterisque eorum / excepta Secundina liberta impia / adversus Caecilium Felicem patronum suum 
/ h(oc) m(onumentum) h(eredem) n(on) s(equetur)”. 
25 CIL 6, 14930: “praeter Eutucho libert(o) / mal{a}e merito de se”. 
  445 
deception (dolus) that had allegedly robbed this father of his daughter26. Very similar 
complaints, however, were made against doctors who had not been able to prevent a 
patient from succumbing to a wound or disease. An imperial freedman, for example, 
deplored the sudden death (mors subita) of his own excellent freedman and alumnus 
Euhelpistus, and blamed the doctors who “cut him open” and thereby “killed” him27. 
Lethal incompetence of medici was a topos also in satire. Martial, for example, scorned 
the career shift of a certain Diaulus, who – as a doctor – all too easily changed to the 
profession of undertaker, implying that his practicing medicine had not been without 
casualties: “what the undertaker does, the doctor used to do”28. Although this may also 
have been the accusation implicitly made against Atimetus, the true nature of the affair 
remains obscure, as his own version of events was naturally not included. 
Finally, in the bilingual inscription adorning his family tomb, Marcus Antonius 
Encolpius notes that the monument is accessible to all his freedpersons – even calling a 
particularly virtuous one by name – but making an exception for M. Antonius Athenio, 
who was not only denied burial but also the right to visit the tomb while still alive. The 
reason quite explicitly mentioned, is that this Athenio – in addition to many other 
insults (multas iniurias) – had denied that Encolpius was his father (me parentem sibi 
amnegaverit)29. Whether “father” should be taken literally or figuratively (e.g. as a more 
emotional substitute for patronus) is not clear. It seems very likely that the two were 
connected by both a biological and a patronage bond. But the fact that Encolpius 
explicitly numbers Athenio among his freedmen (and that he does not describe or 
address him as a son), suggests that his “many insults” pertained first and foremost to 
the patronage relation. Moreover, the choice of parentem instead of patrem may have 
been a very deliberate one, since the former term also evokes a sense of disobedience 
(being not only the accusative of the noun parens, but also of the adjective parens, 
“obedient”). 
The individuals who explicitly provided burial space for their freedmen in their own 
tombs were often freedmen themselves30. Moreover, the manifest exclusion of 
 
                                                     
26 CIL 6, 12649: “Atimeto lib(erto) / cuius dolo filiam amisi restem et clavom / unde sibi collum 
alliget”. 
27 CLE 2140 (= CIL 6, 37337): “D(is) M(anibus) / Euhelpisti lib(erti) qui et / Manes vixit annis XXVII / 
mens(ibus) IIII dieb(us) XI floren/tes annos mors subita / eripuit anima inno/centissima quem / 
medici secarunt / et occiderunt / P(ublius) Aelius Aug(usti) lib(ertus) Peculiaris / alumno suo”.  
28 Mart. 1.47: “Nuper erat medicus, nunc est vispillo Diaulus: quod vispillo facit, fecerat et medicus”. 
Cf. 1.30: “Chirurgus fuerat, nunc est vispillo Diaulus. Coepit quo poterat clinicus esse modo”. 
29 CIL 6, 14672: “excepto M(arco) Antonio Athenione quem veto / in eo mon<u=I>mento aditum 
habere neque iter ambitum / introitum ullum in eo habere neque sepulturae causa / reliquias eius 
posterorumque eius inferri … quia me pos(t) multas iniurias parentem sibi amnegaverit”. 
30 Schumacher (2001), 297. 
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subordinates from their graves was more than simply a punishment of some specific 
persons. To be sure, this punishment in itself was already very severe, since it not only 
deprived the freedman of a secure locus for commemoration, but it also greatly 
tarnished his reputation and social capital, as people from his network would “learn” of 
his faithlessness and untrustworthiness through the inscription. In addition, however, 
such exclusions conspicuously present a (freed) patron in a position of power over his 
own dependents. In this respect, Nicolas Tran reminds us how the extremely popular 
phrase libertis libertabusque posterisque eorum (and variations) did not necessarily refer to 
actual freedmen, but sometimes merely served to express the potential of a tomb-owner 
to have freedmen, thus accentuating his position of control31. In a similar vein, 
Kleijwegt argued that the phenomenon of ex-slaves owning slaves themselves should 
not be morally condemned, but rather respected as contextually embedded in its own 
historical setting. He noted how a “desire to acquire recognition from the freeborn 
population” and a wish to “distance themselves from the slave segment in society” 
prompted ex-slaves to proudly present themselves as slave-owners32.  
One of the harsher examples of this socialisation strategy is that of Marcus Iunius 
Euphrosynus33. The language of the inscription in which he cruelly condemns his 
runaway wife and freedwoman Acte is reminiscent of a curse tablet. Since defixiones 
were not meant to be found or read out loud, the fact that Euphrosynus chose to express 
his indignation in this particular format is therefore meaningful in its own right (i.e. 
even when disconnected from the actual content of the carmen written on it). It signifies 
a realisation and exploitation of his right as a patron to take recourse to a discourse that 
was unavailable to Acte-as-freedwoman. In fact, if we cautiously assume that 
Euphrosynus’ Greek cognomen is an indication of freed status, the inscription is a useful 
reminder not to analytically separate any “patron class” from a “freedman class”, as 
both categories would often overlap34. In this particular case, Euphrosynus clearly 
assumes the role of (cheated and hurt) patron. The specific choice to construct a “curse 
tablet” in stone not only suits the particular purpose of the message Euphrosynus tried 
to convey, but it also accentuates his discursive agency and effective power – rendering 
all the more shocking the way in which it was blatantly disrespected by Acte. Unlike his 
freedwoman, Euphrosynus did not need to secretly write a real defixio to air his 
resentment; he could simply make a public one for all to see. 
 
                                                     
31 Tran (2006), 465-8. 
32 Kleijwegt (2006a), 53-4. 
33 CLE 95 (= CIL 6, 20905). 
34 CIL 6, 8442, for example, features Primilla (a freedwoman of the freedman Eutyches). She is listed 
next to her patron as commemorating the latter’s patron (Strato) in turn. As such, she is virtually 
put on a par with her own patron (i.e. as freedwoman of Strato).  
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The expectation of respect for a patron – enforced also by Roman law – did not prevent 
freedmen from uttering critiques or from outright condemning fellow-citizens other 
than their patron. In his epitaph, attached to his impressive funerary monument outside 
the Nucerian gate in Pompeii, the freedman Publius Vesonius Phileros famously 
honoured his (freeborn) patrona Vesonia and his (freed) amicus Marcus Orfellius Faustus. 
The plaque identified all three individuals, who were moreover gloriously presented as 
Roman citizens with toga (and stola) in the aedicula above it35. That Phileros had made 
the tomb while still alive (perhaps at the passing of his patroness), is confirmed by the 
fact that he later added a second inscription – in verse – underneath the first one36. This 
text reveals a very significant deterioration of the relationship between Phileros and 
Faustus (Vesonia is not mentioned anymore). Apparently, Faustus was no longer 
Phileros’ friend because he had falsely accused him in court37: 
 
 
Figure 2 The grave inscriptions of Publius Vesonius Phileros 
 
 
                                                     
35 AE 1986, 166: “P(ublius) Vesonius |(mulieris) l(ibertus) / Phileros Augustalis / viv<u=O>s 
monument(um) / fecit sibi et suis // Vesoniae P(ubli) f(iliae) / patronae et // M(arco) Orfellio 
M(arci) l(iberto) / Fausto amico”. 
36 It is, of course, already clear also from the inclusion of viv<u=O>s fecit and from the fact that 
Augustalis and suis were added to the original inscription in a later phase. 
37 AE 1964, 160: “Hospes paullisper morare / si non est molestum et quid evites / cognosce amicum 
hunc quem / speraveram mi(hi) esse ab eo mihi accusato/res subiecti et iudicia instaurata deis / 
gratias ago et meae innocentiae omni / molestia liberatus sum qui nostrum mentitur / eum nec Di 
Penates nec inferi recipient”. 
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“Stranger, linger for a while, if it is not too much to ask, and learn what you 
should try to avoid. This fellow, a friend of mine - or so at least I hoped – handed 
me over to interrogators, resulting in a charge being formulated against me. I 
thanked the gods and my innocence, for I was acquitted and freed from all 
distress. May that man, who lied about our business, not be received neither by 
the household gods nor by the gods of the underworld”. (Pompeii) 
 
Even though formally acquitted, Phileros clearly did not forget the betrayal by his 
“friend”. The second – metric – inscription is very clearly designed to resemble a curse 
tablet. Especially the “nail” in the middle – leaving a deliberately carved depression in 
the stone in order to make it look like metal had been pierced – is a clear reference to 
the realm of magical cursing38. Indeed, the last verse of the poem implores all gods to 
make sure Faustus would be eternally punished for his crime. Phileros’ discursive 
agency and his ability to freely air his indignation via a medium often used in secret by 
those who could not express it in the public sphere, matches the freedman’s freedom as 
a Roman citizen, both being explicitly accentuated by the monument’s iconography. 
On these relatively rare occasions where freedmen did express indignation, hate, or 
another unusually negative emotion, this disparagement consistently ran “downwards” 
on the social ladder. As patrons, Aelius Melitimus, Caecilius Felix, Antonius Encolpius, 
and Iunius Euphrosynus – like so many other ex-slaves – adopted the discourse of slave-
owners by expecting loyalty and respect from their own freedmen (and by similarly 
punishing deviations from the expected norm). Much like the picture painted by 
literary sources, the prerogative of complaint could be rightfully claimed only by an 
individual in relation to a socially inferior person. The pungency of Martial’s many 
sneers towards his own idle or too eagerly imposing patrons, derives precisely from the 
fact that these statements usurp this prerogative39. In this regard, it is meaningful that 
these witty complaints feature in a collection of “epigrams”. Originally, epigrams 
(ἐπίγραμμα) were – quite literally – inscriptions written on stone. Ever since the Greek 
lyric poet Simonides started composing non-monumental epigrams in the fifth century 
BCE, it gradually became a literary genre sui generis. Surely, the genre was almost 
entirely disconnected from its roots half a millennium later in Martial’s time, but 
Martial himself kept the link to monumental writing very much alive by occasionally 
 
                                                     
38 For a much more detailed discussion of this monument (and its connection to defixiones), see 
especially Elefante (1985). Petersen (2006), 77-80 completely ignores the “curse tablet” in her 
analysis of the monument (the photograph on p. 79 not even showing it). Williams (2012), 260-6 
provides a discussion of the value of the monument for the study of Roman friendship. 
39 E.g. Mart. 2.32 (where Martial complains about his patron’s idleness); 3.46 (where he contrarily 
accuses a patron of expecting too much from his client). 
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including full-fledged epitaphs among his epigrams40. Expressing potentially 
transgressive thoughts (e.g. complaints about a patron) via a medium that very closely 
represented the realm of the public transcript (“epigrams”), endowed Martial’s sneers 
with an “unnatural” awkwardness that greatly helped in driving home their pointe.  
In short, the strong overlap between the analytical groups of “patrons” and 
“freedmen”, the public nature of (funerary) inscriptions, the strong element of social 
control that derived from it, and the resulting bias towards positive representations 
within the epigraphic habit, render a priori problematic any attempt at reconstructing 
the “freedman’s voice” from this source material. An additional caveat lurks in the 
thorny issue of “authorship” in the realm of funerary epigraphy, which we will briefly 
discuss before turning to our database of carmina epigraphica. 
8.3 Authorship in epigraphy 
8.3.1 Concealed dedicators and deceitful “I”’s 
Another impediment to approaching freedmen’s epitaphs as real ego-documents relates 
to our inability, in several cases, to ascertain the identity of the original dedicator. The 
large majority of carmina in our database that mention their original creator (cf. infra), 
were dedicated by a close family member of the deceased (usually a spouse, parent, or 
child). A freedwoman from Salona, for example, claimed responsibility for the erection 
of a monument in honour of her husband (and their son), who apparently had not 
survived abduction by bandits. She drew specific attention to her agency because it 
constituted a deplorable deviation from the ideal of children erecting epitaphs for their 
parents (rather than vice versa)41. When Aurelius Maximus erected the monument in 
honour of his freedman Timavius, he similarly accentuated his own role in the 
commemoration of this alumnus dulcissimus et sanctissimus by consistently addressing the 
deceased in the second person: “You, Timavius, receive these sweet vows of mine … 
 
                                                     
40 E.g. the famous epitaphs for Melior’s freedman Glaucias (Mart. 6.28-9). 
41 CLE 818 (= CIL 3, 2544): “[…]bricia L(uci) l(iberta) Primigen(ia) / [co]niugi et filio pos(u)it / [fili]us 
hunc titulum / [debeb]at ponere matri”. This was a recurrent thought in epitaphs erected by 
parents for their deceased children, although the formulae through which it was expressed varied 
greatly. Compare, for example, with CLE 55 (= CIL 6, 10096): “reliqui fletum nata genitori meo / et 
antecessi genita post leti diem”; 1155 (= CIL 6, 30110): “[Ve]rius hunc titulum matri tu nata dicasses / 
quam mater miserae nunc tibi nata facit”; 1194 (= CIL 2, 3453): “Mater si poss[em libens] / fili(i) vice 
morti s[uccumberem]”.  
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With your last words, you sang me consolations”42. Maximus does not hide the fact that 
he is expressing his own grief, and does not pretend to speak in the name of the 
deceased.  
Messages like these, when dedicated by a party other than the deceased, and 
especially if this was accentuated by the use of the second or third person, have only a 
limited value in reconstructing the deceased’s thoughts, since they do not genuinely 
reflect his or her own sentiments. A monument found in Comum, immortalising the 
freedwoman Annia Agathonice, ensures us that “she had lived her life piously” and that 
“her spirit shone brightly” (morum vita beata fuit spiri/tus hic nituit), before describing the 
sorrow and grief of Annia’s parents43. The message of the rest of the poem is impersonal, 
expressing a somewhat odd and philosophically inspired thought – that a short life is 
better than a long one because it provides less opportunity for corruption by crimes. 
The final verses of the poem, however, reveal that it was Agathonice’s patroness who 
had set up the inscription. She explains that the odd message of the carmen serves as 
consolation (solacium), somehow rendering sufferable the death of a bright young 
woman. However, her motivations for erecting the monument were loyalty and a sense 
of duty (dat t/amen haec patronae pietas sola/cia fidae iugera quot terrae). Fides and pietas 
were virtues that stressed the ability to reciprocate in a longterm relationship, and 
especially in a familial context, they carried a strong connotation of moral obligation of 
support or – in this case – commemoration44. As such, these motivations contrast 
sharply with, for example, amor as the primary reason behind a funerary dedication45. 
Here, then, we are hearing the patroness’ voice, rather than the freedwoman’s. It seems 
unlikely indeed, that Agathonice would have similarly considered her premature death 
a blessing rather than a curse, or that she would have dedicated the limited space 
available on the stone to the expression of such thoughts, rather than to more concrete 
aspects of her life (cf. infra).  
Although all these cases clearly betray the identity of the true “speaker”, it is well 
known that even a poem rendered in the first person singular does not in itself 
guarantee that it was made or ordered by the deceased. The freedman Marcus Aurelius 
Zosimus from Albanum, for example, was remembered by a lengthy carmen, which at 
first sight had him narrate his own life story46. “I admit I was a freedman”, it sets out at 
the very beginning. The rest of the poem, however, treats the many advantages he had 
 
                                                     
42 CLE 2140 (= CIL 13, 8371): “tu Timav[i] … du[lcib]us votis ad/es … cum mihi extremis ca/nebas 
vocibus solamin[a]”. 
43 CLE 1203 (= CIL 5, 5320). 
44 See especially Saller (1988). 
45 E.g. CLE 81 (= 6, 4379); 465 (= CIL 12, 533); 972 (= CIL 6, 28810). 
46 CLE 990 (= CIL 14, 2298). 
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derived from the association with his patron: Marcus Aurelius Maximus Cotta 
Messalinus47. The latter had bestowed a small fortune on his freedman (qui mihi saepe 
libens census donavit equestris), entrusted him with his business affairs (quique suas 
commisit opes / mihi semper), provided dowries for his daughters (dotavit / natas ut pater 
ipse meas), etc. Although Zosimus remains at the centre of attention throughout this 
enumeration, he is merely the recipient of these benefactions. What the carmen truly 
conveys, therefore, is the benevolence and generosity of Cotta-as-patron (who, with 
exception of the initial verse, is also the grammatical subject of the entire inscription). 
Whereas Eck and Heinrichs leave open the possibility that the carmen expressed 
Zosimus’ true feelings, Kleijwegt’s reluctance to accept this optimistic interpretation is 
undoubtedly justified: “[a]ny identity that Zosimus may have claimed is completely 
overwritten by that of his overbearing patron”48. In this particular case, we are 
fortunate to have this suspicion confirmed by the last verse of the inscription, which 
explicitly points to Cotta as its maker (carmina tristis haec dedit). Interestingly, then, the 
use of the almost apologetic fateor in the first verse was a choice made by Cotta, and 
therefore not necessarily a reflection of how Zosimus would have thought of or referred 
to his condition. 
Similarly, the verse epitaph lamenting the premature death of Seccius Lesbius, uses 
the first person for emotional effect – as if the deceased was still talking to the living 
through his monument49. “I could not reap the fruits of my young age” (ae/tatis praemia 
nulla <t=I>u/li), the 20-year-old freedman himself seems to tell the reader. However, 
focus is shifted immediately afterwards to Lesbius’ patron Seccius, as the freedman 
starts invoking the favour of the gods, asking them to grant this Seccius a long life (di 
meli/ora precor pro nostro / munera casu sentiat / et plures possit habere / suos). Like in 
Zosimus’ case, the last line of the poem reveals that this prayer does not necessarily 
reflect Lesbius’ sentiment, but rather his patron’s. It was the latter, indeed, who not 
only gifted the freedman his tomb (tumulum), but also ordered its inscription (titulum). 
 Other verse epitaphs have a similar structure and content, but fail to reveal as 
explicitly the actual dedicator. For example, the inscription of a doctor from Iguvium 
reads50: 
 
                                                     
47 For Cotta, see Tac. Ann. 6.5-7; Plin. NH 10.52. A more positive (though equally one-sided) 
characterisation is given by Juvenal (7.94) and Cotta’s literary protégé Horace (e.g. Pont. 2.8.1-36; 
Trist. 4.5.1.34). 
48 Eck and Heinrichs (1993), 214-5; Kleijwegt (2006b), 96. This could work the other way around as 
well. See, for example, CLE 1009 (= CIL 11, 1273), where a freedwoman commemorates her patron, 
but uses the carmen mainly to highlight her own qualities. 
49 CLE 1116 (= CIL 13, 7105). 
50 CLE 1252 (= CIL 11, 5836): “L(ucius) Sabinus L(uci) l(ibertus) / Primigenius / ortus ab Iguvio 
medicus fora multa secutus / arte feror nota nobiliore fide / me consurgentem valida Fortuna 
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“Lucius Sabinus Primigenius, freedman of Lucius. I, a physician from Iguvium, 
having visited many towns, was praised for my known ability and my even more 
famous trustworthiness. While I was growing up, Fortune deprived me of my 
healthy youth and placed me on a premature funerary pyre. My ashes that were 
left by the fire were sent to a Clusian grave and my patron buried my bones in my 
homeland”. (Iguvium) 
  
The carmen clearly has Primigenius himself speak out these words, but since it was the 
patron who apparently provided his freedman with a grave, some caution is warranted 
as to the real author of the poem. This doubt does not in itself undermine the value of 
the epitaph for our current purpose, as surely Primigenius too would have thought his 
skill and trustworthiness worth mentioning. It does, however, serve as a useful 
reminder that funerary poems – even when rendered in the first person – do not 
unequivocally represent “freedmen’s voices”, and that the question of authorship needs 
to feature prominently throughout any discussion. 
Only in a few cases do the freedmen in our database clarify that they were themselves 
the creators of their epitaph. For example, Marcus Publicius Unio, a freedman from 
Tusculum, starts out his lengthy carmen by reassuring his readers that he himself had 
ordered and dictated it (versus quos ego / dictavi et iussi scribere)51. The rest of the poem is 
rendered entirely in the first person singular, thus confirming this initial claim (e.g. 
quiesco, reddedi, coagulavi, turbavi, praestiti, etc.). Similarly, Lucius Claudius Rufinus 
proudly announced that he had made his epitaph while he was still alive, so that it 
might cover his grave as a “surviving witness of my existence” and ensure the “eternal 
remembrance of my voice”52. In this case, the first person ([domus saxea] meam retinet 
vocem) can be safely considered as a reflection of the freedman’s own agency in 
composing his verse epitaph. Even though it was his patron who took care of the actual 
erection of the monument after Rufinus’ passing (curante Cl(audio) Sequente patrono), the 
ending of the carmen again stresses that the freedman was the original dedicator of the 
inscription, which commemorated besides himself also his wetnurse (nutrix) Marciana 
and his foster sister (conlactia) Verina. Surely, the determining influence of the person 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
iuventa / destituit rapidis imposuitque rogis / clusino cineres flammae cessere sepulcro / patronus 
patrio condidit ossa solo”. 
51 CLE 477 (= CIL 14, 2605). 
52 CLE 1278 (= CIL 13, 2104): “Cl(audius) hunc viv(u)s Stygias Rufinus / ad umbras instituit / titulum 
post animae requ/iem qui testis vitae fati / sit lege futurus cum do/mus accipiet saxea corpus 
ha/bens quodque meam / retinet vocem data litte/ra saxo vo[ce] tua vivet / quisque lege[s titu]los”. 
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eventually carving out a text on stone should be taken into account in every instance, 
although this can rarely be more than a theoretical consideration53. 
8.3.2 “Fortunata”: ego aut patronus? 
The epitaph erected in memory of the freedwoman Fortunata from Narona (Dalmatia) is 
a good example to illustrate the complexity and importance of the questions related to 
authorship mentioned above. The stele contains a touching poem of which the 
dedicator is not explicitly mentioned54:  
“Here lies Fortunata, freedwoman of Caius, who lived for 18 years. If it is beneficial 
for someone to live modestly, I beg you, Manes, may the Earth be light to me [i.e. 
“reward me for my modesty!”]. My freedom was once promised to me, but because 
of my death, this promise was overruled by the will of fate. Live happily, you for 
whom Fortune is a survivor. Fate has wrecked my hope, in Illyricum”. (Narona) 
 
 
 
                                                     
53 Bradley (1995), 448 thought that this influence could sometimes entirely alter the content and 
tone of an epitaph. Although this may have happened once or twice, it should not be considered a 
general truth. 
54 CLE 1117 (= CIL 3, 1854): “] / C(ai) l(iberta) Fortu[nata] / an(norum) h(ic) s(ita) e(st) XIIX / si pietas 
prodest / cuiquam vixisse / modeste vos precor / o Mane[s sit] mihi / terra lev[i]s / libertas [cui] 
olim fuerat / promissa [s]e<d=T> ante ditis sub / fatum venit [i]n arbitrium / vivite felices quibu[s] / 
est Fortuna superste[s] / spe<m=N>que meam oppress[i]t / fatus in {H}Il(l)<y=U>ricum”. 
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Figure 3 The grave stele of Fortunata 
 
“Fortunata” claims that she had been promised her freedom, but reveals that at least for 
her, the adage nomen est omen was painfully inaccurate, as her hopes were cut short by a 
premature death at the age of 18. However, her full nomenclature – still clearly 
discernible, though cut in half horizontally by the breaking of the monument – included 
formal libertination, and as such indicates that she was in fact no longer a slave at the 
moment of her death.  
Being only 18 years old, she would have had to wait at least another 12 years before 
she could be formally freed – that is, if we are right in dating the inscription after the 
promulgation of the lex Aelia Sentia of 4 CE, as the appeal to the Manes surely seems to 
suggest. Only a iusta causa would allow a formal manumission at a younger age (e.g. 
when Fortunata’s master wanted to marry her, when she was his biological daughter, 
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etc.)55 However, no trace of such a relationship with her master is attested in 
Fortunata’s epitaph. Of course, nothing prevented Fortunata’s master from informally 
freeing her before that time. Alföldy, among others, has famously shown how the legal 
prescriptions of the lex Aelia Sentia did not at all reflect or suddenly change the 
ingrained habit of (informally) freeing slaves at a much younger age than 30, even 
though his radical conclusion that virtually all urban slaves could expect manumission 
relatively early in their lives is unwarranted56. 
In fact, informal manumission is precisely what seems to have happened at the end of 
Fortunata’s short life: she was freed on her deathbed, as a more worldly reward for her 
pietas and modestia. Manumission at the end of a slave’s life was mainly a symbolical act 
without many practical consequences. The legal status of any children Fortunata may 
have had – even at the age of 18 – would have remained “unimpaired” (from the 
master’s perspective). Moreover, since the manumission would be informal, any 
property Fortunata possessed (e.g. a peculium that usually accompanied the grant of 
freedom) would have automatically reverted to her patron. The limited impact of an 
informal manumission surely played a role in Fortunata’s master’s decision of 
honouring her in extremis. However, all of this holds true also for a manumission at an 
earlier date, and does not explain per se why he waited till the very end of Fortinata’s life 
to free her, if freeing her was his intention all along (as his earlier promise indicates).  
This leaves open the intriguing possibility that by libertas, the dedicator did not mean 
“freedom” in the most basic sense – viz. as opposed to unfree status – but rather “formal 
freedom” – viz. freedom, and citizenship, formally obtained after the age of 30. Indeed, 
the explicit focus on the denial of freedom by a harsh fate seems rather odd when the 
praescriptum had already clearly identified Fortunata as a freedwoman. Formal freedom 
is also what the slave Narcissus of Venafrum (or rather the dedicator of his monument) 
had in mind when he wrote that “the freedom that was owed to me has been denied by 
law, but now granted to me for all eternity by a premature death”57. The praescriptum to 
this brief carmen presents Narcissus as a vilicus with a single name. Especially when we 
take into account that his masters are represented by their full names (Titus Titucus 
Florianus and Teia Galla, daughter of Lucius), these elements indicate that Narcissus was 
 
                                                     
55 Gai. Inst. 1.19; 1.39; Dig. 40.2.13. 
56 Alföldy (1986), esp. 290-6, which is a revised version of a 1972 study, that includes Alföldy’s 
responses to some critiques on his arguments. Cf. Harper (1972). The debate is conveniently 
discussed in Mourtisen (2011), 131ff (including many further references). Mouritsen (esp. p. 133) 
rightly accentuates the main flaw in these and similar studies, which too readily accept the 
epigraphic record as a reflection of demographic composition or proportions. 
57 CLE 1015 (=CIL 10, 4917): “Narcissus vil(icus) / T(iti) Tituci Floriani / et Teiae L(uci) f(iliae) Gallae / 
vixit an(nos) XXV / debita libertas iuveni mihi lege / negata / morte immatura reddita perpetua 
est”. 
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still a slave at his death, and that the “freedom granted by death” was – unlike 
Fortunata’s – not legal but merely proverbial58.  
However, at least some masters seem to have been reluctant to informally manumit 
their slaves. Roman law provides illuminating examples of masters who stated in their 
testament that they wanted to free a certain slave, but only after he had reached the age 
of 3059. A similar reluctance may also have withheld Narcissus’ and Fortunata’s masters 
from prematurely fulfilling their promise. This is perhaps the correct interpretation of 
Fortunata’s “harsh fate”, and would be much more in line with the general observation 
that neither patrons nor freedmen, be it in literature or in the funerary realm, tend to 
discriminate between formal and informal freedom60. Most likely, then, Narcissus and 
Fortunata had had the prospect of freedom at the age of 30 tauntingly looming in their 
minds, explaining the severely felt disappointment caused by a premature death. 
Surely, freedom must have been a condition coveted by many slaves. But the 
question remains whether it was also considered an almost guaranteed automatism – as 
insinuated by, especially, Narcissus’ epitaph – and whether a cruel denial of this 
freedom was something a slave would accentuate him- or herself. This case-specific 
warning is but one facet of a much more general methodological caveat. Indeed, 
whether sentiments expressed in freedpersons’ epitaphs are reflections of their own 
state of mind rather than projections of the patron’s perspective, is a question that 
needs to be answered for every epitaph individually, and is indissolubly connected to 
the question as to who the real author of the monument was. In Narcissus’ case, the 
extensive mention of his masters suggests that they were responsible for the erection of 
their vilicus’ tombstone. The explicit mention of the lex as the reason for the denial of 
“deserved freedom” thus served as an apologetic statement by which these owners 
washed their hands in innocence: it was not their fault the law postponed 
manumission61. In Fortunata’s epitaph, however, no mention of a master or patron 
 
                                                     
58 Cf. Brassloff (1932), 242-3. Compare, for example, with CLE 1331 (= CIL 8, 25006), where the death of 
a young child – deliberately remaining anonymous so as not to cause further grief – prevented him 
or her from enjoying freedom. The only solace the (also unnamed) dedicator had, was that eternal 
death now provided its own form of freedom instead (mors vitam vicit ne li/bertatem teneres / … / nunc 
mors perpetua liber/tatem dedit). 
59 E.g. Dig. 10.2.39.2: “Servo libertatem dedit qui erat annorum quindecim, cum erit annorum 
triginta”; 34.5.29: “Plures testamento manumiserat, in quibus sabinam et cyprogeniam, cum quisque 
eorum ad trigesimum annum aetatis pervenisset”. In this sense, the lex Aelia Sentia (deliberatly or 
not) provided masters who wanted to motivate their slaves, with a legal argument, pointing out to 
them that a relatively late manumission was definitely worth the wait. 
60 Cf. Knapp (2011), 174: “The absence in the evidence probably reflects a lack of concern in people’s 
minds to distinguish between freedmen with full citizenship and those with Latin citizenship”. 
61 Cf. Wiedemann (1985), 168. 
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occurs – unless it was part of a lost praescriptum (the stone is severely damaged at the 
top) – making it much more delicate to determine authorship62. 
However, if her master/patron had dedicated the monument, the contradiction 
between legal status and the “denial of freedom” seems even more striking. Much like 
Pliny the Younger, many a patron would consider it a consolation knowing that his 
close slaves had died as free persons (i.e. that they had received their freedom on their 
deathbeds), and would prefer to stress this end-of-life achievement, rather than a “too 
little too late” remark like Fortunata’s63. Moreover, it would greatly benefit the patron’s 
public persona to appear as a benefactor towards his own familial dependents. Thus the 
extraordinary funerary monument of Alfius Felix Flavianus from Sicca Veneria in Africa 
noted (among other things) that the deceased had wanted to free his house-born slaves, 
first and foremost because “he wanted to evoke reverence and affection from his family 
members”, giving only as a second reason (quoque) their individual merit64. Fortunata’s 
tombstone, however, leaves something of a sour taste in any reader’s mouth, as the 
manumission came too late for Fortunata to enjoy it. This sentiment is very different 
indeed when compared to Pliny’s perspective, perhaps suggesting – without stressing 
the point too hard – that Fortunata herself (or a close relative of the same station) 
rather than her patron was responsible for the poem. The formal libertination in the 
praescriptum then both accentuates the pietas and modestia Fortunata had shown 
throughout her life (and for which she was rewarded in extremis), and adds to the drama 
of a premature death. It implies, whether true or not, that Fortunata may have actually 
never known that she had received her freedom. 
The visual arrangement of the tombstone perhaps provides another – though 
unavoidably tentative – clue as to its production. What strikes any observer even before 
any reading takes place, is that the craftsmanship displayed was very sloppy. As was 
often the case, the dedicator had apparently bought a semi-finished stone from a 
stonemason, containing only a carved out frame in which a text still needed to be 
written. However, the finishing touch left much to be desired. The initial letters are 
relatively long, but the carver seems to have realised along the way that he would not 
be able to fit the entire poem in the space provided. The letters thus become smaller and 
smaller, and the lines at the end are curved so as to save up as much space as possible. 
Despite this valiant effort, the carver was forced to finish the epitaph outside of the 
frame. The text that falls outside of it, moreover, was not merely a later addition. 
 
                                                     
62 The carmen, on the contrary, is intact and does not feature a master or patron. 
63 Plin. Ep. 8.16.1: “Solacia duo nequaquam paria tanto dolori, solacia tamen; unum facilitas 
manumittendi (videor enim non omnino immaturos perdidisse, quos iam liberos perdidi) …”. 
64 CLE 1869 (= CIL 8, 27587): “vernulis quos habuit libertate consuluit data … gratum se atque pium ut 
commendaret suis / ad circa meritos quoque fecit plurimos”. 
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Indeed, the traditional memento mori (vivite felices quibu[s] est Fortuna superste[s]) starts 
out within the  frame, but breaks off at quibu[s], only to continue with est underneath 
the bottom line of the frame.  
Clearly, the dedicator was affluent enough to provide a stone, but not wealthy (or 
willing) enough to have it inscribed properly (if such a concern was felt at all, rather 
than merely being an infringement on modern aesthetic sensitivities). It seems safe to 
assume that a patron, desiring to accentuate his own magnanimity through the 
ostentatious publication of his slave girl’s elevation, is more likely to be bothered by 
such imperfections, even though such cases are not without parallel in the epigraphic 
record. Thus when Gaius Quinctius Valgus – an extremely rich land-owner, and a 
generous patron of Aeclanum and Pompeii – had an epitaph made for his beloved and 
popular freedman Protymus, he was not troubled by its manifest imperfection65. Even 
though the entire left side of the inscription is lost, it was clearly a metric text. Its poetic 
nature is confirmed by each verse ending on -us, the first and the last containing the full 
names of freedman and patron respectively, thus “framing” the lines in between. 
Moreover, whereas Valgus’ name is given in the traditional order (praenomen – nomen – 
cognomen), Protymus’ needed a more exceptional one in order not to disturb the rhythm 
of the verse (nomen – praenomen – cognomen). The purpose of these and similar 
operations was, however, defeated entirely when the carver of the stone faced a lack of 
space while writing alumnus on the third line. He managed to go as far as alum-, but -nus 
was simply added after the last word of the fourth line (patronus) underneath. To 
indicate that this syllable belonged to the previous line, the carver even separated 
patronus from -nus by an awkward broken line in between. Not only was the rhythm of 
the third line broken, but the first impression one would get when watching the 
monument was also greatly tarnished by this visual imperfection. However, for Valgus, 
who is explicitly identified as the dedicator, this seems not to have been a problem – or 
at least not one big enough to have the epitaph remade. It is possible that Fortunata’s 
master – in the less likely event that he was the dedicator of the epitaph – was equally 
indifferent, even though the imperfections here were far more visible than in Protymus’ 
case.  
Finally, another cry of desperation felt at a premature death that snatched away an 
almost certain manumission may provide an illuminating parallel. A metric inscription 
found in Pisaurum tells the story of the slave Petronius Antigenes (or rather “Petronius, 
 
                                                     
65 CLE 12 (= CIL 10, 5282). For Valgus, see Cic. Leg. Agr. 3.2.8; 3.4.14; CIL 9, 1140; 10, 844; 10, 852. Cf. 
especially Harvey (1973), 80-4; Gabba (1994), 226-7; Santangelo (2007), 72-3, 161. 
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slave of Antigenes”, depending on the reading of Antigenidis)66. The boy, born in the 
house of his master, was barely 10 years old when he passed away. It becomes clear 
already by a mere cursory reading that Petronius was one of the luckier slaves: he was 
well fed (nutritus) and loved (amatus) throughout his life, enjoyed a very good education 
in the liberal arts, and habitually played “funny games”. Responsible for all of this, the 
carmen continues, was his father Hilarus, who would also have become his patron, if 
only fate had granted little Petronius a longer life (haec Hilarus mihi contulerat pater ipse 
patronus / si non infelix contraria fata habuissem).  
It is unlikely that Hilarus was his own son’s master. “Petronius” calls him “father” 
rather than “master”, but most importantly, the lex Aelia Sentia – as mentioned earlier – 
would have considered their blood relation a iusta causa for formal manumission. 
Instead, both Hilarus and Petronius were waiting for the moment on which to transform 
their relationship, the only thing they thought they needed being time – which was 
precisely what Fate was reluctant to grant them. Apparently, Hilarus was waiting for 
Petronius’ master to sell him his son, so that he could free him himself, perhaps 
facilitating – in a later stage – an adoption, by which Hilarus would also become 
Petronius’ legal father. The closeness of father and son surely suggests that they 
belonged to the same household. Either Hilarus was already freed at the time (and thus 
legally allowed to perform the manumission) but his patron as of yet unwilling to sell 
the charming boy, or Hilarus was still a slave himself and waiting for his own 
manumission. It is not difficult to see how in both cases, the unnamed master could 
greatly benefit from this situation by using the young boy as leverage in the social 
negotiation with Hilarus. This is especially true if the latter was already freed, in which 
case the patron would have had few means more efficient than this one to enforce his 
freedman’s loyalty. The fact that Petronius and Hilarus seem to have had very concrete 
plans also suggests that Petronius’ manumission was a distinct possibility in the near 
future, which would similarly be consistent with Hilarus being already freed himself.   
Either way, the joyful prospect of freedom, but especially the hard-felt grief at its 
abrupt denial by a premature death, seem to have been sentiments sincerely felt – if not 
by Petronius himself – at least by Hilarus, who was almost certainly the dedicator of the 
inscription. The sentiment is echoed in the inscription the parents of the slave boy and 
 
                                                     
66 CLE 434 (= CIL 11, 6435): “D(is) M(anibus) / Petroni Antigenidis / tu pede qui stricto vadis per 
semita viator / siste rogo titulumque meum ne spreveris oro / bis quinos annos mensesq(ue) duo 
duo soles / at superos feci tenere nutritus amatus / dogmata Pythagorae sensusq(ue) meavi 
sophorum / et lyricos legi legi pia carmina Homeri / s{c}iv<e=I> quid(!) Euclides abaco praescripta 
tulisset / delicias habui pariter lususque procaces / haec Hilarus mihi contulerat pater ipse patronus 
/ si non infelix contraria fata habuissem / nunc modo ad infernas sedes Acher<o=V>ntis ad undas / 
t{a}etraque Tartarei sidera possideo / effugi tumidam vitam spes et fortuna valete / ni(hi)l mihi 
vobiscum est alios deludite quaeso / hac domus aeterna hic sum situs hic ero semper”. 
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delicium domini Bebryx made for their son67. Besides attesting to their pride in being able 
to provide their son with a funerary poem (formosum cantu detinet iste rogus), it also 
expresses the crushed hope they had once held for their boy (spes expectata parentum). 
These parallels confirm that the very similar thought expressed in Fortunata’s epitaph 
is very likely to have been one entertained by Fortunata herself and/or by her fellow-
slaves. This does not in itself prove that her inscription was not made by her master; 
after all, the thought expressed is a very common sense one, especially if said master 
had been a slave himself. It does, however, indicate that authorship (potentially) had at 
least as much impact as intended audience (“public transcript”) on the content of an 
epitaph (cf. supra). Whereas literary sources are very straightforward in this regard – 
we know in many cases who their author was, and have a fairly adequate understanding 
of his ideology, norms, and values –, reconstructing the “freedman’s voice” from 
epitaphs requires a constant evaluation and heeding of these methodological caveats. 
In conclusion, monumental writing was not the area in which ex-slaves (or any other 
social group) could freely express their deepest sentiments or feelings. Nor should we 
overstate the differences between epigraphy and literary sources in this regard. This is 
not to say that emotions expressed or thoughts uttered were a priori contrived or even 
hypocritical68, but we should at all times account for the fact that they were, from a 
transcript theory point of view, conditioned by the same social norms and decorum of 
the public transcript. As a result, the question as to what extent opinions could be 
expressed “truthfully” – viz. in light of various mechanisms of “straightjacketing” (be it 
public discourse, financial limitations, issues related to the “epigraphic habit” or yet 
other concerns) – becomes moot. However, throughout this chapter, our point of 
departure is that epigraphy did provide a locus for self-presentation and self-
commemoration for common freedmen that literature simply did not. Put differently, 
inscriptions may not give us a more authentic image of the freedman’s perspective, but 
monumental writing did constitute the arena in which an original appropriation, 
moulding, and stretching of conventions could take place. This difference between the 
often generalising and detached elite discourse on the one hand, and an individual 
reconciliation of the public transcript and individual identity dimensions on the other, 
constitutes the more nuanced perspective of epigraphic sources. As such, rather than 
somehow being a reflection of ex-slaves’ hidden transcript, this uniqueness is closely 
related to the network embeddedness of these documents; respecting the “code” of the 
public transcript, but simultaneously reflecting daily practice in which strategies of 
social negotiation were rooted.  
 
                                                     
67 CLE 1075 (= CIL 10, 4041). 
68 Cf. King (2000). 
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8.4 Carmina Latina Epigraphica 
8.4.1 Structure, content, and standardisation 
Among the most fascinating sources available to the ancient historian are inscriptions 
that were written in verse form, the so called carmina latina epigraphica (CLE). Not only 
the inescapable realisation of the trouble people went through to commemorate their 
loved ones, but also the fact that these poems often address the reader directly and 
personally, unavoidably evoke empathy even 2000 years after they were composed. 
“You who read this epitaph”, a man from Puteoli has his deceased freed wife address the 
readers of her epitaph, “why strive to know my name, or who I was, what man I 
married, of whom I was the freedwoman, or how many years I have lived? Because if 
you realise all this, you will cry for sure. Therefore, to not encumber you with this grief, 
listen to this poem, I beg you”69. Verse epitaphs like this remind us that the people who 
set up these inscriptions were concrete individuals, with a unique life-course and 
personal feelings; a reminder particularly valuable in light of the many “de-
humanising” statistical studies that draw mainly from the standardised inscriptions in 
prose, or indeed, in light of a modern monolithic framework that attributes to all 
freedpersons a moral inferiority that not only influenced their public life, but also 
extended to their self-appraisals (cf. Chapter 2)70.  
Although carmina often provided the dedicator with the opportunity (and space) to 
commemorate identity dimensions that would necessarily remain unexposed in a 
briefer epitaph, a selection still had to be made, which – much like the vocabulary by 
which it was presented – reveals a great deal about attitudes and mentalities (cf. infra). 
There exists a clear correlation between the length of a carmen and the amount of 
identity dimensions highlighted in it. The poems that only reference the deceased’s 
occupation are – on average – 4,5 lines long. The number of lines increases when we 
consider the poems that accentuate, for example, occupation and legal status (6 lines) or 
legal status and family relations (9 lines), and reaches a maximum average of 12 lines in 
the inscriptions where all three identity dimensions are treated71. This observation 
suggests that when given the opportunity, in general, commemorators would elaborate 
 
                                                     
69 CLE 420 (= CIL 10, 2311): “[qui] legis hunc titulum quid no[men] scire laboras / [qua]e fuerim quo 
nupta viro [libe]rtave quoius / [an]nos quod tulerim mec[um] miserabere certe / [si] scieris ergo ne 
sit dolor hoc precor audi”. 
70 Cf. Carroll (2006), 23. 
71 The averages were calculated by considering a standardised edition of the poems (in a digital text 
processor), thus compensating for differences in original letter-size or monument-width, etc.). They 
should therefore be considered as a reflection of proportions, and not in absolute terms. 
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on aspects of the deceased’s life that usually did not make the cut. It also suggests, 
however, that when space was limited, only the identity dimensions considered most 
salient survived the selection process (although in this regard especially, the question of 
authorship becomes most pertinent). 
All of this, it might be noted, holds true also for non-metric inscriptions. The reason 
why this chapter focusses on carmina epigraphica in particular, then, is that these texts 
resemble the narrative structure of the elite literary sources more than any other (non-
metric) subgenre in Latin epigraphy. Indeed, non-metric inscriptions often include no 
additional information about a deceased’s life other than his or her name, age, and 
perhaps profession or a familial relationship (usually with the dedicator of the 
monument). As such, these epitaphs are less interesting for an analysis of (self-
)representations of freedmen, whereas verse inscriptions, on the contrary, provide 
detailed information about individual cases and persons, through a plotted narrative 
with clearly demarcated content and coherent syntax. Sometimes, they consist of only 
one or two lines. Especially when these lines in addition contain very recurrent and 
standardised expressions, the personal information conveyed about the deceased is 
minimal. Thus the epitaph of the freedman Lucius Seppius Princeps addressed his 
mother with the words: “Do not suffer, mother, from what has happened to me. Time 
wanted it that way, it was my destiny”72. The same message, in almost identical 
wordings, is conveyed in many other epitaphs, including that for another freedman – 
Caius Iulius Faustus from Rome – where an even more compressed variation of the verse 
is added in tiny letters underneath Faustus’ name73. Yet other carmina express the 
sentiment much more elaborately (and less standardised). Take, for example, the 
epitaph two freed parents made for their freeborn daughter: “My father and my own 
mother, I pray and beseech you, cease your mourning and stop shedding complaining 
tears. If I, while alive, was delightful and a pleasure for you, my husband, my friends and 
all those who knew me, then I want now, since fate has decided it so, that you carry it 
with equal mind and live in agreement”74. 
Nonetheless, even very short carmina often reveal attitudes, characteristics, or 
relations that non-metric epitaphs simply do not. The poem for a certain Carfinia, for 
example, contained only one verse in addition to the praescriptum that revealed her age 
(20 years) and her legal status as a freedwoman. In it, however, she (or rather: the 
dedicator) accentuated the relationships that had been important to her, and the 
 
                                                     
72 CLE 148 (= CIL 10, 5153): “noli dolere mater factui meo / hoc tempus volvit hoc fuit fatus meus”. 
73 CLE 147 (= CIL 6, 19989): “dolere noli matrem faciundum fuit”. 
74 CLE 59 (= CIL 6, 25369): “pater mei et genetrix germana oro atque o[bsecro] / desinite luctu questu 
lacr<i=U>mas fundere / sei in vita iucunda vobeis voluptatei fuei / viro atque ameiceis noteisque 
omnibus / nunc quoniam fatum se ita tolit animo vo[lo] / aequo vos ferre concordesque vivere”. 
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conduct and attitude by which she had entertained these relations: “[She was] pleasant 
to her relatives, most grateful to her friends, and zealous towards all”75. The longer the 
inscription, the more likely it is to contain recurrent commonplaces. Scholars disagree 
on the precise reason for these remarkable topoi that are often attested well beyond 
provincial borders76. One argument is that inspiration from widely disseminated literary 
works is responsible for this phenomenon77. When the patron of Allia Potestas had a 
carmen made for his beloved freedwoman, for example, he reassured himself that by 
these verses, the memory of this example of feminine virtue would be kept alive 
(quantumq(ue) tamen praeconia nostra valebunt / versiculis vives quandiucumque meis). The 
expression is obviously taken from the two final verses of Ovid’s ode to his wife 
(quantumcumque tamen praeconia nostra valebunt, carminibus vives tempus in omne meis), but 
were slightly modified to claim at least some originality (the connection between 
quantumque and quandiucumque being a particularly artful intervention)78. In the same 
poem – though overall mostly original – other references to literary works are much 
more disguised79. After making a comparison with Helen of Troy, for example, the 
dedicator hoped that it was decent to compare such great things with the mere sorrows 
of a bereaved patron (sit precor hoc iustum exemplis in parvo grandibus uti). An identical 
sentiment is expressed in the same work of Horace, even though the connection with 
the original is much less obvious (grandia si parvis adsimilare licet)80.  
Another line of reasoning suggests that the recurrence of topoi and catchphrases was 
merely a consequence of the specific genre, much like the standardisation in the 
“epigraphic habit” as a whole81. Perhaps more compelling is the assumption that 
workshops and individual stonemasons had model books from which their clients could 
choose the particular epitaph they wanted82. An intriguing inscription from Hippo 
Regius, for example, reads: “Here lies the body of the boy, here has to come a name”83. 
Apparently, a distracted carver had not realised that he had to fill in the name of the 
 
                                                     
75 CLE 364 (= CIL 6, 14397): “Carfinia M(arci) l(iberta) M[3] / vixit an(nos) XX / iucunda su{e}is / 
gratissima amiceis / omnibus officiosa / fuit”. 
76 For some intriguing examples of the same formulas occuring in different parts of the empire, see 
Carroll (2006), 106-8. 
77 For the influence of individual Roman poets on verse epitaphs (in terms of both content and style), 
see (for Virgil) Hoogma (1959); (for Catullus, Tibullus, and Propertius) Popova (1973); Lissberger 
(1934); (for Horace) Popova (1976). 
78 Ovid. Trist. 1.6.35-6. 
79 See Horsfall (1985), 254 gives a general overview of the literary influences (yet overall originality) 
of the carmen. His verse-by-verse discussion of the epitaph (257-72) includes more details. The list of 
literary references in Bourne (1916), 115 is still useful. 
80 Ovid. Trist. 1.6.28. 
81 Cugusi (2007), 190. 
82 Cf. Galletier (1922a), 225-35; Zarker (1958), 110-21. 
83 AE 1931, 112: “Hic corpus iacet / pueri nominandi”. 
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deceased himself, and instead merely copied the line his model book prescribed. But the 
practice of choosing from a selection of traditional poems is unlikely to be the only (or 
even the most important) reason for the standardisation in verse epitaphs84. Most likely, 
then, standardisation in verse epitaphs derived from a combination of factors, of which 
the ones mentioned above are only a few.  
Many carmina, however, refrained from taking recourse to standardised expressions 
(or at least added some personal touches to it), and it are these that are particularly 
valuable for our purpose (cf. infra). A very personalised example is the poem of the 
freedman Ancarenus Nothus of Rome. In the praescriptum, he mentions his name 
(including formal libertination) and his age – he was 43 years old –, and commemorates 
the long duration of his marriage (19 years). The most vivid description of his life, 
however, is given in the metric part of the inscription underneath85: 
“What remains for the mortal man: my bones rest in peace. I do no longer have to 
fear that I might suddenly find myself without food, I do not suffer from gout 
anymore, and I do no longer have to pledge my body for my rent. I now freely 
enjoy an eternal guesthome”. (Rome) 
 
Clearly, Nothus’ existence had not been an easy one. Not only did he suffer from painful 
arthritis, but he also had to work hard to pay for the roof over his head, not even 
knowing if he would have enough money left to buy food at the end of the day. It were 
probably these precarious consequences of independence and freedom Epictetus had in 
mind when he warned slaves not to be too eager or naïve in pursuing manumission86. 
When even a relatively short carmen like this can already convey a highly personalised 
story, one gets a fairly accurate impression of the wealth of information contained in 
the much more lengthy ones, e.g. that of the freedwoman Allia Potestas (50 verses)87. 
The format of epitaphs that contain a poem, usually followed a rather general pattern, 
although many variations coexisted. A non-metric praescriptum often introduces the 
dramatis personae, i.e. at least the deceased, but often also the dedicator. This was done 
 
                                                     
84 Schetter (1989), 228. 
85 CLE 1247 (= CIL 6, 33241): “An]carenus |(mulieris) l(ibertus) Nothus ann(orum) XLIII / [c]um 
coniuge sua vixit ann(os) XVIIII / quod superest homini requiescunt dulciter ossa / nec sum 
sollicitus ne subito esuriam / et podagram careo nec sum pensionibus arra / et gratis aeterno 
perfruor hospitio”. 
86 Epict. Disc. 4.1.33-5 (cited in Chapter 6 note 10). 
87 CLE 1988 (= CIL 6, 37965). The lengthiest extant carmen is the one written on the sides of the tomb 
of the Flavii in Cillium, Africa, which contains no less than 110 verses (CLE 1552 = CIL 8, 212). The 
average carmen in our database contains roughly 10 verses, although this is partially due to our 
selection criteria (for which, see Appendix 7). 
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with a very standardised and recognisable phrase – like in the examples of Carfinia and 
Nothus mentioned above. Sometimes, however, the epitaph immediately started out 
with the poem and ended with a non-metric postscriptum, elucidating the full identity of 
the commemorated individual(s). But even in these instances, the name of the deceased 
would usually already feature prominently at the beginning of the carmen. This was the 
case, for instance, in the inscription that immortalised the lives of Ummidia Ge and 
Ummidius Primigenius, who had been simultaneously crushed to death by a city crowd. 
The names of both persons are spelled out in full only in the postscriptum, but the first 
two verses of the poem already unambiguously introduce them: “This grave-hill covers 
at the same time the spirits of Ummidia and Primigenius, the home-born slave, both of 
whom one single day snatched away”88. Of course, poems could be both headed and 
concluded by a non-metric phrase89. In yet other instances, only a few metric verses 
were included in a predominantly non-metric text (a category of inscriptions closely 
related to Bücheler’s commatica, cf. infra). In short, although there was no strict format 
for carmina epigraphica in any literal sense of the word, they often did to certain extent 
resemble one another in general structure. 
8.4.2 Numbers 
Only between 1% and 2% of the 400.000 or so extant Latin inscriptions are rendered 
(partially) in verse form90. In total, about 3200 relatively extensive verse epitaphs are 
known, roughly four-fifths of which are included in Bücheler’s volume of Carmina Latina 
Epigraphica (cf. Appendix 7). One third of the total amount of carmina epigraphica was 
found in Rome, another third in the rest of Italy. The remaining third originates from 
the provinces. This predominance of Italian inscriptions, reminds us that any 
conclusions drawn from the  corpus of verse epitaphs are likely to reflect the habits and 
mentalities of the people of the heartland of the empire, rather than those of the 
provincials in the periphery, although fascinating carmina have been preserved that 
feature the ambiguous desire to accentuate both foreign origin and romanitas (cf. section 
8.6.1).  
 
                                                     
88 CLE 1159 (= CIL 6, 29436): “Ummidiae Manes tumulus tegit / iste simulque Primigeni vernae / quos 
tulit una dies”. The relation between Ummidia and Ummidius is not certain. The latter’s age of 13 
makes him too young for marriage. Their common nomen might suggest that they were colliberti, 
though only Ummidius is explicitly called a verna. They may just as well have been mother and son, 
or even patroness and freedman. 
89 E.g. CLE 1090 (= CIL 6, 15806): “Clodia |(mulieris) l(iberta) / Elegans / vix(it) an(nos) XXX / hic 
Clodia cara / cunctis iustisque piis/que est sita et subito / tempore rapta abiit / quem flet amissam / 
aeterno tempore / coniunx // C(aius) Memmius / C(ai) et |(mulieris) l(ibertus) Milo”. 
90 Schmidt (2015), 764. 
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Most of the carmina epigraphica were composed by and for the non-elite strata of 
society. At least a segment of the elite experimented with the genre during the mid-
Republic (the oldest verse epitaphs are those of the Scipiones and are dated to the third 
century BCE91), but no traces of elite interest in metric inscriptions is discernible from 
the end of the Republic onward, when they became increasingly popular. By this time, 
the genre had been all but monopolised by Rome’s sub-elite classes, of which freedmen 
notoriously constituted a considerable portion. 
8.5 Freedmen in Carmina Latina Epigraphica 
The source base of the following analytical sections is a collection of 150 funerary verse 
epitaphs dedicated by or to ex-slaves. The great majority of these carmina are taken 
from Bücheler’s collection, the internal ordering of which is also the near universal way 
of referring to them92. The selection criteria we used to establish this database are 
described in greater detail in Appendix 7, which also contains some comments on the 
database’s representativity. Useful to briefly note here, are the data that are included 
for each entry: 
 
1) The number of the carmen in Bücheler’s collection of carmina Latina epigraphica 
(CLE), or, if not included in these volumes, a reference to its number in the Corpus 
Inscriptionum Latinarum (CIL) or L’Année Épigraphique (AE). Indeed, Bücheler’s 
edition originally contained all Latin verse epitaphs, but inscriptions found after 
1926 (when Lommatzsch last updated the original collection) are not included. 
2) A transcription of the original epitaph. The critical apparatus and conjectures are 
adopted from the Clauss-Slaby restorations of the texts, unless Bücheler’s 
seemed preferable. The restoration of the unreadable passages in CLE 88, for 
example, differs significantly in both collections. The entire right side of this 
inscription is lost, thus necessitating considerable conjecture. The Clauss-Slaby 
database follows Bücheler’s initial restoration as cited by the CIL editors (9, 
 
                                                     
91 CLE 6 (= CIL 6, 1287); 7 (= CIL 6, 1284). Cf. Van Sickle (1987); Kruschwitz (1998); Massaro (2002). 
92 Bücheler (1982) [1895-1930], 2 volumes. We will use the standard reference of “CLE xxxx” to refer 
to a carmen (also including, where possible, its number in the CIL or AE volumes). For a good 
introduction to Bücheler’s collection, its intention, its content, and its ordering, see Schmidt (2015), 
769-71. 
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4016)93. The revised restoration in Bücheler’s CLE collection, however, is more 
acceptable on account of the less intrusive nature of the assumptions made (vol. 
I, 45)94. We therefore opted for the latter in our own database. In any case, unless 
conjecture is fairly certain because the verse in question was part of a standard 
or recurrent expression, these restorations have been treated with caution (they 
are, for example, not included in the lexical count). Finally, Bücheler’s CLE 
volumes include prae- and postscripta only in the short commentary provided 
after each carmen, whereas our transcriptions – for the sake of clarity – leave 
them in their original position. 
3) A translation of the carmen. Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own (in 
some cases inspired by the Spanish ones by Fernández Martínez95). 
4) A field that evaluates the general sentiment of the carmen in the same way as was 
done for the attestations of freedmen in the literary sources (positive, neutral, or 
negative). Note that this evaluation is not of the carmen per se, but of how the 
freedperson in question is presented in it. As will become clear momentarily, the 
“negative” category is negligible. Moreover, since the very nature of funerary 
commemoration tends to present individuals positively, only those carmina that 
explicitly draw attention to the good qualities, character, or walk of life of the 
freedperson are counted as “positive”. The epitaph in honour of the freedwoman 
Rusticelia Cytheris (CLE 965), for instance, expresses her husband’s severe grief 
at her passing – reflecting a cordial relationship and the amiable character of 
Rusticelia. However, because she is not described with any specific terms or 
expressions that attest to her individual personality or qualities, the inscription 
is interpreted as the reflection merely of spousal grief in general, rather than as a 
positive evaluation of the deceased in particular. Most of the “neutral” entries 
resemble this situation (thus leaning more the a “positive” characterisation than 
to a “negative” one). 
5) Three fields that record a) whether freed status was explicitly mentioned or 
accentuated; b) whether familial relationships or values were mentioned or 
accentuated; and c) whether (professional) occupation was mentioned or 
accentuated. It should be stressed that we only took into consideration the 
metric part of the epitaphs, any lines in prose that were (accidentally) inserted 
 
                                                     
93 “Novana T(iti) l(iberta) Tryphera ex [testamento(?)] / studium habui ut facerem viva mihi 
aet[ernam domum iam postquam mors praeripuit me vir optime] / tua bonitas fecit titulus declarat 
meus quo[d nomen mihi quae patria qui coniunx fuit]”. The testamento conjecture is an original 
addition by the Clauss-Slaby editors, found in neither the CIL, nor in the CLE volumes. 
94 “Novana T(iti) l(iberta) Tryphera ex [...] / studium habui ut facerem viva mihi aet[ernam domum 
mors intercessit, iam mihi, coniunx optime] / tua bonitas fecit titulus declarat meus quo[d fuerit 
studium me erga pietatis tibi]”. 
95 Fernández Martínez (1998-1999). 
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into it, and passages that somehow complemented or even completed the carmen 
(Bücheler’s so-called commatica)96. References in prae- and postscripta were 
explicitly excluded, since including them would on many occasions render moot 
any attempt at categorisation of the poems. This would, for example, inflate the 
instances where freed status was mentioned, by ironing out the difference 
between inscriptions that mention legal status only briefly and formally (e.g. in a 
praescriptum’s libertination) on the one hand, and those that draw explicit 
attention to it through the narratively structured poem on the other. 
Indeed, many inscriptions are known to belong to (or to have been made by) 
freedmen, only because they include libertination in a prae- or postscriptum. 
Especially in Republican and early Imperial epitaphs, libertination featured 
prominently, but precisely therefore – i.e. as a standardised identification 
formula – it tells us little about the stress (if any) a dedicator wanted to put on 
this status. If, however, libertination (or other circumstantial evidence for freed 
status like mentions of a patron, a collibertus, manumission, servile birth, etc.) 
was explicitly included in the carmen, this points to a specific desire to publicise 
status or social advancement. The same goes for attestations of family relations 
and professional prowess. In fact, exhaustively including all mentions of 
occupation or family relations would be largely derivative, since structural 
research into the inscriptions that mention these identity dimensions has 
already been conducted by, among others, Saller & Shaw and Joshel97.  
Our focus, in other words, is on the identity dimensions that were willingly 
and deliberately accentuated in the narration by which freedmen were presented. 
By “narration” we mean both textual and visual representation of a person’s life 
or character. Thus the epitaph of the Milanese trader Caius Pomponius Sacco 
mentions his profession (copo), but does so only in the praescriptum98. Because, 
however, the tombstone is headed by a portrait of Sacco carrying an amphora – 
clearly representing his occupation – the field indicating mention of profession 
has been filled in in the affirmative for this carmen. 
A result of this specific methodology is that any quantitative rendering of 
relations between, for example, status mention and familial commemoration, 
does not adequately represent how many people proportionally commemorated 
these identity dimensions (see in more detail the notes on representativity in 
Appendix 7). It does, however, give an impression of what (combination of) 
 
                                                     
96 Bücheler (1982) [1895-1930], II, 755-82. Cf. Kruschwitz (2002); Schmidt (2015), 769. 
97 Saller & Shaw (1984) elucidated social relations within the private sphere based on an extensive 
database of inscriptions; Joshel (1992) studied the references to occupation and work in the epitaphs 
of non-elite individuals. 
98 CLE 410 (= CIL 5, 5931): “C(aius) Pomponius C(ai) l(ibertus) Pal(atina) / Sacco copo”. 
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dimensions were felt worth stressing in extended narratives (as opposed to “one-
liners” that only mention name, age, and perhaps profession, and which greatly 
skew the statistical data of, for example, Joshel and Saller & Shaw). Quantitative 
trends, in other words, may not be representative for the total body of 
inscriptions set up by or for ex-slaves, but because our heuristic strategies and 
selection criteria were specifically designed to trace and include extended and 
personalised carmina, they do give an impression of relative proportions within 
this specific body of metric inscriptions.   
8.5.1 The identity dimensions of freedmen in carmina epigraphica 
The identity dimension most frequently attested in the metric inscriptions of ex-slaves 
is familial status as a parent, spouse, child, etc. 77 of the 150 carmina include information 
of this kind. Accentuation of freed status occurs in 51 cases, whereas occupational or 
professional prowess was only deemed worthy of mention 25 times. Three out of four 
mentions of a familial relationship are explicitly positive. The remaining quarter is less 
outspoken, and categorised as neutral. A similar observation can be made for mentions 
of occupation, where the ratio “positive” to “neutral” is also roughly 4:1. These 
proportions are slightly more crystallised in the case of status mentions, where 41 out of 
55 poems (80%) present this identity dimension in unambiguously positive terms, 
whereas the neutral category contains only 9. The only negative reference to a 
freedperson focusses on the dimension of legal status, but uses it to accentuate the – in 
this case – freedwoman’s concrete disloyal behaviour toward her patron99. It is little 
more than an elaborate variation on the recurrent theme (mostly in non-metric 
inscriptions) of patrons excluding a specific freedperson from their funerary 
monument, and has as such nothing to do with any inherent inferiority due to a servile 
past (cf. supra). For a complete overview of the salience and combination of identity 
dimensions in the metric epitaphs included in our database, see Tables 17 and 18 below. 
 
Table 17 The salience of identity dimensions in freedpersons’ metric epitaphs 
 FREED STATUS FAMILY OCCUPATION 
POSITIVE 41 57 18 
NEGATIVE 1 0 0 
NEUTRAL 9 20 7 
TOTAL 51 77 25 
 
 
                                                     
99 CLE 95 (= CIL 6, 20905). This is the inscription of the cursed freedwoman Acte mentioned above. 
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Table 18 The combination of identity dimensions in freedpersons’ metric epitaphs 
 
STATUS + 
FAMILY 
STATUS + 
OCCUPATION 
FAMILY + 
OCCUPATION 
STATUS + 
FAMILY + 
OCCUPATION 
POSITIVE 16 4 3 6 
NEGATIVE 0 0 0 0 
NEUTRAL 3 0 0 0 
TOTAL 19 4 3 6 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Visual representation of the salience and combination of identity dimensions in 
freedpersons’ metric epitaphs 
 
What stands out first and foremost is the relatively small amount of occupational 
references when compared to mentions of legal status or family. They are attested in 
merely 25 out of 150 carmina (17%). This is, however, in line with the statistical evidence 
derived from non-metric epitaphs, which clearly shows that only a very small minority 
of individuals accentuated their profession100. In this regard, 17% for metric inscriptions 
is actually a rather high proportion. This is due primarily to the fact that freedmen, as a 
demographic category, had an outspoken propensity to accentuate their profession101. It 
 
                                                     
100 Joshel (1992), 16 found “merely” 1470 individuals who mentioned occupational title; a very small 
number in comparison to the tens of thousands individuals mentioned in epigraphic sources as a 
whole (even when accounting for Joshel’s omission of imperial freedmen). 
101 Joshel (1992), esp. 184. 
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is due also to the fact that we considered not only “occupational titles”, but references 
to professional activity in general, i.e. references that are particularly prone to appear 
in typically longer and less standardised carmina.  
The “underrepresentation” of occupational references (i.e. relative to mentions of 
family or status) could be a consequence of the epitaph being set up by a patron who did 
not value this identity dimension as much as his deceased freedman (again highlighting 
the importance of “authorship” in assessing these identity dimensions). The inscription 
commemorating Lucius Cominius Firmus and Oppia Eunoea, for example, is revealing102. 
Firmus is identified in the praescriptum as a praetor and quaestor of the treasury and 
child-allowances. That he was at least a second-generation freeborn is given its due 
stress by the extended filiation, which not only referenced his father, but also his 
grandfather. Eunoea is identified as the freedwoman of a certain Sextus Oppius and his 
wife, indicating that Firmus was not her patron103. The most likely bond between Firmus 
and Eunoea, then, was a marital one. Indeed, “Oppia is snatched away from Firmus” 
(erepta est Oppia Firmo) is an expression that suggests an intimate connection, and that 
often occurs in the commemoration of a spouse104. But most importantly, the 
comparison of Eunoea with two of the most illustrious women in the Roman and Greek 
world respectively – Arria and Laodamia – undoubtedly betrays a marital relation, since 
these women were known in particular for their extreme devotion to their husbands105. 
This might point to a very interesting case of a senator ignoring the Augustan ban on 
senator-freedwoman marriages106. Some scholars have argued that Eunoea could not 
have been Firmus’ wife precisely because of this ban107, but that reasoning is circular, 
and moreover ignores the fact that such marriages would not have been declared void 
 
                                                     
102 CLE 423 (= CIL 10, 5920): “L(ucio) Cominio L(uci) f(ilio) L(uci) n(epoti) Pa[l(atina)] / Firmo 
pr(aetori) q(uaestori) aer(arii) et al[im(entorum)] / Oppiae Sex(ti) et |(mulieris) l(ibertae) Eunoea[e] 
/ exemplum periit castae lugete puellae / Oppia iam non est erepta est Oppia Firmo / accipite hanc 
animam numeroque augete sacr[ato] / Arria Romano et tu Graio Laodamia / hunc titulum meritis 
servat tibi fama superstes / sibi suis posterisq(ue) eorum”. 
103 Adoption of Firmus by a L. Cominius after Eunoea’s manumission is virtually impossible, given the 
strong accentuation of paternal ancestry. Moreover, if he was originally named Sextus Oppius, 
Firmus would very likely have retained a modified form of his nomen after adoption (e.g. Lucius 
Cominius Oppianus).  
104 E.g. CLE 1041 (= CIL 6, 24049): “erepta est subito coniugis e gremio”; 1544 (= CIL 6, 20370): “ereptam 
viro”. 
105 See Plin. Ep. 3.16 for Arria’s killing herself to save the reputation of her husband Caecina Paetus, 
and Ovid. Her. 13 for Laodamia’s suicide that would reunite her with her fallen husband Protesilaus. 
Voisin (1987), 280 suggests the parallel indicated that Eunoea had similarly opted for a “mort 
volontaire” in reverence to her husband, but this seems unlikely, since Firmus was still alive at the 
time. The comparison was meant to accentuate Eunoea’s devotion in general, rather than the radical 
expression of it (as attested in the cases of Arria and Laodamia). 
106 Cf. Courtney (1995), 371-2; Keegan (2008), 4. 
107 E.g. Parkin & Pomeroy (2007), 89. 
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(despite the imposition of penalties)108. In any case, the inscription as a whole clearly 
shows that Firmus chose to focus on Eunoea’s elevated character: she was a most 
exemplary girl (exemplum castae puellae) with a great reputation (fama) and very 
deserving (merita), worthy, moreover, of inclusion in the “sacred group” (numero sacrato) 
of famous women, and put on a par with exceptionally renowned Roman matrons. As an 
elite patron, Firmus completely downplayed any “menial” occupation his freedwoman 
may have had (or any reference to her servile past, for that matter) in favour of more 
exalted identity dimensions. In this particular case, an additional apologetic motivation 
may have played a role too, since Firmus would have been well aware of the 
inappropriateness of his relation with Eunoea.  
Moreover, it is perhaps no coincidence that merely 7 out of 25 inscriptions that focus 
on professional prowess were erected by the freedperson’s patron, and that none of 
these patrons can be securely identified as ingenui, let alone as members of the elite. In 
fact, at least three of these patrons – but perhaps all seven – were ex-slaves 
themselves109. Three freedmen (and perhaps seven) mentioned their occupation in an 
inscription they had set up themselves110. The rest of the dedicators were either close 
relatives (parents or spouses), or freedmen who deemed it worthwhile to reference 
professional activity in an epitaph for their (freed or freeborn) patron111.  
But even if we account for the influence of a patron-dedicator on the inscription’s 
content, the spouses, parents, and even freedpersons themselves who did not mention 
their occupation, greatly outnumber those who did, suggesting that it was simply a less 
salient identity dimension when compared to familial pride or legal status. The next 
section focusses in particular on this last dimension, pays specific attention to the 
contextual use of libertination, and thereby constitutes an approach parallel to Chapter 
4. We will show how attention could be drawn to freed status in a variety of ways, and 
that a structural assessment of these differences betrays clear patterns that in turn 
reveal the importance and value freedmen themselves attached to the publicising of 
their status.  
 
                                                     
108 Treggiari (1991), 63-4. The bond between Firmus and Eunoea need not have been formalised 
through marriage. Eunoea may well have been Firmus’ concubina, even though such bond too would 
not be socially accepted (Eunoea not being Firmus’ own liberta), cf. McGinn (1991) 347ff; Mouritsen 
(2011), 43. 
109 CLE 56 (freed couple for their daughter-in-law); 465 (a certain Felix for his alumnus); 1091 (a 
certain Fortunata for her freedwoman); 1252; 1589; 1944; 1988 (all patrons of unknown status). 
110 CLE 53; 74; 83; and perhaps also 71; 134; 410; 1814. 
111 CLE 36 (freeborn patron); 1095 (freed patron); 2154 (unknown patron). 
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8.5.2 Freed status in carmina epigraphica 
8.5.2.1 Representing freed status and patronal presence 
One third of the carmina dedicated by or to freedpersons draws attention to freed status, 
not merely in the praescriptum, but also in the poem itself. This was most conspicuously 
done by carefully fitting status indicators in the cadence of the epitaph. (Co)libertus/-a is 
spelled out in full 16 times112. Since this notation is found in not even a third of the 
carmina mentioning freed status, it seems safe to assume that it was intended to 
highlight in particular this identity dimension, especially when it was placed at the very 
beginning of the carmen113. This is the case for the epitaphs of Marcus Aurelius Zosimus 
(libertinus eram fateor…), Petronia Thallusa (liberta et coniunx Petronia cara patrono / 
Thallusa…), and the one erected by Socconia Attice for herself and her patron ([libe]rta 
hoc titulo patronum pietatis honorat…)114. 
The instances where libertination is spelled out in full, contrast with the poems 
where formal libertination – normally conveyed in a non-metric praescriptum – is 
inserted in the poem115. These are often commatica, as libertination was in some cases 
not metric itself, but nonetheless inserted into the poem. Consider, for example, the 
carmen for the pearl-trader Euhodus, which is interrupted in the middle by the man’s 
formal libertination (C(aius) Ateilius Serrani l(ibertus) Euhodus)116. These carmina draw less 
attention to legal status by using this formal and standard notation, and by referencing 
status only by the abbreviation “L” or “LIB”. Though less conspicuous than a mention of 
(co)libert(in)us/-a outside of formal libertination, the deliberate attempt to render such 
formal libertination metrically (or to insert it in the carmen) does point to a certain 
desire to accentuate this status or connection. This is confirmed by the fact that formal 
libertination is rarely metric in itself, and that dedicators were prepared to change the 
order of names or terms to comply with the poem’s rhythm. The carmen for Lucius 
Annius Argeus, for example, had to place libertination at the end of the naming formula 
(L(ucius) / Annius Argeus / Compsi l(ibertus)) instead of adhering to traditional practice 
(Lucius Annius Compsi libertus Argeus), which would not agree with the pulse of the poem.  
A more intrusive operation was needed for the rendering of the address of the imperial 
 
                                                     
112 CLE numbers 95; 396; 401; 420; 627; 959; 1009; 1011; 1041; 1115; 1140; 1534; 1558; 1564 (libertus/-a); 
990; 1125 (libertinus). 
113 Cf. Weaver (1963), 276-7, who showed how the abbreviation of libertus by “LIB” (rather than by 
the less conspicuous “L”) became more popular among imperial freedmen, who – more than private 
freedmen – deemed their status an important information to mention on their epitaph. 
114 CLE numbers 990; 1041; 1009 respectively. 
115 This happens in CLE 74; 134; 1189; 1563; 1589; 1843; 2161. 
116 CLE 74 (= CIL 6, 9545). 
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freedman Metrobius. It required the construction of a hyperbaton, that quite artfully 
separated his name (in the vocative) from his formal status mention (reliquiae cineris 
tumulo man/data quiescun(t) Aug(usti) lib(erte) sacro hoc tibi Metro/bie)117. The rhythm of the 
distichon for Nassius Amandus similarly necessitated a separation of words. Instead of 
respecting the traditional scheme (Nassius Luci libertus Amandus), a slight modification 
ensured a satisfying cadence (Nassius hic situs sum L(uci) / l(ibertus) Amandus)118. Finally, 
the very cumbersome nomenclature of Gaius Gargilius Haemon can be partially 
explained by the requirements of rhythm: C(aius) Gargilius Haemon Proculi / Philagri divi 
Aug(usti) l(iberti) Agrippiani f(ilii) / paedagogus idem l(ibertus)119.  
Interpretation of this last epitaph hinges on the restoration of the filiation “F”. Some 
scholars thought it an abbreviation for a nominative filius (interpreting Haemon as the 
freeborn son of an imperial freedman)120. The great majority of scholars, however, 
accepts the restoration of a genitive filii (interpreting Haemon as a freedman of the 
freeborn son of an imperial freedman)121. The context of the inscription – it was part of 
a columbarium alongside the via Nomentana – explains the unclear presentation of 
relations (and the lack of interest in avoiding ambiguity), since visitors were expected to 
know all the individuals mentioned122. Haemon was perhaps himself the dedicator of the 
epitaph. Indeed, the plaque has a “V” hovering in between the start of lines 2 and 3. This 
letter is usually not included in modern editions, but it may signify that Haemon made 
the inscription himself while still alive (vivus). In addition to concerns about rhythm, 
then, the extensive nomenclature may well have been the result of a more pertinent 
desire: the dedicator deemed the connection with the imperial household particularly 
worth stressing, even going back two generations to highlight it.  
Together, both categories ((co)libert(in)us/-a or formal libertination inserted in the 
carmen) constitute the group of epitaphs that most conspicuously draw attention to 
freed status. However, this was done only in 23 out of 150 metric inscriptions. 28 more 
poems accentuated legal status, but these used other strategies than the two mentioned 
above. A reference to the grant (or achievement) of freedom occurs in five epitaphs. A 
certain Zoticus obtained the “highest good” (plurima res) for himself and his relatives, 
Lucius Valerius Aries and two alumni from Iuvanum had received the “light” and 
“accomplishment” of freedom respectively (lux libertatis; opus libertatis), Egnatuleia 
 
                                                     
117 CLE 1189. 
118 CLE 1843. 
119 CLE 134. 
120 E.g. Courrier (2014), 279 note 286. 
121 Thus already the editors of the CIL and Bücheler (1982) [1895-1930], 74-5, but more recently also 
Gardner & Wiedemann (1991), 64. 
122 Cf. Nielsen (1996), 37-8; Hasegawa (2005), 4-29. 
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Urbana was “freed from her servile name” (me servili nomine preivat), and Fortunata, as 
has been noted, had been promised her freedom by her master (libertas fuerat 
promissa)123. Another strategy was to allude to social promotion in general, which would 
be further clarified by the explicit mention of freed status by formal libertination in a 
prae- or postscriptum (seven times attested). Thus Anicia Glucera thanked her husband 
“for elevating her from the lowest rank to the highest honour” ([vir bonus] qui me ab imo 
/ ordine ad summum / perduxit honorem)124. Both Valeria Lycisca and Caius Iulius 
Mygdonius noted that “Rome gave them the rights of a citizen” ([Roma] quae mihi iura{e} 
dedit civis; factus / cives R(omanus))125. Gaius Ofillius Arimnestus wanted to “augment the 
name he had received from his father [i.e. with a Roman gentilicium]” (quaesitum ex 
pat[re] / ut potuit s[i]bi nomen adaux[it])126. And though less visibly, the imperial freedman 
Trophimus alluded to his considerable elevation by stating that “he was once the child 
of a Phrygian shepherd” (reliquiae pueri quondam / Phrygii pastoris)127. The other two 
epitaphs in this category describe the freedpersons mentioned in them as alumni or 
vernae; terms that similarly imply a transition from slave to free, as the freed status of  
the individuals was clear from their tria nomina (Sextus Iulius Felicissimus, Ummidia Ge, 
and P. Ummidius Primigenius)128. 
The 16 remaining epitaphs that explicitly draw attention to legal status, do so by 
implicitly or explicitly referencing the freedperson’s patron (patronus/-a or dominus/-a). 
This strategy was, in other words, as frequently applied as spelling out (co)libert(in)us/-a 
in a carmen, and together they comprise well over half of the attestations of poems that 
mention freed status (32 of 51)129. It should be noted, however, that in 20 or 21 of these 
cases, the inscription was explicitly set up by the patron(ess) him- or herself. Thus the 
tombstone of Annia Agathonice in Comum attests to the piety of her loyal patroness, 
whose generosity had granted Agathonice the plot of land on which it stood (dat t/amen 
haec patronae pietas sola/cia fidae iugera quot terrae / dedicat hic tumulus)130. When Marcus 
 
                                                     
123 CLE 71; 89; 1210; 963; 1117. The “plurima” in Zoticus’ epitaph is conjectured by Bücheler and 
based on similar verses in other inscriptions, Bücheler (1982) [1895-1930], 37. 
124 CLE 66. 
125 CLE 1054; 1580. 
126 CLE 1276. 
127 CLE 1815. The repetition of genitives makes the epitaph ambiguous. Trophimus could have been a 
puer Phrygii pastoris, or a puer (et) Phrygius pastor. The word group may be a reference to bucolic 
literature, where Phrygian shepherds were a beloved commonplace. E.g. Apuleius’ Metamorphoses 
features a young man (adulescens) dressed in modum Phrygii pastoris (10.30.2). 
128 CLE 465 (alumnus); 1159 (verna). 
129 This is, of course, partially due to the fact that these inscriptions are most easily recognisable as 
belonging to freedpersons. From this perspective, the fact that half of our carmina that mention 
freed status, do so in other, more original ways, is meaningful in its own right. 
130 CLE 1203. 
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Gellius Maximus made an epitaph for his beloved freedman Phoebus, he noted that he 
had done so with great affection (adfectus omnis possidet iste lapis), and even implied that 
he would take his freedman’s place if only the Fates allowed it (quod si mutari potuissent 
fila sororum / gauderet condi Maximus hoc tumulo)131. In these cases, it are the good 
qualities and generosity of the patron(ess) that are stressed above all, only second to 
which comes the attention to the deceased freedperson. Phoebus, for example, is even 
quite literally subordinated to his patron by his description as a “most important part of 
Gellius” (Gelli pars maxima). Similarly, the carmen for the freedman Caius Quintius 
Fortunatus, made for him by his patron Agathemerus, centres primarily around the 
latter and his sense of loss, that is, insofar as we can reconstruct the text, of which the 
entire left part is missing. The only certain words are a) “a long life” (vita senilis) – which 
must have been preceded by a negative statement, since Fortunatus was only 20 years 
old when he died; b) “he was” (ille fuit), which Bücheler conjecturally completes by 
optumus; c) “who was taken away” ([que]m rapuere); d) “longing for him” (me cupide); e) 
“patron” (patronus); and “he/there existed” (extiterat), which Bücheler again completes 
by adding quoi non libertus gratior. Nearly all of these elements reflect the centrality of 
Agathemerus or his grief at the premature passing of his beloved freedman. Moreover, 
the entire poem is enclosed by a non-metric praescriptum and postscriptum, which greatly 
accentuate not only the dedicatee, but also (and especially) the dedicating patron. The 
stress on the latter is most clear in the final part of the inscription (C(aius) Quintius / 
medicus / VIvir / patronus Fortunati), where the name and profession of Agathemerus are 
rendered in larger letters than patronus Fortunati132.  
Table 19 below gives a quantitative representation of the spread of epitaphs that 
alluded to freed status, and gives an indication of the role of the patron in these 
instances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
131 CLE 1248. 
132 CLE 1766: “C(aius) Quintius / Fortunatus / ann(orum) XX / Agathemerus / liberto / [3] vita senilis 
/ [3 optimus] ille fuit / [3 fata invida que]m rapuere / [dum peteret meritis vincer]e me cupide / [3 
feci monumenta] patronus / [quoi non libertus gratior] extiterat / C(aius) Quintius / medicus / VIvir 
/ patronus Fortunati”. Attention is drawn to C. Quintius … liberto and C. Quintius medicus VIvir by the 
bigger letters in which these non-metric passages are rendered. 
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Table 19 The contextual accentuation of freed status in freedpersons’ metric epitaphs 
 
(Co)libert(in)us/-a 
in carmen 
Formal 
libertination 
in carmen 
Patronus/-a 
Reception of 
freedom 
General 
social 
promotion 
# 16 7 16 5 7 
Association 
with patron 
13 0133 16 1 2 
Made by 
patron 
10 1 (3)134 10 (11)135 0 (3)136 1 (4)137 
 
The Table unambiguously shows that in the majority of cases where explicit status 
markers like (co)libert(in)us/-a or patronus/-a were used, this was a decision made (or at 
least influenced) by the patron, even though freedpersons certainly did not shy away 
from doing this themselves (cf. infra). On the other hand, the reception of freedom or a 
more general social promotion were features almost exclusively mentioned in epitaphs 
erected by freedpersons themselves (the few instances where a patron may have been 
responsible do not at any rate reveal the agency of this patron). Patronal presence, in 
other words, was downplayed in instances where individual merit was chosen as the 
primary locus of commemoration. 
Clearly, there were several strategies dedicators could resort to in order to highlight the 
freed status of the deceased, depending on the precise purpose of the commemoration 
(e.g. stressing social promotion, embeddedness in a patron’s social/trust network, etc.). 
Even though the agency of patrons-as-dedicators somehow distorts this impression, it 
should be clear that their own legal status was not a priori abhorred by ex-slaves (or 
considered inappropriate by patrons – often freed themselves). Such suspicion may, of 
course, be the initial reflex after observing that nearly two-thirds of our carmina do not 
include any reference to freed status. However, this “shame”-hypothesis – as amply 
referred to in previous chapters – does not stand the test of several approaches to the 
varied source material. Even a quick glance, by way of digression, on the membership 
 
                                                     
133 By this number is meant an association with the patron other than the one already implied by 
formal libertination (inclusion of which would render this field moot). In other words, no epitaph of 
a freedman who is identified by formal libertination elaborates on the link between patron and 
freedman any further. 
134 The dedicators of CLE 134 and 1843 are unknown. There is the possibility that the patron erected 
the monument, but this is nowhere made explicit. 
135 The dedicator of CLE 1003 is unknown, although the vehement stress on the masters (and later 
patrons) to whom the freedman was a pleasure, suggests that they may have been responsible for 
the erection ([Gra]tus qui fuera[t d]ominis liberq(ue) patronis / [c]oncidit et lapide hoc ossa tegenda dedit). 
136 The dedicators of CLE 963, 1117, and 1210 are unknown. See note 134. 
137 The dedicators of CLE 66, 1054, and 1815 are unknown. See note 134. 
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lists (alba) of the professional associations (collegia) of Ostia and Portus illustrates that 
status was simply a less salient identity dimension in these contexts, rather than a 
dimension the collegiati deliberately tried to downplay.  
8.5.2.2 The salience of legal status in collegium membership lists 
First and foremost, alba were often set up without revealing any information as to the 
legal status of the members listed138. This is the case, for example, for an unknown 
collegium from Ostia. Despite the fact that many (if not all) of its members were very 
likely ex-slaves139, the album does not say so explicitly. Once again, this might be 
interpreted as emanating from a desire to conceal freed status, but a comparison with 
other lists clearly suggests that status simply played a less prominent role in the lives of 
ordinary Romans. This is borne out also by the observation that the makers of at least 
some alba did not seem to have cared a whole lot about any doubt that might have risen 
as a result of careless notations. The membership list of the Ostian corpus 
lenunculariorum tabulariorum auxiliariorum, for example, lists 6 patrons and 8 
quinquennales under the heading of “EQUIT ROM” (equites romani), even though only the 
first two can be securely identified as belonging to this ordo140. It is most doubtful 
whether the other 12 men were similarly knights, and it has been plausibly suggested 
that they were listed under this heading simply because there was no more space 
available elsewhere on the stone141. The contrast between a very pragmatic 
consideration like this and the elite (literary) practice of consistently stressing status 
hierarchies and distinctions, could hardly have been more pronounced. 
The lack of interest in separating freed from freeborn on collegium alba is perhaps 
best illustrated by those cases where the (single) names of slave members are outlined 
to the right of a column, so as to leave space – in the event of manumission – to add a 
praenomen and nomen in front of it142. This points to a very real sense of expectation – 
the spes libertatis often alluded to in slaves’ epitaphs (cf. supra). But evidently, we know 
of these cases precisely because at least some slaves never saw this expectation fulfilled, 
and would thus forever remain recognisable as slaves. An unknown amount of freedmen 
listed on collegium alba may have once been recorded solely by their cognomen. Whereas 
the distinction between slave and free was thus stressed – although it may have been a 
corollary of practical concerns more than anything else – the acquisition of freedom 
 
                                                     
138 Throughout this section, we make use of the material compiled and analysed by Royden (1988). 
139 CIL 14, 258. Cf. Rohde (2012), 372-3: “es handelt sich somit augenscheinlich um einen Verein, 
deren Mitglieder allesamt Freigelassen waren” (373). 
140 CIL 14, 251. 
141 Cf. Royden (1988), 41-3 discusses the case extensively. 
142 E.g. AE 1929, 161 (third frame, line 13). For this practice, see Tran (2006), 489-90. 
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would remove all traces of a servile past, the freedman’s tria nomina now figuring in a 
list of “peers”. In a sense, then, this practice is almost a metaphor for the ideological 
transition caused by manumission, i.e. the freedman becoming equal in principle to his 
fellow free Romans. 
Even in the cases where legal status was explicitly referred to, there existed no 
standardised format for doing so, and a separation of freed and freeborn (e.g. in 
separate columns) was resorted to only occasionally143. The Ostian collegium 
dendrophorum, for one, included filiation for its freeborn members, but did not 
physically separate them from the freed members144. Moreover, only one out of eight 
patrons (Larcius Lepidus) is recorded with filiation, even though all of them were 
probably freeborn145. In addition to the lack of (physical) separation of freed and 
freeborn members, the inconsistency in mentioning filiation – at least in the case of the 
patrons – is significant. Nor is this an isolated instance. The album of the corpus 
lenunculariorum tabulariorum auxiliariorum, for example, only lists the first 4 (of 8) 
patrons with full filiation146.  
Moreover, a pragmatic concern again seems to have played in several cases where 
indicators of legal status were included. The occasional mention of IUN(ior) in the 
album of the corpus fabrum navalium Portensium, for example, was intended merely to 
distinguish the men to whose names it was attached, from their fathers who bore the 
same name, not to accentuate freeborn status147. Some names occur more than once 
without there being added a mark of distinction like IUN148. It is likely that in these 
cases no difference in status or paternal relation existed that could serve to distinguish 
these men. In one case, mention of an occupation may have fulfilled this need, but this 
 
                                                     
143 For example, an album found in Herculaneum – the function of which is unknown – listed freed 
and freeborn members in separate columns (CIL 10, 1403). For a detailed discussion (with a focus on 
the inscription’s value for the study of Latini Iuniani), see Mouritsen (2007a), including many 
references.  
144 CIL 14, 281. See again Royden (1988), 57-9 for some remarks concerning the status-determination 
of the members of this association. 
145 This is suggested by the extensive nomenclature, which would be most atypical for freedmen (e.g. 
M. Acilius Priscus Egrilius Plarianus). See also CIL 14, 326 where two patrons of our list (Istorius 
Octavianus and Pomponius Quirinus) are distinguished from the freedman Abascantus, who 
similarly features in CIL 14, 281. Surely, one of the patrons of the collegium dendrophorum received 
the suffix IUN(ior), but this served to distinguish him from his homonymous father, rather than to 
accentuate his freeborn status (as filiation would have done). 
146 CIL 14, 250. The carver did make sure to identify the only freedman among them (Aurelius 
Strenion) with libertination. 
147 CIL 14, 256: line 40 (to distinguish from, line 28); line 56 (idem, line 7); line 246 (idem, line 11); line 
267 (idem, lines 266 and 329). Unless line 235 (-elius) has to be linked to line 42 (Helvius), to line 171 
(Aurelius), or to a lost name, it looks like a unique deviation from this practice. Cf. Tran (2006), 475. 
148 E.g. in the same inscription:, lines 50 and 66; lines 293 and 326. 
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cannot be ascertained, since a professional title could be included without this being 
necessitated by the occurrence on the list of double names149. 
Likewise, the sole mention of IUN(ior) on the album of the corpus lenunculariorum 
tabulariorum auxiliariorum, can be explained like this150. This collegium also featured the 
suffixes LIB(ertus) and F(ilius) on its membership list, in order to distinguish the 
persons thus tagged from members with the same name (i.c. their patrons and fathers). 
These markers occur three and four times respectively151. Because it is highly unlikely 
that the collegium counted only three freedmen or only four ingenui among its members, 
the pragmatic function of these suffixes seems beyond doubt in this case too152. On 
another album of the same association – compiled some 40 years later – F(ilius) and 
IUN(ior), but also P(A)(T)(er) and SEN(ior) are used exclusively to distinguish 
homonymous individuals or to accentuate family ties, rather than to express freeborn 
status153. 
In other words, mentioning legal status was clearly not a priority for the collegiati of 
Ostia and Portus154. If it had been, surely the freeborn M. Magius Marsus of the corpus 
scaphariorum et lenunculariorum traiectus Luculli would have mentioned his status, just like 
his son did. The latter, however, did so by adding F(ilius) to his name, a practice that, 
again, did not derive from concerns related to legal status. It did not bother Marsus that 
he was not distinguished (in terms of status markers) from his freedman M. Magius 
Iustus, mentioned on the same list155. The members of the collegia valued collegiality – in 
a literal and figurative sense – over status distinctions, which is precisely why the 
 
                                                     
149 E.g. in the same inscription: line 141 (mentioning a sesquiplicarius) to distinguish from line 193. 
Line 179 mentions an occupation without it being “necessary” (from our point of view). 
150 CIL 14, 250: column 4, line 33 (to distinguish from, column 2, line 23). 
151 In the same inscription: for LIB(ertus): column 3, line 30 (to distinguish from, column 1, line 32); 
column 4, line 26 (idem, column 2, line 11 and column 2, line 28); column 4, line 27 (idem). The 
reasons for the use of LIB(ertus) in these instances may thus be less “obscure” than Tran (2006), 132 
assumed. For F(ilius): column 2, line 9 (idem, column 1, line 7): column 2, line 30 (idem, column 1, 
line 33); column 4, line 9 (idem, column 1, line 23); columns 4, line 31 (idem, column 1, line 27). The 
remark referred to in note 149 is applicable in this instance too (e.g. column 3, lines 5 and 20). 
152 Even though we cannot ascertain the legal status of most individuals mentioned, at least a 
portion of the members that were not characterised as LIB(ertus) must have been in fact freedmen 
(especially given the “servile” nature of many cognomina). Cf. Mouritsen (2005), 41; Tran (2006), 112-
24. 
153 CIL 14.251. 
154 On official state lists, the elite habit of including legal status was much more strictly adhered to. 
See, for example, the list of the magistri vicorum of Rome (2nd century CE) in CIL 6, 975. Although 
status is referenced consistently, freed and freeborn are not (physically) separated from one 
another. In fact, the large majority of ingenui must have been merely first or second generation 
freeborn, cf. Duff (1928), 132. 
155 CIL 14, 246: M. Magius Marsus (columns 2, line 20); M. Magius Marsus F(ilius) (column 6, line 9); M. 
Magius Iustus (column 5, line 18). For the status of these individuals, see Royden (1988), 91-2. 
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associative context established “une proximité de vie sociale entre ingénus et 
affranchis”, and provided freedmen with the locus par excellence for practically 
exercising the respectability they were endowed with the moment they became free 
Romans156.  
When we are lucky enough to find several inscriptions from one and the same 
person, the importance of contextual factors in deciding whether or not to draw 
attention to legal status can be neatly illustrated. When, for example, the freedman 
Publius Aufidius Faustianus dedicated a monument for his patron Fortis or to the latter’s 
son, he consistently included a formal status marker (whether the reference to a 
patronus indulgentissimus or the mention of libertus)157. When the same Faustianus occurs 
in a professional context – dedicating a monument to a procurator annonae in his 
capacity as quinquennalis of the Ostian college of grain traders – he completely omits any 
status marker158. In his professional life, status was simply less salient.  
In short, the use or omission of status indicators in the context of professional collegia – 
arguably more indicative of an ex-slave’s actual socialisation than any image the 
detached sources present – was influenced by highly contextual factors. Although 
senatorial or equestrian patrons often (though not always) included their legal status, 
no rigid standard or convention prescribed the way in which this should be done. 
Among the plebs of the collegia, status was even less relevant. Any confusion or 
misrepresentation resulting from the non-formalised use of status indicators was not 
considered problematic. Status as identity dimension, in other words, did not play the 
same structuring and distinguishing role it did in detached elite discourse. Accentuating 
membership of a collegium, and avoiding confusion about the identity of members of the 
same name – at the same time highlighting familial bonds – were much more pressing 
concerns for the body of common collegia members. Or as Tran succinctly concluded: 
“Aussi explicites et tranchés que soient les clivages juridiques, toute image de netteté 
tend à s’estomper, en partie, quand le regard se porte sur le terrain des pratiques 
sociales”159. 
Returning to our carmina epigraphica, then, the omission of status in 2 out of 3 cases 
needs not be indicative of any shame or desire to explicitly downplay legal status; it may 
simply not have been considered relevant in several cases. This is equally borne out of 
the observation that occupation or family relations were, generally speaking, not 
 
                                                     
156 Tran (2006), passim (e.g. p. 111-2, 124ff, 468, 490-2). The quote is from p. 132. Cf. Hopkins (1978), 
117 note 37 for a similar observation for religious associations. 
157 CIL 14, 4621 and 4622. 
158 CIL 14, 161. 
159 Tran (2006), 133. 
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invoked to somehow downplay or compensate for legal status. Of the 77 carmina that 
accentuate family, merely a third also includes an explicit reference to legal status. 
Similarly, of the 25 carmina that draw attention to occupation, not even half also 
mention legal status. Put differently, freed status is deliberately alluded to without any 
“compensation” in 22 out of 51 poems. Only in slightly more than half of the cases, then, 
it was accompanied by a reference to family relations and/or occupation. These 
observations suggest not only that the deliberation as to which identity dimensions to 
include was circumstantial (with financial resources and authorship being two of the 
most important determining factors), but also that freed status was eagerly resorted to 
for commemorative purposes, without there being any indication that it had to be 
somehow compensated by other traits. We will come back to this point in more detail 
shortly.  
In the next subsection, however, we first reiterate an issue raised in Chapter 5, namely 
the question to what extent freedmen “needed” the patronage relationship as an 
“enabling framework” to advertise their qualities and virtues, and whether it was, as 
such, an instrument for social stratification, accentuating the inferior status of ex-
slaves. Our main focus will be on the implications of the nuanced answers to these 
questions for our attempt at reconfiguring the debate on freedmen socialisation from a 
monolithic macula framework to a dynamic symbiosis of principled equality and elite 
distinction. 
8.5.3 Dedication and subservience as social capital 
The pyramidal structure and pervasiveness of patronage relations in Roman society as a 
whole, ensured that on almost every level patrons were themselves in turn clients (or 
freedmen) of social superiors. Each individual who had the means to immortalise his 
life, had the opportunity to accentuate the identity dimension he deemed most salient 
at the time. These choices were by definition highly contextual, and the external 
influences that steered commemoration in one direction or another (e.g. burial in a 
family grave, financial help of a patron in erecting a tombstone, etc.) are often 
untraceable for modern interpreters. In Martial’s work, this structure is laid bare on 
many occasions. In one epigram, he scorns his own patron because he appears to be a 
client of another patron himself, and because he performs the same duties to that third 
party as Martial to him: he too attends the morning salutation: sumus ergo pares, he too 
fishes for dinner invitations: sumus ergo pares, and he too escorts his patron during 
excursions: sumus ergo pares. Martial subsequently – and exaggeratingly – compares this 
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condition with that of a slave (servus), but notes that he might have been able to bear it, 
if only his patron was an independent and noble man. Instead, however, he turned out 
to be a slave himself, making Martial the slave of a slave (vicarius)160. The central 
lamentation of the epigram is that a patron should be like a king (rex), and thus not have 
a patron of his own. But the reality of Roman social relations was, of course, much less 
idealistic. Martial regularly uses the same metaphor of the extremes of slavery and 
(regal) domination to address this issue.  
On another occasion, for example, he is upset that his patron is too encumbered with 
obligations to his own social superiors, and as a consequence neglects to defend 
Martial’s interests. It is not good to be a client (servire) of a friend who is himself a slave 
(servus), Martial notes. He once again demands that he who wants to be his lord 
(dominus) should be free (liber) from such obligations161. In yet another epigram, he lets 
his patron Olus know that he will henceforth address him by his name instead of the 
titles he had used up till then: lord and master (quod te nomine iam tuo salute, quem regem 
et dominum prius vocabam, ne me dixeris esse contumacem)162. The message he thereby 
wanted to convey was that he wanted to get rid of Olus as a patron, and presents this 
emancipation as a manumission (totis pillea sarcinis redemi). The “payment” for his 
“freedom” symbolises the forfeiture of any future benefits Martial would have kept 
receiving if he remained under Olus’ patronage163. This, however, was a price he gladly 
paid for regaining his independence. Men who desire what lords and masters desire (i.e. 
influence over subordinates), Martial concludes, too easily subjugate themselves to lords 
and masters in order to acquire it (reges et dominos habere debet qui se non habet atque 
concupiscit quod reges dominique concupiscunt). 
Dedication and subservience have often been recognised by scholars as the primary 
virtues from which ex-slaves derived their sense of self, and via which they could aspire 
to glory otherwise denied by restrictions in public life164. This assumption is confirmed 
 
                                                     
160 Mart. 2.18: “Capto tuam, pudet heu, sed capto, Maxime, cenam, tu captas aliam: iam sumus ergo 
pares. Mane salutatum venio, tu diceris isse ante salutatum: iam sumus ergo pares. Sum comes ipse 
tuus tumidique anteambulo regis, tu comes alterius: iam sumus ergo pares. Esse sat est servum, iam 
nolo vicarius esse. Qui rex est, regem, Maxime non habeat”. Compare with Mart. 10.10, where 
virtually the same complaint is made in similar terms against a consul who did not shy away from 
cashing in sportulae, carrying other men’s litters, slavishly flattering performers by excessively 
applauding them, etc.  
161 Mart. 2.32: “Non bene, crede mihi, servo servitur amico: sit liber, dominus qui volet esse meus”. 
162 Mart. 2.68. 
163 Cf. Mart. 1.112: “Cum te non nossem, dominum regemque vocabam: nunc bene te novi; iam mihi 
Priscus eris”. For a discussion of the reoccurrence of these themes and terms throughout Martial’s 
work, see Williams (2004), 83-9; 124-7; 220-2. 
164 Mouritsen (2011), 61f; MacLean (2012), passim (e.g. 45). On p. 30ff, she discusses “freed virtues” – 
considered “different from [those] applied to freeborn adult males and freeborn women and 
children” – like obsequium, fides, and industria. See also Chapter 7. 
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by the epigraphic record, but consistently ignores or undervalues the crucial dimension 
of authorship. It is true that Larcia Horaea is explicitly described as virtuous (proba) and 
subservient to her masters (parens domineis), but this description originates from her 
parents-in-law (who were also her patrons), and her husband (who was the son of these 
patrons)165. Likewise, Allia Potestas was most virtuous (proba), diligent (sedula), and loyal 
(fidissima) toward her patron, but the entire description breathes the agency of her 
patron in establishing the monument166. The same observation can be made for the 
epitaph of Fortunatus (already mentioned above), which – if the restoration roughly 
resembles its original thought – similarly represents the freedman’s merit and 
achievement only in relation to his patron Agathemerus167. As noted before, however, it 
was the latter who ascribed this pride to Fortunatus.  
To briefly reiterate a point made earlier, authorship is most easily ignored in the 
epitaphs that have freedpersons speak in the first person, where the discourse is 
represented as a direct reflection of that freedperson’s attitude and sentiments. Iulia 
Erotis, for example, says that she was pleasing to her husband and her patron (viro et 
patrono placui)168. But the words are not hers. It was this very husband and patron 
(perhaps one and the same person?) who dedicated the inscription169. Similarly, 
Vettiena Spyche (sic) considered herself blessed for always having been pious toward 
her patron (Vettiena Spyche benedicta / hic sum in patrono meo / semper pia)170. As the 
praescriptum indicates, however, the inscription was made by Vettiena’s husband ([lost 
name] coniugi pien/tissimae bene me/renti de se fecit / et sibi). It is more than likely that this 
husband was also her patron – as was so often the case – but even if he was not, this 
would not change the fact that the inclusion of the mention of Vettiena’s deference to 
her patron was not a decision made by this freedwoman herself. A final – and perhaps 
the most clear – example, is the epitaph for Tinuleia Musa, which reads171:  
“Tinuleia Musa, freedwoman of Sextus. If those who are taken away from the light 
somehow enjoy the voices of the living, this monument shows that I was pleasing 
to my patron, who gave me a splendid funeral out of vehement gratitude. On the 
last day, he cried when he buried me, the woman he lost. That made me a happy 
 
                                                     
165 CLE 56. 
166 CLE 1988. 
167 CLE 1766 (cf. note 132 above). 
168 CLE 86. 
169 For a discussion on the identity of this patron and husband, see Perry (2014), 106. 
170 CLE 1792. 
171 AE 1946, 208: “Tinulei[a S]ex(ti) l(iberta) Mus[a] / si voce superum ga[udent] qui a luce abierunt / 
placuisse me patrono [mo]n<u=I>mentum indicat / quo funere amplo per f[re]quentem gratiam / die 
supremo lacr<i=U>mans(!) [me] amissam intulit / in quo hoc effecit me feli[ce]m mortuam / ut 
dicant omnes quod [pat]rono placuerim”. 
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deceased woman because now all will say that I was pleasing to my patron”. 
(Regium Lepidi) 
 
Musa was greatly pleased because the intense grief of her patron – to which the 
beautifully carved out tombstone publicly attested – would forever remain a sign for 
anyone to see that she had been a pleasing freedwoman. The phrase placere patrono is 
used twice to convey this sentiment, which – if the epitaph is taken as a representation 
of Musa’s own attitude – was the one and only identity dimension and concern this 
freedwoman thought worthy of commemoration. But of course, the very first line 
already implies that Musa did not make the monument herself, since the question 
whether the poem would be successful in posthumously delighting a deceased, is 
typically one posed by those still living (voce superum). This is confirmed more explicitly 
in the next lines, where Sextus is identified as the man responsible for the funus amplum. 
In all of these cases, then, the characterisation of the freedperson as a particularly 
obliging dependent, was a choice made by the patron qua dedicator. In doing so, the 
latter not only honoured his deceased dependent, but he also highlighted his own social 
and symbolic capital, by commemorating the pious fulfilment of his patronal 
obligations. At the same time, he presented himself as a good pater familias, who had not 
only been right in freeing this worthy individual in the first place, but who had 
subsequently also commanded respect and devotion from his subordinates, thus 
consolidating and conforming to the social hierarchies on which order and harmony – 
at least from the slave-owning class’ perspective – depended. As noted earlier, this 
motive was particularly salient for patrons who had once been slaves themselves, like in 
the cases of Larcia Horaea, Iulia Erotis (if the names Celadus and/or Blastus are any 
indication of freed status), Fortunatus, etc. For these individuals, their rise from slavery 
would be enhanced even further by explicitly showing that they now belonged to the 
slave-owning class themselves172.  
Nicolas Tran rightly stresses this multidimensional nature of patronage relations 
when he discusses the socialising potential of Roman collegia. These associations 
provided freedmen with an opportunity to acquire respectability and prestige, thus 
constituting the context par excellence for freedmen to actualise in practice the principled 
equality the legal act of manumission bestowed on them173. He notes that on many 
occasions, freedmen would accentuate their own position as master and patron over 
 
                                                     
172 Kleijwegt (2006a), 53-4.  
173 Tran (2006), 112: “Les collèges admettent en leur sein un grand nombre d’affranchis, qui, mêlés 
aux ingénus sur un pied d’égalité, trouvent dans ces collectivités un moyen de gagner en 
respectabilité et parfois en prestige”. 
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their dependents, thus drawing attention away from their own subordination. Focussing 
on other identity dimensions, and omitting any reference to their own patron in their 
inscriptions served a very similar purpose: “lorsqu’ils sont les auteurs des inscriptions, 
les collegiati sont portés à taire les relations de patronat dans lesquelles ils sont enserrés, 
dans une position de subordination” and “les collegiati affranchis semblent chercher à 
stomper l’image de subordination propre à leur statut en se présentant eux-mêmes 
comme patrons”174. In a sense, then, this was a way for freedmen to partake in a path to 
glory highly valued also by the elites. The sense of personal power and control, and 
occupying the superior position in a relation of dependence was arguably far more 
important than participation in political life, which – even if it had not been formally 
restricted to ingenui – would have been unreachable for the large majority of common 
freedmen (or freeborn members of the plebs media, for that matter)175. 
The same observation can be made, mutatis mutandis, for freedmen commemorating 
themselves via metric epitaphs. Most striking is Manlia Gnome’s tombstone found in 
Rome176:   
Manlia Gnome, freedwoman of Titus, has passed. Here lies a woman who has 
always lived with an upright character. I have had many clients. This one place I 
have procured for myself. I have thus lived my life for as long as I wanted. I never 
owed anyone anything and I have lived faithfully. I trusted my bones to the earth 
and my body to Vulcanus, thus discharging the last duties of Death. 
 
This is the only extant verse epitaph that mentions a freedperson as the socially 
superior party in a patron-client relationship. Unsurprisingly, the exceptional passage 
occurs in a text that strongly accentuates the agency of the deceased (discursively 
reflected also by the many verbs in first person; habui, optinui, volui, debui, etc.). Having 
many clients was but one way to express a strong sense of individuality. Claiming 
financial independence (nemine unquam / debui), for example, was another, though this 
expression occurs in many other epitaphs as well, usually in tandem with another 
 
                                                     
174 Tran (2006), 462-8 (the quotes are from p. 463-4) 
175 Weber (1988), 257: “(…) es war Freigelassenen nicht möglich, öffentliche Ämter zu bekleiden (…). 
Aber [diesen] Nachteil teilten sie mit der weitaus überwiegenden Mehrheit der Bevölkerung”; Knapp 
(2011), 191: “Almost all freedmen, like almost all freeborn, cared not at all for office-holding and 
public life beyond neighborhood offices in professional and social clubs and associations, and found 
their satisfaction in their work, families, and friends”. 
176 CLE 67 (= CIL 6, 21975): “|(Obita) Manlia T(iti) l(iberta) Gnome / haec est quae vix{s}it semper / 
natura proba clientes habui / multos locum hoc unum opti/nui mihi itaque quoad aetatem volui / 
exsegi meam nemine unquam / debui vix{s}i quom fide / ossa dedi terrae corpus Volchano dedi/di 
e<g=C>o ut suprema mortis man/data edidi”. 
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popular attestation of moral virtue (e.g. that the deceased has never been accused of 
wrongdoing)177. It is a claim particularly often made by people whose occupation 
required a reputation of fidelity and reliability, leading several scholars to the very 
plausible hypothesis (especially when taking into account her many clients) that Manlia 
must have been some kind of businesswoman178. She even implies that she defied Fate 
itself by having lived for precisely as long as she wanted (itaque quoad aetatem volui / 
exsegi meam). This claim contrasts sharply with the more common expression that one 
has lived “as long as was allowed”179, and again presents Manlia as a determined 
individual, accountable to no one but herself.  
The inscription is particularly valuable because it explicitly names Manlia as the 
dedicator of her own epitaph (locum hoc unum opti/nui mihi). Although no doubt intended 
to yet again draw attention to  her assertiveness, this information allows us to take this 
poem as the reflection of the freedwoman’s own thoughts and attitude (that is, within 
the limiting framework of the public transcript). In this regard, it is meaningful also that 
Manlia only references her patron Titus in the praescriptum, but that she chose to 
entirely omit him or her relationship to him in the metric part of the inscription. 
Manlia’s success was no doubt due at least in part to patronal backing (Titus’ social and 
economic capital would have greatly facilitated the construction of her network of 
clients), but in what was one day to become the final testimony to her life, character, 
and success, Manlia explicitly preferred not to mention this. The exceptional claim of 
having had many clients, the high degree of real-life and discursive agency, and the 
complete absence of a patron in the poem, make this inscription as a whole 
indiscernible from that of freeborn members of the plebs media. Especially relevant, 
finally, is Manlia’s claim that she not only had an inherently upright character (natura 
proba) at the moment of her death, but that she had had it for her entire life. Manlia 
clearly perceived her own character as having been virtuous all along, manumission 
only having been a mere legal recognition – albeit hugely important for all practical 
means and purposes – of an innate goodness she already possessed as a slave girl180. She 
did not contrast her time as a slave with the rest of her life as a free woman. Instead, she 
focussed entirely on the latter, omitting any reference to her servile past, and 
 
                                                     
177 CLE 134 (= CIL 6, 8012): “vixi (…) sine lite / sine rixa sine controversia / sine aere alieno”; CLE 477 
(= CIL 14, 2605): “vixit semper honeste / praestiti quod potui semper sine lite recessi”. Petronius also 
has a collibertus of Trimalchio’s express a similar idea: “(…) assem aerarium nemini debeo; 
constitutum habui nunquam; nemo mihi in foro dixit: 'Redde quod debes'”. 
178 Veyne (2000), 1188; Kruschwitz (2001), 53. 
179 E.g. CLE 81 (= CIL 6, 4379): “properavit aetas hoc dedit fatus mihi”; 134 (= CIL 6, 8012): “vixi quam 
diu potui”; 1944 (= CIL 11, 7470): “vixi vicenni / temporis aevo / dum mihi vita fuit / dum fata 
deusque / sinebant”. 
180 Cf. also below for the case of Veratia Eleutheris. 
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presenting her life as one continuum which was determined by and centred on her own 
individuality rather than her legal status (cf. infra). 
Although some freedpersons thus clearly chose to highlight their own superior position 
in relations of dependence, this does not in itself mean that a desire to suppress a 
“macule servile” was responsible for this choice181. In fact, some freedmen readily chose 
to mention their patron, without there being – at first sight – any “reason” to do so. To 
conclude the eulogy of his freed daughter – including the glory and successes she 
achieved as a famous dancer –, the father of a certain Eucharis gladly noted how she had 
been reverential towards her patroness, without the latter being mentioned elsewhere 
in the carmen182. Likewise, when commemorating his freeborn daughter, the freedman 
Quictus Rancius Protus drew attention to her devotion to her husband, parents, and 
friends, but also to the twins she had given birth to. These, he meaningfully adds, meant 
a great increase in prestige for his own patron183. This patron may very well have been 
the unnamed daughter’s husband – and father of the twins – but his relation to her is 
presented only by his identification as Protus’ patron.  
The voluntary mention of a patron(ess) is most clear in the epitaph for the little 
Ikadium. Ikadium was the son of Anthis, a freedwoman of Caesar’s wife Calpurnia. It was 
Anthis who set up the epitaph for her son, who was, like his mother, freed by 
Calpurnia184:  
“Calpurnia Anthis made this. I was fortunate with my reputation, destiny, and 
patroness, the wife of the great and divine Caesar. I was kept safe by her. I myself 
was useful to my dear friends, who cared for me greatly. Anthis, the reason for my 
life, buried my dear bones in her own tomb. I am called Ikadium”. (Rome) 
 
Prior to elucidating Ikadium’s loyalty to his friends, his mother explicitly – and lengthily 
– invokes her (and his) patroness Calpurnia. In the wake of Caesar’s murder (Caesaris illa 
dei), her care and protection would have meant a great deal to both Anthis and 
Ikadium185. The reason for invoking Calpurnia (and having her featuring prominently in 
 
                                                     
181 Pace Tran (2006), 463-4: “l’existence même du lien patronal révèle l’incapacité de l’ancien esclave 
à réussir pleinement, c’est-à-dire à effacer la macule servile”. 
182 CLE 55 (= CIL 10096). 
183 CLE 59 (= CIL 6, 25369). 
184 CLE 964 (= CIL 6, 14211): “Calpurnia Anthis fecit / dextera fama mihi fuit et fortuna patrona / 
magnifici coniunx Caesaris illa dei / qua bene tutus eram caris nec vilis amicis / quis etiam mecum 
plurima cura fuit / Anthis causa meae vitae quae cara sepulcro / condidit ossa suo nominor 
Ikadium”. 
185 Cf. MacLean (2012), 51-2. 
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the carmen) is clearly intended to accentuate the upward ties Ikadium and Anthis had. 
Much like the connections to patrons or pseudo-patrons in letters of recommendations, 
these ties served to highlight the social capital and network embeddedness of, in this 
case, both commemorator and deceased. The same preoccupation can be discerned in 
the cases of Eucharis and Protus’ daughter mentioned above.  
Finally, the carmen made by an unnamed freedwoman for her daughter confirms this 
image. At the end of the poem – expressing the mother’s grief at the loss of her child – 
this mother quite literally invokes the Manes of her “deserving and sacred patroness” as 
protection for the grave (o<b=P>testor Manes meritae sanctaeque patronae)186. The 
inscription does not only express the devotion and reverence of the freedwoman 
towards her patroness, but it also – much more explicitly than the previous epitaphs –  
accentuates the concrete benefits the relation might entail for these individuals (i.c. 
protection), and for which the explicit commemoration of this patronage relation was a 
confirmation, a guarantee, and a reciprocal sign of gratitude. 
In conclusion, reverence and devotion to a patron were accentuated by both 
freedperson and patron alike. In both cases, it served as a means to accentuate social 
capital (and arguably also symbolic capital when the patron did so). Surely, in several 
cases, ex-slaves felt that the omission of any patron was a more efficient way of 
immortalising their lives than stressing the social capital they derived from this 
connection. But assuming that a desire to downplay a macula servitutis was responsible 
for these omissions greatly undervalues individual motivations. The choice was always 
personal and contextual, and as such cannot be reduced to a monolithic model (like 
“shame” or a “stain of slavery”) postulating that freedmen would d’office leave out their 
patron from their epitaph when they had the chance. This is ignoring the great value 
network embeddedness and social capital entailed for people who were just starting to 
create their own “family”. Accentuation of patronal ties was beneficial for both parties, 
rather than a necessary corollary of any imposed obligation of obsequium. It was this 
private relationship that was the structuring factor in identity formation and 
representation in funerary epitaphs, not an overarching and omnipresent sense of 
moral inferiority (cf. Chapter 2). As noted repeatedly, this latter notion has frequently 
led to rather problematic readings of the source material. To conclude this section, we 
very briefly draw attention to one of these, namely the assumption that freedmen 
regularly tried to conceal their “servile” cognomina. 
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8.5.4 “Nomen si quaeris titulus tibi vera fatetur” 
Immortalising one’s name was a particularly pertinent concern of many Romans. Many 
epitaphs therefore draw extraordinary attention to the nomen of the deceased, and 
appeal to the passer-by’s willingness to speak it out in order to have it live on among the 
living187. Wordplays on the name of a deceased occurred frequently, and may come 
across as inappropriate to modern readers, but only if they are taken at face value 
instead of as deliberate attempts at drawing attention to that name. Thus the first verse 
on the monument of Fortunata, a freedwoman from Rome, explained that she had been 
very lucky (fortunata) to live together with a good husband188. Likewise, the patron of 
Gaius Attius Maturus began the poem for his 16 year-old alumnus by saying that despite 
being “Maturus in name”, he was not “mature in age” at the moment of his death189.  
For freedpersons in particular, of course, accentuating a (full) name was also a means 
to highlight free (citizen) status. Whether Iunian Latin or citizen optimo iure, freedmen 
received a (prae)nomen to distinguish them from members of the unfree class, from 
which they had been able to rise themselves. Thus Egnatuleia Urbana was particularly 
grateful to her patroness Hilara because “she had freed her from her servile name and 
endowed her with her own”190. Similarly, Caius Seccius Lesbius deplored that by dying, 
he had made his patron Seccius weep for his own name191. More than merely drawing 
attention to Lesbius’ nomen, this rather exceptional phrase also perhaps suggests that 
Seccius had freed his slave with the specific intention to pass on his family name, but 
that these plans had been thwarted by the premature death of the latter at the age of 
20192. This is likely also the meaning of the commemorative poem the freedman 
Artemisius dedicated to Fabia Pyrallis. This “best and blessed patroness” had already 
during her life ordered the construction of a tomb that would become the last resting 
place of her descendents for generations to come. “Our name is secure”, Artemisius 
gladly noted. “It will always be remembered by these descendants who will 
 
                                                     
187 E.g. CLE 1184 (= CIL 6, 18385): “[semper ego ut Manes possint] audire iterabo // Flavia Nicopolis 
nomen dulce tuum”; 801 (= CIL 6, 22215): “quid sumus aut loquimur … stat lapis et nomen tantum 
vestigia nulla”; 420 (= CIL 10, 2311: “[qui] legis hunc titulum quid no[men] scire laboras”; 465 (= CIL 
12, 533): “nomen si quaeris / titulus tibi vera fatetur”; 965 (= CIL 6, 25617): “quandocumque … 
incisum et duro nom<en=INE> erit lapide; 1086 (= CIL 6, 19175): “si quis forte leget titulum nome[nve 
requirit]”; 1125 (=CIL 9, 3358): “oramus / lecto nomine pauca legas”. It was a preoccupation also of 
the elites, similarly expressed in their literature, e.g. Plin. Ep. 6.10.4-6. 
188 CLE 389 (= CIL 6, 27278): “[Fortuna]ta fui et vixi te digna / [marit]o”. 
189 CLE 2177 (= AE 1920, 83): “nomine eram / maturus non aetate”. 
190 CLE 963 (=CIL 6, 17130): “hilaram / quae me servili nomine preivat / et dulci suo participat 
cinerem”. 
191 CLE 1116 (= CIL 13, 7105): “proprium no/men d<e=I>stinat in lac/r<i=V>mas”. 
192 Cf. Saller (1994), 79-80. 
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commemorate it forever”. The epitaph meaningfully ends with an address to all future 
family members: “Remember the old name and the epitaph which grants you this 
spot”193. 
In all of these cases, however, it is the nomen – rather than the cognomen – that is 
alluded to. Urbana was not really “freed” of her slave name (she still carried it as a 
cognomen), but her name was no longer “servile” because it now included a nomen 
gentilicium. Similarly, Seccius wept for his own family name, and by stressing “our 
name”, Artemisius meant the nomen Fabius he and his descendants had received from 
his patroness. In all of these cases, then, it was the promotion from slave to free that 
inspired the explicit focus on nomenclature, not a desire to downplay a servile past. 
Indeed, ex-slaves were as prone as freeborn individuals to draw attention to their 
personal cognomina – e.g. when asking the passer-by to read them aloud so as to keep 
them “alive” – even though these were often “servile” Greek ones instead of Roman 
ones194.  
However, Bodel, among many others, has nonetheless suggested that ex-slaves 
occasionally tried to get rid of names that reflected a servile past195. Only in very few 
instances – not coincidentally occurring in literary sources – do we see this assumption 
confirmed. Thus Suetonius relates the story of the rich imperial freedman Cerylus, who 
pretended to be freeborn by changing his name to Laches in order to not have parts of 
his inheritance (perhaps all of it if he was a Iunian Latin) go to the emperor at his death 
(et de Cerylo liberto, qui dives admodum ob subterfugiendum quandoque ius fisci ingenuum se et 
Lachetem mutate nomine coeperat ferre)196. But Kleijwegt’s more nuanced observations 
warrant due attention. He recognises that the phenomenon of name-change occurred 
and that “concerns with the symbols of their suffering” may have occasionally inspired 
freedmen to do this, but argues that it cannot be generalised or considered a 
representation of “the” attitude of ex-slaves in general197. He furthermore gives several 
examples of the practice of changing Greek names to Roman ones, but convincingly 
 
                                                     
193 CLE 1216 (= CIL CIL 6, 17622): “securos colimus memores de / nomine nostro et faciet / suboles 
multos memorata per annos / sacra deis patribusque suis / memoresq(ue) priorum et memo/res 
nostri nostrorumq(ue) alta/ propago aeterno servent / semper memorabile nomen / quisquis es{t} 
aut olim nostra de / stirpe futurus sis memor / antiqui nominis et tituli in / quorum titulo hic datur 
esse / locus”. 
194 Mouritsen (2005), 41 note 17. 
195 Bodel (1984), 54; Frank (1916); Hasegawa (2005), 79-80. Cf. already Duff (1958), 56-7: “Thus 
oppressed with the burden of a servile name, it was hard for a freedman to pass as a man of 
ingenuous Roman birth. How he still felt the incubus of a past slavery, how his spirit revolted 
against the slur to which his origin exposed him, is shown by his efforts to start afresh in life with a 
new name”. 
196 Suet. Vesp. 23. 
197 Kleijwegt (2006b), 94 (with note 22 containing further references). For similar critiques, see 
Weaver (1972), 84-9; Huttunen (1974), 195-6. 
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argues that this was not necessarily motivated by a desire to erase the memory of a 
servile past. Thus Lucius Crassicius Pasicles changed his name to Pansa. But since the 
man had been originally freeborn (and had received his name from his parents rather 
than from a master), his subsequent choice to “romanise” it reflects a desire to present 
himself as Roman rather than Greek (not as freeborn instead of freed)198. Evidently, we 
do not know how many freedmen changed their “servile” Greek name to a “good” 
Roman one, since only less successful attempts are visible in the source record199. But it 
is no doubt meaningful that in Rome alone already, more than 60 cases are attested 
where a Roman name is appropriated, but the old Greek one maintained and recorded 
next to it200. The practice is well known also from literary sources, and suggests that the 
true intention of such operations was increasing romanitas rather than downplaying 
libertinitas201. Finally, the habit of many freed couples to give their freeborn children a 
Greek or “servile” Latin name seems incomprehensible if a generally shared desire to 
remove all traces of servile descent existed among this group of people202. 
In any case, many freedmen eagerly appropriated the habit of drawing attention to 
their (non-Roman) names, clearly not worrying about any allusion to their servile past 
this habit could evoke in the readers of their epitaphs. One particularly revealing 
example to conclude this overview is the poem the freedman Lucius Claudius Rufinus 
made for himself in Lugdunum. In it, he reveals that he had made it while still alive “so 
that when my spirit rests among the shades in the Styx, and when my body has been 
received in this house of stone, this epitaph will be a surviving witness of my existence 
by the laws of fortune, and my voice, preserved by these verses on stone will live on by 
your voice, whoever you are, traveller, who reads them”203. Interestingly however, in 
the next part of the inscription, the deceased calls himself Rottio instead of Rufinus. 
Certainly, consistency in writing names on funerary monuments was not a priority to 
many commemorators204, but the change from Rufinus (stressed in both the 
praescriptum and the first distichon of the carmen) to Rottio is evidently due to a 
deliberate choice rather than to accidental inconsistency. The earliest editors of this 
 
                                                     
198 Suet. Gram. 18. 
199 The antithesis quoted is from Sullivan (1939), 504 (an outdated, and at any rate too tentative 
presentation of social reality). 
200 Wiseman (1985), 189 
201 Cf. Borbonus (2014), 144. E.g. Tac. Hist. 1.13, 49 (Marcianus Icelus). 
202 Duff (1958), 57-8; Tran (2006), 115; Mouritsen (2005), 41 note 17; (2011), 286-9. 
203 CLE 1278 (= CIL 13, 2104): “Cl(audius) hunc viv(u)s Stygias Rufinus / ad umbras instituit / titulum 
post animae requ/iem qui testis vitae fati / sit lege futurus cum do/mus accipiet saxea corpus 
ha/bens quodque meam / retinet vocem data litte/ra saxo vo[ce] tua vivet / quisque lege[s titu]los”. 
204 E.g. CLE 396 (= CIL 8, 10533): Hippolithe = Hippolite; 959 (= CIL 6, 9499): Philematio = Philematium; 
CLE 1064 (= CIL 6, 20466): Felicula = Felicla; etc. 
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inscription considered Rottio to be an endearing nickname, given to Rufinus by his 
wetnurse and foster-sister (who are commemorated with him in this later part of the 
epitaph)205. Bücheler and later commentators, however, corrected this interpretation by 
plausibly suggesting – and taking into consideration the monument’s origin – that 
Rottio had been the deceased’s original (Germanic) name206. Interestingly then, Rottio’s 
master had given him a “Roman” name on enslavement, but Rottio himself stuck to his 
old name, even though he did not ignore the value of including his “Roman” one at the 
top of the inscription207. 
The next section focusses in more detail on a very similar topic. It explores the variety 
of ways in which freedpersons incorporated explicit references to their servile past in 
their metric epitaphs, and gauges their possible motivations for doing so. It tries to 
reconstruct the way in which these freedpersons themselves perceived the moment 
that changed their life (manumission), asks whether this was considered a significant 
milestone at all, and explores how it was integrated in their life-stories. 
8.6 The stain of a servile past in carmina epigraphica? 
Although verse epitaphs that reference maculae or labes in a metaphorical sense (e.g. as 
stains on a reputation or soul) occur predominantly in Christian contexts, these 
inscriptions will not be structurally included in our discussion here, because they 
require evaluation in a framework of Christian conceptions of virtue and sin that greatly 
exceeds the scope of our intentions. Usually, these inscriptions contrast earthly flaws 
(labes terrenae) or stains of life (vitae maculae) with heavenly spirits (caelestes animae) or a 
cleansing (purgatio) in heaven (aethra; caelum) after a pious life of reverence to God or 
Christ208. Expressions that bodily stains (carnis maculae) can be washed away by water, 
 
                                                     
205 Allmer & Dissard (1890), 227. 
206 Bücheler (1982) [1895-1930], II, 600; Galletier (1922b), 301-2. 
207 The inclusion of the Roman name may also have been (in part) a consequence of Rottio’s patron 
being the person actually taking care of the erection of the monument (curante Cl(audio) Sequente 
patrono). 
208 E.g. CLE 311 (= CIL 6, 41379): “Qui peccatorum sordes abolere priorum / terrenisq(ue) optas 
maculis absolvere vitam”; CLE 704 (= CIL 5, 6723), verses 22-25, on the virtue of Eusebius, episcopus 
et martur: “omnes / terrenas vicit labes purgatior aethra / vitarum maculas puro qui decoquit igni / 
rebus qui docuit populos factisq(ue) vocavit”; CLE 783 (= CIL 5, 7640), verses 1-3 (= lines 1-6): 
“Caelestes animae / damnant quae crimina / vitae terrenas metuu/nt labes sub iudice C(h)risto / 
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but that faith (fides) is required to more profoundly efface sin and purify the soul, are 
legion in the Christian tradition209. Since literal attestations of maculae, labes, and other 
kinds of stains have been discussed in Chapter 2, this section focusses on less explicit 
references to a servile past, and to the ways these served to mediate a freedperson’s 
identity. 
8.6.1 Natal alienation, rebirth, and the macula servitutis 
In her recent monograph on Roman funerary commemoration, Maureen Carroll 
contrasted the freeborn (elite) with the freed population by drawing attention to the 
fact that whereas freeborn people could highlight a family history and ancestors, ex-
slaves only  “began their ‘history’ with their manumission”210. Though this is true in a 
strictly legal sense, it is not at all the way in which slaves and freedmen themselves 
thought about or commemorated their (familial) lives. Certainly, failure to indicate a 
legal father was a popular topos in elite literature. In his De Oratore, Cicero cited an angry 
outburst of Scaurus, who had in turn drawn from one of Statius’ verses to make the 
point that people who could not name a father or a mother should not act haughtily211. 
Similarly, Martial could live with a freedman obtaining the ius natorum – excusing him 
from munera and tutela legitima – as long as nobody gave him a mother or a father212. 
Although a certain Diodorus invited senators and knights to his table, nobody believed – 
Martial elsewhere tells us – that he was “born”213. Livy, finally, provides the most 
illuminating example when he defines patricians as those men who could name their 
father, and when he explicitly relates this ability to free birth (patricios, qui patrem ciere 
possent, id est, ingenuos)214. In all of these cases, the one more disparaging than the other, 
a lack of legal parentage is considered among the most important identity dimensions of 
freedmen; a result of their “social death” and “natal alienation”215. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
corporeo laetae gaude/nt se carcere solvi”. See Raschieri (2014), 108-10 for a contextualisation of 
these and similar carmina in a broader Christian literary context. 
209 E.g. CLE 913 (= AE 2000, 188), verses 5-6: “unda lavat carnis maculas sed crimina purgat / 
purificatque animas mundior amne fides”. 
210 Carroll (2006), 39. For social death and natal alienation, see the hallmark study of Patterson 
(1982). 
211 Cic. De Or. 2.257: “St, tacete, quid hoc clamoris? Quibus nec mater nec pater, tanta confidentia? 
Auferte istam enim superbiam”. 
212 Mart. 11.12: “Ius tibi natorum vel septem, Zoile, detur, dum matrem nemo det tibi, nemo patrem”. 
213 Mart. 10.27.4: “Natali, Diodore, tuo conviva senatus accubat, et rarus non adhibetur eques, et tua 
tricenos largitur sportula nummos. Nemo tamen natum te, Diodore, putat”. 
214 Livy 10.8.10. See, however, Gardner (1993), 16-7 for the observation that ingenuus, in this instance, 
refers not simply to free birth, but to noble birth. 
215 Patterson (1982), passim (e.g. 1-13, 35ff); Mouritsen (2011), 37-8 (including many more examples). 
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However, even leaving aside the fact that similar comments were directed also, even 
in law texts, at illegitimate (but still freeborn) children216, freedpersons themselves did 
not perceive their personal history or present in such terms. It is well known that slaves 
and freedmen ignored legal fictions and elite ideology when presenting their family 
relationships on their tomb stones. Thus the slave couple Spendon and Vitalis called 
themselves parentes of their filius pientissimus Lucius Neratius Spendon, who was 
nonetheless first introduced as L. Nerati Prisci libertus217. Similarly, the imperial freedman 
Tiberius Claudius Zosimus was defined as Augusti libertus on the tombstone erected by 
his parentes and their nepos, all of whom were imperial freedpersons themselves, before 
they presented him and his frater Epaphras as filii dulcissimi218. The strictly legal inability 
to name a parent did not preclude the accentuation of parental and filial association in 
these – and countless other – cases. 
An interesting tabula ansata found in Rome features the two freedpersons Sosia and 
Apollonius. The elegiac distichon underneath their formal nomenclature warns anyone 
who is “reborn” (renascentes) to think twice before competing with them for honour 
(laus), since their faithfulness (fides) had been impeccable in the past219. “Reborn” does 
not refer to any Christian notion of eternal life in Heaven (the inscription is pagan), nor 
did Greco-Roman conceptions of afterlife in the underworld lend themselves to an 
expression like this. It is very likely, therefore, that these freedmen were addressing 
fellow ex-slaves, and that they perceived manumission as rebirth, even though this may 
have been a public recognition of the “master’s perspective” (publicising the 
internalisation of expected norms and values) rather than a personal belief (cf. infra). 
Similarly, in his eulogy of Claudius Etruscus’ freed father, Statius thanks the emperor for 
having allowed this freedman to be reborn (renato), thus giving him the chance to prove 
his value as a free man220. In these cases, manumission is clearly considered an act that 
made tabula rasa of the preceding period of slavery, and that introduces an entirely new 
life phase. 
 
                                                     
216 E.g. Dig. 1.5.23: “Volgo concepti dicuntur qui patrem demonstrare non possunt, vel qui possunt 
quidem, sed eum habent, quem habere non licet". 
217 AE 1999, 00315: “L(ucio) Neratio Spendonti / L(uci) Nerati Prisci lib(erto) / Nerati(i) Spendon et 
Vitalis / parentes filio pientissimo / sibi posterisque suorum”. 
218 Panciera (1987), nr. 70: “D(is) M(anibus) / Ti(berio) Cl(audio) Zosimo Aug(usti) lib(erto) vixit annis 
XXX / et Epaphrae fratri eius / vixit annis X qui nobis / abrepti sunt fili(i) dulcis/simi fecerunt 
eorum / parentes Ti(berius) Cl(audius) Hermes et / Cl(audia) Primitiva et Cl(audius) Vitalis / nepos 
eorum et Licinia / Onesime conlactia eorum / b(ene) m(erentibus) f(ecerunt)”. 
219 CLE 1077 (= CIL 18209): “Cn(aeus) Flavius Cn(aei) l(ibertus) Sosia / Cn(aeus) Flavius Cn(aei) 
l(ibertus) Apollonius / sei qua renascentes optant certamina laudis / ex nostra aspiciant facta priora 
fide”. 
220 Stat. Silv. 3.3.154-5: “Quas tibi devoti iuvenes pro patre renato, summe ducum, grates, aut quae 
pia vota rependunt!”. 
 496 
However, explicit references to the “living on” (in the private sphere) of the period of 
slavery did not seem to have bothered freedmen if these at the same time revealed 
individual merit and social promotion. Publius Ummidius Primigenius, for one, was 
called a house-born slave (verna) by his commemorator – also a freedman – even though 
his tria nomina clearly betrays freed status221. Apparently, he had retained this title after 
manumission as a badge of honour, distinguishing him from freedmen who would 
typically have had a less cordial relationship with their patron222. A servile past could 
similarly be invoked when a relationship rooted in slavery was commemorated. When 
Aulus Memmius Urbanus erected a monument for his dearest companion Aulus 
Memmius Clarus, for example, he repeatedly described their relationship as one 
between colliberti. He even explicitly mentioned that they had first met each other on 
the slave market, that they were freed in one and the same household, and that only 
death had eventually succeeded in separating them (hoc quoque titulo / superos et inferos 
testor deos / una me tecum congressum / in venalicio una domo liberos / esse factos neque ullus 
unquam / nos diunxisset nisi hic tuus / fatalis dies)223. Urbanus seems to have had no 
problem whatsoever with drawing attention to his (and Clarus’) servile past, because it 
constituted the very basis of their friendship and their social promotion, which are by 
far the most important identity dimensions Urbanus wanted to highlight. 
Yet other freedpersons did not present their life-course as one rooted in slavery, 
abruptly changed on manumission, and finally ending in well-deserved freedom. 
Instead, they preferred to present it as a continuum in which the period of slavery 
either did not feature at all, or was downplayed by presenting virtue and good character 
as inherent traits, disconnected from legal status. This is already clear from the many 
examples where freedpersons claim to have lived virtuously and honourably 
“throughout their entire life”, discursively ignoring any change that had taken place at 
manumission. Both Manlia Gnome and Annia Agathonice thus noted that they had 
always lived with an upright character (vix{s}it semper / natura proba; floruit haec anima bis 
denos / perfuncta annos sine crimine / morum vita beata fuit spiri/tus hic nituit)224. Moreover, 
a perfumer from Vardagate allowed the curators of his large gardens to enjoy its yields 
on condition that they also used its flowers to annually celebrate his birthday (nam 
cu/ratores substituam / uti vescantur ex ho/rum hortorum redi/tu natale meo et per / rosam in 
perpetuo)225. Whether he had been originally freeborn and subsequently enslaved, or was 
 
                                                     
221 CLE 1159 (= CIL 6, 29436). 
222 Cf. AE 1991, 198, where Gaius Herennius Blastus makes a monument for his libertus item verna 
Hermes; CIL 6, 2650, where a freedman is called verna without the mention of libertus (his status only 
being indicated by his tria nomina). 
223 CIL 6, 22355a. 
224 CLE 67 (= CIL 6, 21975); 1203 (= CIL 5, 5320). 
225 CLE 809 (= CIL 5, 7454). 
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born a slave, this freedman did not commemorate his “social (re)birth” (at 
manumission), but rather the beginning of his life as a whole, which he did not consider 
as split in two along the way. The same holds true for the already mentioned epitaph of 
Gaius Attius Maturus. The day and time of both his birth and death are minutely 
recorded, as was the length of his life (annos vixi XVI et / menses VIIII totidemque diebus et 
horis octava fui / natus noctis ego hora idem octava fatis red/didi quod dederunt)226. Within this 
clearly delineated period of time, and despite his patron being the dedicator, only 
Maturus’ relation to his close family (his parents, his sister, and his grandparents) is 
recorded. Any reference to his servile past, his manumission, or his patron is entirely 
lacking in the continuum representing his familial life. 
Another favoured strategy was to focus on other identity dimensions as endowing a 
freedperson’s life course with a sense of continuity across boundaries or changes of 
status. Statia Antiochis, for example, was commemorated by her husband and daughter 
with a carmen that only mentioned the fact that she had sustained herself throughout 
her life by making boots (qui caliculis lana / pelliculis vitam / toleravit suam), and Quintus 
Octavius Primus accentuated that he had worked hard from his earliest youth until the 
day he died (hic mea conposito requiescunt o[ssa sepulcro] / <et=II> labor a puero qui mihi 
semper erat nunc labor omnis [abest durus] / curaeque moleste)227. Iunia Victoria, on the 
other hand, used the honourable union with her husband to accentuate her lifelong 
virtue (iugu/mque coniugalem / pudicum piissimo / marito exhibui / in diem vitae meae )228. In 
all these cases, attention is drawn away from changes in legal status, either deliberately, 
or because other features were simply deemed more relevant.  
Yet another way to present a life course as monolithic and uninterrupted by a change 
in legal status, was to deliberately indicate that a burial was provided in one’s home 
region, ethnic origin thereby serving as the structuring biographic dimension. The 
individuals who took recourse to this strategy are likely to have been enslaved ingenui, 
who nonetheless retained a strong (emotional) connection to their region of birth. By 
ending life at the same place where it had started, any events that had occurred in 
between (both enslavement and manumission) were subordinated to this sense of 
belonging. Papiria Rhome, for example, thought it worth the trouble to cross the 
Adriatic Sea to inter her son Proculus (tragically killed in Rome by a falling roof tile) and 
her daughter Cladilla (passed away under unspecified circumstances in Siponte) in the 
 
                                                     
226 CLE 2177 (= AE 1920, 83). 
227 CLE 209 (= CIL 9, 3193); 1095 (= CIL 5, 3415). 
228 CLE 141 (= CIL 8, 5030). 
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grave she had acquired for herself in her hometown of Salona229. Similarly, as noted 
earlier, the patron of the physician Lucius Sabinus Primigenius made sure to have the 
bones of his freedman buried in his homeland (patronus patrio condidit ossa solo)230.  
But even if circumstances did not allow a burial in one’s home region, it was still 
possible to reference this region in the epitaph. Though not as strong a signal of 
preservation of a pre-slavery identity, it surely attests to freedpersons’ ability to nuance 
the alienation imposed on them as a consequence of their enslavement. The already 
mentioned imperial freedman Trophimus thus identified himself first and foremost as 
having once been the child of a Phrygian shepherd; a certain Logismus from Ferentium 
started out his funerary poem by stating that his roots were in Pontus (e Ponto mihi gens); 
and the epitaph made by Aurelius Maximus for his freedman Timavius began with a 
reference to his Dardanian birth (Dardania genitus)231. Neither of these men drew 
attention to their subsequent enslavement or manumission. What really mattered for 
them was their origin, not the misfortunes fate had had in store for them afterwards. 
In short, the commemorative integration of a servile past – and especially the variety of 
available strategies (not) to do so – betray a highly contextualised activation (or 
omission) of this identity dimension. Some freedmen explicitly accentuated “rebirth”, 
whereas others stressed that they had only once been born. Many freedmen ignored the 
legal fiction of natal alienation that denied them parentage, whereas others explicitly 
accentuated birth in the patron’s household (e.g. by keeping the title verna). And a 
reference to the servile past could be merely instrumental in accentuating friendships 
rooted in slavery, but invocation of friendships, marriage, occupation, or origin at the 
same time provided frameworks that stressed continuity and often omitted any 
reference to that servile past. A nice illustration of how several of these commemorative 
strategies could be combined in one monument is provided by the epitaph for an 
unnamed freedman from Patara (Lycia)232. 
“Here lies buried a man greatly deplored by the Greek Muses. Although he was a 
slave by fate, his spirit was definitely ingenious. But he was very quickly turned 
into a Roman citizen and made a fellow tribesman of his master Placidus, who 
 
                                                     
229 CLE 1060 (= CIL 3, 2083): “condidit hic miseri mater duo funera pa[rtus] / ossaque non iustis intulit 
exequiis / tegula nam Romae Proculum prolapsa peremit / pressit Sipunti pressa Cladilla rogum”. 
230 CLE 1252 (= CIL 11, 5836). 
231 CLE 1815 (= CIL 6, 27657); 1944 (= CIL 11, 7470); 2152 (= CIL 13, 8371). 
232 AE 2005, 1508: “Hic situs est Graiis de/flendus saepe Camenis / servus fortuna mo/ribus ingenuus 
/ se<d=T> cito Romanum ver/tit fecitque tribu/lem indulgens Pla/cidi dextera mol/lis eri / pascua 
viniferi geni/tum prope Lydia Tmoli / contexit Lycii terra / beata Cragi”. Petzl (2005), 35 allows for 
the possibility that the deceased was named Ingenuus, and that moribus ingenuus contains a 
wordplay on this name. 
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made it so by touching him with his gracious and soft right hand. He was born in 
the Lydian grape-bearing fields of Mount Tmolos, but now he is covered by the 
beautiful earth of Lycian Cragos”. (Patara) 
 
We do not know who erected the epitaph, but the themes accentuated in it are very 
reminiscent of other inscriptions made by freedmen themselves. The explicit mention 
of Placidus and his decision to manumit his slave, on the other hand, perhaps suggests 
that he was responsible for the poem. Equally unclear is whether the deceased was born 
a slave, or only later turned into one. In any case, however, his character did not suffer 
in comparison to that of a freeborn person (a claim attested in other carmina as well)233. 
It was this innate virtue his master soon (cito) noticed, and that led to the slave’s almost 
inevitable manumission – or so it is, with the benefit of hindsight, presented by the 
dedicator. The inscription is one of the rare cases where it is made clear that the 
manumission had been formal, turning the deceased not only into a free man, but also a 
Roman citizen. Indeed, not only the solemn and ceremonious nature of the 
manumission (indulgens Pla/cidi dextera mol/lis eri), but also its far-reaching consequences 
(Romanum ver/tit fecitque tribu/lem) leave no doubt as to the formality of the act. Clearly, 
it was not deemed inappropriate by whoever composed the poem to quite explicitly 
reference the preceding period of slavery, because it was subsequently used to highlight 
merit and social promotion. 
Very different in tone is the epitaph made by Gaius Ofillius Arimnestus for himself 
and his family. Its praescriptum immediately reveals that he was a freed Roman citizen 
(belonging to the Palatine tribe), and that he had married a freeborn woman, who had 
also given him a son. The carmen underneath is entirely dedicated to Arimnestus, 
however, and focusses not on his accomplishments in the familial sphere, but rather on 
the changes in legal status throughout his life234. 
“Born from barbarian soil, custom exposed him to undeserved slavery, thus 
bending his entire nature. He worked hard so that he could augment the name he 
had received from his father [with a Roman gentilicium], and at a price he obtained 
what he could not receive via entreaties. He overcame his master through his 
 
                                                     
233 E.g. CLE 1125 (= CIL 9, 3358). 
234 CLE 1276 (= CIL 12, 5026): “C(aius) Of[illi]us C(ai) l(ibertus) / Pal(atina) A[3]estus / viv<u=O>s [sibi] 
et / Mindiae M(arci) f(iliae) Primae / uxori et / C(aio) Ofillio C(ai) f(ilio) Proculo / filio et / barbara 
quem genuit tellus / hunc tradidit usu[s] servitio / ingenium ut flec[t]eret / inmerit[o] quaesitum ex 
pat[re] / ut potuit s[i]bi nomen adaux[it] / et pretio [obtin]uit quod prec[e] / non valuit officiis vicit 
/ [d]ominum nec verbera sens[it] / [p]raemia non habuit pignor[a] / quae potuit quid properas / 
[h]ospes requies tibi nota parat[a] / [es]t hospitium hoc populo / semper ubique patet horaru[m] / 
numerum quem suspr[3]V[3] / quoque senti summam [3] / [3] securum [“. 
 500 
zealous services, and was never subjected to beatings. He did not receive any 
rewards, but pledges as many as he could. Why do you rush, passer-by, there is a 
place here for you to rest. This resting area is open to the people always and 
everywhere for as many hours as [...]”. (Narbo) 
 
Interestingly, Arimnestus tells us that his entire character (ingenium) had been twisted 
as a result of his enslavement. The epitaph is the only instance of a freedman explicitly 
claiming to have been “changed” by his servile experience. However, this confession 
may not have been a true reflection of Arimnestus’ opinion, as much as a means to 
convey the internalisation of Roman legal and philosophical conceptions. Indeed, the 
entire poem smacks of attempts to display true romanitas, and the quick succession of 
clauses, as well as the very dense style in which this was done (even by carmen 
standards), was intended to achieve this goal.  
Although he had been undeservingly reduced to slavery, Arimnestus accepts and 
respects that the act an sich had not been illegitimate, resulting as it did from 
established custom (usus). The poem alleges that he had unconditionally accepted his 
new status, and testifies that he had been able to shake it off again through the many 
dutiful services (officia) to his master. The latter had apparently been reluctant to grant 
Arimnestus his freedom at first – even after he had begged him for it on multiple 
occasions. Arimnestus therefore quite literally had to overcome his master (vicit 
dominum), but nonetheless saw his wish fulfilled eventually, since by his hard work, he 
had been able to save up enough money to buy his own freedom (pretio [obtin]uit quod 
prec[e] / non valuit). Moreover, he added that for all this hard work as a slave, he never 
enjoyed any remuneration up till then. Instead, being the good slave he was, he was 
content merely with his work testifying to his zealous nature ([p]raemia non habuit 
pignor[a] / quae potuit)235. 
Deemed equally worthy of mention was the fact that Arimnestus had never been 
subjected to beatings (nec verbera sens[it]). Perhaps more than any other phrase, this 
reference clearly reveals the freedman’s desire to express the internalisation of truly 
Roman attitudes and sensibilities. Indeed, having received physical punishment was 
generally considered an impediment to any form of respectability after manumission. It 
was a stigma – sometimes in a very literal sense – that would, at least theoretically, lead 
to the status of dediticus after manumission, i.e. the worst kind of free status, which left 
 
                                                     
235 Pignora was used in epitaphs with a variety of meanings. In CLE 1586, for example, it means 
“children” (duo pignora matura sensit sui). The meaning in this instance, however, is similar to that in 
CLE 972: “testimony”, “pledge” (quae tibi cumque mei potuerunt pignora amoris nata dari populo sunt 
lacr<i=U>mante data). 
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no chances for improvement236. Deliberately denying that any such humiliation had 
taken place not only accentuates Arimnestus’ unconditional adherence to the Roman 
status hierarchies imposed on him when he was enslaved (he was a “good slave”), but 
also safeguards his right to claim respectability – i.c. through the epitaph. This carmen, 
of course, was written with hindsight, and with social promotion already having been 
achieved. It is difficult to imagine that complacent obedience had also been Arimnestus’ 
initial reflex to the ill-fated turn of events that led to his enslavement. 
Finally, Arimnestus saw in obtaining a Roman nomen gentilicium a clear way to escape 
his unfortunate condition. Aspiring a tria nomina in itself again attests to an inherent 
desire to “become” Roman, and its mention as such was part of the overall message 
Arimnestus wanted his epitaph to convey. Interestingly though, he did not consider his 
new Roman identity to completely efface his foreign origin. Indeed, Arimnestus implies 
that he would retain his original name; perhaps formally (as a cognomen), but maybe 
informally (like Rottio alias Rufinus did, cf. supra). In both cases, the Roman nomen 
would not replace, but be added to (adauxit) this original name. Though Arimnestus does 
therefore not entirely break with his homeland, it is no doubt meaningful that he 
nowhere states where it actually was that he originally came from. Instead, he 
appropriates, once again, a very Roman point of view – hardly congruent with how he 
would, at least initially, have thought about the matter – by calling his native soil 
“barbarian land” (barbara tellus).  
In short, the epitaph paints a picture of an ex-slave who had seemingly come to 
terms with both his servile past and his new status as freed Roman citizen, accentuating 
acceptance of degradation next to (resulting) individual merit and subsequent success. 
The entire narrative, however, is conspicuously “Roman” – perhaps too much so to be 
read as a reflection of Arimnestus’ real state of mind. It is in this context too, that the 
“change of nature” should be interpreted, i.e. as speaking to the tastes of a primarily 
Roman audience. 
How much different indeed is the epitaph for Gaius Iulius Mygdonius, inscribed on 
his sarcophagus that was found near Ravenna. The poem states that he was born free as 
a Parthian (generi Parthus / natus ingenuus), but already at a young age captured and 
taken to Rome (capt(us) / pubis aetate dat(us) in terra(m) / Romana(m)), where he was 
subsequently made a citizen (qui dum factus / cives R(omanus))237. Mygdonius explicitly 
mentions his homeland, and does not elaborate on his time as a slave beyond briefly 
mentioning that he was “captured” when still a boy. No servile obedience, no begging 
for freedom, and in fact, not even a master or patron are mentioned. Indeed, contrary to 
 
                                                     
236 Gai. Inst. 1.13-6; Ulp. Reg. 1.11. Cf. Duff (1958), 72-7; Klees (2002), 116; Mouritsen (2011), 33-4. Roth 
(2011) poignantly calls them “men without hope”. 
237 CLE 1580 (= CIL 11, 137). For detailed discussions of the sarcophagus, see Gnoli (2003); (2006). 
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Arimnestus, Mygdonius did not include libertination in the praescriptum. However, he 
did not omit this because he was somehow ashamed of the status, as he does not shy 
away from explicitly stating that he was “captured” in the subsequent poem. By 
presenting the three life phases he went through in quick succession (freeborn – slave – 
citizen), the middle phase only features as a conditio sine qua non for obtaining 
citizenship. In this regard, it is no doubt meaningful that in the climactic conclusion of 
the description of his changes of fortune, Mygdonius preferred to describe himself as a 
citizen, rather than as a freedman.  
The remaining part of the poem, moreover, presents Mygdonius’ life as one solid 
continuum by focussing solely on the blessed age of fifty years he had been able to 
reach: “I had this sarcophagus made by the time I reached 50 years of age. I managed to 
live through my young age and have now reached my old age” (co[l]/locavi ar<c=K>am 
dum esse(m) / annor(um) L peti(i) usq(ue) a pub/ertate senectae meae perveni/re). Contrary to 
Arimnestus or the unnamed freedman from Patara mentioned above, Mygdonius clearly 
did not construe his biography around his period of slavery. Instead, he focussed on his 
long life, on his eventual Roman citizenship – mentioning enslavement merely as the 
enabler of this success – and on his financial prosperity. Indeed, next to the carmen is 
depicted the goddess Fortuna with a horn of plenty (cornucopia), visually reflecting the 
end-of-life achievement Mygdonius already presented in the text. 
Finally, the verse epitaph for Valeria Lycisca occupies a position in between those of 
Arimnestus and Mygdonius. “When I was twelve years old”, Lycisca entrusts us, “I came 
to Rome, which gave me the rights of a citizen and a burial spot” (XII annorum nata / 
Romam veni / quae mihi iura{e} dedit civis dedit et / mihi vivae quo inferrer tum / cum parvola 
facta c{e}inis)238. Like Mygdonius, Lycisca omits any reference to the time she spent as a 
slave, and instead skips immediately to her obtaining citizen rights. Also parallel to 
Mygdonius’ story, is the complete absence of a patron: it was the city of Rome itself that 
had granted her freedom. Both freedpersons, then, focussed entirely on their end-of-life 
achievements, rather than on the demeaning context of slavery, which other freedmen 
like Arimnestus or the unnamed man from Patara felt particularly worth accentuating. 
In Lycisca’s case, moreover, the story might easily be (mis)read as that of a (freeborn) 
foreigner obtaining citizen rights – especially because the initiative of the migration to 
Rome was discursively presented as Lycisca’s (veni). However, the formal libertination 
(absent in Mygdonius’ case) in the praescriptum explicitly attests to her condition, the 
concealment of which was therefore not Lycisca’s primary motive in omitting status in 
the carmen. Moreover, the columbarium context in which the inscription was found, 
suggests that the formal identification in the praescriptum served to accentuate 
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connections and network embeddedness rather than status as such. Unlike Mygdonius, 
but very much in line with Arimnestus’ commemorative choices, Lycisca does not 
mention her homeland. Together with the active role of “Rome” as giving her citizen 
rights and a burial spot, this omission points to a desire to represent the deceased as 
fully committed to her new identity as a citizen239. 
8.6.2 Three case studies 
Whereas some freedpersons thus clearly downplayed their period of servile 
subservience, others like Arimnestus voluntarily chose to give it pride of place in their 
epitaphs. In doing so, however, they typically contrasted this chapter of their lives with 
the current condition of freedom (and citizenship), thereby accentuating the promotion 
and elevation that was secured by their virtuous behaviour, despite the harsh realities 
of slavery rendering such behaviour very difficult to display. Undoubtedly the clearest 
example of this practice is the already mentioned claim made by Anicia Glucera that her 
patron had elevated her from the lowest condition to the highest honour by marrying 
her, and in doing so, allowing her to obtain the position of respectable matron in the 
prominent Anicii family (qu(a)e viro placui bo/no qui me ab imo / ordine ad summum / 
perduxit honorem)240.  
This section discusses three (brief) case studies that reveal in more detail how freed 
status could be combined with and mediated by attention to other identity dimensions. 
It argues that it was much more often “pride” than “shame” that steered the 
deliberation of whether or not (and if so, how) to include the servile past as meaningful 
determinant of the present condition. 
Larcia Horaea 
The epitaph for the freedwoman Larcia Horaea from Minturnae combines several 
strategies of (self)representation. The praescriptum to the poem includes all the persons 
featuring in it with full name and libertination or filiation, plus a brother of the 
husband. From left to right, these are 1) Horaea’s freed patron; 2) Horaea’s freed 
patroness; 3) Horraea’s freeborn brother-in-law; 4) Horraea’s freeborn husband; 5) 
Horraea herself. 
 
 
                                                     
239 Pace MacLean (2012), 203 who (over)interprets the mention of Lycisca’s age of arrival in Rome as 
a sign that “the memory of a time before servitude could persist in the shadow of an acquired 
Romanitas”. 
240 CLE 66 (= CIL 5, 1071). 
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P LARCIUS P L 
NEICIA 
SAUFEIA A L 
THALEA 
L LARCIUS P F 
RUFUS 
P LARCIUS P F 
BROCCHUS 
LARCIA P Ɔ L 
HORAEA 
 
The names are juxtaposed horizontally, quite literally representing each member of the 
core family as situated on the same level. Read from left to right, of course, the order of 
names reflects traditional age and familial hierarchies. First comes the eldest couple and 
founders of the family: Neicia and Thalea, both freedpersons of a different patron. Next 
come the two freeborn sons of the couple, whose typically “Roman” Latin names (Rufus 
and Brocchus) contrast sharply with their parents’ “servile” Greek ones. The actual 
recipient of the laudatory carmen is named at the very right: Larcia P(ubli) (mulieris) 
l(iberta) Horaea. Considering both the ordering of the praescriptum and the juxtaposition 
of their names, it seems safe to assume that Horaea’s husband was Brocchus rather than 
Rufus. The carmen underneath the list of names goes as follows241: 
“I was approved by good people, and envied by no respectable woman. I obeyed 
my old master and mistress and was deferential to my husband. Thus the first two 
adorned me with freedom, the latter with the stola. From my girlhood onward, I 
have managed the entire household for 20 years. The last day made the 
judgement: Death took away my soul but not the splendour of my life”. 
(Minturnae) 
 
The first verse describes the range of different people to whom the deceased had been 
particularly pleasing. These “good people” (boni) are not described in detail. Nor was 
this necessary, as the expression was meant first and foremost to reflect Horaea’s 
elevated character in general terms242. Similarly, the only thing we need to know about 
the women Horaea lived on good grounds with, is that they were respectable (proba). 
Instead of ascribing these virtues directly to Horaea, the carmen elaborately links them 
to her by association, implying that the freedwoman lived in the company only of good 
 
                                                     
241 CLE 56 (= CIL 10, 6009): “boneis probata inveisa sum a nulla proba / fui parens domineis 
senibus huic autem o<b=P>sequens / ita leibertate illei me hic me decoraat stola / a pupula annos 
veiginti optinui domum / omnem supremus fecit iudicium dies / mors animam eripuit non 
v{e}itae ornatum apstulis”. Today, the monument is known only from drawings, but three 
independent sketches confirm its authenticity (CIL, ad loc.).  
242 Being probatus bonis was a character trait occasionally invoked in other carmina as well. See, for 
example, CLE 12 (= CIL 10, 5282) where Protymus’ patron deemed it appropriate to accentuate that 
his freedman had been summa cum laude probatus. The object in dative is unknown due to 
fragmentary preservation of the monument, but Bücheler argued that boneis vireis would constitute 
a plausible completion of the hexameter (CIL, ad loc.).  
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and respectable individuals, whom she attracted and pleased by her own good morals243. 
The  second verse turns to Horaea’s immediate surroundings, as it describes her relation 
to her parents-in-law qua patrons, and to their son, her husband. To all three of them, 
she was respectfully deferential, although different terms were used to describe this 
virtue: parens in relation to the patrons and obsequens in relation to the husband.  
This is an interesting formulation, since the use of two different terms establishes a 
clear demarcation. In this respect, it is meaningful that Horaea is described as 
deferential to her old “masters” (domineis senibus), rather than to her “patrons”. In fact, 
we can read in the line a chronological (perhaps even causal) evolution, insinuating that 
it was this very deference that allowed and enabled her to also be reverential to her 
husband once freed. Marriages between slave and (son of) master were not exceptional 
and would even be “encouraged” only a few decades later by the promulgation of the lex 
Aelia Sentia, which declared prospective matrimonium a iusta causa for manumission 
below 30 years of age244. Whether Horaea had been freed with the explicit intention of 
marrying her off to Brocchus, or whether she was a free woman already when the plans 
were made, we cannot tell. In any case, it was the reverence to her “masters” that was 
rewarded by manumission, and which thus at least indirectly allowed her to be 
obsequious to her husband. This interpretation is confirmed by the next verse. The use 
of ita clearly connects it with the previous line, and introduces a further elaboration on 
the reasons and consequences of her reverence. The “masters” had adorned (decoraat) 
her with freedom, Brocchus with the stola (i.e. turning her into a respectable matron by 
formal marriage). Once more, there is a clear chronological sequence, which is again 
discursively reflected by the placement of stola after libertas, just like the deference to 
the dominis preceded the reverence to her husband (huic): manumission was the 
necessary condition for the subsequent conjugal piety.  
The use of decorare as zeugma transfers its literal meaning (Horraea’s husband 
“adorned” her with the stola) to a more symbolic one (her patrons “honoured” her with 
freedom), and once again manifestly frames both actions in one chronological 
continuum. The chronological perspective is made even more explicit in the next verse 
where Horaea reveals her “career” in her masters’ household. From a young age (a 
pupula), and for twenty years on end, she had managed (obtinui) this household and all 
that pertained to it (domum omnem). Moreover, the last verse of the carmen even 
 
                                                     
243 In CLE 64 (= CIL 6, 23685), Pacilia Sospita is similarly described as bonis probata, but the quality 
proba is ascribed to her directly instead of to the women she was associated with. Cf. also CLE 1089-
90. 
244 Gaius, Inst. 1.19: “Iusta autem causa manumissionis est, veluti si quis filium flliamve aut fratrem 
sororemve naturalem aut alumnum aut paedagogum aut servum procuratoris habendi gratia aut 
ancillam matrimonii causa apud consilium manumittat”. The inscription is dated to the first half of 
the first century BCE, cf. Bücheler (1982) [1895-1930], 28. 
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suggests that she had continued to do so until the day she died. Combining these 
elements, we can chance an estimated guess of Horaea’s age at death (between ca. 25 
and ca. 35 years old), assuming that pupula roughly refers to the period in between her 
fifth and fifteenth birthday. Even though her manumission was given considerable 
attention in verse three, the description of Horaea’s career does not reflect this critical 
milestone in her life. In fact, as a free matron, she was apparently still doing the same 
work as when she was a young slave girl245. Both the great responsibility and the long 
duration of her function were clearly a source of great pride: the carmen ends by the 
optimistic note that Horaea’s life had in a way defeated death. It may well have taken 
her soul (mors animam eripuit), but it was not able to snatch away the splendour of her 
life (non vitae ornatum apstulis). Whereas the transition from servitude to respectful 
marriage was worth stressing at the beginning of the carmen, Horaea’s career 
unambiguously provided the overarching biographic continuum in which this transition 
had taken place.  
Although Horaea in all likelihood did not write this poem herself, she is endowed 
with considerable agency. This agency is reflected most prominently by the verbs 
rendered in the first person, as if uttered by the deceased herself. Especially optinui 
attests to the freedwoman’s responsible domestic tasks. As such, Horaea’s real-life 
agency is matched and reflected by her discursive agency in the carmen. Because her 
husband and patrons (if they – though senes – outlived their freedwoman) were most 
likely responsible for the poem, it primarily reflects their concerns and attitudes. 
However, since they were of servile descent themselves, these may not have differed 
radically from Horaea’s point of view. Indeed, Saufeia Thalea, for one, would from her 
own experience have known what it meant to transcend slave status and become a 
respectfully married freedwoman. Even if the carmen does not express the personal 
inner feelings of Horaea, it does provide a reliable impression of how a servile past was 
incorporated in the freedperson’s obituary. Rather than a badge of shame, it was 
considered the first step in social advancement. Excellent behaviour as a slave girl 
enabled the freedwoman to engage in a narrative of individual merit, which – with the 
luxury of hindsight – credited inherent characteristics and morality for her promotion. 
 
                                                     
245 Cf. Milnor (2008), 37: “one significant aspect of the feminine domestic ideal as it is expressed in 
Roman texts is the extent to which it does not vary by class”. The possibility that the domus changed 
over time (e.g. after Horaea’s marriage or after her patrons’ death) is irrelevant for us (as it was, 
apparently, for the dedicator). The stress lay on her responsible function, in whatever domus it was 
to be situated. 
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Veratia Eleutheris 
Whereas freedpersons could opt to deliberately omit or explicitly include a reference to 
their servile past, poems like that of Larcia Horaea reveal how a combination of both 
approaches constituted an original way for ex-slaves to mediate different identity 
dimensions (i.c. accentuating freed status, but situating it in an overarching narrative of 
personal merit and domestic virtue). An even more subtle strategy can be discerned in 
the carmen for Veratia Eleutheris246: 
“Gaius Iulius Antiochus, freedman of Caius. Veratia Eleutheris, freedwoman of 
Caius. So chastely did Veratia hold the flower of her youth that she never derived 
any joy from dishonour. Because she lived happily with only one devoted 
husband, she was a woman worthy of all kinds of good things, but enduring also 
the bad ones. Veratia Salvia, freedwoman of Caius”. (Rome) 
 
The prae- and postscripta inform us about the deceased and the dedicator of the 
inscription, but a lot of questions remain unanswered. Antiochus is undoubtedly to be 
identified as Veratia’s “only husband” mentioned in the poem. But apart from this, their 
relation remains obscure. They were both freedpersons, and they both named a certain 
“Gaius” as their patron. But whether Antiochus was Eleutheris’ patron or her collibertus 
is not clear. In both these cases, however, Antiochus had to have been adopted. Indeed, 
if he shared the same patron with Eleutheris, he should have been called C. Veratius 
(not C. Iulius), and if he had freed her himself, she should have been called Iulia (not 
Veratia). The most plausible solution, then, is that Antiochus and Eleutheris were both 
freedpersons of a different Gaius altogether. The inscription was either set up by Veratia 
Salvia or by Antiochus (or both). As a freedwoman of a certain Gaius Veratius, Salvia was 
most likely a colliberta of Eleutheris, but her precise function in the inscription remains 
unknown247. At any rate, Eleutheris’ patron – even if this was Antiochus – is not 
explicitly present as such in the epitaph.   
The carmen typically focusses on the marital bond between Antiochus and Eleutheris. 
Consequently, the descriptions are very traditional: she was very “happy” (contenta) 
 
                                                     
246 CLE 968 (= CIL 6, 19838): “C(aius) Iulius C(ai) l(ibertus) Antiochus / Veratia C(ai) l(iberta) 
Eleutheris / s{e}ic florem aetatis tenuit Veratia caste / nulla ut perciperet gaudia dedecoris / 
coniuge namque uno vixit contenta probato / cetera digna bonis femina facta tulit / Veratia C(ai) 
l(iberta) Salvia”. 
247 The letters of her name are as big as those of Antiochus and Eleutheris, and thus slightly bigger 
than those of the carmen. Her name was not added in a later phase, but included as part of the 
original inscription. This latter observation suggests that she was at least partially responsible for 
the erection of the monument. 
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with her “devoted husband” (coniuge uno probato). However, the very beginning of the 
carmen takes the opportunity to first accentuate a somewhat more personal and 
individual trait of Eleutheris: as a young woman, she had always remained chaste. The 
use of flos aetatis to express flourishing youth clearly betrays literary influences248, but 
the expression is immediately and causally linked (sic…ut) to the disclaimer that 
Eleutheris had never experienced any joy from dishonourable activities throughout this 
young life. Readers of the epitaph would know that Eleutheris’ status as a slave girl 
would have at least potentially subjected her to all kinds of (sexual) degradation. 
However, the act of manumission, especially when combined with respectful marriage, 
wiped out the stigma attached to this servile subordination, and allowed the liberta to 
begin her life as a free woman with a clean slate249. It is certainly no coincidence that 
the dedicator chose to accentuate Eleutheris’ role as respectful and chaste unavira of her 
husband. As mentioned earlier, freedwomen could become respectable Roman matrons, 
whom the legal sources defined as persons who had “never lived dishonourably”250.  
Indeed, being a matron had less to do with simply being married than with displaying 
the correct conduct expected from such women251. Eleutheris clearly exhibited such 
appropriate conduct, but she did not entirely cover up her past experiences. The 
expression nulla ut perciperet gaudia dedecoris can be interpreted as Eleutheris never 
having had the opportunity to enjoy shameful deeds (i.e. “she has never been 
dishonoured”). But it is equally possible to read in it a subtle recognition of the 
freedwoman’s servile degradation, even though she had always had her mind set on 
advancement and never enjoyed these adversities (i.e. “she never enjoyed the disgrace 
she had been subjected to”). In fact, the rendering of this passage in the negative sense – 
using dedecus instead of decus, pudicitia, or other positive descriptions typically reserved 
for matrons252 – seems to hint at this too. Dedecus is nowhere else used in metric 
inscriptions, whereas decus, for example, was a much more popular term to convey the 
(positive) sentiment253.  
The last verse of Eleutheris’ carmen similarly seems to point to a desire to not entirely 
disregard or conceal the past. It tells us that Eleutheris was a woman who deserved 
nothing but good things (digna bonis femina), but that she had nonetheless endured 
hardships too (cetera facta tulit). Once again, the sentiment could have been expressed in 
exclusively positive terms, exalting Eleutheris as a virtuous example of a dignified 
 
                                                     
248 E.g. Verg. Aen. 7.162: “pueri et primaevo flore iuventus”; 8.499-500: “iuventus flos veterum 
virtusque virum”. 
249 This is one of the central themes in Perry’s (2014) inspiring monograph dedicated to this subject. 
250 Dig. 50.16.46.1. Cf. Chapter 2. 
251 Saller (1999), 193-6; Evans Grubbs (2002), 19. 
252 Cf. Langlands (2006), 37. 
253 E.g. CLE 55 (= CIL 6, 10096); 1038 (= CIL 6, 14404). 
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matron. But instead, the verse deliberately includes the suggestion that she had in fact 
been made to endure bad things too; bad things which – taken in conjunction with the 
first two verses – she refused to enjoy, but merely tolerated because it was her part to 
do so (i.e. as a “good slave”). 
Accentuating a decent walk of life, or referencing the valiant coping with adversity 
are recurrent topoi in obituaries, but the ambiguous rendering of nulla ut perciperet 
gaudia dedecoris, the very exceptional use of dedecus in the first place, and the connection 
between the first two verses and the last – encapsulating the depiction of the happy and 
respectful marriage – point to an original modification of these themes to suit a very 
specific purpose. The dedicator – whether Antiochus or Salvia – thought that Eleutheris’ 
status as a virtuous matron would be all the more accentuated by referencing the 
hardships she had had to go through to obtain it. Any reader would have known (or 
have a rough idea of) what these hardships included, but they would also have known 
this if the dedicator had left them out of the picture. Therefore, rather than entirely 
omitting the dishonour suffered as a slave girl, the dedicator subtly recognised it, but at 
the same time used it to draw attention to Eleutheris’ social promotion, as well as to her 
ability to conform to social norms and expectations. Indeed, she had been, 
paradoxically, as good a slave girl when she had to, as a Roman matron when she was 
allowed to. The implication is that Eleutheris had been virtuous all along, and that only 
external influences had forced her to (reluctantly) endure dishonourable things. Once 
freed, however, she could fully benefit from her elevated character. In a moral sense, 
then, Eleutheris had been ἐλευθέρα all along. 
Princeps 
Finally, a severely damaged inscription found in central-Italy (Aesernia) attests to the 
possibilities the realm of professional activity entailed to nuance a servile past254. The 
praescriptum is still intact, and informs us that the monument had been made by the 
freedman Princeps for himself, his relatives, and his patron Lucius Taminius Rufus. 
Rufus receives full filiation – L(uci) f(ilio) – and tribal association – Tro(mentina) –, clearly 
revealing his freeborn status. On the top of the monument is depicted the (very 
damaged) bust of a man, probably to be identified with this Rufus, as his name is 
featured (at the beginning of the praescriptum) immediately underneath it. Under the 
praescriptum, a scene is shown of (at least) two men sitting at a table – probably Princeps 
and his patron. The metric text of the inscription is written on the table at which these 
individuals were sitting, clearly linking the poem to whatever it was they were doing. 
Unfortunately, the carmen is severely damaged, and its first part has been very 
 
                                                     
254 CLE 36 (= CIL 9, 2749). 
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differently restored by several observers. The CIL editors mention many different 
readings, but the one best corresponding to the surviving pieces of text is: vig<i=U>l a 
mane an(n)a et / capias sic aes cito (“Be watchful from the very start of the day, and you 
will reap coin immediately”). It is a clear advice – or exhortation, if the imperative anna 
is taken literally – to be zealous, to work hard, and to enjoy the profits from this labour. 
The text, then, reveals that Rufus and his freedman were likely involved in a lucrative 
business, and the relief indicates that they could do this job from behind a desk. This has 
led scholars to the very plausible suggestion that they must have been bankers or 
moneylenders255. 
 
Figure 5 The funerary monument of Princeps and his patron Lucius Taminius Rufus 
 
Be that as it may, the entire monument breathes the air of pride, success, and 
achievement. Lending money for a living was not something members of the elite 
publicised in their funerary monuments (even though they frequently engaged in it256), 
since it came very close to Cicero’s first category of “vulgar means of livelihood” 
 
                                                     
255 Thus Lega (2012), 207, who also restores the text in this way. 
256 Andreau (1982), 108; (1999), passim (e.g. p. 2).  
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(quaestus et artificia sordidi), i.e. that of usurers (faeneratores)257. Even though Princeps 
would certainly not have presented himself or his patron as a faenerator – terms like 
argentarius and nummularius are much more often attested, and have at any rate a less 
pejorative connotation258 – freedmen (and freeborn members of the plebs media, for that 
matter) felt no shame in publicising their success in these occupations. As noted several 
times before, professional status was an identity dimension particularly valued by freed 
slaves who wanted to gain prestige – and wealth – via ways (“paths”) other than the one 
denied to them. Jean Andreau captured this situation most comprehensively by 
introducing the notion of “statut de travail”, an expression perhaps best left un-
translated, and most recently reintroduced by Nicolas Tran259. It should be clear, 
however, that both Andreau and Tran considered it an analytical tool to study the 
socialisation of Rome’s lower classes in general, without a priori separating freedmen 
from the freeborn members of the plebs media. 
Indeed, Princeps makes this inscription for himself, but also for his freeborn patron, 
who clearly derived equal pride from his success in business260. Moreover, neither of the 
two individuals wears the toga to highlight citizen status (even though at least Rufus 
was allowed to). Both men instead present themselves in tunica, i.e. the clothing they 
would most likely wear during work. This reveals a clear preference to depict the “statut 
de travail” as veracious as possible, with other identity dimensions being explicitly 
downplayed to achieve this goal. Finally, Princeps and his patron are seated next to each 
other at the table, as equals: they wear the same clothes, they perform the same work, 
and they are as equally prominently present in the scene. Although the freed status of 
Princeps was naturally “inferior” to that of his patron from a legal point of view, it did 
not seem to have played a role at all in the choices the freedman made when erecting 
this monument261.  
The final section of this chapter reiterates the main subject of Chapter 7, but this time 
from a markedly non-elite perspective. It focusses on a more literal sense of “discourse”, 
 
                                                     
257 Cic. Off. 1.150. 
258 Verboven (1993), 80-2; (2007). 
259 Andreau (1985), 378; (1987), 25ff; Tran (2013), passim (e.g. 5-10).  
260 Compare, for example, with CIL 11, 139, where two freedmen of the ship maker Publius 
Longidienus commemorate their patron by citing his personal motto: “P(ublius) Longidienus P(ubli) 
f(ilius) ad onus properat”. Together with the visual representation of Publius zealously at work, the 
monument is an illuminating example of how the importance of legal status would all but disappear 
in these contexts, cf. Clarke (2003), 118-21. 
261 Cf. Fabre (1981), 341 (not talking about this monument in particular): “Une certaine proximité 
s'établissait, renforcée par la fierté du travail et l'exaltation de valeurs qui apparaissent propres aux 
affranchis et aux ingénus maîtrisant des techniques souvent délicates, et qui contrastent avec le 
mépris du travail manuel exprimé par ceux qui ne voient dans de tels producteurs que des operarii”. 
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and asks the question whether freedpersons described their merits and qualities with a 
delineated “set of virtues” or with a “specific vocabulary”. It pays particular attention to 
the interaction with elite discourse, and on the implications for our main research 
question, viz. whether any moral taint of slavery is reflected in the attempts at (self-
)representation of freedpersons. 
8.7 A “libertine discourse” in carmina epigraphica? 
As noted in the previous chapter, MacLean’s central thesis – drawing heavily on 
Mouritsen’s 2011 synthesis – postulates a strong separation between “elite virtues” and 
“libertine virtues”. It thus distinguishes between “securely aristocratic terms like gloria, 
laus, honos, and nomen” on the one hand, and “the articulation of a different sort of fama, 
one that derived (…) from the combination of obedience to one’s master and the 
industrious performance of labor” on the other262. The previous chapter argued that the 
latter combination of virtues was valued in and by all strata of society, and that singling 
out freedmen is a methodological fallacy, leading to self-fulfilling arguments. It too 
readily concludes from the difference between freed and elite “paths to glory” that the 
former was status-related and as such sui generis; a conclusion deriving in no small 
degree from ignoring the representation of and discourse on other non-elite members 
of society, such as the freeborn members of the plebs media. Freedmen’s prominent 
presence in both elite writings and epigraphic texts does not ipso facto justify the 
assumption that a binary opposition existed with the elite (i.e. somehow “libertinising” 
the general discourse of distinction). Put differently, when “virtues” appear to be 
“libertine”, we must ask ourselves whether this is a consequence of a uniqueness 
inherent to freed status, or of the fact that our sources (and heuristic methodology) 
focus predominantly on this category of people. 
The central argument of the previous chapter, then, was that values, qualities, and 
terms “typically reserved for freedmen” were, in fact, not. It postulated the existence of 
two (ideal-typical) paths to glory, one of which was available only to the elite (noble 
lineage, public office, …), but the other to all members of society, regardless of their 
social or legal status (family values, personal virtue, respect towards social superiors, 
etc.). Literary sources may well single out (especially rich and usurping) libertini as the 
 
                                                     
262 MacLean (2012), passim. The quote is from p. 44-5. “Libertine” and “elite” virtues are literally 
contrasted on – for example – p. 33 note 117.  
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most conspicuous “other” against whose attempts at anticipatory socialisation the elite 
directed its efforts of distinction (Chapter 6), but it is something else entirely to argue 
that they developed a specific set of qualities or terms to do so, or that they believed 
that this discourse on the “bad” freedman was a priori applicable to the entire (legal) 
category of ex-slaves in general263. Of course, like the urban poor or even (lower) 
middling groups, freedmen were excluded from the “elite path”, not because they were 
ex-slaves per se, but because they were non-elite in general terms (i.e. lacking (access to) 
at least one of the criteria that had to be met in order to qualify as “elite”)264. The 
former interpretation derives mainly from (elite) literary sources. This section, 
therefore, approaches the matter from another perspective – feasible only because of 
the individual and network embedded nature of funerary inscriptions – by evaluating in 
particular how aspects of the elite’s “path to glory” (like MacLean’s “securely 
aristocratic terms”) were contextually appropriated and mediated by ex-slaves to suit 
individual commemoration purposes.  
Gravitas was a virtue the elite attached great value to265. Robert Kaster has recently 
honoured its pivotal position in the idealising discourse of these elites by formulating a 
lengthy definition of the term. He wrote that the virtue could be obtained only by 
observing all possible “vectors of excellence”, including “performing manly deeds while 
serving the community in war and peace, maintaining your freely chosen commitments 
by displaying fides and the other associated virtues, and fulfilling the many obligations 
of reciprocity that bound you to the living, the dead, and the divine, all the while 
regulating your behaviour by the promptings of  ethical dispositions such as verecundia 
and pudor”266. It is no coincidence that many high-standing freeborn individuals chose 
to include this character trait in their (verse) epitaphs267. As a consequence, however, 
the elite deemed gravitas a virtue particularly lacking in men and women of lesser 
means and status, who were almost by definition – either because of their financial 
means or because of formal restrictions – unable to “serve the community”268. Edwards 
 
                                                     
263 From a comparative perspective, the observations made in Ogilvie (2005), 11-2 are worth 
mentioning. She noted how Early Modern literary productions assimilated poor craftsmanship to 
moral wickedness, but stressed that these texts are in no way representative for the occurence of 
such wickedness. This is true also, mutatis mutandis, for “bad” freedmen. 
264 Alföldy (1988), 107-8 famously recognised wealth, membership of a formal ordo, social prestige, 
and a record of office-holding as the most important criteria. 
265 Ferguson (1958), 176. 
266 Kaster (2010), 154. 
267 E.g. CLE 1388: “annis parve quidem sed gravitate senex”; 1390: “moribus ingenio et gravitate 
nitens”. 
268 Legal sources, on the contrary, could refer to the gravitas even of mancipi, e.g. Dig. 7.1.15.2: 
“Sufficienter autem alere et vestire debet secundum ordinem et dignitatem mancipiorum”. 
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convincingly argued that this was the case especially for actors, but the exclusion of 
freedmen from the army (at least de facto) and from public office (formally since 24 CE) 
would prevent them too from meeting all requirements269.  
Nonetheless, gravitas does occur in freedpersons’ funerary inscriptions as well. A nice 
example is the epitaph the freedman Gaius Pagurius Gelos made for a certain Salvia270. 
The latter’s status is not made explicit, but the name Salvia was a popular slave name271. 
Moreover, the description of her young age (sepulta haec sita sum verna quoius aetatulae) 
contains a subtle wordplay on her status, since although verna means “vernal” in this 
particular case (“in the spring of her life”), it also evokes the image of a home-born slave 
girl (verna)272. Salvia’s relationship with Gelos is, however, much more ambiguous. An 
identification as his partner seems most plausible, given her depiction as a true matron. 
She is said to have fulfilled in all seriousness her duty, and excelled in the spinning of 
wool (gravitatem officio et lanificio praestit{e}i), a combination of qualities praised almost 
exclusively in honourable wives273. All of these inferences combined, Salvia and Gelos 
appear to have been partners (and perhaps even formally married). If “Salvia” was a 
cognomen rather than a nomen, moreover, she may even have been Gelos’ own 
freedwoman, but this cannot be ascertained.  
What is particularly interesting, though, is the description of Salvia fulfilling her 
domestic duties “with gravitas”, a term that is accentuated even more by the repetitive 
use of grave in the next verse. Surely, there existed an elaborated “Tugendkanon” for 
pious women, whether freed or freeborn. Thus the freedwoman Clodia Secunda was 
commemorated for her piety (pietas), loyalty (fides), love (amor), understanding (sensus), 
modesty (pudor), and sanctity (sanctitas)274, but so were Vestal Virgins, freeborn 
 
                                                     
269 Edwards (1994), esp. 89-90. 
270 CLE 63 (= CIL 5, 6808): “C(ai) Paguri C(ai) l(iberti) Gelot[i]s / hospes resiste et tumulum hunc 
excelsum aspic[e] / quo continentur ossa parvae aetatulae / sepulta haec sita sum verna quoius 
aetatulae / gravitatem officio et lanificio praestit{e}i(t) / queror fortunae cassum tam iniquom et 
grave / nomen ei quaeras exoraturi salviae / valebis hospes opto ut s<e=C>is felicior”. 
271 E.g. CIL 6, 7206: “Manlia Cn(aei) l(iberta) Salvia”; CLE 1563 (= CIL 6, 33087): “Sa[t]riena P(ubli) 
l(iberta) Salvia”; but also as nomen: CIL 6, 29249: “Salvia / Attice”. Cf. Kajanto (1965), 134, 177 Schulze 
(1966), 472; Jansen (2007), 268-70. 
272 Some scholars take verna to literally mean “house-born slave girl” in this instance, e.g. 
Cholodniak (1904), 549. Others are inclined to interpret it merely as “vernal”, e.g. Jansen (2007), 267-
8. But Gelos’ intention seems to have been precisely to create this “double meaning”. Trying to 
establish the “only correct” reading of verna is therefore disrespecting the clever semantic 
connotation of the word in this particular case. Cf. Dickison & Hallett (2015), 70, who consider it a 
“sophisticated pun”. 
273 E.g. CLE 237 (= CIL 6, 11602): “Hic sita est Amymone Marci optima et pulcherrima / lanifica pia 
pudica frugi casta domiseda”. Cf. Massaro (1992), 111-2. 
274 CLE 81 (= CIL 6, 4379). 
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mothers, illegitimate daughters, etc.275 Although gravitas was a quality first and 
foremost attributed to (high-ranking) men276, Roman matrons too could be occasionally 
characterised this way, even though their gravitas – much like any other virtue women 
could theoretically share with men – expressed itself rather differently277. Pliny thus 
commemorated the 14-year-old daughter of his friend Minicius Fundanus by 
accentuating that she had had the “seriousness characteristic of a matron” (matronalis 
gravitas), but also implied that this virtue derived primarily from her father’s 
example278. Fannia, the respectable wife of Helvidius Priscus, showcased – among other 
virtues – her integrity (sanctitas) and seriousness (gravitas), but these qualities were 
respectable first and foremost because they were “worthy of her husband and father”279. 
Freedpersons, however, supposedly lacked such gravitas in any form, but did not differ 
in this respect from freeborn members of the plebs media, or from the later formal 
category of humiliores280.  
Nonetheless, Gelos too ascribed the virtue to his dear Salvia in the poem he made for 
her. Interestingly, the quality is not used to describe her elevated innate character – like 
in the cases of the aristocratic daughters mentioned above. It is used instead to 
accentuate the way in which she fulfilled her duties, among which the spinning of wool 
(surely a pars pro toto for household work in general) was the one worth stressing most 
explicitly. In other words, terms and qualities that were in elite discourse almost 
exclusively reserved for freeborn nobles, were here appropriated by freedpersons in 
their epitaph, and adjusted to fit this non-elite context. Salvia could not claim to have 
inherited this virtue from any noble father, nor could she claim to be gravis as a 
consequence of her following her husband into exile (like Fannia did), or to have 
married a young nobleman because of this admirable strictness (like Minicia was about 
to, right before she died). Her gravitas derived instead from the “path to glory” available 
to her, and was related first and foremost to dutiful housewife activities. Whereas elite 
authors, too, respected this kind of virtuous devotion, they would surely have abstained 
from framing it in a discourse of elite gravitas. Gelos’ description of his wife thus drew 
attention to very traditional virtues, but endowed them with the semantic connotation 
 
                                                     
275 E.g. CIL 6, 32415; 6, 32414; CIL 8, 11294; 11, 3941; 2, 2436; 2, 4403; 10, 3079; … For this 
“Tugendkanon”, see Muth (2005), 263. 
276 E.g. CIL 6, 8401; 6, 41228; 8, 5367; 8, 5502; 10, 1126.  
277 E.g. Sen. Ep. 70.10: “Scribonia, gravis femina”. Cf. Tuomela (2014), passim (e.g. p. 17). 
278 Plin. Ep. 5.16.2, 9: “nondum annos XIIII impleverat, et iam illi anilis prudentia, matronalis gravitas 
erat et tamen suavitas puellaris cum virginali verecundia. (…) amisit enim filiam, quae non minus 
mores eius quam os vultumque referebat, totumque patrem mira similitudine exscriperat” (about 
Minicia Marcella). 
279 Plin. Ep. 7.19.4: “animus tantum et spiritus viget Helvidio marito, Thrasea patre dignisimus; (…) 
quae castitas illi, quae sanctitas, quanta gravitas quanta constantia” (about Fannia). 
280 Alföldy (1984), 94. 
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of nobility, which Salvia – from Gelos’ perspective – deserved just as much as a “real” 
noblewoman.  
Nor was Gelos alone in originally appropriating and mediating “elite virtues” to 
accommodate the purpose of self-commemoration. Interestingly, patrons too – 
sometimes of relatively high standing – discursively endowed their deceased 
freedpersons with virtues that would be considered by the “detached” discourse of the 
top-elite as particularly inappropriate to praise ex-slaves with. The consular Cotta 
Messalinus was proud to claim that he had “ennobled” (nobilis facta) his deceased 
freedman Zosimus by having granted him vast riches (and his son a position as tribune) 
throughout his life281. Cotta himself was undoubtedly nobilis, as even the most hostile 
author recording his life had to admit. Indeed, Tacitus wrote that although Cotta was an 
aristocrat, he was nonetheless destitute because of his luxury, and degraded by his vices 
(qui nobilis quidem, set egens ob luxum, per flagitia infamis)282. For Tacitus, Cotta’s nobilitas 
was unrelated to his activities and behaviour, which greatly tarnished his reputation, 
but which did not nullify this nobility, as it was a trait bestowed on him first through 
birth, and later confirmed by his holding the highest public office (consul in 20 CE).  
Obviously, Cotta could invoke neither of these sources of prestige in his appraisal of 
Zosimus, since the latter was a libertinus. Regardless, he explicitly appropriated the term 
to endow the memory of his freedman with some of its semantic gravity. The main 
reason for this pseudo-nobility, however, was Zosimus’ pivotal position in Cotta’s trust 
network (as accensus), and his being responsible for his patron’s financial affairs (suas 
opes)283. By serving as a valued extension (or, literally, umbra, “shadow”) of his patron, 
and by his overall close association with him, in other words, the latter’s nobility was (at 
least discursively) passed on to Zosimus. It is meaningful in this respect, that Cotta 
explicitly links (sed) Zosimus’ nobilitas to his being a libertinus (this epitaph being the 
only one extant that spells out libertination in this way284), whereas the reasons for his 
elevation are situated entirely – and necessarily – within the bounds of the freedman’s 
relationship with his patron. The juxtaposition of libertinus and nobilis was undoubtedly 
intended to exceptionally praise Zosimus and commemorate his social rise, but also – 
and arguably even more so – to eulogise Cotta, through whose good cares Zosimus was 
allowed to prosper in the first place.  
 
                                                     
281 CLE 990 (= CIL 14, 2298): “libertinus eram fateor sed facta legetur / patrono Cotta nobilis umbra 
mea”. (see already the discussion above). 
282 Tac. Ann. 6.7. 
283 Cf. Aubert (1994), 24; Mouritsen (2011), 214 (with references). 
284 In CLE 1125 (= CIL 9, 3358), Ninnia Primilla does mention her libertini parentes, but the term is used 
as an adjective, and not to describe the deceased (who was explicitly not a libertina herself: “Ninniae 
Q(uinti) f(iliae) Primil/lae sacerdoti Cereriae”). 
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It can be compared to Statius’ eulogy of Claudius Etruscus’ freed father – the 
prominent Augusti libertus who rose to exceptional heights under Trajan285. One of the 
identity dimensions Statius exploits most fervently is Claudius’ elevated position in the 
court of several emperors, whose favour allowed him to obtain great honour (e.g. laeta 
dehinc series variisque ex ordine curis auctus honos; semperque gradi prope numina, semper 
Caesareum coluisse latus sacrisque deorum, arcanis haerere datum)286. Mouritsen typically 
described Statius’ strategy as a “curious attempt to minimise the stigma of servitude” 
and considered it a confirmation of his assumption that “the only effective way of 
eulogising a freedman was to play down the dishonour normally associated with 
subservience” 287. However, this seems true only from a one-sided and top-down elite 
point of view. Indeed, Cotta too had Zosimus somehow reluctantly “admit” (fateor) that 
he was a freedman, but as we will see momentarily, the expression of “noble” traits by 
ex-slaves was rarely accompanied by a deliberate attempt to downplay freed status. At 
least for these individuals, both identity dimensions did not necessarily conflict288.  
Occurrences of the term nobilis in freedperson’s epitaphs are rare289, and we should 
be careful not to over-interpret these attestations. Whereas nobilis in Zosimus’ case was 
clearly intended to flirt with social transgression, the term could also be included 
simply to convey the extent of one’s fame or renown, i.e. seemingly unrelated to social 
prestige or legal status. Thus the unnamed patron of the freed doctor Primigenius 
praised his freedman’s “known ability and even more famous trustworthiness” (arte 
feror nota nobiliore fide)290. Nobiliore is used to – crescendo-wise – accentuate Primigenius’ 
renown, and could as such be translated in a rather neutral way. However, much like 
Gelos’ use of verna, the particular choice for this specific term, i.e. when lots of 
synonyms were available (insignis, celeber, inclitus, …), was a deliberate choice (as is any 
choice of words). In any case, any implied nobleness derived from Primigenius’ fides, 
 
                                                     
285 Stat. Silv. 3.3. For the most comprehensive study on this freedman, see still Weaver (1965). 
Kleijwegt (2006b), 96 note 24 already noticed the parallel between Zosimus and Claudius. 
286 Stat. Silv. 3.3.63-6. 
287 Mouritsen (2011), 23. 
288 Statius’ eulogy, it might be added, accentuated innate virtues of Etruscus’ father as well, i.e. 
disconnected from his freed status. E.g. Stat. Silv. 3.3.106-8 (his frugality): “Hinc tibi rara quies 
animoque exclusa voluptas, exiguaeque dapes et numquam laesa profundo cura mero”. Compare 
with Mart. 9.79.5-6, where Martial eulogises imperial freedmen for their gentle character (placidae 
mentes), respectfulness (reverentia), calm (quies), and modesty (pudor). 
289 CLE 1136 (= CIL 6, 9693) mentions a nobilis Euphrosyne, but we cannot know whether this young 
woman is to be identified as the liberta Euphrosyne Paragmia mentioned at the end of the inscription. 
Vidman (1980), 256 (= the index of names to the sixth volume of the CIL), for example, lists them as 
one and the same. Cenerini (2014), 99 is more hesitant, but similarly notes the coincidence of 
freedwoman and patroness sharing the same name. 
290 CLE 1252 (= CIL 11, 5836). The inscription has Primigenius speak the words himself, but it was his 
patron who made the grave (patronus patrio condidit ossa solo), cf. supra. 
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which was in turn closely connected to his profession and renown as a doctor. Once 
again then, a patron deemed it appropriate to confirm and praise the exceptional 
achievements of his freedman by borrowing (or at least alluding to) virtues typically 
associated with elite discourse, but at the same time re-contextualising them to 
maintain “proper” decorum.  
The use of the epithets bonus and optimus in freedpersons’ epitaphs signify a similar 
strategy. As “nouns” or as adjectives modifying vir, elite parlance reserved these terms 
almost exclusively for the nobility, and especially for the portion of it that (purportedly) 
advanced the interest of the state291. As adjectives, inscriptions feature them 
prominently to accentuate the particular virtue of a spouse, regardless of legal status 
(optimus/-a coniunx or bonus/-a uxor)292. It is in this emotional sense also, that references 
to a libertus optimus or a patrona optima should be understood, i.e. disconnected from any 
political connotation the word carried in literary sources293. However, the qualities, 
reputation, and judgement of a freedperson could also be described as “good”. This 
happens much less frequently, but echoes the sense of goodness elite authors would 
rarely attribute to an ex-slave. Thus the freed couple Gaius Numitorius Asclepiades and 
Mummia Zosima were happy to record their good reputation (bona fama) in their 
funerary inscription294. Moreover, the phrase is juxtaposed to a reference to their 
honourable passing (exsituq(ue) hones). An “honest” life, and the praise one had received 
for it, was accentuated on several occasions. To draw attention to their praiseworthy 
morality, for example, four freedmen from Alba Fucens noted in their shared epitaph 
that they were lauded by their acquaintances (vitam laudarunt meam) because they had 
lived an honest life ([post vitam ho]nestam aeternam deveni domu[m])295. Similarly, in the 
long and touching bilingual inscription Atimetus Anterotianus made for his deceased 
wife Claudia Homonoea, a colliberta of his, the mourning husband regrets that despite 
 
                                                     
291 Cf. Achard (1973); Seletsky (1976); Hellegouarc’h (1963), 485–93; Fabre (1981), 237-8; Santoro 
L’hoir (1992), 10-11, 65. One of the few exceptions is Att. 7.4.1 (Chapter 7), but it is intended there 
precisely to “cross established boundaries”, cf. Mouritsen (2011), 61-2. 
292 E.g. CIL 6, 18510; 20438; 28281; etc. For attestations in metric epitaphs by or for freedpersons, see 
e.g. CLE 15’ (= CIL 6, 23297): “Pontia ux{s}or / fruge bona pudica”; 477 (= CIL 14, 2605): “fecit Unio sibi 
et Galliae Tyche / optimae coniugi”. The expression was so popular that it could be abbreviated to 
“C O B M” (= “coniugi optimae bene merenti”), e.g. CIL 9, 302. 
293 E.g. CIL 9, 265: “Clodio / Eutychi / T(iti) li{i}b(erto) bon(o)”; CLE 1216 (= CIL 6, 17622): “Fabiae 
Pyrallidi optimae / et sanctae patron(ae) / de se bene merit(ae) / Artemisius libertus”; 1248 (= CIL 
14, 2709): “M(arcus) Gellius Maximus Phoebo lib(erto) opt<i=U>m(o)”.  
294 CLE 15 (= CIL 6, 23137): “C(aius) Numitorius / Asclepiades / Mummia L(uci) l(iberta) / Zosima / 
h{e}is sunt duo / concordes / famaque bona / exsituq(ue) hones / felixs”. 
295 CLE 72 (= CIL 1, 1822). The poem is rendered in the first person singular, but it is unclear which of 
the four freedpersons mentioned in the praescriptum was supposed to be the speaker. The vagueness 
could have been intentional, implying that the sentiment of the carmen applied to all four of them. 
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greatly deserving it, Homonoea could no longer enjoy her own moral goodness (mulier 
dign/issima vita quaeque tuis / olim perfruerere bonis)296. And the wife of the imperial 
freedman Metrobius was happy to record that her husband had ruled (praefuit) over the 
island of Pandateria for a long time, where he enacted several provident laws 
(providaque in melius iura dedit populo)297. This exemplary behaviour was a consequence 
not only of his irreproachable loyalty, his unimpeachable honesty (inculpata fides 
innocuusque pudor) and his splendour (fulgor), but first and foremost of his righteous 
mind, which was full of goodness (plena bono mens aequa). All of these cases reveal an 
appropriation of the term bonus to describe freedpersons, but although they may to 
some extent reveal a desire to present oneself (or a loved one) as morally elevated, none 
of them convey the same meaning (or even have the same grammatical function) as the 
kind of “goodness” ascribed solely by and to elites. 
However, in other cases, it is precisely this elite practice that seems to have been 
appropriated. The pearl-trader Gaius Ateilius Euhodus, for example, explicitly identified 
himself as a good man (homo bonus)298. Perhaps even more explicit is the case of Lucius 
Annius Argeus (ille bonus), whose commemorator omits any noun when describing this 
freedman, thus mirroring the elite practice of rendering bonus itself as a “noun”299.  The 
imperial slave Nicodromus did precisely the same in the inscription he made for his 
“wife” Minicia Prima, whom he remembered as a pure and good woman (bona simplex), 
i.e. using bona as a noun (either next to or modified by simplex)300. Minicia was 
undoubtedly a freedwoman. Not only was Prima one of the most popular slave names, 
but even if she had originally been freeborn, she would have been reduced to freed 
status by the senatus consultum Claudianum of 52 CE301. Finally, even in a columbarium 
 
                                                     
296 CLE 995 (= CIL 6, 12652). 
297 CLE 1189 (= CIL 10, 6785). Pandateria lay off the coast of Campania, close to Naples. Successive 
emperors seem to have had a particular interest in the island, even preferring it as a destination for 
exiles, e.g. Tac. Ann. 14.63-4). This is no doubt the context in which to situate Metrobius’ function as 
overseer. D’Arms (1970), 78 plausibly suggested that the island was incorporated in the imperial 
domain already under Augustus. 
298 CLE 74 (= CIL 6, 9545). 
299 CLE 2161 (= CIL 6, 7541): “Hic cubat / ille bonus L(ucius) / Annius Argeus / Compsi l(ibertus) vix(it) 
a(nnos) LX”. 
300 CLE 1187 (= CIL 8, 12792): “a multis fletu renovaveris o bona simplex”. 
301 Scheidel (2011), 304 (including references). For the senatus consultum, see the references in 
Chapter 2. Hadrian at least partially revoked the measure (Gaius Inst. 1.84 only mentions the 
consequences for the children of the women thus reduced in status), but it was soon reintroduced 
and remained intact until Justinian permanently repealed it (Cod. Iust. 7.24). For a discussion of this 
evolution, see Westermann (1955), 148. Bücheler (1982) [1895-1930], II, 555 dates the inscription of 
Minicia Prima to the reign of Trajan, Hadrian or Antoninus. Lassère (1965), 215 suggests Nicodromus 
served in Carthage as a secretary of the annona (similarly dating the epitaph to the reign of Trajan, 
and thus in a period when the SC Claudianum was in full effect).  
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context – a relatively non-competitive sphere of commemoration302 – this discourse was 
appropriated. The inscription for certain Iulia Erotis, for example, describes her as an 
excellent woman (optima femina), albeit before accentuating her inferior position in a 
patronage network by referencing her patron303.  
In most of the instances mentioned above, no effort was made to downplay or 
conceal the deceased’s freed status, not even in cases of self-commemoration. However, 
concluding from this observation that “elles [expressions soulignant l'honorabilité de 
défunt] ne laissent jamais de doute sur le fait que c'est avant tout en rapport avec le 
patron que ces ‘vertus’ se sont manifestées” is premature at best304. The claim was made 
by Georges Fabre in his pioneering study on the private relation between patrons and 
their freedmen, but it is very much inspired (perhaps necessitated) by his general and 
rather pessimistic thesis that freedmen had no real individuality, and that their identity 
derived entirely from the relationship with their patron. In this line of reasoning, a 
derivative conclusion of Fabre was that “honos et decus à propos d'un affranchi, ne 
peuvent concerner que sa position par rapport au patron”. He supports this claim with a 
few examples: the children of the daughter (“Iulia”?) of a certain freedman Protus 
would constitute a great help and pride for Protus’ patron (patrono aux{s}ilium ac decus), 
and the freedwoman Eucharis’ devotion to her patroness was aborted by her sudden 
death (studium patronae cura amor laudes decus / silent ambusto corpore et leto tacent)305. In 
the first case, however, the auxilium and decus derived from Iulia’s children, who were 
second-generation freeborn (Iunia herself already being Quincti Ranci feilia). In the 
second case, the position of patronae in the sentence begs the question whether it 
modifies all five nouns, or only studium. The phrase can be taken to reference Eucharis’ 
zeal, care, love, praise, and grace towards her patroness, but studium patronae can also be 
taken apart, viz. as but one of the virtues for which the freedwoman is praised (i.e. “the 
zeal towards her patroness, her care, love, praise, and grace”)306.  
In both cases, of course, decus appears in (or near) the context of a patronage 
relation, but nothing warrants Fabre’s generalisation. Indeed, Eucharis’ rise to glory 
(gloria) had – at least in the epitaph’s rendering of her life – nothing to do with her 
 
                                                     
302 Borbonus (2014), passim (esp. 106ff).  
303 CLE 86 (= CIL 6, 5254). CLE 131 (= CIL 6, 18938) features the liberta Gavia as a femina prima, a claim 
supported by what must once have been a beautiful portrait of the (veiled) woman. 
304 Fabre (1981), 262. 
305 CLE 59 (= CIL 6, 25369); 55 (= CIL 6, 10096). 
306 In any case, considering patronae a genitive (so Fernández Martínez (1998-9), 109) is untenable. 
This would not only constitute a very abrupt change of subject – all the preceding verses focussed 
explicitly on Eucharis’ many qualities – but a patron(ess) exhibiting studium towards one of his/her 
freedpersons seems unlikely. Patronae is thus with relative certainty a dative (compare, for example, 
with Cic. Fam. 10.2.1: “meum studium honori tuo [Planco]”). 
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patroness, who is mentioned for the first time (and in another context) only 8 verses 
later307. Moreover, many other inscriptions indicate that the praise, glory, honour, etc. 
of freedpersons did not by definition derive from (and were at any rate not restricted 
to) the association with a patron. The poem for a certain Junia (Quinti liberta), made by 
her husband Gemellus (Luci libertus), was dedicated entirely to the deceased, without her 
patron even being mentioned or alluded to308. She was a beautiful young girl (formosa 
puella), an unavira, and for all eternity the “pride of all chaste women” (decus castarum). 
Junia, in other words, derived her honour from her qualities as a pious wife, not a 
freedwoman.  
Similarly, Valerius Aries’ studium and cura were directed towards the construction of 
his own funerary monument during his life, as he testifies in a very egocentric poem 
that does not reference his patron309. It were his own initiative and funds (monumentum 
apsolvi et impensa mea) that were responsible for making Aries one of the happy few who 
could safeguard their bones underneath an eternal testimony of character (amica / tellus 
ut det ho(s)pitium ossibus quod omnes / rogant sed felices impetrant). Aries deemed his zeal 
and care particularly honourable (egregium) and desirable (cupiendum), because the 
resulting monument would eventually become the ultimate sign of his innocence 
(innocentis signum / est maximum). The absence of his patron, moreover, is all the more 
conspicuous when Aries – at the end of the carmen – mentions that he had received the 
“light of freedom” (lux libertatis) at the very spot where now his monument is erected. 
Receiving freedom enabled this freedman to display the virtues of zealousness, honour, 
and innocence, but this acquisition is presented as a personal achievement, just like his 
many qualities derived not from his patron, but from his own innate character. 
Likewise, the parents of Ninnia Primilla may well have been ex-slaves, so she tells us 
herself in her epitaph, but they were of uncorrupted character (sum li/bertinis ego nata 
parentibus ambis / pauperibus censu moribus ingenuis)310. The apologetic contrast between 
libertinis and ingenuis stands out conspicuously (as it did in Zosimus’ case311), but instead 
of originating from the connection with their patron, the moral excellence of Primilla’s 
parents is presented as an intrinsic quality. The innocence (innocentia) of Vesonius 
Phileros too, was the essential trait to which he owed his acquittal in the legal case 
against his “friend” Orfellius Faustus (mentioned earlier), but which was recorded in an 
 
                                                     
307 CLE 55 (= CIL 6, 10096): “h{e}ic viridis aetas cum floreret artibus / crescente et aevo gloriam 
conscenderet / properavit hora tristis fatalis mea (…)”. 
308 CLE 1038 (= CIL 6, 14404). 
309 CLE 89 (= CIL 6, 9632). 
310 CLE 1125 (= CIL 9, 3358). 
311 Cf. notes 281 and 284 above: libertinus – nobilis. 
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inscription that focussed solely on his relation with this “friend”, entirely omitting his 
patroness Vesonia312.  
Despite the existence of all these attestations of “independent” or “innate” virtues 
freedpersons (or their close relatives) described themselves with, Fabre’s argument 
continues with the assertion that the term virtus itself is attested in relation to ex-slaves 
neither in literary nor in epigraphic sources313. It is well known indeed that elite 
literature avoided the term in such contexts, but once again, Fabre’s claim that this 
practice extended to the epigraphic realm is too rash314. The epitaph for Pomponia 
Eleusis, for example, mentions the “remarkable virtue of her mind”, which had 
endowed her with glory (Po/mponia Eleusis quae eximia / virtute animi peperit sib{e}i 
laudem)315. According to Fabre, this is the only epitaph referencing the virtus of a 
freedperson316. Not only is this claim factually incorrect (cf. infra), but he also sticks to 
his general thesis by downplaying the nature of this virtus. He argues that because it was 
Eleusis’ patron who had made the inscription, her virtue was reconfigured within this 
relationship. In fact, he reads in the inscription that the freedwoman had borne her 
patron six children, and that this was the reason for describing her as virtuous. Not only 
does this interpretation hinge entirely on the tentative restoration of a damaged 
passage at the beginning of the fifth line317, but it also assumes that this origin of her 
virtus somehow made it qualitatively different from that of a freeborn person. The 
assumption, however, is nowhere qualified. In fact, freeborn persons similarly and 
explicitly derived honor and laus from “virtuously” begetting a family of their own that 
would subsequently increase the fame of their ancestors and clan318.  
But even if we are to follow Fabre on all these points, his overall argument definitely 
crumbles in the face of other inscriptions that describe freedpersons’ virtus outside of 
the patronage relation. Indeed, what about Tiberius Claudius Primus, who in a true 
 
                                                     
312 AE 1964, 160. The omission of Vesonia is again all the more conspicuous because she is the central 
figure in both the inscription and the group of statues that featured above this particular epitaph 
(cf. supra). 
313 Fabre (1981), 262: “Relevons d'ailleurs, que le mot virtus n'est jamais utilisé ni dans l'une ni dans 
les autres sources que nous venons de rappeler [i.e. funerary inscriptions and Cicero’s works]”. 
314 McDonnell (2006) 159–60. Mouritsen (2011), 62 is more nuanced, making claims only for Cicero’s 
letters of recommendation. Generalisations, as always, disregard those instances (exceptional as 
they may be) in which virtus was attributed to freedmen, e.g. Cic. Cat. 4.16: “[homines libertini] qui 
sua virtute fortunam huius civitatis consecuti”.  
315 AE 1968, 142.  
316 Fabre (1981), 262 note 500. 
317 He reads “Se]x sibi praemeisit simili virtu[te] et amore”, but the editors of L’Année épigraphique, 
for example, restored it to “et sibi praemisit …” (AE 1968, 54). 
318 E.g. CIL 6, 1293 (the poem on Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Hispanus’ sarcophagus): “Virtutes generis 
mieis moribus accumulavi, progeniem genui, facta patris petiei. Maiorum optenui laudem, ut sibei 
me esse creatum laetentur; stirpem nobilitavit honor”. 
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Bourdieusian sense, desired to “transubstantiate” some of his symbolic capital into 
economic capital, in order to provide his deceased wife with a more impressive tomb: “If 
I had as much wealth as virtue and good spirit, I would have built a splendid tomb for 
you here” (si pro virtute et animo / fortunam habuissem magnificum mon<u=I>men/tum hic 
aedificassem tibi)319. Similarly, Sextus Iulius Felicissimus was not only honest (integer), 
harmless (innocuus), and of pious mind (pia mente), but also empowered by his own 
virtue (virtute potens)320. Although the inscription was set up by his patron – judging by 
his name “Felix”, also a freedman – these qualities are not framed in this patronage 
relation at all. Instead, they are linked – much like Felicissimus’ glory (gloria), and the 
praise (laus) and love (amor) he received from the people (populus) – to his professional 
prowess as a beautiful arena fighter, bear hunter, and member of an association of 
Iuvenes321.  
In conclusion, the rigid exclusivity of certain terms, qualities, and virtues discernible in 
elite literature (Chapter 7) is considerably relaxed in the funerary realm, where 
freedpersons (and even their elite patrons) adopted “noble” descriptions, and 
reconfigured them to suit a non-elite context. This practice reveals a high degree of 
initiative and agency in identity formation and (self-)representation on the part of ex-
slaves, but we should be careful not to construe any such endeavours as clear-cut 
attempts at presenting oneself as “noble” or “elite”, or, indeed, at awkwardly concealing 
loathed libertinitas. In fact, freed status or a subordinate position in a patronage 
relationship was never considered incompatible with the adaptation of “elite virtues”, 
and was, quite on the contrary, often highlighted in tandem. Moreover, on several 
occasions where such “elite virtues” were included, they were intended to mediate 
other identity dimensions that were manifestly non-elite (e.g. professional prowess). 
Rather than as attempts at “usurpation”, then, the practice should be considered as an 
expression of a dynamic process of social negotiation, in which even the elites 
themselves engaged – without transposing any such “proliferation” of elite exclusivity 
to their literary discourse. Indeed, as shown in Chapter 7, when Cicero called Dionysius 
a vir bonus, this expression was manifestly framed in a discursive context that allows 
even modern readers to detect its exceptional nature.  
 
                                                     
319 CLE 204 (= CIL 6, 15225). 
320 CLE 465 (= CIL 12, 533). 
321 For the Iuvenes associations, see Ginestet (1991); Kleijwegt (1994); Laes & Strubbe (2014), esp. 122-
33. Le Glay (1990), 629-30 argued that very few freedmen were members of these associations, but 
the claim is only superficially supported. Kleijwegt, id., 79, noted that “slaves and freedmen have 
been attested in numbers large enough to doubt whether membership was restricted only to the 
elite”. See also Laes & Strubbe, id., 125. 
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In short, the analysis of freedman socialisation as attested in carmina epigraphica 
confirms several of the arguments made in previous chapters (e.g. libertination as social 
capital, the patronage relation as but one of the loci for the expression of freedmen self-
appraisals, the servile past as an asset in accentuating social promotion, etc.). At the 
same time, it sheds light on freedmen’s bottom-up attempts to secure a place for 
themselves in Rome’s societal texture. Especially the latter observation constitutes a 
valuable complement and counterbalance to the impression obtained from either 
network embedded or detached literary sources. Although certainly not providing a 
transparent “window” on the beliefs and perceptions of freedmen, the inscribed poetry 
we inherited from this social group attests to the variety of strategies they had at their 
disposal to integrate any and every aspect of their identity – of which the servile past 
was but one of many options – in the display of their end-of-life achievements. As such, 
it does allow us to catch at least some glimpses of the “freedman’s perspective”.  
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General conclusions 
Throughout academic enquiry, there has been a shift from a paradigm that saw freed 
status as a state of continued slavery to a general effort of revisiting the agency and 
relative independence of freedmen. Underlying both approaches, however, has been the 
tenacious assumption that freedmen carried a pervasive “stain” as a constant reminder 
of their moral inferiority when compared to ingenui. Whereas early freedmen studies 
typically framed this assumption in a discourse of racial impurity and xenophobic 
reflexes, much more recent analyses postulated the existence of an omnipresent moral 
“servile” stain in the minds of the elites, lawgivers, and freedmen alike, thereby equally 
appropriating a primarily elite point of view. Put differently, the abandonment of one 
orthodoxy has given rise to another one, as scholars sought a way to provide an 
alternative all-encompassing framework in which to situate and study the Roman 
freedman’s disabilities and restrictions. Indeed, it is no coincidence that the notion of a 
macula servitutis was elevated as the catch phrase par excellence for Roman freedmen in a 
study that aspired to provide a general synthesis of the social condition of ex-slaves in the 
Roman world.  
In doing so, however, it made a significant methodological error. Surely, any modern 
study necessarily relies on labels and approaches to make and support an argument. 
Social capital, a Bourdieusian strategy of distinction, the public transcript of principled 
equality, or yet other theoretical notions used throughout this dissertation, are 
analytical concepts that do not claim to be more than just that: tools that provide a 
framework for interpretation, that in turn allow for an “emplotment” of the fragmented 
source material, but that can along every stage in the analysis be questioned, critiqued, 
and adjusted. The notion that an all-pervasive macula servitutis loomed large in the 
minds of both Roman elites and freedmen themselves, on the other hand, is structurally 
presented as the result of such an analytical process, rather than as a constituent of its 
underlying premise. The observation that the literal expression occurs in (a few) law 
texts is conveniently invoked to endow the claim with compelling authority, but our 
Chapter 2 unambiguously showed that it was in fact never the “tag” for the libertine 
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condition that it is often made out to be (as the overview of the arguments made in each 
separate chapter once more highlights, cf. infra). 
The danger of “projection” is always present in historical research, whether by the 
theoretical framework employed, by implicit comparison with other historical periods 
(e.g. US slavery), or by too literal or exclusive a reading of inherently biased sources. 
The most profound problem arises when the analytic framework itself is heavily inspired 
by, or entirely based on, such biased sources. It is notoriously difficult to break out of 
the self-confirming and predetermined “logical loop” such a framework produces. 
Observations that do not fit within it, are reconfigured to match it nonetheless, 
resulting in a problematic skewing of ancient reality. Explaining the agency of freedmen 
in the private sphere by a “suspension of the servile stigma”, by freedmen’s personae 
being “subsumed” into that of their patrons, or by these freedmen “exceptionally 
transcending” their moral inferiority in such contexts, are interpretations based 
entirely on an unquestioned premise, of which the problematic nature becomes clear 
immediately by the almost mystical transformations it implies. 
An essential attempt at deconstructing this framework was Petersen’s introduction of 
the notion “Trimalchio vision”, which analytically underpinned the often too easily 
ignored danger of using literary sources (and thus ideology) as a point of departure to 
analyse freedman socialisation. She argued that this framework tacitly encourages and 
condones “belittling or reductive comments about those outside elite circles”1. 
Certainly, Petersen’s warning was but an acknowledgement of insights that were 
already present in earlier scholarship, but by explicitly having it run like a red thread 
throughout her study on freedman art, she rightly elevated it to the structural position 
of importance it is due. In spite of these efforts, however, modern studies are not quite 
“liberated from Trimalchio’s grip”, especially when it comes to identifying the 
underlying causes of their disabilities in both the private and the public sphere. This 
dissertation has argued that the monolithic view of the Roman freedman’s identity as 
inherently tainted by a moral inferiority is a particularly tenacious remnant of this 
“Trimalchio vision”, which has structurally escaped revision because of the 
(predetermined) studies and interpretations that at first sight seem to confirm it. 
Surely, studies like that of Tran, Joshel, Carroll, and others – typically focussing on 
epigraphical rather than literary sources – have to some degree weakened the existence 
of any encompassing framework to situate (and study) Roman ex-slaves in. They all 
considered the funerary realm as indicative of the diverse strategies available to 
freedmen to construe alternative (“multiple”) identities. But even such approaches have 
as implicit point of departure that these strategies were instrumental primarily in 
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mediating legal status, viz. the primary identity dimension that allegedly loomed large 
in all spheres of the freedman’s private life. It comes as no surprise, then, that even 
these studies occasionally resort to a discourse of general stigmatisation as the 
background against which personal agency was always and inescapably accentuated2. 
Because this preoccupation with legal status is very much an elite perspective, it can 
rightly be considered an expression of “Trimalchio vision”. It is for that reason that this 
study focussed in many different ways on libertinitas as an asset, rather than as a liability 
that almost necessarily needed to be mediated or counterbalanced. 
 
* 
Central to our endeavour was a constant appreciation of the distinction between 
“network embedded” sources and “detached” ones. The former – arguably more 
revealing of the everyday context in which the interaction between freed and freeborn 
took place – unmistakably elucidate the role of libertinitas in accentuating social capital, 
whereas the latter employed libertinitas primarily as a meta-narrative instrument in the 
attempt to accentuate elite exclusivity. It was observed repeatedly that arguments in 
favour of an all-encompassing servile stain derived either from a reductive focus on the 
latter source type, or from adopting an elite perspective by singling out freedmen as a 
literary category that is somehow representative for the lived experiences of freedmen 
in network embedded contexts. 
Throughout this study, we therefore conceptualised a heuristic quadrant in which all 
sources on freedmen could be situated, and of which the axes indicate “authorship” and 
“readership” respectively. Most letters in the three letter collections we drew from, 
were written by the elites, and were originally intended for a very limited “in-group”, 
although editorial intervention somewhat distorted this latter aspect (in various 
degrees). This interference was, however, much less outspoken in Cicero’s 
correspondence, which was – if not more spontaneous – at the very least more 
“authentic” when compared to Pliny’s (Chapter 3). Moreover, the letters were always 
intended to be read qua letters, and as such structurally differ from “detached” 
discourse. Besides its relative extensiveness and its large amount of freedmen 
attestations, these were our main reasons to focus in particular on Cicero’s 
correspondence in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. In short, the “readership” dimension of these 
letters was their most attractive feature for our purpose. Evidently, the elite context 
(“authorship”) in which they were written greatly determined the specific aspects of 
freedmen socialisation touched upon in these documents, which is why we did not so 
much focus on their actual content, but rather on their discursive rendering, and on the 
 
                                                     
2 E.g. Joshel (1992), 32, 60, 134; Tran (2006), 125; Carroll (2006), 146, 242. 
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para-textual implications of, for example, libertination use (Chapter 4). In this sense 
also, our analysis greatly diverged from the ingrained habit of using Roman letters – or 
rather, some of the famous passages that have over time become a semi-canonical set of 
references – in a very isolated and scattered way to support highly specialised aspects of 
freedmen’s social, economic, or cultural life. As an alternative, our approach was much 
more “holistic”, treating the “epistolary freedman” (rather than any single individual 
manifestation) as the main subject of enquiry, and focussing in particular on the 
discursive strategies of representation. 
Whereas letters were valuable particularly for the (private) “readership” aspect, but 
less for their (elite) “authorship” dimension, the exact opposite was true for our 
collection of metric epitaphs, which thus provided an opportunity to reconstruct the 
“freedman’s perspective” (Chapter 8). Composed as they were by freedmen (though 
certainly not in all cases), we were able to catch a glimpse of the identity dimensions 
freedmen themselves valued, and of the way they presented these. However, we 
repeatedly highlighted several caveats related to the fact that these carmina – like all 
epigraphic texts – were intended to appeal to a very wide range of readers, and thus 
strongly adhered to the “public transcript”. This limited the extent to which these texts 
could be seen as “true” or “authentic” reflections of real freedpersons’ opinions and 
thoughts, although the fact that they nonetheless originated from members of the lower 
strata made them a valuable complement to the letter corpora. Indeed, inscriptions may 
not give us a more authentic image of the freedman’s perspective, but monumental 
writing did constitute the arena in which an original appropriation, moulding, and 
stretching of conventions could take place. In short, although both letters and carmina 
were network embedded, they were also situated at the other end of each of our axes 
(“readership” and “authorship”).  
Chapter 6 discussed the other two remaining combinations of “readership” and 
“authorship”. The works of Tacitus and Suetonius served as a representation of 
documents that were written from an elite perspective, and that were intended to be 
read by a broader audience. Once again, the novelty of our approach consisted in 
structurally analysing the “detached freedman” in a general way, rather than singling 
out isolated passages (although the latter was done on occasion to qualify certain trends 
of freedman representation). It was in particular the exhaustive prosopographical Table 
of freedmen in these works that facilitated this endeavour (Appendices 5 and 6). The 
final square of our quadrant would typically have contained documents that 
represented the freedman’s perspective (“authorship”), and that were written for a 
trusted in-group (“readership”). As is the case for any non-elite group in Roman society, 
however, such sources are particularly hard to come by. The most obvious and 
interesting examples would be letters written by freedmen, or attestations of 
freedmen’s “direct speech” in private contexts. But as we noted in a first section of 
Chapter 6, the only remnants of these (e.g. Charilas’ letter to Fronto, Timarchides’ letter 
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to Apronius, the direct speech of imperial freedmen in Tacitus’ works, or Tiro’s 
expression quoted by Cicero) are typically embedded in either elite letters or in 
detached discourse, which in both cases fundamentally re-contextualised their actual 
content and tone. Especially when compared with the other three quadrants – 
represented in this study by Cicero’s letters (elite authorship – in-group readership), 
detached historical works (elite authorship – broad readership), and carmina epigraphica 
(“freed” authorship – broad readership) – this fourth one (“freed” authorship – in-group 
readership) thus necessarily remains underappreciated.  
We accentuated throughout the study that all four fields in the quadrant (and the 
unique representations of freedmen that derive from each of them) provide different 
windows on the same ancient reality, and that any enquiry into freedmen socialisation 
that claims some kind of representative value has to consider and integrate all of them 
to a certain extent. Indeed, serious misconceptions (of which “Trimalchio vision” is a 
contextualised expression) result from (implicitly) approaching one quadrant through 
the “glasses” of another, or – and  this is arguably the methodological fallacy of the 
macula servitutis framework – any quadrants through the “glasses” provided by only (or 
mainly) one of them. These observations are of course true for all historical studies, but 
they are especially relevant for freedmen studies, as this macula framework is a 
particularly troublesome instance of such reductive approach.  
Besides Chapters 1 and 3 – expounding the general theoretical framework and 
highlighting, quantitatively and qualitatively, the role and function of freedmen in 
Roman correspondences – each Chapter of this dissertation adopted a unique 
perspective to rehabilitate the distinct importance of context (network embeddedness 
versus detachedness) and heuristic nature of our source material (the quadrant of 
“authorship” and “readership”) to establish to what extent a servile past impacted the 
lives of Roman freedmen. 
 
* 
Chapter 2 presented in very general terms the central thesis of this dissertation, and 
introduced several arguments that would be elaborated upon in further detail 
throughout the subsequent chapters. Its main aim was to expound the entire raison 
d’être of this study, by highlighting both the pervasiveness of the macula framework, and 
the circular and predetermined analyses it occasionally facilitates in modern enquiry 
(2.1). A second section adopted an “emic” approach, by scrutinising the actual evidence 
for the claim that a “stain of slavery” was a notion that captured the freedman’s 
condition in the ancient world (2.2). It concluded that neither the literary nor the 
epigraphic record contains any trace of this expression (or similar ones), and that on the 
very rare occasions where it is attested in law texts, it explicitly refers to the servile 
condition, without there being any insinuation that this taint would continue to exist 
after manumission. Evidently, the observation that ancient writers did not use 
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expressions like macula servitutis, labes servitutis, naevus servitutis, etc., does not ipso facto 
mean that the underlying social stigma did not exist. It is for that very reason that 
subsequent chapters embraced methodologies derived from critical discourse analysis 
to penetrate the sub-textual meanings of varied samples of literary and epigraphic 
source material.  
In this second chapter in particular, this approach was foreshadowed by gauging the 
extent to which “stains” of any kind (including a “servile” one) could either be cleansed, 
or would remain as a perpetual mark on the individual thus tainted (2.3). Its preliminary 
conclusion was that even if a stigma was incurred (cases of prostitutes, Iunian Latins, 
corrupt commanders, infames, etc. were touched upon), it was never considered absolute 
or pertinent. In all these cases, there were clear-cut ways to (at least legally, but also 
socially) cleanse such marks – even if they were at least rhetorically related to slavery –, 
be it by the lapse of time, by exemplary behaviour, etc. Moreover, the fact that a macula 
servitutis is nowhere attested as an expression to capture the (legal) condition of 
freedmen, foreshadows the conclusions of Chapter 7, which argued that the notion of a 
“stratifying” or even “stigmatising” freedman discourse has no basis in our source 
material, and that it stems almost entirely from unquestioned assumptions related to 
the macula framework (cf. infra). The conclusion of this part of the chapter was that the 
expression “macula servitutis” is an arguably anachronistic misnomer, and that its use 
in modern studies as the common denominator for all freedmen’s social condition is not 
only symptomatic for its underlying assumptions, but that it is also in itself 
demonstrably misguided. 
Another goal of this chapter was to assess the inconsistencies inherent in the macula 
framework (2.4). The central argument was that formal legal status always preceded and 
trumped any moral “stigma” as a stratifying tool. Formal punishments (e.g. infamia) or 
rewards (e.g. the ius anulorum) reveal that on the surface, privileges and restrictions 
could be artificially revoked or granted, but these interventions did not change the 
underlying legal status of the individuals in question3. The macula servitutis framework 
argues that it is an assumed moral inferiority – imposed on an entire legal class – that 
prevented freedmen from obtaining public office, and that this inferiority derived from 
servile treatment. However, people who were a priori qualified to enter the ordo 
decurionum were not prevented from doing so after an ostentatious servile treatment 
(flogging). Moreover, the explicit creation of the category of freed dediticii by Augustus 
would – by accentuating these individuals’ manifest servile treatment – at the same 
 
                                                     
3 Exceptions were, of course, the highly extraordinary measures of restitutio natalium or the senatus 
consultum Claudianum of 52 CE, which did in fact (artificially) change the legal status of their 
beneficiaries and victims respectively. 
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time distinguish them from the other categories of freedmen that were by definition not 
tainted in this manner (Iunian Latins and citizens optimo iure).  
Much more in line with the nature of the disabilities of freedmen, it was argued, is 
the proposition that it was the patronage relationship that de facto or formally 
prevented freedmen from joining the army, obtaining public office, or that restricted 
their inheritance rights and limited the impact of their vote. Both these private and 
public restrictions thus resulted from a preoccupation with preventing freedmen from 
rising to positions where they could exert formal power over their former owners, 
especially in contexts where no legal framework existed that formally denied them 
access to either army or public office (i.e. prior to the lex Visellia of 24 CE). This centrality 
of the patronage relationship in the discourse and ideology related to freedmen has 
been recurrently accentuated throughout the subsequent chapters. 
One of the most pervasive corollaries of the macula framework – although increasingly 
nuanced in recent studies – is the belief that libertination served as a stigmatising 
reminder to a freedman’s servile past, or to frame him in a position of “dependence” or 
even “inferiority” in relation to his patron. This ingrained assumption was revisited in 
Chapter 4, which centred around the discursive strategies Cicero and his 
correspondents employed to represent freedmen. As shown in section 4.2, this tacitly 
assumed notion looms large in the debates about epigraphic libertination (e.g. the 
assessment of the legal status of incerti, the assumption that adopted freedmen 
preferred filiation over libertination in their epitaphs, etc.). A more neutral explanation 
for the use of literary libertination was considered, viz. that its inclusion was a mere 
functional (“identifying”) habit of letter-writers, but it was observed (4.3) that this 
interpretation too does not account for the many instances where libertination was 
included in, for example, letters addressed to the  freedman’s own patron, or letters that 
formed part of a wider exchange in which libertination had been consistently omitted. 
By adopting an explicitly holistic approach to the freedmen attestations in Cicero’s 
correspondence (facilitated by our prosopographical database in Appendix 2), we 
revealed a strong correlation – in both quantitative and qualitative terms – between 
libertination, a trust context, and a discursive connection to a patron. We first limited 
our scope by opting for a detailed case study of couriers and messengers (4.4.1-3), but 
later extrapolated the results to Cicero’s (and his correspondents’), as well as Pliny’s and 
Fronto’s use of libertination in general (4.4.4-5).  
The main conclusion of the chapter was that libertinitas (and its discursive expression 
by the employment of libertination) was an inherent asset in the social practice of letter 
writing. It was one of the most effective means to accentuate trustworthiness and social 
capital, reflecting the crucial nodal function of freedmen in the networks of their 
patrons. This was a strategy eagerly employed in network embedded contexts, where 
spatial distance, misunderstanding, interception, or misinformation could have had 
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impactful repercussions on a trust network (4.3). This function of libertination can be 
occasionally discerned also in detached sources (6.3-4), although in these documents, 
the instrumentality of libertination in serving meta-narratives and processes of 
distinction features much more prominently (cf. infra). Finally, freedmen themselves 
benefited from the social capital and “network control” libertinitas reflected and 
generated (as guaranteeing trustworthiness in interactions with third parties), that is, if 
Timarchides’ practice of introducing himself as accensus (and thus libertus) of Verres in 
his letter to Apronius is any indication (cf. the overview of Chapter 6 below).  
Chapter 5 elaborated on the previous one by arguing that the triadic intertwinement of 
libertination, trustworthiness, and a patronage relationship was not a stratifying or 
stigmatising tool (i.e. somehow framing the freedman in a perverse conundrum that 
indissolubly linked his paths to virtue to a perpetual subservience and surrender to 
“patronal guidance”), as it is often made out to be from a macula servitutis point of view. 
A first aim of the chapter was to confirm the observations made in the previous one 
(especially the existence of this triadic intertwinement) by focussing on the specific 
epistolary genre of recommendation. An underlying preoccupation throughout the 
chapter was to avoid the traditional pitfall of reading such letters through the “glasses” 
used to interpret the more detached meta-narratives (cf. supra). For example, the often 
tacitly assumed notion that freedmen recommendations differed in essence from 
recommendations of ingenui because they allegedly endorsed essentially different people, 
was nuanced by drawing attention to several problematic arguments that are often 
invoked in support of it. The assumption of a “specific set of virtues” (treated in further 
detail in Chapter 7) was briefly touched upon insofar as it related to letters of 
recommendation in particular (5.3.1), as was the assumption that “libertine” 
recommendations differed structurally from others (5.3.2). Neither argument was found 
to have compelling footing in the source material, and we suggested that the already 
considerable variation in the very limited amount of freedmen recommendations 
precludes any conclusion as to either the uniformity, or the uniqueness of freedman 
recommendations (i.e. when compared to recommendations of ingenui).  
The main objective of the chapter, however, was to reassess the ingrained notion that 
accentuating libertinitas (and thus libertination) was the only way in which freedmen’s 
trustworthiness could be praised or recommended (cf. also Chapter 7). We dispelled this 
premise by fully appreciating the performative function of the letters (5.3.3). We noted 
that libertination was – especially in contexts of recommendation – a highly effective 
means to propagate social capital and trustworthiness because of its instrumentality in 
guaranteeing “dyadic” and “network” control. However, this close integration in the 
networks of a patron served a purpose very similar to the accentuation of upward ties in 
patronage relations between freeborn individuals, since social capital was an asset 
coveted by all social groups, regardless of their (legal) background. We observed how in 
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these latter instances too, the invocation of a vouching (pseudo-)patron served a very 
similar purpose as the mention of a freedman’s patron. In neither of these cases was 
subservience or hierarchical inferiority considered a shameful trait – quite on the 
contrary. Moreover, when alternative identity dimensions (deemed more salient, 
appealing, or efficient than embeddedness in a patronage relation) were available to 
accentuate the virtue and value of a freedman, these were eagerly invoked, sometimes 
even rendering entirely redundant any focus on a patron (or at least greatly 
overshadowing his presence). In short, the patronage relationship provided 
recommendation writers with a very good argument in favour of a freedman’s 
trustworthiness, but it was not the only possible argument, nor was this strategy used 
solely when recommending freedmen. Similarly, libertination was a pragmatic asset 
rather than a liability or stratifying “tool” in these highly network embedded contexts. 
As noted earlier, Chapter 6 shifted attention towards two other fields in our heuristic 
quadrant. A first part focussed on the rare occasions where we can discern freedmen 
“speaking” for themselves (6.1). We briefly touched on the well-known fact that the 
very few extant products of freedmen’s literary activity in no way shed any light on 
their authors’ experiences as freedmen, or on the integration of their servile past in 
their identity formation as free men (6.1.1). Instead (and in sharp contrast with the 
situation in, for example, 19th century America), these documents typically adopt, 
reproduce, and thereby consolidate the slave-owners’ discourse, thereby bearing 
remarkable testimony to the unparalleled possibilities of integration in Rome’s societal 
texture available to ex-slaves, as well as to an essential socialisation strategy by which a 
position as (potential) master or patron is invoked to mediate one’s own servile past 
(attested also in epigraphic sources, cf. Chapter 8). We expanded the scope to include 
attestations of freedmen’s “direct speech” in elite literature, but concluded that – 
intriguing as these may be – they were always re-contextualised by the (elite) narrative 
in which they featured, and often served to rhetorically support the veracity of the 
author’s claim (6.1.2). Nonetheless, especially the deconstruction of Timarchides’ 
“letter” (noted above) showed how freedmen would draw from the very same para-
textual strategies we observed in Cicero’s correspondence, in order to advertise their 
own social capital (e.g. a self-representation as accensus or libertus to accentuate 
trustworthiness). In their personal correspondences too, then, libertinitas and a 
connection to a patron were considered an asset rather than a liability; something 
worth stressing rather than hiding (6.1.3). In short, the “speaking freedman” in elite 
literature clearly betrays socialising strategies also discerned in elite letters, but the 
distortion by either a meta-narrative of moral decay or an explicit (forensic) desire to 
incriminate the freedman in question greatly tarnished the representative value of 
these passages.  
 534 
A more extensive second part of the chapter (6.2) therefore shifted attention from 
trying to recover the freedman’s voice, to demonstrating in greater detail that the 
representation of ex-slaves by the Roman historians – often considered definite proof of 
a general servile taint on freedmen – was inspired mainly by such meta-narrative 
concerns. This section thus treated the field of our quadrant that contains “detached” 
elite sources (“authorship”) intended for wider dissemination (“readership”), which we 
defined earlier as documents that were produced and published in non-communicative 
and non-networking contexts. Their writers were typically less preoccupied with 
concerns related to potential repercussions on personal networks. As such, these texts 
much more profoundly allowed for the imposition of a meta-narrative, whereby 
interpretations of individual expressions of this social reality served to “naturalise” 
both a broader (“detached”) literary representation, and the stereotypes and ideological 
beliefs that underlie it. On a more pragmatic level, Tacitus and Suetonius were singled 
out as proxies because their narratives explicitly claimed veracity (whereas the extent 
to which, for example, satire writers were exaggerating, satirising, or “truthfully” 
representing reality is never made explicit). One of the essential novelties of this part of 
the chapter, was that it – like Chapters 4 and 5 – was based on an exhaustive database of 
freedmen mentions (Appendices 5 and 6), and as such again allowed for a “holistic” 
assessment of the discursive representation of freedmen in the historical narratives, 
rather than merely isolating passages to answer specific questions of freedman 
socialisation. 
Two brief subsections provided a general overview of the amount and evaluation of 
freedmen in these works (6.2.2), and a comparison between the two authors in this 
regard (6.2.3). A very manifest communal feature was the focus on imperial freedmen, 
rather than on private ones (contrary to Cicero’s correspondence). Closely related to 
this was the observation that especially these ex-slaves served as a template to condemn 
or praise respective emperors with, and that a meta-narrative of moral decay and 
decline of (senatorial) freedom under the emperors prompted an overall negative 
assessment (6.2.1). We observed how the contradictory nature of a freedman’s 
obligations (respectful obedience to a patron and assertive exploitation of the beneficium 
of freedom and often citizenship) allowed the historians to single out the aspect of this 
condition that best suited their argument or narrative in each distinct context (6.2.4). It 
is no coincidence that the most recurrent attacks against freedmen centre around either 
their ingratia or their (perceived attempts at) usurpation, each of which is precisely the 
vice associated with (not adhering to) both of these respective obligations. The main 
conclusion of this section was that individual freedmen’s character, behaviour, and 
actions were manifestly moulded and re-contextualised to suit the historian’s pre-set 
agenda. Indeed, stripped from the structural emplotment imposed by the meta-
narrative, the bare action statements that thus remain (as well as the function of, for 
instance, libertination and the patronage relationship by which they are discursively 
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rendered) are very much in line with the impression of freedman-patron interaction 
provided by embedded sources (6.3.1).  
A final section of the chapter (6.4) focussed – by means of detailed case study – on a 
hitherto under-accentuated aspect of the literary representation of freedmen, viz. the 
use of libertinus instead of libertus to denote them. This earlier lack of attention was 
naturally due to the fact that libertinus only very exceptionally (twice) occurs in Cicero’s 
correspondence. The discussion confirmed the previous observation that the historians 
talk about the body of freedmen much more often than the letter-writers, precisely 
because they used it in a very general (“detached”) sense as the representation par 
excellence of moral decay and decline of freedom (and as accentuating them not only as a 
threat to the elites, but to the “natural order” of society at large). When the historians 
talk about libertini, they do not so much talk about individual freedmen in embedded 
contexts, but about a contextualised representation of an abstract category that suited 
both their attempts at distinction, and their meta-narrative of moral decay. Each 
libertus, in other words, was but an expression of the iconic template of the usurping 
libertinus, who was in turn a stereotype based essentially on the role imperial freedmen 
played in the household of their patron. Because of this connection, individual actions 
of freedmen were almost automatically reconfigured, leading to a vicious cycle of 
pejorative interpretation, that became more and more detached from empirical 
observation. 
The main conclusion of the chapter, in short, was that derogative sneers to, and 
general condemnation of, freedmen were predetermined confirmations of an a priori 
established meta-narrative, which derived in essence from a rhetorical generalisation of 
individual cases of “usurping” or “morally depraved” imperial freedmen to the class of 
libertini as a whole. Such generalisations were in turn (and dialectically) instrumental in 
“recognising”, confirming, and “naturalising” this meta-narrative, by representing 
individual freedmen as an expression of this “general truth”. As a “detached” rhetorical 
practice, however, such generalisations should not be seen so much as indications of an 
all-pervasive and omnipresent moral deficiency a priori attributed to any freedman in 
contexts outside these meta-narratives, but rather as a literary tool that – much like the 
metaphor of slavery in general (cf. Chapter 2) – served to support the central theme of 
the author’s work.  
Parallel to the previous focus on the use of libertination (Chapters 4-6), Chapter 7 again 
served primarily to nuance the notion of an all-pervasive belief that a moral taint 
remained indissolubly attached to the freedman after manumission, but this time by 
critically revisiting the thorny issue of a “specific set of virtues” to praise freedmen 
with, and the notion of a “freedman discourse” in more general terms. The assumption 
is one of the most tenacious tenets of the macula framework, and as such a particular 
pervasive one even in very recent scholarship, as several paragraphs in earlier chapters 
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already noted in passing. This tenaciousness derives from the expectation that moral 
inferiority has to be somehow discursively reflected. The unquestioned premise, 
however, regularly leads to both methodological and analytical flaws, as our explicit 
engagement with the recent works of Mouritsen and MacLean has revealed (7.1-2). 
An initial attempt at reconfiguring the debate centred around the case study of Tiro’s 
phrase valetudini fideliter inserviendo (7.3.1), and focussed primarily on the “language of 
slavery” the Cicerones allegedly used in their letters to Tiro. A second case study was 
Cicero’s description of Dionysius in Att. 7.4.1 (7.3.2), which provided the framework for a 
discourse analytical approach that combined the methodologies proposed by Corpus 
Linguistics and “lexis selection” (7.3.2.1). Indeed, whereas in both 7.3.1 and in 7.3.2 the 
point of departure for an in-depth and quite extensive lexical analysis was an epistolary 
passage, the scope was now enlarged to include a representative sample of other 
literary genres as well. It singled out five virtues that have been almost unanimously 
considered as part of a traditional “libertine” praise. This assumption derives mainly 
from the discursive setting in which Cicero rendered them (i.e. in opposition with the 
typically “elevated” characterisation bonus vir), a setting which has barely ever received 
any critical assessment in its own right, as a consequence of the apparent confirmation 
it provides for the existence of a libertine set of virtues (and, in extenso, of an inherent 
taint on freedmen). 
An essential point repeatedly raised throughout this chapter, however, is that the 
existence of a set of values reserved for the appraisal of ingenui (and especially high 
elites) does not ipso facto confirm the existence of contrasting and typically “libertine” 
virtues. The former was a proven strategy in these elites’ attempts at distinguishing 
themselves – in a “Bourdieusian way” – from the “other”, viz. by accentuating unique 
features (presented as) unattainable for sub-elites. The claim that it was directed solely 
against freedmen, is a result only of biased premises related to “servile inferiority”, 
rather than of any structural comparison with sub-elite groups in general. We 
conceptualised one “path to glory” available only to the freeborn (elites), and another 
one that was more generally accessible to all strata of society (including these very 
elites, freedmen, and freeborn members of the lower classes). Unwarrantedly opposing 
these, and ignoring the similarities between freedmen and other lower classes by 
focussing solely on the former, may lead to the conclusion of a “distinct set of virtues” 
or a “freedman discourse”, but such conclusion is highly predetermined.  
We therefore ended the chapter by firmly embedding the conclusions of our lexical 
analysis (that neither a specific set of values, nor a distinct vocabulary or discourse was 
ever reserved solely or primarily for freedmen) in our theoretical framework of 
transcript theory (7.4). The section proposed the (at first sight paradoxical) symbiosis of 
a transcript of principled equality (“free men and citizens”) with a discourse of 
distinction (“non-elites”), as a much more nuanced approach to freedman socialisation 
than the common denominator macula servitutis implies. It was argued that too strong 
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(and exclusive) a focus on detached literary sources disproportionately accentuated the 
second element (“distinction”), and that the macula servitutis framework moreover 
attributed these sneers to a presumed moral inferiority of all ex-slaves, instead of to a 
general preoccupation with the discrimina ordinum (and in particular the safeguarding of 
patronal rights). 
Only when the freedman is isolated as an object of elite distinction (a particularly 
pervasive instance of “Trimalchio vision”) – without adequately realising that he is 
thereby “detached” from the network embedded context in which his actions and 
behaviour were fundamentally rooted – can the assumption of a specific discourse on 
freedmen be maintained. Such conclusions, however, typically suffer from the above 
mentioned fallacy of equating the existence of “elite virtues” with what is a priori 
assumed to be a logical consequence, namely the existence of “libertine” virtues. They 
ignore the fact that the former were a tool of general distinction, and that the latter 
were in fact virtues attributed to all kinds of people, regardless of legal status. 
The eighth and final chapter focussed on a selection of carmina epigraphica, both 
centralising the “freedman’s perspective” and reiterating several of the arguments 
made in previous chapters. We extensively expounded the theoretical and 
methodological caveats related to the fact that epigraphy typically adhered to the 
public transcript (8.2), and that recurrent uncertainties regarding authorship of 
epitaphs often preclude straightforward conclusions about freedmen socialisation (8.3). 
By analytically separating three identity dimensions (libertinitas, family, and profession), 
we were able to assess both the relative importance of each (in extended verse epitaphs, 
that is), but also the ways in which they were often combined, depending on a variety of 
contextual factors (8.5.1). Section 8.5.2 focussed in particular on the accentuation of 
freed status by freedmen themselves (firmly taking into account potential skewing as a 
consequence of patronal authorship). We identified several ways in which this was 
done, each potentially providing insights into the reasons for a specific choice. Indeed, 
there are marked differences between, for instance, publicising freed status merely in a 
standardised praescriptum (by the abbreviation “L”), drawing attention to a fully spelled 
out libertus within a carmen, or explicitly elaborating on a servile past throughout 
several verses. We noted that the inclusion of explicit status markers like libertus or 
patronus were often (though certainly not exclusively) included in poems composed by 
the freedpersons’ patrons, whereas a more elaborate account of the reception of 
freedom or of general social promotion was accentuated primarily in epitaphs made by 
the freedpersons themselves. In these latter cases, moreover, patronal presence was 
downplayed (or entirely omitted) in order to focus on personal merit and achievement. 
Put differently, a connection to a patron was sometimes deemed worth stressing, but it 
was never considered the only option for publicising virtue. As such, these conclusions 
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were in line with the ones of Chapter 4 and 5 (i.e. the analyses of the other network 
embedded sources). 
A corollary of these observations was that libertinitas itself was never an identity 
dimension that needed to be “hidden” as a consequence of a heartfelt “shame”. We 
noted – adopting a more statistical point of view – that familial relations or professional 
prowess did not serve to “compensate” or to draw attention away from freed status. 
Moreover, it was similarly argued that the omission of freed status in roughly two-
thirds or our epitaphs was not so much a reflection of embarrassment, but rather of the 
limited salience of this identity dimension in the daily life of ex-slaves. Indeed, the same 
crooked logic would imply that occupation likewise was a source of shame (it is included 
on even fewer occasions than a reference to freed status). Such interpretations – as 
noted in greater detail in Chapter 2 – are a consequence of the adaptation of a typically 
“detached” elite perspective, and were as such structurally avoided throughout this 
chapter. 
A third section (8.5.3) focussed in greater detail on the role that dedication and 
subservience to a patron played in a freedperson’s self-representation in metric 
epitaphs. As noted in Chapter 5 (to which this section is closely related), these identity 
dimensions have often been “recognised” by scholars as the primary virtues from which 
ex-slaves derived their sense of self, and via which they could aspire to glory otherwise 
denied by restrictions in public life. We observed, however, that in most cases where 
they were explicitly accentuated, it was a consequence of the patron being the 
dedicator. Moreover, these patrons had often been slaves themselves, confirming our 
earlier conclusion that conspicuously referencing (the loyalty of) one’s own dependents 
was an often resorted to strategy to compensate for one’s own subordination. In other 
words, these (freed) patrons thus imposed themselves as the protagonists of the 
inscriptions. Once again, we stumbled upon the vital necessity of accounting for 
authorship when analysing freedmen’s epitaphs. This is not to say that poems made by 
freedmen themselves as a rule omitted a reference to their patron. Indeed, and as noted 
above, this framework could provide the context for accentuating virtue. The essential 
point we made throughout this section, however, was that it was anything but the only 
one. It should be clear at any rate, that whenever a freedman or a patron chose to either 
mention or omit libertination or embeddedness in a patronage relation, it was not a 
consideration inspired by any kind of pervasive moral taint on ex-slaves. Instead, it was 
a result of the always contextual practice of assessing and balancing salient identity 
dimensions, which cannot be reduced to a monolithic model of “shame” or a “stain of 
slavery”. As such, this impression is very much in line with the central role of the 
patronage relation in the restrictions and disabilities in the freedman’s public life (cf. 
Chapter 2). 
Section 8.6 focussed in more detail on the question whether there are traces in the 
epigraphic record of any generally held belief that freedmen suffered from a moral taint 
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in the eyes of society at large. It argued that freedmen employed a variety of strategies 
to endow their biography with a sense of continuity that transcended the mere legal 
rupture that was manumission. Freedmen gladly accentuated their servile past if it was 
instrumental in, for example, commemorating a particular bond of friendship that had 
its roots in slavery. On other occasions, a servile past was accentuated to draw attention 
to the social promotion that ensued from it. In yet other instances, references to a 
servile past were omitted entirely, focussing only on end-of-life achievements related to 
familial pride or occupational prowess. Allusions to one’s region of origin (especially 
when combined with a mention that the deceased’s body was returned to and buried in 
it) similarly had the effect of framing the life course in a narrative that downplayed the 
period of slavery or the impact of manumission, although we should be careful not to 
interpret this as a specific desire resulting from a “shameful memory”. The great variety 
of strategies observed throughout this section (highlighted by the three case studies 
situated at the end of it), once more warned us against using monolithic models to 
interpret these representations, and highlight the contextual motivations in either 
including or omitting a reference to the servile past.  
A final section (8.7) reiterated several points raised in Chapter 7, as it gauged to what 
extent any specific “discourse” or “set of virtues” is discernible in freepersons’ metric 
epitaphs. Whereas Chapter 7 – focussing on elite literature – argued that a specific set of 
virtues was reserved for the elites, but that the existence of a status-related discourse of 
freedmen could not be concluded from this observation (quite on the contrary), this 
section focussed on the ways freedmen contextually and originally appropriated and 
mediated aspects of this “elite set of qualities”. In doing so, it further nuanced the 
unwarranted isolation of freedmen as a social category that was discursively and 
rhetorically separated from the freeborn outside, which generally derives from a 
narrow focus on detached sources.  
 
* 
In short, this study has focussed not so much on freedpersons per se, but rather on the 
concept of libertinitas, and on its instrumentality in the processes of identity formation 
and socialisation of ex-slaves. By adopting an outspoken focus on representation and 
discourse (as both reflecting and construing lived experience), it approached the subject 
matter from a point of view markedly different than a more traditional focus on social 
and legal hierarchies. As such, it deliberately avoided any attempt at construing yet 
another overarching model of either Roman society as a whole, or of “the” position of 
“the” freedman within it. In fact, scholars who have tried to establish such models have 
typically struggled with the question as to which place (wealthy) freedmen should 
occupy. Some models proposed a bipolar distinction between “elites” (typically the 
three highest ordines) and “non-elites”, whereas others preferred a three-tier 
conception that usually postulates the existence of some kind of “middle class” in 
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between the “elites” and the lower plebs4. In all of them, however, the category of 
(wealthy) freedmen notoriously defied any attempt at rigid classification. Rather than 
assuming that such models should be used as a point of departure for analysis, our 
deliberate focus on representation and discourse was framed in a dynamic framework 
that situated any interaction between freed and freeborn on a scale with “principled 
equality” on the one hand, and “elite distinction” and “protection of patronal rights and 
dignity” on the other.  
The interplay of these seemingly contradictory tendencies may come across as 
paradoxical at first, but it should be remembered that a very similar symbiosis marked 
the socialisation of the body of citizens in general terms. Indeed, this body was never 
homogenous and equal in every respect; equality (sharing a same “point of departure”) 
was never the same as equity (sharing a same “outcome”)5. Legal and ideological 
equality did not erase differences in rank, wealth, influence, ancestry, merit, etc., which 
were invoked by the discourse of distinction as factors justly mediating principled 
equality, and as such reflecting the “natural differences that are bound to exist between 
people”6. Or to paraphrase George Orwell: all citizens were equal, but some were more 
equal than others7. 
Rather than yet another monolithic “orthodoxy”, the symbiosis of these three 
archetypical socialisation processes results in a dynamic interpretative perspective, 
which allows for contextual differentiation (as its application on our heuristic quadrant 
throughout this study has repeatedly revealed), but which, most importantly, presents 
itself as an analytical tool, rather than an ancient reality. As such, the flexibility and 
adaptability of this approach, it is argued, constitutes an improvement over the macula 
servitutis framework and its general imposition of the “stigma” or “moral taint” 
template on processes of freedmen socialisation in both the private and the public 
sphere.  
 
 
                                                     
4 Alföldy (1988) and Jongman (1988), esp. 279-91 are the most influential examples of the former 
model; Veyne (1961), 231 and Christ (1980), esp. 218ff of the latter. 
5 Wiseman (1971), 65ff. 
6 Koops (2013), 105. For the many different factors mediating social status, see e.g. Wikander (1993) 
(ancestry); Kühnert (1990) (class membership); Corbeill (2007) (education); Andreau (1982), 108; 
(1999), passim (e.g. p. 2); Finley (1973), 53-5 (financial and economic enterprise). For the assumed 
“natural differences between people”, see Cic. Rep. 1.53; Plin. Ep. 9.5.3. Cf. Wirszubski (1968), 1-2; 
Arena (2006); Mouritsen (2011), 66. 
7 Orwell (1945), 126. 
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